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PREFACE 
THE loss of life and the expenditure of money incurred 
by the self-governing Dominions in the prosecution of 
a war in whose inception they had and could have no · 
responsibility have brought into prominence the question 
of the possibility of so revising the relations of the several 
parts of the Empire as to prevent a recurrence of the 
anomaly. The demand for closer unity is insistent, but 
the difficulties of any federal system, as the foremost 
authority on th~ English constitution, my friend, 
Professor A. V. Dicey, has recently shown, in the Intro-
duction to the last edition of the Law of the Constitution, 
are both numerous and formidable. 
The view that the self-governing Dominions are sister 
nations of the United Kingdom has bee11 expressed both 
by Mr. Lyttelton and Mr. A. J. Balfour, but neither 
rhetoric nor philosophy must blind us to law and fact. 
Doubtless, equality and fraternity are the ideals to be 
aimed at, but the mode of their realization is the funda-
mental problem of Imperial relations at the present day. 
The Dominions have been, and still are, dependencies 
of the United Kingdom : but the system of colonial 
autonomy, with which the name of Sir Wilfrid Laurier 
will in history be honourably associated, has brought 
them to a degree of power and prosperity which bids 
us believe with Sir Robert Borden that their national 
consciousness will not be satisfied indefinitely with 
• 
8 IMPERIAL UNITY AND THE DOMINIONS 
a subordinate position in the Empire. Two paths · are 
open for this development of nationhood : in the first 
place, the Dominions may be encouraged to attain 
complete independence and to become units of inter-
national law, in the hope that they will enter first into 
alliance and later into federation with the United King-
dom ; in this case the unity of the Empire will be broken 
up in the hope of the achievement of greater unity in 
days to come. In the second place, there may be devised 
some plan by which the Dominions may share with the 
United Kingdom the control of foreign policy and take 
their definite share in the defence of the Empire ; this 
course has the obvious advantage that the unity of the 
Empire suffers no breach, and no violent change of any 
kind is needed to bring it about, but the difficulties of 
devising a practical system are serious and must not 
be underestimated. Nor can their solution be a matter 
of rapid action ; patience is essential for the evolution 
of an imperial constitution, nor in any final solution 
will the position of India and the Crown Colonies be 
ignored. 
No attempt is made in this book to suggest any final 
solution of a problem so great and so dependent on the 
change of circumstance. It is its aim to set out, in 
Part I, the actual facts regarding the limitation of the 
autonomy of the self-governing Dominions, and to 
suggest in what matters these limitations might be 
relaxed in favour of the Dominions, while in Part II 
are set out some considerations affecting the possible 
modes in which Imperial unity can be attained. In 
view of the fact that the history of responsible govern-
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ment up to 1911 has been given in my Responsible 
Government in the Dominions, the subject-matter of 
Part I has been in the main drawn from the events of 
the last four years, which have been years of high 
· importance in the development of self-government. 
One word of explanation may be given in regard to 
the terminology employed. ' Self-governing Dominions' 
or more shortly ' Dominions ' is the technical term, 
first invented at the Colonial Conference of 1907, for the 
aggregate of the five colonies possessing responsible 
government Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, 
New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, and New-
foundland. ' Crown Colonies ' denotes all the colonies 
which do not possess responsible government, and which 
therefore are under the control of the Crown as regards 
their executive government. The term has unfortunately 
in recent years been abandoned as a collective term by 
the Colonial Office out of a wish to defer to the ill-
informed desire of some West Indian communities to 
avoid the use of a title which in their opinion denotes 
that their legislatures are controlled by the Secretary 
of State for the Colonies ; their opinion is wholly 
unhistorical, and it may be hoped that in course of 
time the historical expression will prevail over the 
monstrosity of ' colonies not possessing responsible 
government ', which has been coined to replace it. To 
the use of the adjective 'colonial' it may be trusted that 
no exception will be taken, since it has been endorsed 
by the action of Mr. Bonar Law, who is not merely 
Secretary of State for the Colonies but is proud to have 
been born in the Dominion par excellence . 
• 
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Freedom from the restrictions of an official position 
has enabled me to express more freely my views on 
the actions of both Dominion and Imperial Ministries. 
The press assumption that in every controversy between 
the Dominion and Imperial Governments the latter is 
invariably wrong does more credit to the chivalry of 
the United Kingdom than to its historical judgement, 
but such complaisance is inadmissible in a serious 
discussion. 
For assistance in the preparation of this work I am 
indebted to my wife. 
A. BERRIEDALE KEITH. 
N ove1nber, 1915. 
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INTRODUCTION 
THE immediate cause of the origin of responsible govern-
ment in the British Dominions was the outbreak of rebellion 
in Canada, which convinced the Imperial Government of the 
day that the system of government then in force in that 
Colony had ceased to serve even t .he elementary purpose of 
maintaining public order. It became clear that some form 
of administration must be devised which would obviate the 
recurrence of rebellion in close proximity to the frontier of 
a power which might without much injustice be suspected 
of being not unwilling to see the disappearance of mon-
archical government from the American continent ; but it 
was not less certain that the form chosen must be such as 
to obviate any possibility of the separation of the Colony 
from the mother country, a contingency which from the 
period of the War of American Independence was always 
painfully present to the minds of those responsible for the 
conduct of colonial affairs. The solution then adopted, in 
large meaS'ure at the instigation of Lord Durham, was to 
leave to the colonists, to the greatest extent possible, the 
control of those affairs which could properly be described 
as local, while reserving control in those matters which 
could be held to affect the Empire as a whole. To con-
cede full responsible government was, Lord John Russell 
argued, impossible, if it was meant by this that the 
Government of the Colony · should be at liberty to manage 
all the affairs of the country in the same unfettered . manner 
as the affairs of the United Kingdom were managed by 
the Imperial Ministry, for that Ministry could not permit 
disloyalty to flourish in the country as it had done in 
Lower Canada under Papineau; but nevertheless it was 
possible to allow the affairs of the Colony to be managed 
for the most part by the Governor as representative 
\ 
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of the Imperial Government on the advice of those who 
could command a majority in the elected House of the 
Legislature. 
True to the compromise to which it owes its origin, respon-
sible government has always, throughout its history of three-
quarters of a century, exhibited the character of a qualified 
freedom. Unquestionably the history of its operation has 
always tended in one and the same direction : restrictions 
which originally were enforced .and considered of importance 
have gradually been allo1ved to lapse, as public opinion in 
the colonies became more articulate in favour of freedom 
from control, or public feeling in the mother country 
recognized that there had ceased to be sufficient reason for 
the exercise of that control. In this development both 
· colonial impatience of restraint and Colonial Office reluc-
tance to exercise it co-operated : colonial statesmen might 
consider that Imperial statesmen were unduly tenacious of 
rights of supervision, but it is doubtful if, with the possible 
exception of Lord Carnarvon, there was in the nineteenth 
century any Secretary of State for the Colonies who did not 
accept and endeavour to follow the principles laid down for 
himself by Earl Grey, that the interference of the Home 
Government in the affairs of the colonies should be exercised 
as rarely as possible, and that when exercised it should, 
whenever possible, be restricted to the form of advice. 
Nor was this attitude at all surprising : the great distance 
of the important colonies, with the exception of Canada, 
rendered any effort at control singularly difficult and 
· troublesome, and the great majority of holders of the office 
of Secretary of State were men who, whatever their interests, 
were not anxious to create troubles for themselves in 
colonial problems, finding sufficient scope for their energies 
in those difficulties which presented themselves unasked. 
Nor in any account of the influences which favoured the 
development of freedom from restraint should mention be 
omitted of the influence on Secretaries of State of the 
permanent officials of the Colonial Office : their education 
and training, especially before the system of open com-
• 
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petition was applied to the recruitment of the office, were 
not such as to encourage qualities of mind which made for 
interference in what could be left alone, and this attitude 
of laissez faire, which was in harmony with the spirit of the 
period when responsible government grew to maturity, was 
undoubtedly the cause why so much liberty was attained 
by the colonies with, comparatively speaking, so little 
friction. 
From the beginning of responsible government it was 
clearly recognized that the relaxation of the bonds of union 
between the colonies and the United Kingdom must suggest 
the final solution of the connexion between them and the 
mother country. On the one hand, it was pointed out, 
the colonies might well desire to obtain complete freedom 
and to enjoy the rank of independent nations subject to no 
external control : the mere bond of loyalty to a common 
sovereign would not avail when in a few generations the 
memory of the place of origin had come to an end, and 
still less in cases where no such common origin had ever 
/ 
existed. On the other hand, experience sho:wed that 
colonial troubles were the chief causes of foreign difficulties 
endangering the United Kingdom, which would do well to 
cast from its neck the millstones of the wretched colonies 
and let them fight their own battles.1 To this argument 
a reply fro~ the side of the colonies was soon adduced in the _ 
statement that, so far from the United Kingdom running 
risk of foreign wars through the possession of colonies, it 
was the colonies which ran risfks of invasion through their 
connexion with the United Kingdom, which involved them 
in t,he danger of war provo~ed by European combinations 
in which they had no interest. · Thus in the period before 
confederation in Canada the Imperial Government endea-
, 
voured to convince Canada that she was under obligation 
to m~e every effort to provide for her own defence, since 
it was through Canadian interests that any danger of 
conflict with the United States would arise, while the 
1 See the quotations from Sir J. Stephen, H. Merivale, Sir F. Rogers. 
Disraeli, and others, in J. S. Ewart, Kingdom Papers, i. 32-44. 
... 
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Canadian Government persisted in the view that, while 
anxious to do anything possible to aid in the defence of 
the Empire, Canada could not but expect that the main 
burden of expenditure would be undertaken by the United 
Kingdom, since it was merely through her connexion with 
that kingdom that Canada ran any risk of war. Neither 
contention, either then or now,1 can be regarded as being 
strictly correct. The connexion between Canada and the 
United Kingdom undoubtedly, even in the case of the 
United States, involved dangers for Canada : the irritation 
felt in the United States over the sympathy which it was 
thought England manifested for the Confederate States in 
the War of Secession naturally turned the eyes of many 
Americans to the possibility of accomplishing the policy set 
before the States in 1812 of uniting Canada with the rest of 
the northern portion of North America by force of arms 
if not by the simpler method of purchase. Some thirty 
years later the militant attitude of the United States over 
the question of the Venezuela boundary might have pro-
voked a less pacific power than the United Kingdom to 
enter upon a struggle in which Canada would have been 
exposed to the greatest danger. If the war· with the Boer 
republics, though technically involving Canada in hostilities, 
did not and could not in itself bring any risk of injury to . 
Canada, the s~me cannot be said of the great war of 1914. 
But on the other hand must be set the fact that for many 
years Anglo-American relations were rendered difficult and 
every now and then dangerous owing to the fishery questions 
affecting Canada and Newfoundland, questions in which the 
United Kingdom had not the slightest direct interest. 
From the termination of the reciprocity treaty with the 
United States in 1866 until the conclusion of the Treaty of 
Washington in 1871 there was constant risk that the efforts 
made by the British Government to protect the Canadian 
fisheries from encroachment by American fishermen would 
result in war, and the termination of the provisions of that 
treaty in 1885 marked the beginning of a fresh period of 
1 Kingdom Papers, i. 311. 
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difficulty, which was enhanced by the claim put forward 
by the United States on the strength of inheritance from 
Russia to dominion over the Behring Sea. Sir Charles 
Tupper, then High Commissioner for Canada, records in 
his account 1 of the efforts -made by him to secure action 
by the British Government that he warned Lord Salisbury 
in 1890 that, if prompt action were not taken to prevent 
the United States carrying out its threat to seize ships 
flying the British flag when catching seals in the Behring Sea, 
Canada could only come to the conclusion that the British 
flag was not strong enough to protect her. The result was 
that the British Ambassador was instructed to inform the 
Secretary of State of the United States that if the British 
flag was interfered with the United ~tates must be prepared 
for the consequences, and in deference to this warning 
immediate orders were sent to the United States cruisers 
' 
not to carry out the instructions to seize British vessels 
which had been given to them. The Behring Sea question 
was finally disposed of by the arbitration at Paris in 1893, 
but the older fishery question revived itself in 1906 when 
the Newfoundland Government made an unwise effort to 
secure the ratification by the United States of the com-
mercial convention negotiated in 1902 2 by Sir Robert Bond 
· with Mr. J. Hay, the United States Secretary of State, by 
adopting a policy of insisting on the rigid enforcement of 
the treaty of 1818 regarding the rights of the United States 
fishermen in the Newfoundland fisheries. Fortunately the 
good -sense of the United States Government and the 
resolve of the Imperial Government to secure a reasonable 
settlement prevented matters drifting so far as happened 
in 1890, but it was not until the arbitration of 1910 3 that 
the fishery question received, if not a final settlement, at 
least so much definition as renders it almost impossible that 
it should ever again present the possibility of danger of 
hostilities between the two countries. 
Even in the case of Canada, however, the balance of 
1 Recollections of Sixty Years, pp. 209, 210. 
2 See Parl. Pap., Cd. 3262. 3 Ibid., Cd. 5396 and 6450. I 
1874 B 
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advantage can be shown to have been clearly on the side 
of the Dominion. The greatness of Canada lies in the fact 
that the whole of the North American continent north of 
latitude 49°, with the unimportant exception of Alaska, 
is united under one supreme Government, and this could 
never have been effected except through the protection of 
the United Kingdom, which prevented the American occu-
pation of the west and of British Columbia, secured the 
addition to the Dominion of the North-West an.d of Rupert's 
Land, and thus opened the way to the creation of a new 
and powerful nation. The same consideration applies in 
even greater force to Australia and ·New Zealand, whose 
long and slow growth to national stature, still far from 
complete, has been rendered possible only by the power 
of the United Kingdom, which has preserved for both lands, 
which their scanty population could not have held for 
a moment against any invader. It is the habit to lay 
stress on the failures in policy of statesmen of the past and 
to emphasize errors made by them, such as the unsatis-
factory boundaries of Eastern Canada, the fishery rights of 
Americans and French in Canada and ,Newfoundland, and 
the presence of other foreign nations in the Pacific. It 
would perhaps be more just if less interesting to l~y stress 
on their great achievements in preserving for the Empire 
all the lands of first-rate importance : all the possessions 
of foreign powers in the Pacific which might by any process 
· of reasoning be considered as having fallen to these powers 
through any negligence of British statesmen could not 
compare in value for a moment with the island of Tasmania. 
Even in South Africa, in which the disadvantages of British 
administration have revealed themselves far more fully 
than in any other part of her dominions, due recognition 
must be accorded to the statesmanlike policy of conciliation 
which has after much tribulation produced a Union in 
which it may be believed in due course conflicting ideals 
may yet be reconciled, a view encouraged by the over-
whelming defeat of the Nationalists in the general election 
of October 1915. 
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There are other important advantages which have been 
derived by the self-governing Dominions from the connexion 
with the United Kingdom. Apart from the possibility of 
development in security from external influences which is 
the chief boon conferred by British control, these countries 
have profited by the free use of British capital, in some 
cases assisted by guarantees of government loans by the 
Imperial Parliament, by a steady stream of British immi-
gration, and by the protection afforded in foreign countries 
to the persons and interests of British subjects of Colonial 
origin by the diplomatic and consular officers of the United 
Kingdom. In the first two cases the advantage derived has 
been mutual: the Colonies have paid the interest on the 
loans contracted by them, the emigrants have flourished 
and benefited themselves, and indeed often those whom 
they left in the mother country. But that a benefit is 
mutual does not alter the fact that it is advantageous, and 
while precision of valuation is impossible, it is quite certain 
that neither loans nor population would have been forth-
coming from the United Kingdom in equal measure and on 
equal terms to countries not under the British Crown. 
In the case of the advantages conferred by the use of the 
diplomatic and consular service and of in the last resort 
the authority and power of the United Kingdom the gain 
must be considered as being wholly on the one side. The 
people of .... l\.ustralia, New Zealand, Canada, Newfoundland, 
and South Africa have thus enjoyed in China, in the Turkish 
Dominions, in Morocco, in Siam, and in Persia the valuable 
exterritorial privileges assured to British subjects, privileges 
which as independent powers they could hardly have won 
for themselves, while in the rest of the world the repre-
sentatives of the United Kingdom have in matters great 
and small, in questions of trade and of personal liberty, 
vindicated with constant vigilance the rights of British 
subjects of Colonial origin.1 The wrongs of Canadian 
sailors in Uruguay and of a shipping firm of New South 
Wales in the Marshall Islands have been redressed as 
1 See Mr. Borden's speech in Canadian House of Commons, Dec. 5, 1912. 
B2 
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effectively as any grievances of British subjects pertaining 
to the United Kingdom, and the whole cost of the diplomatic 
and ·consular services has been borne by the Government 
of the United Kingdom, without complaint or hesitation. 
It wO,uld of course be idle 'to pretend that the advantage , 
of the connexion of the Colonies with the United Kingdom 
' 
has been all on the one side. It has been clear gain to the 
latter to have a fair field for investment and for emigration 
in lands which are under the British Crown. It has always 
been a cause for national pride that the United Kingdom 
has colonies in number and extent far superior to that of 
any other country and that the British Empire is the 
greatest known to history, and if this was the 9ase in the 
_.days when it was believed that in time of stress no military 
aid could be expected from the Colonies, the feeling has 
been greatly intensified by the decision of the Dominions 
-in the case of the Boer War and in far greater measure in 
the case of the European War to aid the mother country 
·with all their resources and power. It was indeed not 
believed by any sane statesman that the stress of a European 
.war would reveal any flaw in the unity of the Empire; 
the conception that the British Dominions would seize the 
opportunity of a ·· struggle involving the existence or at 
least the independence of the mother country to declare 
. themselves independent was a chimera ~hich could be 
hatched only in a disordered brain, but it was legitimate 
to feel doubt how far these Dominions would feel them-
selves bound to take active part in a war which was brought 
on without consultation with them being possible and under 
conditions which they inevitably could hardly completely 
realize. The analogy of the Boer War was clearly not · 
conclusive. In that case the feeling of the Dominions had 
been attracted to the support of the Uitlanders in the 
South African Republic, many of whom were of Colonial 
origin. The long drawn out negotiations had been followed 
by them with care, and the struggle assumed in · their eyes 
an effort to secure constitutional liberties on reasonable 
terms. Moreover~ the war appeared to have been deliber-
• 
' 
• 
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ately forced on the British Government by the republics at 
a time when the British preparations for war were quite 
incomplete, and when war was not desired by the British 
people or Government. The jealousy of foreign powers was 
observed, and it was felt just and proper to assist fellow 
colonists in South Africa when the Cape and Natal w~re. 
invaded by enemy forces. Nor can it be overlooked ~hat 
to many of those who volunteered the conflict afforded 
prospects of excitement and enterprise welcome to the bold 
and hardy characters of young Canadians, Australians, and 
New Zealanders. In point of fact events showed that the 
Dominions realized the seriousness of the issues in the 
European War, and recognizing that liberty and democracy 
were on their trial, responded to the need by organizing 
with all seriousness and earnestness forces on a scale wholly 
unexpected alike by the British people and by the enemies 
of the allied powers. 
The response of the Dominions at the hour of greatest 
peril may be deemed su:f.ficient answer to the theory that 
the Dominions seek independence of the mother country 
and desire to set themselves up as independent nations. 
The difficulti~s in the way of such ambitions are obvious 
and important, even assuming, as it can doubtless be safely 
assumed, that the United Kingdom would not seek to deny 
independence to any Dominion which deliberately decided 
that such independence was desirable, after the whole 
question had been submitted to the free ju·dgement of the 
electorate under a democratic franchise. In the case of 
the Australasian Dominions, the presence of a great power 
of the first rank with a large population and no large avail-
able territories for that population to occupy would compel 
an independent Australia to rely for security upon an 
alliance with one or other of the only powers whose aid 
could possibly preserve the country from annexation in 
whole or part, the United Kingdom and the United States 
of America. Alliance with the United Kingdo'm after 
a declaration of independence would only be procured on 
terms which would be at least as onerous as the form er 
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connexion under a common Crown, and despite the wave 
of enthusiasm which passed through Australia on the 
occasion of the visit of the United States fleet in its famous 
cruise to Japan, it would be rash in the extreme, as is clearly 
recognized in the Commonwealth, to assume that the great 
republic would for no obvious advantage to itself undertake 
the grave task of defending a distant ally whose territory 
is singularly open to attack and whose resources are still 
comparatively undeveloped. The independence of New 
Zealand and South Africa would of course be still less 
capable of defence. With Canada matters are different, 
for commercial considerations present great possibilities of 
advantage from the union of the Dominion with the United 
States, and the fact that the establishment of close recipro-
city between the two countries might result in annexation 
was recognized in 1891 b·y no less cool a judgement than 
that of the Hon. Edward Blake, ·when he found himself 
unable to persist in the policy of the Liberal party in Canada 
in favour of close trade connexions with the United States.1 
Twenty years later the same issue divided Canada into two 
hostile camps, and a scheme of reciprocity resulted in the 
defeat by an overwhelming majority of a Government which 
had seemed perfectly secure of office, and which in its 
general policy had certainly never shown itself deficient 
in sense of Imperial obligation. It appears clear, therefore, 
that the destiny of Canada, despite the great influx of 
American citizens to take advantage of its wealth in farm 
lands, does not point to absorption in the great republic, 
nor is it certain that the ideal of su·ch absorption is loQked 
upon in the United States with as much favour as at an 
earlier date, partly no doubt because any attempt to 
assimilate so vast an accession of territory might alter 
beyond recognition the fundamental divisions of American 
party politics. 
But if independence is not the ideal of responsible states-
men in any Dominion, and if dreams of independence are 
only vaguely held here and there among isolated units of 
1 Cf. Sir C. Tupper, Recollections of Sixty Years, pp. 304 seq. 
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the population of these Dominions, it is a different thing 
with the growth of national feeling in the Dominions. 
The rise of such a feeling was quite inevitable and in every 
way desirable: it was present in germ from the beginning 
of self-government, but it has come to fuller development 
only since the people of the Dominions realized that national 
development was only possible under conditions showing 
national spirit. It was unquestionably right that in the 
early days of her history Canada should devote her resources 
to providing means of transport to unite the east and west 
of the Dominion rather than to equipping armed forces on 
land and on sea, and that Australia should bend its efforts 
to subjugating nature rather than to pr~viding the fleet 
without which her coasts would be overrun by others desirous 
of sharing the potential riches of the country. But the 
scanty resources which rendered this policy desirable and 
right were not compatible with that self-reliance which 
must characterize a real nation. There is on record a 
striking recognition of this fact in the report of certain 
members of the Victorian Royal Commission on federation 
in 1870.1 It was there pointed out that the Colony of 
Victoria and the other Australian Colonies were in many 
respects separate States connected only by a personal tie 
with the United Kingdom, with parlia,mentary institutions 
of their own, with an executive entirely of local appointment 
with the exception of the Governor, with separate revenues, 
and even with separate armed forces, and it was suggested 
that the grant by the Crown of the power of making inde-
pendent treaties was all that was required to set the Colonies 
up as independent States united to the United Kingdom 
only by the possession of a common Sovereign in a relation 
analogous to that which formerly existed between the 
Ionian Islands and the British Crown. But the framers of 
these proposals, who included Sir G. Berry and Sir Gavan 
Duffy, were evidently conscious that the armed forces which 
the Colonies possessed were not of the character suitable to 
the protection of an independent nation, for they pinned 
1 See Responsible Government, iii. 1155. 
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their faith on the recognition of their neutrality which they 
hoped, from the hurp.anity shown by the great powers in the 
adoption of rules forbidding privateering and protecting 
private property at sea, would readily be accorded by these 
powers. The naive faith shown thus in treaties is only 
equalled in absu:rdity by the further proposal that the 
' 
adoption of t ·his attitude would not in any way pr~vent 
the Colonies from coming to the aid of the mother country 
if she were attac.ked, such aid possessing all the greater 
value because of . their being independent States. It is 
hardly surprising that nothing further came of this re·mar;k-
able exposition of international law. 
The situation is now changed when Australia, New 
Zealand, and Canada have forces which cannot be regarded 
on any theory as negligible and when Australia possesses 
the nucleus of an effective Navy in place of the old gun-
boats which constituted the naval defence possessed by the 
Australian Colonies in 1870. Countries which have the 
power to supply themselves with effective protection or 
even with substantial protection may justly claim that they 
have outgrown a Colonial status, may resent the phrase 
' our Colonies ' used fondly of the Dominions by the 
average inhabitant of the United Kingdom, may insist that 
the title Dominion or Commonwealth should be replaced 
by Kingdom, and may even seek to compel the abandon-
ment of the term Colonial as applied to self-governing 
possessions or, more properly, countries. The eradication of 
the adjective Colonial from the English speech is doubtless 
impossible, but it is common ground with all responsible 
statesmen that all possible steps must be taken to further 
the national life within the Empire of the self-governing 
Dominions. Nor is it doubtful that this end is to be 
obtained in one way only, the encouragement of the greatest 
autonomy in self-government coupled with the creation of 
closer bonds of union between the several parts of the 
Empire as a whole. The first part of this proposition is 
self-evident : any check to the growth in self-reliance of the 
peoples of the Dominions would be a calamity ; but the 
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second part is not less indisputable. No Dominion could 
possibly by whatever extension of its national life be as 
great as the . British Empire ; even if Canada poss~sses 
the most highly educated, the most hardworking and the 
most intelligent of the people of the world, nevertheless in 
organic connexion with forty-five millions in the United 
Kingdom and five millions in Australia they may hope to 
reach yet a higher destiny than can await them as Canadians 
only. Canada herself and the Commonwealth represent 
aggregates of independent units, nor can any one doubt that 
the life of Canada and the Commonwealth is fuller and 
better than that of the units from which they have emerged 
could have been: even five years have done not a little 
to broaden the outlook of South Africa, and the difficulties 
of the task should not make us despair of any solution for 
the problem of the self-governing portions of the British 
Empire other than the loose alliance which some believe is 
all that is possibl~. But the attainment of true organic 
unity for so great an Empire and so diverse elements scat-
tered widely in space is a task far exceeding that of any 
federation yet accomplished, and it may well be that the 
form which ultimately will be evolved will be one which 
has no existing parallel. 
In the meantime it is certain that the efforts of statesmen 
must be bent on removing as far as is practicable all grounds 
of friction between the several parts of the Empire; and 
on promoting unity of sentiment and action upon common 
problems. These questions must present themselves for 
partial solution as far as may be practicable under existing 
circumstances at the next Imperial Conference, and it is 
therefore of interest to consider in the first place what are 
the existing limitations of the independence· of the self-
governing Dominions and in what degree they can be 
relaxed without injury to the framework of Empire, and 
in the second place what means there exist of effecting 
a closer union between the several parts of ·the Empire. 
• 
J 
PART I. THE LIMITATIONS OF THE 
AUTONOMY OF THE DOMINIONS 
A. THE GOVERNOR 
CHAPTER I 
THE APPOINTMENT OF THE GOVERNOR 
IN all Colonies of the Empire the rule is observed that 
the appointment of the head of the executive government 
is vested in the Crown. It is recognized that while the 
executive government must be vested in the Crown, never-
thel~ss it cannot normally be exercised by the Sovereign 
in person, and must be carried on by a representative, 
styled Governor-General in the case of federations and 
Governor in the case of unitary Dominions and of the 
Australian States, which preserve within the federation of 
the Commonwealth a certain independence. This fact en-
titles them to a position superior to that of the provinces 
of Canada or the Union of South Africa, which is indeed in 
essence a unitary Government, though some appearance of 
federal institutions has been preserved. In the case of the 
federations and the Union, which owe their existence to the 
action of Parliament alone, the power of the Crown to 
appoint a Governor-General rests upon the express provisions 
of the constitution Acts: in the case of the unitary Dominions 
and the States of Australia the office of Governor is indeed 
recognized by 'Dominion statutes, but it is created by 
Letters Patent under the Great Seal of the United Kingdom, 
and the actions of the Governor are regulated by these 
Letters Patent and by the Instructions under the Signet 
and Sign Manual which are issued along with the Letters 
Patent. · Even in the case of the federations and the Union, 
• 
THE APPOINTMENT OF THE GOVERNOR 27 
similar instruments have been issued in supplement of 
the bare authority of appointment contained in the Acts 
creating the constitutions. The actual individual officer 
is appointed to the post of Governor-General or Governor 
by a Commission under the Sign Manual and Signet, which 
serves as the authority for the swearing in of the new 
officer in s.upersession of the old commission. 
In m~king the appointment of a Governor by which 
term a Governor-General may conveniently 1 be included-
the Crown must naturally act on the advice of the Imperial 
Ministry of the day. There is, of course, no legal necessity 
that this should be the case, but it is a maxim of the British 
constitution that any act of Government in the British 
Islands carried out by the Crown must be authorized by 
the responsibility of a minister, and thus in all cases of 
appointment responsibility is assu.med in the first instance 
by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and in the second 
place by the Cabinet and Prime Minister for the time being. 
Formally this responsibility is indicated by the counter-
signature of the Governor's commission by the Secretary 
of State, and in practice a Secretary of State may be called 
upon to defend the selection of a Governor which on his 
advice the Crown has seen fit to make ; as for instance in 
1913 when the appointment of Sir W. Ellison Macartney 
was challenged on his selection for the Governorship of 
Tasmania on the ground that he had been at one time an 
Orangeman and would therefore not prove acceptable to 
the Roman Catholic elements in the State. Practically, 
of course, the appointment is not made on the sole authority 
of the Secretary of State : appointments to important 
Governments are matters in which the Prime Minister must 
be expected to take a certain direct interest, and it is an 
acknowledged part of ~he royal prerogative that no person 
should be submitted for appointment as a representative 
of the Crown whose appointment would be distasteful to 
the Sovereign. Nor is it doubtful that the Ministry of the 
day would give all possible consideration to any suggestion 
1 So in Canadian Statutes the Governor in Council is used. 
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for the filling of · an important post which might be made 
by the Crown, the selection of men for the highest posts in 
the Dominions being obviously a matter in which the judge-
ment of the King would have peculiar value. 
The question naturally presented itself at a comparatively 
early date whether the power of choice could not be shared 
in some degree by the Colonial Government. The matter 
was definitely raised in a somewhat acute form by the 
decision of the 'Imperial Government in- 1888 to appoint 
as Governor of Queensland a distinguished officer, Sir Henry 
Blake, who had just served a period as Governor of New-
foundland.1 The feeling in Queensland ran at that moment 
somewhat high; the late Governor, Sir Anthony Musgrave, 
whose distinction had been won in Crown Colonies and who 
was not familiar with the niceties of responsible government, 
had thought it his duty to exercise a personal discretion 
in a case of the proposed exercise of the prerogative of mercy. 
The exercise of this discretion was formally permitted by 
the royal instructions then in force, nor in all probability 
was the discretion of the Governor at fault ; there is nothing 
more difficult than the due exercise of the prerogative of 
mercy in a small community, when everything tends to 
bring pressure on ministers to remit penalties which, how-
ever just, are offensive to the majority or even a considerable 
. minority of the people in the locality in which the offence 
was commit_ted or the criminal lives. The .Ministry of the 
day resigned, and as there was no Imperial interest involved, 
it was impossible to maintain the action _ of the Governor, 
whose death followed shortly after. It was not unnatural 
in all the circumstances that the Queensland Government 
should have been anxious to secure a man of long experience 
in self-governing Colonies, and at the same time South 
Australia approached the Secretary of State for the Colonies 
with the request that the Government might be informed in 
confidence of the name of the .officer proposed as the next 
Governor so that if necessary any objection might be taken 
to the proposed appointment before it was formally made. 
1 See Parl. Pap., C. 582$ . 
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The Parliament of New South Wales a little later enunciated 
the view that any future Governor of that Colony should be 
a man of parliamentary experience in the United Kingdom. 
The Secretary of State for the Colonies persisted, however, 
in the view that much as he would like to share the wor:k of 
choice of a suitable Governor with the Colonial Governments 
the task was one which was impartible ; if a Governor were 
in any sense the no'minee of a Colonial Ministry he might 
be held to have lost his claim to be impartial, especially 
in the very delicate matter of exercising the right of the 
Governor to grant or refuse a request for a dissolution of 
Parliament; moreover, a Governor had duties to perform 
not merely as head of the Colonial Government but also as 
an Imperial Officer, and the Secretary of State must, there-
fore, remain responsible for the selection. The claim that 
colonies should receive Governors with parliamentary 
experience was noted, but it was pointed out that in point 
of fact it would be difficult to induce men with such experi-
ence to give up their careers at home for the sake of Governor-
ships, and stress was laid on the fact that the rule, if adopted, 
would have excluded from office many of the most distin-
guished Governors of the past. The difficulty was, however, 
solved in the case of Queensland by Sir Henry Blake 
tendering his resignation in view of the objections raised 
by the local Government, and while declining to regard 
these objections as satisfactory ground for the refusal to 
accept him, the Secretary of State made another and more 
acceptable selection for the office. In point of fact, though 
the formal claim of the Colonial Government was thus 
rejected, it was thought best shortly afterwards to adopt the 
rule that the local Government should be asked before any 
appointment was formally made whether the name of a pro-
posed appointee was in any way objectionable to them. 
The result has normally been to elicit an acceptance, and 
this fact is of great value to the Colonial Secretary in making 
his selection : in a few cases objection has been taken on 
some ground or other, and in them the wishes of the local 
authorities have been respected: the transaction has 
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remained fairly 1 confidential, and the rejected candidate 
has not been placed in the mortifying position of being 
rejected by a Colonial Government probab~y for utter~y 
insufficient reasons. There is also one conclusive reason to 
render consultation requisite in that it is obviously most 
improper that an officer whose appointment has received 
the royal approval should be rejected by the Colony which 
he is to govern. 
Can the policy of consultation be carried further and the 
Governor be made in effect a nominee of the Dominion 
Government ? This question has not been as yet of practical 
importance save in the case of the States of Australia. In 
them it has been canvassed from time to time and a certain 
amount of popular support for the appointment of local 
candidates has manifested itself ; on two occasions labour 
Governments, that of Mr. Price in South Australia in 1908, 
and that of Western Australia in 1913, have put forward 
reasoned arguments in favour of the alteration of the practice 
by which Governors are chosen from men whose work and 
whose family connexions lie outside the Commonwealth. 
In effect the arguments in favour of this movement are that 
the post is one which could be suitably filled by a local man, 
that such an appointment would permit of economies being 
effected, it being a fixed belief with many members of the 
labour party in Australia, that the very moderate salaries 
now paid to the Governors of the States are princely incomes 
imposing an undue burden on the resources of the States, 
and that it is not fair that a man should be debarred from 
appointment because he is an Australian by birth. A further 
suggestion which, however, has not officially been put 
forward by any Government is that the duties of Governor 
should be combined with those of Chief Justice, and it has 
been pointed out in support of this argument that in the 
event of the rubsence on leave of the Governor and Governors 
of States at one time were fond of taking some si~x months' 
leave in the course of their term of office, formerly of six 
1 Actual proposed appointments are normally allowed to leak out by 
ministries, but not rejections of candidates. 
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and now of five or six years' duration the Chief Justice 
acts in his stead without difficult·y or inconvenience. 
The arguments against the proposal are of weight. The 
combination in the hands of one man of both the control 
of the executive government and of the Chief Justiceship 
is anomalous in theory and in practice would be likely 
to result in difficulty ; in point of fact the Chief Justices of 
the important States of Victoria and New South Wales 
when acting as Governor have been in the habit of ceasing the 
performance of their duties as Chief Justice. It is doubtful 
whether in the long run the States are really anxious to 
see the salaries of . the posts made so low that they could 
only be accepted by local men who were prepared to abandon 
the social side of the Governor's functions ; in fact, if not 
in theory, the view prevalent is rather that a Governor 
should not be unwilling to pay something for the honour of 
serving as the representative of the Sovereign. The choice of 
local men, whether the selection be confined to natives of 
the State as was suggested by Mr. Price or to natives of 
Australia as was the view of the Government of Western 
Australia, might have the advantage claimed that he would 
be more likely to avoid any action which would run counter 
to Colonial feelings, but this result is very problematical. 
What is much more probable is that the person selected 
would be a man who had played a part in local politics, 
and who would inevitably be accused of abusing his authority 
as Governor in order to further the interests of the party 
with which he had formerly been in political sympathy. 
It must be remembered that the communities forming the 
States are still comparatively small except in the case of 
New South Wales and Victoria, and that the selection of 
a man wholly detached from party politics would be difficult, 
and the readiness which prevails to attribute improper 
action to local men can be judged from the fact that so per-
sistent were the allegations that a Chief Justice of Tasmania 
had made improper use of information acquired by him 
when acting as Governor that the Government of the day 
found it advisable to have the charges examined and refuted 
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by a formal investigation. An officer appointed from out-
side may be guilty of indiscretions and may commit errors 
of judgement, but it is impossible to consider that he has 
been actuated b·y improper motives. A still more important 
consideration lie,s in the fact that while the Imperial duties 
of State Governor are not of substantial extent or importance 
he should serve as a supporter of art, literature, and higher 
culture generally in a way which can hard~y be expected 
of a man who ex hypothesi has spent his life in the limits 
of the Commonwealth. Yet a further reason against the 
adoption of the proposal is the fact that the constitution 
of the Commonwealth plainly contemplates that the 
Governors of the States like the Governor-General should 
' 
be appointed by the Imperial Government without regard 
to considerations of local origin. This point is one of 
the consequences of the clear differentiation between the 
constitution of the Commonwealth with the quasi indepen-
dence of the States and that of Canada in which the provinces 
are in certain matters definitely subordinated to the central 
government of the Dominion, and in which in harmony 
with this fact the Lie~tenant-Governors are chosen by 
the Governor~General in Council, naturally from among 
ex-politicians. Nor has the position of Lieutenant-Governors 
been preserved at the high level of Governors selected by 
the Imperial Government, and appoin_ted by the King ; it 
is characteristic that when Sir Charles Tupper learned that 
Mr. I. Tarte was in a position to establish charges of corruption 
which would have driven Sir H. Langevin from office in 
the Dominion Cabinet in 1891, his first idea of a solution of 
the difficulty was to suggest to the Prime Minister that 
Sir H. Langevin should be appointed Lieutenant-Governor 
of Quebec.1 Nor can it be denied that it is precisely in the 
provinces of Canada that Lieutenant-Governors have inter-
preted in the widest possible sense the powers which are 
vested in their hands. 
Considerations like these have probably availed to prevent 
the claim for local appointments being made more vocal in 
1 See Recollections of Sixty Years, pp. 214, 215. 
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the Dominions, though the elective Governor is a phenome. 
non which is not un:known in labour circles. The present 
method of appointment indeed seems to serve as effectively as 
almost any that might be devised. It is open to a Dominion 
Government if they feel a desire for any special person as 
Governor to mention the matter infor)llally to the Secretary 
of State, and no Dominion Government is compelled to 
accept any Governor to whom it can take exception. The 
result has been in the main to provide excellent heads of 
the Government, and to make as adequate a substitute as 
the very different conditions permit for the actual presence 
of the person of the Sovereign. The only alternative scheme 
is one which has been suggested of late from time to time, 
but which has not yet established itself and which must, 
therefore, be considered as still on trial. The retirement of 
Earl Grey from the Government of Canada in 1911 was 
followed by the appoin~ment of the Duke of Connaught 
for a period of two years in the first place, a tenure of office 
afterwards extended by a year and then prolonged until 
the end of the war. Before, however, this event changed the 
course of happenings, the proposal had been made to Canada 
and accepted that he should be followed in office by H.S.H. 
Prince Alexander of Teck. It is impossible not to see in 
this scheme a design to treat the post of Governor-General 
as something of very high importance, in which place 
should be found for a royal or semi-royal personage, and the 
position was clearly recognized in the Dominion. It has 
produced diverse expr~ssions of opinion, and it must be 
admitted that the opinion of Canada would not accept the 
doctrine that the post must be held by a person of royal 
blood ; such a doctrine would offend the sense of democracy 
of many who have no tinge of American connexion, nor 
would it be acceptable to that very considerable body of 
Canadian opinion which from connexion, often of blood, 
with the United States has a sentimental objection to 
monarchy. The mere suggestion that the Duke of Connaught 
was to be followed in office by Prince Arthur of Connaught 
produced the most clear expressions of hostile opinion, based 
1874 c 
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on no personal defect of a popular Prince., but on his youth 
and inexperience of affairs which unsuited him for the holding 
of the most distinguished place in the Dominion. On the 
other hand, the fears of an introduction of the practices of 
a royal court which were'" widely entertained on the appoint-
ment of the Duke of Connaught, as with less ground they 
had been entertained on the appointment of the Marquess 
of Lorne, were dispelled by the adherence of His Royal 
Highness to the regime of his predecessor, and the distin-
guished public career of the Duke, added to his competence 
in business and charm of manner, secured his wide popularity 
in the Dominion. But this is far from indicating that there 
is any possibility of the acceptance whether in Canada or 
in any other Dominion of the theory that the representative 
of the Sovereign should be a royal prince, still less of the 
suggestion that such Governorships should be hereditary 
in a branch of the royal family. Difficult as is the problem 
of providing Governors for the Dominions, it has yet to be 
shown that the present method is not the best attainable ; 
the election of a Governor would offend radically against 
the principle of responsible government and would raise 
up in the Dominion a power which, resting on an elective 
basis, would tend to compete with the authority of the Prime 
Minister himself. 
CHAPTER II 
THE POWERS OF THE GOVERNOR AS RESTRIC~ED 
BY-L:EGAL LIABILITY 
IT is a fundamental principle of the Government of the 
United Kingdom that the whole executive authority of 
the kingdom rests in the hands of the Crown, that this 
authority is exercised in every case on the advice of ministers, 
and that for every act of the King which is done in his 
official capacity a minister of the Crown must be responsible. 
It is further established that the King can do no wrong, 
and that therefore, if wrong is done, it cannot have been 
done by the command of the King, and the wrongdoer must 
answer to the law for his action, whether criminally or · 
civilly. Liability, whether criminal or civil, is measured by 
the ordinary law of the land; the doctrine of Act of State 
cannot be invoked by a government official against any 
person but a foreigner,1 and the only protection possessed 
by public authorities in the case of British subjects and in 
the case of foreigners generally is that afforded by certain 
rules regarding the period of time within which action 
may be taken and the form of procedure to be adopted in 
such action. The application of the same principle, the 
following of the rules of the common law, results in what is 
sometimes regarded as anomalous, the position of the 
official who contracts in the name of the Crown. The rule 
is that he is not personally liable on such a contract, since 
a man cannot be held liable on a contract which he makes 
for a disclosed principal, and yet as the Crown cannot be 
sued the Crown cannot_ be held to be directly liable. The 
procedure by petition of right, however, remedies this 
defect, and though it is true that the royal fiat is required 
before a petition of right can be brought and that, therefore, 
1 See Harrison Moore, Act of State. 
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theoretically the remedy for breach of contract on the part 
of the Crown can be denied by the Crown, it is an establishe~ 
part of constitutional usage that the fiat should be granted 
whenever a prima facie case for inquiry by a court is shown. 
There is no difficulty in conceiving that the position of 
the Governor might have been assimilated in these matters 
to the position of the Crown in the United Kingdom. It 
seems clear that the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland is as 
exempt from suit in respect of any of his official actions 
as the Crown in England, and that a claim preferred against 
him would not be entertained by the courts, nor would any 
attempt be made to subject him to the criminal law in respect 
of any official action. ·The position of the Governor in 
these respects is ;quite different; it was early realized that 
the position of Governor at a great distance from the mother 
country would be seriously abused if no means of punishment 
existed, and criminal acts of Governors are liable to be 
punished in England under the provisions of the old Acts 
II and I2 Will. III, c. I2, and 43 Geo. III, c. 85, though 
fortunately these Acts have not been effectively invoked 
against a Governor for over a hundred years. More impor-
tant is the fact that civil actions can be brought against 
a Governor in the courts of the Dominion in which he is 
Governor and also in the courts of the United Kingdom 
for torts committed by him, and such actions have been 
brought from time to time within recent years. The 
Governor is not liable for contracts entered into by him on 
behalf of the Crown, for in that case the principle applies 
as in England that only the principal can be sued, but 
contrary to the principle adopted in England, by local 
legislation direct suit against the Crown in cases of contract 
is allow·ed in the Dominions, while in many of the;m this 
privilege of suit is extended to torts. The difficulties arising 
from the liability of the Governor to actions both in England 
and in the Dominion is mitigated by the fact that by 
English law an action on tort brought in England must be 
based on the fact that the act in question must be tortious 
both by the law of England and by the law of the place in 
• 
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which the action took place, and that according~y if by an 
Act of Indemnity the tortious character of the act is removed 
in the Dominion, then the basis of ar1 action in England 
disappears; thus in the case of Phillips v. Eyre,1 which 
arose out of the action of the notorious Governor Eyre in 
putting down with undue severity the revolt of the negroes 
in Jamaica, it was decided that the effect of an Act of Indem-
nity passed by the island Legislature, even though that 
Act had been assented to by the Governor whose acts were 
impugned, was nevertheless sufficient to deprive his pro-
ceedings of any tortious character, and to relieve him from 
liability in civil proceedings in England. On the other 
hand, this doctrine does not apply to criminal proceedings 
under the Acts of Will. III and Geo. III, nor to proceedings 
for murder or manslaughter under the Act 24 and 25 Viet. 
c. 100, which authorizes the trial" and punishment in England 
of these offences when committed anywhere abroad by a 
British subject, for no Colonial Act can operate to destroy 
the effect of an Imperial Act unless there is express authority 
in some other Imperial Act for this purpose. But the effect 
of this anomaly could at any time be made good by the 
decision of the Crown to enter a 'nolle prosequi if proceedings 
were taken by any private individual against a Governor. 
The same proceeding is available in a Dominion to prevent 
the actions of a Governor being examined criminally 
there, though there seems to be no doubt that in theory a 
Governor even for his official actions is liable to the criminal 
jurisdiction of the Dominion courts in the absence of express 
legislation to the contrary. In his private capacity he is of 
course liable both civilly and criminally. 
In the case of the self-governing Dominions it may be 
argued that the application of the old Acts is out of date, 
and that they should be formally removed from the statute 
book in their application to such Dominions. The total 
repeal of the measures might be held to be unadvisable in 
view of the fact that in some of the smaller Colonies the 
Governor occupies a post of such authority and power that 
t 4 Q.B. 225 ; 6 Q.B. I. 
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in the hands of an unscrupulous man injury might be 
done to individuals which could not be adequately met by 
mere civil proceedings. But the larger question naturally 
presents itself whether the Governor of a self-governing 
Dominion or State should not be placed as regards all his 
official actions in a position more nearly akin to that of the 
Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland and made exempt fro;m all 
form of legal process as regards any official act done by hirn, 
leaving the responsibility for illegal acts, if any, to be borne 
by the officers who carried them out. It is, of course, true 
that even as the law at present stands these officers may be 
held to be liable for the acts in question, but obviousl~y, 
if they are .authorized by the Governor, it is natural and 
proper that proceedings in respect of them should be 
directed not against mere subordinates but against the head 
of the Government, who 1s much more likely than any 
subordinate to be able to meet the damages which might 
be awarded. Moreover, as an action in England would 
normally only be possible when the proposed defendant 
was resident in the country, an action there would normally 1 
have to be directed against a Governor during his presence 
in England on leave of absence or immediately after retire-
ment from the administration of his government. 
The matter is not of academic interest because the opera-
tion of the rule places the Governor in a position of difficulty 
with regard to the conduct of the Government of the country 
and compels him to share in some degree with ministers 
. . 
responsibilities which he ought not to have to bear. The ~ 
two most prominent instances in which the Governor finds 
himself in difficulties are in connexion with the expenditure 
of public money and the declaration of martial law. In 
both instances he may quite easily find himself in the position 
of having to decide either to approve illegal action and thus 
to render himself liable to suit, or to decline to permit 
ministers taking action which they can assure him is essential 
in the interest of the country ; normally indeed he has no 
1 This follows from the rules of the High Court as to service of process 
abroad. 
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real choice ; he cannot as a rule hope to secure other ministers 
if he dismisses those whom he has, he can11ot rule the country 
without ministers, and so he is compelled to agree to the 
proposals of ministers and thus to put himself without any 
real option of choice in a position of incurring legal liability. 
In the case of Crown Colonies the practice has always 
prevailed under which the expenditure of money may be 
authorized by the Governor if approved by the Secretary 
of State for the Colonies before the amount in question has 
been appropriated by the Legislature. This procedure is 
applicable because the Legislature of a Crown Colony in 
the narrower sense of the term is one which is controlled 
by the Secretary of State through the Governor, and there-
fore its sanction to expenditure approved by the Secretary 
of State can always be relied upon. In the Dominions the 
transition from Crown Colony control to the forms of 
responsible government has naturally enough not been 
effected without leaving traces of the older forms, and there 
has been from time to time in varying degree a tendency 
for Ministries to secure expenditure in anticipation of . the 
authority of Parliament.1 The expenditure is later on brought 
before Parliament and formally sanctioned, but the practice 
is obviously open, unless regulated, to objections ; _the 
Opposition in Parliament complain that the matter is reduced 
to a farce when they are asked to authorize the expenditure 
of moneys which have been paid out and which, therefore, 
are already beyond their power of control. More serious 
is the fact that the Upper House is inclined to resent any 
attempt made to force its hand by the use of sums which 
have not been brought before them for approval, especially 
in. those cases in which, as in South and Western Australia 
and Tasmania, the Upper House has nearly equal power 
over money Bills with the Lower House. 
The intervention of the Governor is required in all the 
cases of the expenditure of public money, for in accordance 
1 In England the rule is normally observed, but exceptions have occurred; 
see the case of the Treasury action in July 1901, referred to in the case of 
Bowles v. The Bank of England, Times, Oct. 22, 1912. 
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with the old practice under Crown Colony government, he 
is required by the Audit Acts to sign every warrant for the 
issue of public money by the Treasurer. This provision 
must, it is clear, as a mere matter of law be read subject to 
the express provisions contained in every Dominion and 
State constitution that the consolidated revenue fund can 
be appropriated only by the Parliament, and, though the 
Constitution Acts do not expressly 1 provide that no warrant 
may be signed by the Governor except on the strength of 
an appropriation by Parliament, it is clear that, if the inter-
pretation that a Governor could sign warrants without such 
appropriation were adopted, the result would be that two 
different and not necessarily harmonious forms of dealing 
with public money would be provided, which is absurd. 
Any appropriation, therefore, must be made by Parliament, 
and it is only when this is done that the action of the 
Governor is possible, if the law is to be strictly followed. 
Now it is obvious that to carry out this scheme it is ne-
cessary that the Ministry of the day should secure that 
Parliament is summoned to meet at such times and that such 
business is brought before it as will ensure that the necessary 
appropriations of public money shall be duly made for each 
financial year, or that in the alternative power should be 
given to the Government, in the event of the passing of an 
· appropriation measure not being carried through in good 
time, to expend money on the basis of the expenditure 
authorized by Parliament for the previous year. There 
would still remain the case of urgent expenditure which it 
was necessary to incur when Parliament was not in session, 
and which arose from causes not foreseen, and legislative 
authority to expend sums in anticipation of formal authority 
could-also be given. These devices have been, as is clearly 
right, widely adopted in the Dominions and States; 2 thus, in 
· 
1 It was so provided for the provinces of the Union in 9 Edw. VII, c. 9, 
s. 89, but modified in Act No. 10 of 1913, s. 17. 
~ Thus, in the Union, Act No. 21 of 1911 by s. 26 allows special warrants 
for unforeseen needs or excesses on foreseen services up to £300,0 0, but 
subject to appropriation by Parliament not later than the next session. 
For South Australia cf. Parl. Pap., Cd. 6091, p. 50. 
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South Australia in order to meet the difficulty of appropria-
tion without legal authority Acts were passed in 1911 and 
1912 (Nos. 1065 and 1087) which permit the Governor to 
appropriate within clearly defined limits sums for the support 
of the ordinary needs of Government and an additional 
sum of money not exceeding £50,000 for unexpected needs 
arising when Parliament is not in session. Another and 
simpler device is that of the Treasurer's Advance, which 
is adopted very freely by the Com·monwealth of Australia 
and in Western Australia, but which is recognized also in 
the other States, but even this expedient has been criticized. 
Thus, in Western Australia in 1913 the Legislative Council 
protested against the action of the Government regarding the 
direction in which the advance to the Treasurer sanctioned 
in Act No. 17 of 1912 had been applied, despite the fact 
that the sum was to be subject to appropriation for the 
defined purposes for which it had been used in the Appropria-
tion Act of the year in which it was expended.1 
Notwithstanding the existence of these provisions, cases 
constantly occur in the Dominions and States where 
expenditure has to be incurred without the approval of 
Parliament being previously obtained.2 In Queensland 
when Mr. Kidston resigned office in 1907 as a result of the 
refusal of the Governor to give him an assurance as to 
adding members if necessary to the Legislative Council 
in order to overcome its resistance to the measures regarding 
wages boards and voting proposed by the Government, 
it was necessary for the Premier who succeeded him to ask 
the Governor to issue warrants for expenditure amounting 
to some £700,000 without Parliamentary authority, and the 
illegality of the Governor's action was strongly condemned 
by the Opposition, who threatened when in power to refuse 
1 It has been argued that in view of the Audit Act, No. 12 of 1904, of the 
State appropriation by warrant is ( s. 31) contemplated without Parlia-
mentary sanction being first required, but this cannot be pressed. The 
Audit Act cannot override the Constitution Act of 1890. 
2 Most often when Parliament is dissolved as a result of governmental 
difficulties, e. g. in 1911 in Canada when Sir W. Laurier appealed to the 
people on the Agreement with the United States. 
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to ratify the expenditure, though fortunately when the defeat 
of Mr. Philp at the polls resulted in the return of Mr. Kidston 
to power wiser counsels coupled with new political tendencies 
rendered it unnecessary to fulfil the threat. The procedure, 
however, was in so far legal that the Governor was actually 
asked to issue warrants ; in the case of the dissolution of 
the Parliament of Victoria by Sir T. Gibson Carmichael at 
the request of Sir Thomas Bent in 1908, the necessary means 
of carrying on the business of the State had to be provided 
without any legal authority at all, and the committee which 
examined the question of the procedure followed could 
not suggest any very effective way of meeting the case, 
although it was discovered that in granting a dissolution 
the Governor had inquired of the Premier and had received 
a formal assurance that the Treasury was provided with 
funds to carry it over until Parliament should meet and vote 
further sums. The difficulty of the position of the Governor 
when he is asked to act in these cases is further illustrated 
by the case of the action of the Government of the Transvaal, 
just before the expiry of the Transvaal Legislature on the 
occasion of the coming into effect of the Union ; anxious to 
reward its supporters and to make compensation in some 
degree to them for their losses through the disappearance 
of a full Colonial Parliament on the formation of the Union 
Parliament and the reduction of the status of the local 
legislative body, the Transvaal Ministry secured the authority 
of the acting Governor for the issue of the full salary which 
would normally have been paid for a complete session to each 
member. The courts of the Transvaal pronounced the action 
clearly illegal/ but found that there was no appropriate 
form of action in which the steps taken to pay the money 
could be checked, and much criticism was naturally directed 
1 Dalrymple and others v. Colonial Treasurer, [1910] T.P. 272. Techni-
cally the Government evaded flagrant illegality by waiting until Parliament 
was not in session and then presenting the warrant for signature on the 
ground that the expenditure was urgently required and Parliament was 
not in session; see Lord Crewe's defence in the House of Lords Debates, 
July 25, 1910. 
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not merely locally against the Governor amongst those who 
considered the action tal{ en in the light of a disgraceful waste 
of public money on an illegitimate object, and the carrying 
through by executive action of a proposal which could not 
have been enacted legislatively owing to the objection which 
would have been taken by the Legislative Council, but also 
in England both against the Governor's action, and against 
the Imperial Government for permitting the action. The 
criticism in a sense was erroneous, for the interference of 
the Imperial Government would obviously have been 
motived by no Imperial interest, and the acting Governor 
was advised by his ministers that his action was proper, 
but it is perfectly clear that the action of the Ministry was 
indefensible, since not only did they evade the decision 
of the Legislative Council, but they took this action at a time · 
when they evaded the responsibility which might otherwise 
have been brought home to them by the vote of the electors 
to whom they owed their power, since as the Parliament 
was on the verge of abolition, they had never to face the 
same electorate again. Nothing can more clearly illustrate 
the desirability of removing from a Governor all liability 
for his action, and the assimilation of his position in this 
respect to that of the Crown in the United Kingdom. Rigid 
adherence to the rule of law is impossible; even when the law 
is reasonably wide in terms, as in Canada and New Zealand, 
excess expenditure has from .time to time to be incurred, 
and even in a case like Newfoundland, where a considerable 
unauthorized expenditure results annually from the practice 
of underestimating all requirements, the theory that the 
Governor is responsible is unsound and tends to obscure 
the real facts of the position by throwing over the acts of 
the Ministry the aegis of the King's representative. 
The case of the declaration of martial law is a still more 
glaring example of the absurdity of the theory that the 
Governor is legally responsible for the acts of his ministers, 
and the case is the more serious in that, while the means 
of bringing a Governor to book for signing warrants without 
legal authority are by no means obvious, there exists no 
• 
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such difficulty in the case of acts done under martial law& In 
the case of expenditure without Parliamentary authority 
there exists no certain form of procedure to punish a 
Governor, assu·ming that he has not been guilty of appro-
priating the money to his own use ; it does ·not seem that 
any court would issue an order prohibiting expenditure, 
nor is it easy to see by whom an action for the expenditure 
of the money could be brought. In the case of acts done 
under martial law the liability of the Governor to pro·-
ceedings not merely in the Dominion or State is in full 
effect, and a local Act of Indemnity can only bar civi' 
action in the United Kingdom ; even if it is very improbable 
that criminal proceedings could ever be successful, the attempt 
has been made in recent years to make them effective, and 
the trouble which might thus be involved upon a Governor 
is not one which he should fairly be called upon to undergo, 
when as must be the case with a Governor of a self-governing 
Dominion or State the action taken was not his own, as was 
that of Governor Eyre of Jamaica, but that of his ministers. 
It may indeed be contended, as . was done in the case of 
the proclamation of martial law in Zululand of December 3, 
1907, by critics of the Government of Natal on whose advice 
the proclamation was issued by Sir Matthew Nathan,1 
contrary to his own judgement of the necessities of the 
case, that it is desirable to maintain the personal responsi-
bilityof the Governor and not to throw it upon ministers, since 
thus the Governor is required to exercise a personal discre-
tion, and is able to act on his own judgement, and on the 
instructions of the Secretary of State for the Colonies. It 
is, however, impossible to accept the argument thus put 
forward. The essence of a proclamation of martial law, when 
made under the royal prerogative as it is now normally 
made in every self-governing Dominion and State, is that it 
asserts the intention of the Government to exert in a state 
of disorder all the powers which are inherent in the Govern-
ment for the maintenance of the public peace, and also 
if need be powers which go beyond even the extraordinary 
1 See Parl. Pap., Cd. 3888, pp. 174, 194. 
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authority which every Government possesses at law in 
time of overthrow of public order. The common law of 
England, which is the common law of nearly all the self-
governing Dominions, and the common Roman-Dutch law 
which prevails inSouthAfrica agree in allowing no inconsider-
able latitude to the Executiv-e in the repression of disorder, 
but experience has shown that it is necessary in order to 
cover all the acts which take place in the suppression of 
a distur,bance to obtain from Parliament an Act of Indemnity 
for what has been done in good faith in the suppression of 
disorder. The existence of a state of public unrest is a matter 
which must be better understood by ministers than by 
the Governor or the Secretary of State, and therefore prima 
facie the declaration of martial law is a matter on which 
the Governor should act on the advice of ministers. More-
over, as an Act of Indemnity for ·what is done is required as 
much by n1inisters as by himself in acting on this advice, 
he has the full assurance that in doing so he ,will find the 
action of his Government supported by the Parliament and 
that the necessary Act relieving him from legal responsibility 
in the Dominion or State will be passed into law. What 
probability is there that a Governor who refuses to proclaim 
martial law at the request of a Ministry will find other 
ministers to face the situation ? In the particular case of 
Natal doubtless the unprejudiced j'udgement will consider 
that Sir Matthew Nathan was right in holding that the 
declaration of martial law was premature, but no one will 
doubt that he was in the right in subordinating his own views 
to that of his ministers after he had by expressing his opinion 
done all that lay in his power to show them the more correct 
aspect of the matter. 
· But, while the general principle cannot be seriously 
contested on constitutional grounds that a Governor should 
be freed from personal liability in respect of a declaration 
of martial law and should act on the advice of ministers 
in declaring and withdrawing it, it must be admitted that 
in the case of Natal difficulty arose from the ~act t ·hat 
Imperial troops were retained in South Africa and even in 
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Natal itself, on the services of which the Government of 
Natal could have relied in the event of the revolt such as 
it was becoming too serious for their forces to hold in cheqk. 
It was this circumstance which confused the issue of martial 
law in 'Natal, and it was this fact which gave just ground for 
so·me of the objections taken to the attitude of the Imperial 
Government in the matter·, though the objectors seldom 
succeeded in expressing their objectio11s in the correct 
form. Responsible government involves as an essential 
corollary that the Government shall undertake the full 
· responsibility for the defence of internal order : if it is not 
able to do this the grant of such government is clearly an 
error, for it means that the community is unfit for self-
government. In Nat_al candour must admit that the grant 
was premature, that it was not actually desired by any 
very great majority of the people of the Colony as represented 
in ~he Legislature, and that the number and resources of 
the white population were so small in comparison with the 
number of natives, many of them uncivilized, that the 
entrusting to the Colony of responsible government was 
ill advised, especially when it was known that tl1e Colony 
could not provide for its own internal order for so·me years 
at least after self-government. The evidence of the Natal 
Native Affairs Commission 1 was emphatic on the de'merit~ 
of the native administration in-Natal, and as it was composed 
of distinguished representatives of the people of Natal it 
is impossible to question the justice of the views so expressed. 
A wiser policy would doubtless have been followed had the 
people had before then1 the necessity of proving their 
capacity to govern themselves by maintaining security in 
the territories of the Colony by means of their own forces. 
As it was, reliance on the Imperial troops removed tlie 
necessity for caution which otherwise ~ust have tempered 
and guided into better channels native policy. From the 
Imperial point of view the retention of troops long after the 
grant of self. . :government was occasioned in the first instance 
by the events of the Boer War, which prevented the carrying 
1 See Parl. Pap., Cd. 3889. 
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out of the original intention to withdraw the forces after 
six years' notice from the grant of responsible government, 
and it was afterwards found difficult to remove them, partly 
in view of the recent conquest of the republics and the 
necessity of maintaining a garrison in South Africa to 
prevent any possible insurrection, a precauti()n obvious in 
itself and fully justified by the revelations made in 1914 
of the irreconcilable attitude of considerable sections of the 
Boer population. But their presence in Natal undoubtedly 
led the Imperial Government into the position of aiding, 
however passively, the Natal Government in a proclamation 
of martial law which neither the Governor nor the Imperial 
Government could believe to be necessary. 
The same accident of the presence of Imperial troops 
in the Transvaal led to two further incidents in which these 
troops were employed by local Governments in support of 
the enforcement of declarations of martial law, issued by 
those Governments. In 1907 a strike on the Rand mines 
necessitated the issue of a proclamation of martial law and 
the calling out of 1,419 of the Imperial forces as a precaution-
ary measure, but the magnitude of ~ the occasion was far 
surpassed by the strike which came to a head on July 4 
and 5, 1913.1 The number of Imperial troops employed 
reached the high figure of 2, 910 out of a total of 6, 660 then in 
the whole of the Union, and the loss of life in the repression 
of disorder in Johannesburg when the Imperial troops after 
showing the greatest forbearance were compelled to fire on 
the rioters amounted to twenty-one lives. The Government 
of the Union explained the request which they made 
urgently for the assistance of the Imperial forces by the 
peculiar position in which they were placed by reason of 
the disbandment of the existing military forces of South 
Africa in order to reconstitute the Defence forces under the 
terms of the Defence Act. The strikers had chosen the 
moment for action when the Government was most helpless, 
and in1mediate measures were necessary to protect the sixty 
odd gold mines, the coal mines and power stations, the 
1 See Parl. Pap., Cd. 6941, 6942. 
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municipal buildings and the stations and railways, which 
were manifestly in great danger. The existing forces of 
police, though augmented to the utmost possible extent, were 
quite inadequate to repress the disorder, and the presence 
of 170,000 male natives in the mines added enormously to 
the danger, since if the railway was cut there would be no 
food for these men in three days and rioting amongst them 
would be inevitable. Stress was also laid on the number of 
the criminal class in Johannesburg which would have taken 
part in any disorder and added to the confusion. The 
Governor-General, therefore, was satisfied that the Imperial 
forces must be used for this purpose despite the fact that 
they were not intended for any such work, and approved the 
action of the General Officer commanding these troops in 
putting them at the disposal of the civil authorities on the 
application of General Smuts and in anticipation of the 
approval of the Governor-General. The action thus taken 
by the -Governor-General was also ex post facto considered 
proper by the two judges of the Supreme Court of South 
Africa who formed the Witwatersrand Disturbances Com-
mission,1 and who held after a prolonged investigation into 
all the circumstances that, had the Impe;rial forces not been 
on the spot to render prompt assistance, the injury to life 
and property would have been much greater than it actually 
was. On the other hand, it was strongly felt by the repre-
sentatives of labour in the Transvaal that the Government of 
the day had taken unfair advantage of the presence of the 
Imperial troops to 9-eny them the concessions which could 
have averted the str~ke, and Lord Gladstone, while thinking 
that the employment of the Imperial forces in the circum-
stances was essential, and that to have allowed them to 
stand by would have deserved the severest condemnation, 
laid stress on the fact that it was his intention to draw the 
notice of ministers to the lessons of the strike, adding tha 
he was sure that they realized that Imperial troops were not 
retained in South Africa to do such work. 
The warning thus given by Lord Gladstone had due 
1 See Parl. Pap., Cd. 7112. 
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effect : the Government proceeded energetically with the 
reconstruction of the military forces of the Transvaal, and 
when in January 1914 the Labour Party brought on the 
general stri,ke which they had planned as the most effective 
means of securing from the Government their legitimate 
aims, they found themselves confronted with a declaration 
of martial law in parts of the Transvaal, Natal, and the 
Orange Free State, and with the most complete preparations 
to suppress any disorder by means of the defence force, 
now fully organized and armed, and disposed with much 
military ability by the Government.1 The result of the action 
thus taken was decisive : faced with the impossibility of. 
achieving success the motion collapsed; and the strikers 
suffered complete and ignominious defeat but without loss 
of blood. This very fact was naturally made the ground. 
for the criticism of the action of the GoVernor-General in 
agreeing to the proclamation of martial law when the forces 
mustered were obviously adequate to meet the situation, 
but Lord Gladstone pleaded that, apai~t from the fact that 
the Ministry were most anxious to make the repression 
a complete success and to avoid the use of Imperial troops 
by the taking of measures of the most determined type, 
the matter was one for South Afl--ica to decide and not for 
any other authority to deal with. It is impossible to resist 
the force of his reasoning: a self-governing community 
must be allowed to manage its own internal affairs, and the 
... 
~nistry must have the power to advise the proclamation 
of martial law without the Governor having any right to do 
more than interpose the reasoned suggestion which it is 
always within the province of a Governor to offer on any 
action of his ministers. But this is only possible if the 
Governor is not subject to any legal liability for his action, 
and if the Ministry do not require the support, active or 
passive, of the Imperial forces. As the mere presence of 
such forces always implies the possibility of their use, it 
is clear that full responsible government is impossible unless 
a Dominion has within its borders no military forces w·hich 
1 See Parl. Pap., Cd. 7213, 7348. 
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are nOt raised and maintained by itself. · This fact explains 
the slow and unsatisfactory development of responsible 
government in the Union of South Africa. The necessities 
of the native territories have always, prior to the European 
War, rendered it necessary for Imperial troops to be quartered 
in the Union, and the position of the Governor of the Cape of 
Good Hope prior to the Boer War, of the Governor of the 
Transvaal after that war, but before union, and now of the 
Governor-General of the Union as at the same time High 
Commissioner for South Africa with special Imperial duties 
in that capacity, has really been incompatible with the 
natural exercise of the duties of responsible government. 
The difficulties of the position have as a rule been minimized 
by the exercise of tact on both sides ; the Ministry have 
striven to remember that the Governor is also something 
more than a Governor, and he has conformed his action to 
. the fundamental idea at the basis of the arrangement for 
the combination of the two offices in one hand, th~ advantage 
of securing that the policy of the responsible government 
colony and of the administration of the native territories 
should be carried on in close harmony. When, however, 
each side has pressed its rights to the furthest extent, as 
in the famous case of the disagreement between Sir Bartle 
Frere as Governor of the Cape and Mr. Molteno, the Prime 
Minister in 1878, the result has been friction and eventually 
in that instance the successful dismissal of the minister by 
the Governor, who succeeded in finding another Ministry 
to accept full responsibility for his action in the matter.1 
The anomalies resulting from the presence of Imperial 
troops in a Dominion, in itself an undesirable state of affairs, 
should not be allowed to obscure the fundamental rule that 
the executive government must be responsible for the 
declaration and maintenance of martial law, that it should 
not be hampered in its action by the difficulty that the 
Governor has personal liability under the law, and that 
accordingly it is necessary in the interest of the full develop-
ment of self-government that the Governor should be 
1 See Responsible Government, i. 289- 91. 
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enabled to act freely on ministerial advice by being relieved 
from all liability to suit, a relief which would at the same 
time throw upon ministers alone the responsibility for 
dealing with the finances of the Dominion or State. The 
result could in part be accomplished by Dominion or State 
legislation, and as regards financial liability the suggestion 
that all responsibility might be removed from the Governor 
was made many years ago by a Secretary of State, though 
it has not been acted upon, but Imperial legislation for 
the same end would be desirable, and in part as regards 
criminal liability strictly necessary .1 
1 Quite apart from this question is the duty of an Imperial officer, wherever 
he is, to aid in preserving order and safeguarding life, as was done, for in-
stance, in New Zealand by the commander of one of H.M. ships during the 
great strike there in Oct. 1913. There is then only the question of the com-
mon law, of a citizen's duty, not of the intervention of the Imperial Govern-
ment. The same thing might have happened at Brisbane in 1912 had a ship 
then been there. 
f 
D2 
CHAPTER III 
THE LIMITATION OF THE PREROGATIVE 
IT is now clear law that the Gover110r has a delegation of 
so much of the royal prerogative as is required for the 
conduct of the executive government of the Dominion or 
State of which he is Governor, and time and good sense 
have united to make it clear that this necessary delegation 
includes practically all the prerogatives of the Crown in the 
United Kingdom. Moreover in cases where there might 
exist doubt Dominion or State legislation has long ago 
• 
disposed of the matter so as to render considerations of the 
extent of the prerogative a matter of merely academic 
interest. The old grant of the right to dispose of Crown 
land which remains as a relic of the past in the Letters 
Patent of Newfoundland of March 28, 1876, in those of 
·New Zealand and the Australian States, might have long 
since disappeared from these instruments, as the disposal 
of Crown land is regulated in the Dominions and States 
and now also in Newfoundland by statutes, which render 
obsolete the old discussions as to the power of the Governor 
in respect of such lands. The prerogative of making 
appointments to offices, including judgeships, though still 
delegated is needless and of no value, since these appoint-
ments are regulated by statute, 1 though it has been sug-
gested that the delegation serves as authority ~or the use 
of the royal name in the instruments of appointment. 
There are, however, certain powers which are held not to 
pass without special delegation, and therefore only to be 
1 See for New Zealand Act No. 23 of 1912; for the Union, No. 29 of 1912. 
It has been argued that the power is one available to create a Royal 
Commission; ex parte Leahy, 4 S. R. (N.S.W.) 401, at p. 417, and it may be 
useful for this purpose. The prerogative power is recognized in Common-
wealth Act No. 4 of 1912. 
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available for exercise in accordance with ' the express terms 
of the delegation. Of these the first and foremost is the 
right to declare war and to make peace, which is not now 
delegated to any Governor whatever. The forces raised 
in a Dominion are forces for the protection of the Dominion 
not for an aggressive war, and the Governor therefore does 
not require for the government of the Dominion the power 
of declaring war. Nor in the case of an indivisible empire 
is it possible for one part to make peace without the assent 
of the United Kingdom and, therefore, the Governor is not 
given author~ty to conclude a peace. Hence in the European 
War the measures of warlike operations undertaken · by the. 
Governments of the Commonwealth of Australia, New 
Zealand, and the Union of South Africa were -all undertaken 
on the strength of the royal declaration of war as com-
municated to the Governors of the several Dominions by_ 
the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and the arrange-
ments made by the officers entrusted with the conduct of 
hostilities by the several governments were· ·of the nature 
of military conventions such as are competent to sub-. 
ordinate military commanders in the field; subject of course 
to confirmation or alteration by higher authority.1 · 
It is clear that these prerogatives cannot belong to any 
but a completely sovereign power, and that their concession 
would conver:t the Dominions into independent entities even 
if they owned allegiance to the same Crown, in which · case 
they would stand to the United Kingdom in much the same 
relation as Hanover stood to the United Kingdom during 
the period when that state was under the Crown of Britain~2 
The · essence of a united Empire in any form is that for 
foreign affairs there can be only one voice, and these pre- · 
rogatives therefore cannot be sought if the unity of the 
Empire is to be maintained. The same . considerations 
apply to the prerogative of concluding treaties o~ political 
alliance or other purely political character, but with much 
less force to the power of concluding other kinds of treaties 
such as commercial treaties, and indeed international law 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 7873 and 7972. 2 See Part II, ch. ii. 
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shows us cases where such treaties can be concluded by 
non-sovereign states. An instance of a treaty so concluded 
by the Governor of a colony under a special authority from 
the Crown is that 1 between the Governor of the Transvaal 
and the Governor-General of Mozambique of 1909 regulating 
commercial relations and the employment of native labour 
from the Portuguese. territories on the Rand mines, but as 
a normal rule it is found more convenient to adopt another 
mode of procedure eliminating the action of the Governor, 
which will be described later on. 
• 
A further consequence of the fact that a Dominion is not 
a sovereign state in the full sense of international law is that 
the Governor has no power to annex territory to the Domin-
ion, and that he can only do so under the express authority 
of the Crown, whether conveyed before the annexation takes 
place or sometimes given by way of ratification of a fait 
accompli. The most famous case of the attempt of a Colonial 
Government to make an annexation independent of the royal 
authority is the Queensland effort to annex ·New Guinea, 
which was not ratified by the Imperial Government, but 
which in due course led to a minor annexation with new 
authority. In harmony with this rule is the fact that none 
of the territories occupied by the Dominion forces in the 
Pacific and in South-West Africa in the course of the war 
were annexed by the ·Dominion forces occupying them, 
military possession· alone being taken in the name of the 
Crown.2 Here again no extension of the prerogative is 
possible without impairing Imperial unity, unless the right 
to annex is strictly limited to lands hitherto unoccupied 
lying in the immediate vicinity of British territory, such as 
the lands north of Canada or even those south of Australia. 
A further prerogative which cannot be fully conferred 
is that of the grant of honours. This power has always-
been most carefully withheld from a Governor, who is merely 
entrusted with the duty of investing the recipients of the 
honours conferred by the Crown upon deserving Dominion . 
subjects. Indeed it is only the Governors-General who are 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 4587. 2 Parl. Pap., Cd. 7873 and 7972. 
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given the right to confer the title, degree, and honour of 
knight bachelor upon such persons as they may be author-
ized to invest as Knights Grand Cross or Knights Com-
manders of the Order of Saint Michael and Saint George, 
and the grant of medals to soldiers or others on the mere 
authority of a Dominion Government has always been 
regarded as a violation of the royal prerogative. T4e force 
of the rule is obvious : the honours are not colonial honours, 
but they are Imperial, and their value is increased by the 
fact that they are not bestowed and cannot be bestowed 
except on the direct approval of the Sovereign himself. 
The honours so bestowed have a rank and distinction 
throughout the Empire which is of no small value as sign 
of ·Imperial solidarity. A Governor might, indeed, be 
authorized by the Crown to confer honours with Imperial 
validity, but the mere fact that they were not conferred 
by the Sovereign would invest them with certain inferiority. 
The alternative scheme that honours might be given which 
should be confined within the bounds of the Dominion or 
State can hardly be regarded as satisfactory : it is extremely 
doubtful whether by any stretch of law it could be held 
to be within the power of the Crown to confer any such 
power on a Governor, and it is most improbable that such 
honours would be valued highly even if the local legislature 
were to confer upon the Governor the power of conferring 
them, a view which is hardly within the bounds of possi .. 
bility. 
Assuming, however, that titles and honours must be 
conferred as the personal gift of the sovereign, the question 
does arise whether any change is possible in the manner 
in which they are at present conferred. ~rhe conferring of 
honours is one of the most difficult and invidious tasks 
which devolve upon the Secretary of State for the Colonies 
and the Prime Minister, and there is no Dominion in which 
trouble has not resulted from the mode of action. The 
apportionment of honours among the Canadian ministers 
on federation cre~ted much heart burning until it was found 
possible by the grant of a baronetcy to sooth the indignation 
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of Sir George Cartier at the higher position assigned to 
Sir John Macdonald,1 and in more recent times the con-
ferring on Sir Joseph Ward of a baronetcy in 1911 was 
followed by the introduction into the New Parliament of 
a Bill which purported to forbid the use in the Dominion 
of any title of honour, the truth being merely . that the 
Opposition were dissatisfied at the conferring of so . high 
a distinction on the leader of a government then tottering 
to its fall. Much more important than this episode must 
be reckoned the discussion which took place in the Dominion 
Parliament on February 5, 1913, when the second reading 
of a Bill to abolish .titles of honour in Canada was moved 
in the House of Commons by Mr. Burnham. He argued 
that titles of honour which in their origin were indicative 
of office or occupation had been appropriated for orna-
mental purposes and had developed into names for the 
establishment of classes. The use of such names in a demo-
cracy was a contradiction in terms, and entirely contrary 
to the wish and spirit of democracy.2 . It was true that 
titles had been conferred on men like Sir Wilfrid Laurier, 
who was worthy of any title, but that fact did not make the 
conferring of titles any less a violation of the principle nor 
did it n1ake it less likely for the democracy to in<Sur the 
grave and serious danger of drifting into a possible sale and 
purchase of honours such as was alleged to have taken 
place in England. In reply Mr. Foster pointed out on 
behalf of the Government that the reference in the Bill to 
titles of honour heretofore created by the Parliament or 
Government of Canada had no application, as none had 
been created by the Canadian Government. The bestowal 
of honours came from the source of all honours, the King, 
who must be allowed to be his own judge as to the sel.ection 
of persons upon whom honours should .be bestowed. From 
that point of view there was objection to the passage by 
Parliament of such a Bill. Moreover he did not think that 
1 See Sir C. Tupper, Recollections of Sixty Years, p. 62. 
2 Cf. Canadian Annual Review, 1913, p. 297, for the view of the grain 
growers of Canada, 
~ 
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it was undesirable to have in a country some means of 
giving recognition to deeds for the benefit of the country 
performed in a pat:iotic spirit. ~uch of the best public 
service in the Empire was done without payment, and he 
did not think it took away from the merit of what was 
dane that there should be a superior power which when 
there arose a striking case of public service could signalize 
it by the grant of an appropriate honour. The principle 
had done much good in the past and might do more in the 
future. Sir Wilfrid Laurier, on behalf of the Oppositio.n, 
was also unable to support the Bill, though he admitted 
that he was much disposed to agree with the mover. He 
did not think that the mode of procedure by means of 
a Bill was proper, and considered that the appropriate 
procedure was a recommendation or address to the King 
and not an Act of Parliament. He agreed that titles both 
in Canada and in the mother country were a relic of feudal 
society: his own title was the relic of such a state, and he 
did not think that in Canada such titles were in accord 
with the spirit of the age or could ever take root. But at 
the same time the prerogative o£ the Crown had been exer-
cised for so many centuries with such general acceptance 
that it was hardly possible to take very serious exception to 
the manner in which the prerogative had been exercised. 
At the same time, in reply to questions addressed to him, 
Sir Wilfrid Laurier defined the position of the Prime Minister 
of Canada as regards the responsibility for the grant of 
honours. When he held that office he had regarded that 
matter as a prerogative of the Crown and not a matter to 
be covered by ministerial responsibility. The Governor for 
the time being should consult the Prime Minister, and the 
Prime Minister would mention the matter to his colleagues, 
but he did. not consider it a matter of such importance that 
ministerial responsibility should be required. Even ·in 
England, while the Sovereign would generally consult the 
Prime Minister, there might be cases in which he would 
exercise his own prerogative, and he doubted if any Prime 
Minister would make it a matter of ministerial responsibility 
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or ministerial crisis. This fact was evidence that titles 
had become antiquated, but at the same time the experience 
of France, where the Legion of Honour was more sought 
after than it had ever been under the Napoleonic regirrte, 
proved that even in a democracy there was always present 
a tendency to confer such honours and distinctions. 4 
In view of the agreement between the leader of the 
Opposition and the view of the Government the Bill was 
not pressed by its supporters and was negatived without 
a division. 
Sir Wilfrid Laurier's statement of the relation of the 
Ministry to the Governor is capable of some expansion. 
The conferring of any honour is made on the recommenda-
tion of the Secretary of State for the Colonies or of the 
Prime Minister, according as the honour is one connected 
with the Order of Saint Michael and Saint George or is of 
a different character, though of course in the latter case the 
Prime Minister acts on the advice of the Secretary of State : 
knighthoods for Dominion services are conferred on the 
advice of the Secretary of State after consultation with 
the Prime Minister. The ministerial responsibility for 
appointments therefore rests with the Imperial Government, 
and not with any Dominion Government, and it is open 
for the King to confer an honour on his own initiative, 
though no doubt in such a case when a Dominion subject 
was concerned he would consult the responsible minister 
for the Colonies. But in making the recommendations of 
honours to the Sovereign the Secretary of State must act 
on advice for the most part since, save in the case of Gover-. 
nors and a few of the more prominent statesmen of the 
Dominions, he cannot be in a position to decide on whom 
honours would most properly be bestowed. Therefore it is 
necessary for him to have recourse to the Governor and the 
Ministry for guidance. The Governor in making~ recom-
mendations is not compelled to restrict himself to the 
names submitted by his ministers : he is at liberty to 
submit others, his special care being to bear in mind the 
merit of public service, other than political, and the claims 
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of art, science, and .literature, but he is required to inform 
his Ministry of the names proposed to be submitted, so that 
they may take any exception which they think fit. In their, 
turn the ministers are at liberty to suggest any names 
whatever, and these the Governor must forward with ~uch 
observations as he sees fit : it is understood that no honours 
will be conferred on political opponents of the Ministry 
without their sanction : thus when it was desired to recog-
nize the great services of Sir Charles Tupper to Canada the 
full assent and approval of Sir Wilfrid Laurier were obtained 
and communicated to the recipient of the Privy Coun-
cillorship then awarded.1 Nor is it normal to award any 
honour to a public servant of a Dominion save with the 
express approval of the Ministry. 
The situation in the Commonwealth of Australia is, 
however, complicated by the existence of a federal 
govern·ment side by side with the State governments and 
not, as in Canada, in marked preponderance over the pro-
vincial governments. In that case, while the same rules 
apply as in the other Dominions, there is laid down the. 
further principle that with a view to attempting to balance 
the claims of the different States of the Commonwealth the 
Governors of the States are required to send to the Governor-
General copies · of the dispatches forwarding their recom-
mendations to the Secretary of State. These recommenda-
tions may then be commented on by the Governor-General 
to the Secretary of State, his duty being to assist the Secre-
tary of State in the apportionment among the various 
persons recommended of . the available honours, .which 
naturally fall short of the numbers of names put forward. 
The position is clearly far from ideal, since the Governor-
General has his own recommendations and those of his 
ministers to consider, though the latter duty is somewhat 
diminished by the objections to putting forward any names 
for honours entertained by the Labour Government when 
in office, a11d he cannot be expected to be able to regard 
the recommendations of the States with quite the same 
1 Recollections of Sixty Years, p. 12 . 
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favour as those made by himself on his own personal k11ow-
ledge or on the recommendation of his responsible advisers. 
It is not wonderful, therefore, that the State Governments 
from time to time formally raise objections to the system 
by which the Governor-General has any voice in the matter 
at all. The situation has also been rendered more difficult 
by the complication which arises from the possibility that 
a State official may be rewarded for a Commonwealth 
service, and further trouble has arisen owing to the rule 
that the Governor-General offers to invest any recipients of 
honours who desire to receive investiture from him, thus 
interfering in some degree with ·what the State Governors 
feel is their proper function. Moreover the Governor-
General alone receives a delegation of the power to confer 
the title of Knight Bachelor on the recipients of the honour 
of K.C.M.G. or G.C.M.G. These matters are indeed trifles, 
but that does not prevent them being sources of annoyance 
out of all proportion to their intrinsic merit . 
. As the honours are Imperial and as they rest on the 
personal bestowal of the Sovereign, the only change which 
could be made in the mode of procedure would be to eliminate 
the personal activity of the Governor and to lay it down 
that no honour should ever be bestowed but on the recom-
mendation of the Ministry. This change would in effect 
be very slight, the number of recommendations made by 
the Governors being very small, and practically no such 
recommendation would ever be accepted had it not received 
the approval of the Ministry, when suggested to them. 
Erroneous views as to the action of the Secretary of State 
in this regard have now and then been expressed, as in the 
case of a coronation honour bestowed on a Canadian gentle-
mail engaged in finance, whose appointment was strongly 
criticized in the Canadian press : in fact, however, the 
gentleman in question was recommended not for Canadian 
services but for his services as an M.P. in the United King-
dom by the leader of the Opposition, and the honour was 
conferred on that ground alone without reference to the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies. The issue, therefore, 
• 
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narrows itself to the questions whether every recommenda-
tion made by a Dominion Government is to be adopted, 
and put in that form the answer must . clearly be in the 
negative, since, as the honour is an Imperial one and as the 
number of honours to be bestowed must be limited, only 
a selection of the names put forward can possibly be accepted. 
In making his choice the Secretary of State naturally 
welcomes the opinions of Governors as to the comparative 
merit of the various candidates put forward by the Ministry, 
but it must be remembered that the recommendation of the 
ministers is submitted in full to the Secretary of State, and 
that therefore, the opinion of the Governor is merely one 
of the facts which the Secretary of State has to take into 
account. It is doubtful, therefore, whether any substantial 
change in the present procedure is either necessary or 
desirable. The simple plan of abolishing honours for 
Colonial services is one which has not yet by any means 
won general approval in the self-governing Dominions, nor 
at present is there any indication of the trend of public 
opinion in these Dominions decisively in that dire~tion. 
At the same time it is right to say that the conferring of 
hereditary honours in the case of residents in the self-
governing Dominions is probably a mistake. It is not 
a practice of recent origin: baronetcies have been bestowed 
from a comparatively early date upon men in respect of 
Dominion services, nor can it be forgotten that a considerable 
number of baronets in the United Kingdom claim to be 
baronets of Nova Scotia. Peerages have been fewer : 
Sir John Macdonald's services to Canada were recognized 
by the conferring of one on his widow, and Lords Mount 
Stephen and Strathcona obtained their peerages, in each 
case with a special limitation, for financial services to the 
Dominion. But in all these cases the recipient was resident 
in the United Kingdom, and though the suggestion that 
peerages might properly be bestowed for services in Australia 
has been put forward occasionally in the Australian press, 
it would be idle to deny that such a proposal would not 
meet with general approval. The conferring of a baronetcy 
• 
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on Sir Joseph Ward was certainly unpopular among quite 
a wide circle in New Zealand, and has told against his well-
deserved popularity in that Dominion : in the opinion of 
competent observers it assisted in his defeat in the general 
election of 1911. In South Africa the feeling does not seem 
to be so marked, but South Africa is not a pure democracy, 
and its views cannot be deemed to be precisely those of 
the great democratic communities generally. If as early 
as the end of the eighteenth century it was felt that the 
proposal to create a hereditary aristocracy which was 
contemplated as possible by the Quebec Act of 1791 was 
out of the question, the creation of a mere social aristocracy 
must be deemed still less in harmony with the ideals of the 
Dominions in the twentieth century. The grant of member-
ship of the various Orders, of knighthoods, of the highest 
distinction of Privy Councillorships terminate with life, and 
are earned by service : there is no essential objection on 
democratic grounds to such distinctions which meet a need 
of human nature, but there is the gravest objection to the 
grant of honours which descend to those who have no 
claim to them except by the accident of birth. 
The grant of such honours is made the more objectionable 
by the curious and indefensible anomaly · laid down in 
No. 142 of the Colonial Regulations, which in the last edition 
reads as follows : 
Except as provided in the following paragraph, British 
subjects who enjoy in the United Kingdom precedence 
by right of birth or by dignity conferred by the Crown do 
not lose such precedence, while either temporarily or per-
manently residing in any part of His lVIajesty's over-sea 
dominions. 
In the absence of special instructions from the King, and 
subject to any specific provision in the authorized local tables, 
the precedence within any of the Governments of His Majesty's 
over-sea dominions of all persons holding office or discharging 
official duties, whether naval, military, or civil, within that 
Government, is determined solely by official rank, and the 
wives of such persons, even though they enjoy precedence in 
the United Kingdom by right of birth, take their place 
according to the precedence of their husbands. 
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The second paragraph above cited lessens the absurdity 
which would result from the . strict application of the rule 
as first enunciated, under which in not a few instances 
subordinate officers would have taken precedence over the 
ministers in charge of the departments of State in which 
they were serving at the time. But the rule as a whole 
must be deemed to be wholly incompatible with the prin-
ciples of responsible government which demand that 
precedence should be regulated by the Governor solely in 
accordance with the wishes of ministers as regards every 
person residing in or visiting the Dominion, subject of 
course to any wishes of the King regarding the precedence 
of the members of the royal family, who normally rank 
immediately after the Governor, though on special occasions, 
such as the visit of the Duke of Connaught to the Union of 
South Africa to open the first Parliament of the Union, 
special precedence over all persons in the Dominion, includ-
ing the Governor-General, was granted by Letters Patent. 
Subject to this one exception there is no possible ground 
of Imperial interest in insisting that persons entitled to 
precedence in the United Kingdom shall enjoy such pre-
cedence in the self-governing Dominions, and the rule as laid 
down in the Colonial Regulations contradicts other instru-
ments of greater validity such as the authorized table of 
precedence for the Commonwealth of Australia which does 
not conform to the rule. Nor in point of fact is the rule 
strictly observed : -indeed save at the most formal functions; 
such as birthday dinners, precedence is normally not 
strictly observed in governmental functions in the oversea 
Dominions. In the Commonwealth of Australia indeed the 
question is as usual complic:ated by the existence of the 
States and the Commonwealth as in some degree equal 
authorities. The Commonwealth· table assigns in the 
opinion of the States too low a position at Commonwealth 
functions to State ministers, and the States have State 
tables of precedence which differ among themselves and 
differ from the tables for the Commonwealth in the position 
assig11ed to the several officers. In Victoria and Tasmania 
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special precedence is conferred by law on the Chief Justices, 
and this precedence can only be modified by legislation. 
A further confusion arises from the question whether ·the 
presence as a guest of the Governor-General turns a function 
into a Commonwealth function, though the answer to that 
question would appear to be clearly in the negative, and the 
height of confusion is reached in theory though not in 
practice by the occasional holding of joint levees by the 
Governor-General and Governor of a State. 
The question of ecclesiastical precedence, long agitated, 
has practically been solved by the recognition of the sever-
ance of the Church of England in the Dominions from any 
direct connexion with the State, arid the natural conclusion 
that ecclesiastical precedence must be honorary and need 
not be confined to any one denomination, a position Which 
leaves the Governor to settle the matter with the aid of 
ministers in such manner as meets from time to time the 
needs of the community, even if it does not necessarily 
satisfy wholly the views of the heads of the different Churches. 
The question, like all questions of precedence, is essentially 
one which does not lend itself to rigid definition, and the 
compiling of a table of precedence for the Dominions ~-~ 
a task which promises less and less success. The old 
Canadian table which is nominally still in force contains 
a good many anomalies and even absurdities, but any 
alteration would raise thorny questions of the kind indicated 
in a debate in the Canadian Parliament in 1909 .when 
a proposal was made that the quasi-diplomatic position 
which the Consuls-General of the great powers were coming 
to occupy in the Dominion should be recognized by the 
assigning to them of a definite place in the table of pre-
cedence. The proposal was not without some weight, and 
the Government were not at all unsympathetic in tone in 
their reply, but it was not felt desirable to take any action, 
nor indeed could a new table of precedence be drawn up 
without raising grave questions connected with ecclesias-
tical precedence. The obvious conclusion to be drawn is 
that precedence is essentially a matter for the judgement 
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of ministers and for the fullest exercise of the rules of 
responsible government. 
A further prerogative, the complete exercise of which 
is not entrusted to a Governor, is that of mercy, which is 
still dealt with as in some degree a matter too important 
to be completely entrusted to the Governor for exercise at 
the discretion of his ministers. The reservation of authority 
is a historical accident easily explained when it is remem~ 
bered that responsible government began at a time when 
the Colonies were far from the mother country as regards 
means of communication, and when the communities were 
so small that the prerogative of mercy was one to be exer~ 
cised with great care under difficult circumstances. It was 
also for a long time considered by ministers to be in their 
own interest to maintain the responsibility of the Governor :-
they were, in cases in which they were unwilling that the 
prerogative should be exercised, able to state that they had 
no power to comply with the requests made for the liberation· 
of criminals, and that the matter was one for the discretion, 
of the Governor. But naturally with growing sense of 
self-reliance ministers began to feel that they were entitled 
to have a say in all matters connected with the management 
of the affairs of the Colony, and in 1888, as a result of an 
insistence by the . Governor of Queensland on the strict 1· 
interpretation of his rights under the instruments of Govern-: 
ment, the Ministry resigned office, and the Secretary of State 
for the Colonies found it impossible for him to 'Support the 
position taken up by the 9overnor. In 1892, as the result · 
of a communication from the Governor of New Zealand, 
who pointed out the anomaly of a positio11 in which the 
Governor was instructed to exercise a personal discretion . 
which he could not effectively do in face of the power of · 
ministers to resign and render his position untenable, the 
personal responsibility of the Governor in the Australasian 
1 Perhaps an erroneous one, as the question actually raised was one 
affecting a statutory power under the Probation of Offenders Act to reduce 
sentences. But the principle was discussed as such ; of. Queensland Votes 
and Proceedings, 1888, i. 601-5. 
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Colonies was restricted, as it had already been restricted 
in Canada since 1878, to cases in which the grant of a pardon 
or reprieve might directly affect the interest of the Empire 
or of any country or place beyond the jurisdiction of the 
Government of the Dominion, in which cases the Governor 
• 
was to take these interests into his own personal considera-
tion in conjunction with the advice tendered to him by his 
mini~ters. This is now the position in the case of Canada, the 
Commonwealth of Australia, the six Australian States, and 
New Zealand, but there are still further restrictions imposed 
in the case of the Union of South Africa and of Newfound-
land~ In the .former case the Governor-General is required, 
whenever any offender shall be condemned to death by the 
sentence of any court, to submit to the Executive Council 
any report made by the judge who tried the case, and to 
consult them with regard to it, taking steps to obtain the 
presence of the judge if that course is deemed desirable. 
The Governor-General shall ·not pardon or reprieve the 
offender unless it shall appear to him expedient to do so 
upon receiving the advice of the Executive Council thereon : 
but in all such cases he is to decide either to extend or to 
withhold a pardon or reprieve, according to his own deliberate 
judgement, whether the members of the Executive Council 
concur therein or otherwise; but in case he decides any 
such question in opposition to the judgement of the majority 
of the .members of the Council he shall enter on the minutes 
of the Executive Council a statement of his reasons for not 
acting on the advice of that body. In other than capital 
cases he is, like all other Governors, except that of New-
foundland, expressly required to receive the advice of one 
at least of his ministers, who would of course be the minister 
for justice or officer corresponding, and in such cases nothing 
is said as to his forming a personal opinion in cases where 
~mperial interests are concerned. In the case of Newfound-
land, which adheres to the old type, the Letters Patent an,d 
Instructions dating from 1876 before the changes in the 
Canadian instructions were made at the request of the 
Canadian Government, no obligation of consulting ministers 
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is expressly · inserted, but in . capital cases the Governor i~ 
required to follow the procedure sketched above in the case 
of the Union. ; The result in the Colony has been not alto-
gether satisfactory, since until quite lately the Ministry 
have left the Governor to deal with all .cases of pardon, 
with the inevitable result that when Sir William Macgregor 
pardoned an offender for a slight contravention of the game 
laws, he was somewhat bitterly attacked in the .Oppositiori 
press, nor does it seem that in the time of his successor 1 
matters had altered in any way for the better, though it is 
now recognized that theoretically at least Governors are not 
responsible for dealing with cases of applications for remis .. 
sions of sentence, save in capital cases. It is, however, easy 
enough to understand how serious is the pressure put upon 
ministers in countries with a small population when death 
sentences are involved: in Tasmania, on the last occasion 
of such a sentence, the Governor took pains to point out 
that the responsibility, no Imperial interest arising, lay on 
his ministers, not on himself, and the Ministry, despite the 
fact that the murder was a particularly inexcusable one, 
felt bound to yield to popular feeling and commute the 
sentence of death. Somewhat later in Weste1~n Australia 
the Government were attacked bitterly in Parliament by 
one of their own supporters for their determination to carry 
through a death sentence, the justice of which could only 
be denied by supporters of the abolition of capital punish-
ment for every offence. In New South Wales still more 
recently the action of the Government in commuting the 
sentence of the perpetrator of a particularly cold-blooded 
murder was challenged in Parliament and attributed to the 
lack of moral courage of the Government, an attack to which 
the most effective reply of the Government was that their 
opponents had shown equal lack of moral courage.2 In 
Canada successive Governments have had energetically to 
assert the principle that the action of ministers in granting 
1 See Sir R. Williams, How]. became a· GoVernor, p. 415. . 
2 New South Wales Parl. Deb-., 1910, Sess. 2, ·pp. 44 seq. Cf. ibid. 1911; 
PP· 1295~, 1296, 1316; Sydney Bulletin, July .13, 1911 ; ·Aug. 10, 1911. · 
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pardons must not be made the subject of parliamentary 
discussion if the evil of dealing with judicial matters by the 
worst possible of tribunals, a deliberative assembly acting 
on ex parte statements and arguments, is to be avoided. 
and the tenor of justice not obstructed. The strength of 
popular feeling can be seen from the famous incident in 
the Union of South Africa, when the Governor-General 
in his Imperial capacity as High Commissioner commuted 
a sentence of death passed for an. offence committed by 
a native in Southern Rhodesia, although of course Lord 
Gladstone's action as High Commissioner was not in the 
slightest degree a legitimate source of complaint by the 
people of the Union, to whom he owed no duty or respon .. 
sibility in the matter. . . 
. But, though these instances might easily be increased 
ad nauseam, it does not appear that any proper purpose 
is served by the attempt to create an independent position 
in tJ,:lese matters for the Governor or to throw upon him 
a. personal responsibility. It may be convenient for minis• 
ters to shelter themselves behind that responsibility, but 
that is no reason for sparing them the burden of a . duty 
which is an essential part of the Government of any country_ 
The retention of a clause requiring the personal responsibility 
of a Governor for the execution of death sentences cannot 
possibly be justified when the question is merely one of 
internal administration : the concession of responsible 
government should not be made to a community which 
cannot be trusted to deal properly with its criminals. If 
the question is one of Imperial concern, it is equally clear 
that the decision should re~t with the Dominion Govern-
ment, upon whom the Gov~rnor on his own account and 
on the account of the Imperial Government can urge 'vhat• 
ever considerations may be of importance in the matter, 
and it really cannot be .assumed that .any Dominion Govern• 
ment would fail to give due effect to these recommendations 
on behalf of a criminal. At least it would be wholly im-
possible to find any case recorded in which the Government 
of any Dominion or State has refused just consideration to 
. - ~ 
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uch a claim, or any case in which. t.l1e Governor has really 
:equired tO overrule his ministers on such .a head. Any 
cases in which representations on behalf of a criminal have 
been made by foreign Governments of wl1ich there are 
several on record, the best known being the case of Andersen 
in South Australia, have been examined by the Colonial 
Ministries and any necessary action taken in respect of the 
examination. The restriction in the case of the Union of 
South Africa and Newfoundland might be said to have 
a certain justification arising from the special facts of these: 
cases, but it may be doubted if it is really worth while 
endeavouring in this very indirect way to secure protection 
for natives in the Union in the solitary case of death sen-
tences, ar1d in Newfoundland the only Imperial use of the 
prerogative could be to protect aliens in the enjoyment 
of fishery ·rights from penalties imposed under local laws, 
and it may safely be assumed that the Governments of these 
aliens would take effective steps to relieve directly or 
indirectly these alien subjects from any wrongful penalties 
imposed upon them, though no doubt the remission by the 
Governor of such penalties might be a more co11venient 
mode of procedure from the point of view of the Imperial 
Government. But any real issue of this kind should be 
met by direct action such as was taken in 1907, when for 
a definite -purpose the la-w·s of Newfoundland regarding the 
fishery were overridden by Order in Council 1 in order to 
preserve American fishery rights, and when the simpler 
means of the use of the prerogative of pardon was not 
resorted to, nor contemplated. 
A further criticism on the existing rule as to pardon 
presents itself. In every case it is expressly laid down that 
the Governor is not to grant pardons conditional on the-
person pardoned going into banishment or exile, though 
except in the case of Newfoundland this rule is not applicable 
to cases of a political offence unaccompanied by any other, 
grave crime, and in the case of the Union of South Africa, 
in view of the extreme fondness of criminals for infesting 
1 See Parl. Pap., Cd. 3765. 
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the Rand, the prohibition of banishment is restricted to 
the case of British born or naturalized subjects. · The 
origin of the limitation is historical : the United States 
Government complained in the case of one Gardiner that 
he had been liberated by the Governor of New South Wales 
011 condition that he went into banishn1ent, and protested 
that this procedure was improper as tending to induce 
criminals to have resort to the {Tnited States, and the 
principle was then adopted that each Colony should accept 
responsibility for the punishment of its own criminals.! 
The principle is on the whole a just and proper one, at 
least when it is limited to British subjects, as there may well 
be cases where the best . plan of dealing with .a criminal 
alien is to expel him for good from the scene of his misdeeds, 
but it is _not a principle which should be enforced through 
the Governor i11 the mode prescribed. It could not of course 
effectively be thus enforced. There is nothing whatever to 
prevent the making of an agreement between the criminal 
a11d the Adm.inistration that. if he is willing to leave the State 
he ""rill be pern1itted to do so, but will be prosecuted if he again 
appears in it, so that banishment can in practice be effected. 
It is clear that the best course to adopt and that most 
in harmony with Imperial relations is that the power to 
pardon should be delegated in absolute terms without any 
sort of reservation and subject to no conditions whatever. 
The taking of this step would result in the removal of the 
absurd anomaly -through which the Governors-General of 
Canada and the Union of Soutl1 Africa have been deprived 
of the power to pardon offenders who have committed 
orimes outside the Dominion for which they may be tried 
within the Dominion or Union. This anomaly is due, it 
is clear, to following in the instruments for Can~da and the 
Union the terms of the Royal Instructions to the Governor-
. ~ 
General of the Commo11wealth of Australia. In the Com-
monwealth the crimi11al law remains under the control of 
the States., and the Governors of the States therefore possess 
the power of pardoning offences again'3t the criminal law, 
1 See Parl. Pap., :_C~ 1202, 1248. 
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and also offences for which offenders may· be tried in State 
courts though the offence was not committed in the Common-
wealth. The power of pardon in the case of the Governor-
General is therefore limited to offences against the laws ~f 
the Commonwealth, as is appropriate since the laws of the 
Commonwealth and the States are distinct things. In 
Canada and the Union, however, the Lieutenant-Governors 
and Administrators of the provinces have no delegation of 
the pardor1ing power from the Crown, though the former 
have the power to remit penalties under provincial statutes, 
a power conferred by statute, and accordingly the following 
for Canada and the Unio11 of the Commonwealth model has 
resulted in an omission, which could only be made good in 
strict law by the exercise of the royal prerogative by the 
Crown or by a special delegation. Moreover, by the same 
procedure the powers of the Governor-General of Canada, 
as it existed under the Letters Patent a11d Instructions up to 
1905, to pardon for offences against the laws of the provinces 
is taken away and no power of pardon in the case of offences 
a<Yainst the provincial Acts of the Union is cor1ferred on the 
0 
Governor-General, omissions of theoretic interest if of n() prac-
tical importance, since apart from the question whether such 
pardons are ever likely to be desirable, no one would question a 
pardon, even if not lawfully granted, by the Governor-General. 
A further power hitherto delegated to the Governor has 
recently become of doubtflil validity. Earl~y· in the history 
of New Zealand it became obvious that it was often desirable 
that when the Governor 'vas on duty in some part of the 
Colony at a distance from head-quarters, as was naturally 
often the case, there should be some person within easy 
reach available to perform the minor operations of govern-
ment which required his assent. It was therefore decided 
that it would be desirable by express provision to alter the 
rule that a delegate cannot delegate his powers, and pro-
vision 'vas accordingly made in the Letters Patent of 1867 
which permitted the Governor, in the event of his having 
occasion to be absent for a short period from the Colony 
or the seat of government, to appoint by an instrument 
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11-nder 'the public seal the Lieutenant-Governor of the 
Colony, or any other person if no such officer existed, to 
be his deputy and to exercise on his behalf during his 
absence such powers and authorities vested in the Governor 
by the Letters Patent as should be specified in the instru-
ment, without prejudice, however, to the full exercise by 
the Governor of his powers. The same rule was adopted 
in the case of the Australian Colonies, and the convenience 
of th~ practice is obvious. Provision is also contained for 
the appointn1ent of deputies by the Governors-General of 
Canada, the Commonwealth, and the Union of South Africa 
in the constitutions of these Dominions, the power being given 
by statute for the same reason as the creation by statute of 
the office of Governor-General, the Crown having no pre-
rogative to create the federations or appoint their officials. 
In 1906, however, a Bill was introduced into the House 
,of Assembly of South Australia and duly passed by that 
,House under which it was contemplated to confer on the 
deputy Governor all the statutory powers of the Governor 
and the powers conferred on the Governor by the Letters 
Patent. The Bill was rejected by the Upper House, which 
considered not unnaturally that, the matter affecting the 
prerogative, it was neither necessary nor desirable, but in 
1910 it was reintroduced and passed in an altered form, 
and was reserved for the signification of the royal pleasure. 
It appears from the preamble and the proceedings in the 
Parliament on the Bill that it was felt by the Chief Justice 
of the State to be doubtful whether the Letters Patent were 
adequate to delegate to the deputy Governor any powers 
other than those portions of the prerogative which were 
actually possessed by the Governor by reason of thei~ 
delegation in the Letters Patent only, and whether anything 
short of a statute would be adequate to enable the Governor 
to delegate powers which were vested in him by statute 
~nly. The Bill therefore delegated to the Governor the 
power to appoint a deputy during his temporary absence 
from the State or from the seat of government who would 
be able, subject to any limitations contained in the instru ... 
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ment appointing him to be a delegate, to perform any of 
the prerogative powers or statutory powers of the Governor. 
It conferred the same power on the officer for the time 
being administering the government and ex majore cautela 
it ratified all acts done by deputy Governors in the past. 
The essence of the argument plainly is that the term 
Governor in local acts refers only, unless the contrary is 
clearly expressed, to the person actually appointed by the 
Crown to be Governor, and does not apply to a deputy 
·whom that person may be definitely permitted by the Crown 
to appoint to exercise a certain portion of his functions. 
The question is one doubtless . not free from ambiguity, but 
in favour of the validity of the power must be set the fact 
that save by Sir Samuel Way in South Australia: no doubt 
seems ever to have been expressed by the law officers or 
judges of Australia or New Zealand as to the right of the 
Crown to confer this power, and that it is difficult to see, 
in the absence of any statutory definition of the term 
Governor, how it is not open to the Crown to arrange for the 
action as Governor of a defined individual selected by the 
Governor. At any rate although the Act was accorded 
the royal assent by Order in Council, thus intimating the 
acceptance by the Secretary of State of the views of the 
Chief Justice, and although the attention of the other 
States and of New Zealand v,ras drawn to the passing of 
the Act, the opinion of its necessity was not by any means 
unanimous. New Zealand :t, indeed legislated by Act No. 4 
of 1912 in the sense of the South Australian Act, and 
Tasmania followed suit by Act No. 18 of the same year, 
but no legislation seems to have been deemed necessary 
by the high legal authorities of N e"\v South Wales 2 and 
Victoria, and the need for such legislation ·may very well 
be doubted in the case of a prerogative exercised for some 
fifty years without question raised. 
1 See Parl. Deb., clviii. 530-2. So in Western Australia by Act No.l7 of 
1911; Parl. Pap., Cd. 6091, p. 54. 
2 Of. Clough v. Bath, 22 W. N. (N.S.W.) 152, where a signature of th~ 
Chief Justice acting as Deputy was held valid though not stated to be 
signed by him as deputy. 
CHAPTER IV 
IMPERIAL INTERVENTION IN EXECUTIVE ACTS 
THE Governor of a Crown Colony is in constant receipt of 
instructions for his guidance from the Secretary of State, 
and in his executive action he is always subject to control 
from ·home. The essence of responsible government is to 
transfer the direction from the Imperial Government to 
the Government of the Dominion or State, but the question 
inevitably presents itself whether that transfer is absolute, 
or whether there is any class of cases in which a Governor 
should or may act in disregard of the wishes of the Ministry 
of the day, on no other ground than that he is instructed 
Dr holds that an Imperial interest is involved in the matter, 
which it is his duty to preserve even at the expense of 
disagreement with ministers. It is clear that in so far as 
such a class or classes of cases exist there is a definite limit 
to the self-government of the Dominions. 
Apart from his action as part of the Legislature, which 
will concern us later,1 two classes of cases have already 2 
been mentioned. In the first place, the Governor has certain 
definite obligations in the case of the exercise of the preroga-
tive of mercy, and in the second place, he is not bound to 
• 
support the recommendations for honours put forward by 
his ministers or to refrain from putting forward names of 
persons whom they do not recommend. These are definite 
departures from the full rule of responsible government ; 
the former is an anomaly which might well be removed, 
but the latter is less easy to dispose of, as it is essentially 
a c·ase in which Imperial and Dominion interests are so 
involved as to exclude the full operation of the rule of 
responsible government, inasmuch as the principle in this 
event comes into conflict with the principle that the Crown 
has a right to confer honours without ministerial responsi-
1 Part II, chap. i. 2 Above, chap. iii. 
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bility and that for the conferment of honours not made 
proprio m_o~u_ by the Crown ~he Im?erial Government has 
a responsibility to the Imperial Parliament. · 
The state of affairs as regards honours suggests that any 
other instance in which the Imperial Government has 
interfered or sought to interfere in connexion with the 
executive acts of a Dominion Government will lie in a debat-
able region in which Imperial and Dominion action are 
seriously confused. In point of fact this is precisely the· case 
in the most famous of modern instances, the instruction 
sent by Lord Elgin as Secretary of State on March 28, 1906, 
to the Governor of Natal to suspend the execution of twelve 
natives who had been tried by a court-martial sitting under 
martial law, proclaimed on February 9, for the · murder of 
two police officers who had fallen on February 8 in the execu-
tion of their duty in the arrest of certain natives.1 The 
unrest in the ·Colony was apparently in some degree con~ 
sequent upon the removal of the forces of the Imperial 
Government from Natal, with the exception of the remnants 
of the garrison regiment which . was then in the- process of 
gradual disappearance, the policy under which it had been 
created having been abandoned by the Imperial Government. 
The result of the withdrawal, which was in strict accordance 
with the arrangements made on the concession of responsible 
governmer1t, though the actual move was delayed owing 
to the outbreak of the Boer War, was doubtless to impress 
the Government of Natal with a sense of the danger of the 
position of the Colony with its white population of 100,000 
to nine times that nu~ber of natives, and the murder of the 
policemen, which would normally have been regarded as 
mere matter for the action of the police force, led to the 
hasty declaration of martial law, and an energetic appeal to 
the Imperial Government was made by the Natal Govern-
ment for the sending of Imperial forces from the Transvaal, 
on the ground that the moral effect of the sending would 
be incalculable though it was not expected that any actual 
use of the men would be made. · The request was complied 
1 Responsible Government, i. 291-6. 
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with, the 2nd Cameron Highlanders being dispatched from 
Pretoria to Pietermaritzburg, where their mere ·presence at 
once impressed the whole native population of the Colony 
with the view that the Natal Government had the full 
support of the Imperial Government. In these circumstances 
it would have been normally proper that the trial of the 
alleged murderers of the two policemen should have been 
carried · out by the extremely competent High Court of 
Natal, but the Government, despite the representations to 
this effect by the Governor, who naturally considered that 
with the situation well in hand there was no need for the 
action under martial law when the courts of the Colony 
'vere open, insisted on trying the natives by a court-martial. 
Their persistence in this action is the more remarka~le in 
that they had clearly not the slightest desire to give the pri-
soners anything but a fair trial : care was taken to examine 
witnesses in the defence of the accused, and to treat the 
matter with all serious consideration, and the decision to 
execute twelve of the natives was only arrived at after the 
sentences of the court had been carefully considered by the 
Governor in Council. On the other hand, the proceedings 
could not from the nature of the case possess that validity and 
security of due observance of the forms of law and justice 
which would have resulted from the adoption of the normal 
mode of trial by the law courts. This fact naturally caused 
perturbation in the United l{ingdom, and at the same time 
the position of the Imperial Government was directly affected 
by two considerations : in the first place, they could ·not 
ignore the fact that the action of the Government of 
Natal 'vas in the long run rendered possible by the presence 
of the Imperial forces in South Africa, and immediately by 
the presence of the battalion in Pietermaritzburg, and in 
the second place, they realized that the action of · the Natal 
Government and of the Governor must be sanctioned ex post 
facto by an Indemnity Act, since obviously as the courts were 
open there could be no chance of alleging successfully that 
the court-martial held on the murderers was legal in itself. 
It was in these circumstances that the Secretary of State 
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on March 28, 1906, learned from the Governor that it was 
intended to execute twelve of the natives tried for the 
murder of the policemen, that the trial had been conducted 
in due order, that the sentences had been conside-red by the 
Governor in Council, and that the Governor had agreed, 
being satisfied that no injustice was being committed. Lord 
Elgin replied by telegram on the same day that feeling 
was being caused by executions under martial law, that the 
Imperial Government was involved through the retention of 
Imperial troops in the Colony and the necessity. of sanction-
ing an Indemnity Act, and he added, 'I must impress upon 
you necessity of utmost caution and you should suspend 
executions until I have had opportunity of considering your 
further observations '. The reply to this telegram was an 
intimation through the Agent-General of the resignation 
of the Ministry ; further information was supplied by the 
Governor on March 29, and on March 30 the Imperial 
Government agreed to the executions if the Ministry on 
full considerati<?n considered them necessary, a view which 
the Ministry naturally held. 
The episode is one which unhappily has never received the 
discussion in cool and calm dispatches which Mr. Churchill 
promised the House of Commons that it would ~n due 
course receive, and the view of the Government on the topic 
must be gathered from the reply made by Mr. Churchill 
to the criticisms of the · Opposition in the debate which took 
place in the House of Commons on April 2 on the motion 
for the adjournment of the House moved· by Mr. Ramsay 
Macdonald to discuss the way in which martial law in Natal 
was being applied, and the imminent and grave dangers 
to the native subjects of the Crown involved in its administra-
~ion. The gist of this brilliant and combative defence is 
that by an unfortunate concatenation· of circumstances 
the Governor fail~d, without any fault being imputed to 
him,1 to make known the full situation as to the means 
taken to make clear the guilt or otherwise of the natives, 
SQ that the telegram of March 28 arrived when it had been 
.. 
). • :::.· .!.-.. ;. . ~· 1 This was clearly absurd . 
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assumed by Lord Elgin that the trouble was subsiding, that 
the information of the proposed execution came as a great 
surprise, that the telegram of suspension and inquiry was 
absolutely essential in order that the Secretary of State 
should be able to justify his position, that the resignation 
of the Natal Government had a flavour of precipitancy, 
but that it had not influenced in any way the decision of 
the Imperial Government, which would have been the .same 
had the Government not resigned, once it had the requisite 
information. He made flirther a strong point by insisting 
that had the persons executed been foreigners the Imperial 
Government would have been the persons to whom the 
foreign Government would have turned for redress, and he 
also laid stress on the importance of the meting out . of 
even-handed justice to the native subjects of the .Crown. 
Colo:q.el Seely reinforced Mr. Churchill's arguments by in-
sisting on the error of trying the men by martial law in 
view of the defects of any military tribunal from the point 
of view of appreciation of legal points. The Opposition was 
feebly represented: Mr. Long was impressed with the gravity 
of the questio11 at issue and p1uch relieved by the explanation 
given, though he raised the question whether it was proposed 
to treat the great self-governing Dominions in the same 
fashion as Natal. Sir Gilbert Parker insisted that every 
Colony had a perfect -right to manage her own affairs, as she 
thought proper ; and laid stress OJ} the fact that the Common-
wealth of Australia has telegraphed to express objectio11 
to interference with the action of a self-governing Colony. 
It is clear that the comparisons of the case of the great 
self-governing Dominions with that of Natal were hardly 
seriously . meant as contributions to the discussion, ~nd 
allowance must be made for the natural bitterness of feeling 
of the Opposition in view of the recep.t defeat of the party 
at the ,general election, which had been greatly contributed 
to by the policy of the late Government as to Chinese labour. 
The sufficient answer to that argument is that the self-
governing Dominions like Canada do not require the aid 
of British troops to keep them from grave risk in the event 
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of a native rising, and that the acceptance and indeed earnest 
solicitation of Imperial aid is not consistent with full self-
government when that aid is needed for the preservation 
of internal order. Nor again can it be supposed that 
a Ministry conscious of its true position and_ duty would 
have resigned in the midst of what it declared to be a . critical 
situation without even arguir1g the question at issue with 
the Secretary of State; such headlong precipitancy was the 
action of an admittedly weak Government seeking public 
applause in view of an appr_oaching parliamentary struggle, 
and had the Imperial Government been as little aware of 
its duty as the Government of Natal it could have met the 
situation by the withdrawal from Pietermaritzburg of the 
battalion, and the grant of leave of absence to the Governor, 
leaving Natal to emerge as it best could from its difficulties, 
with the immediate result of a collapse on the part of the 
Ministry. Fortunately, the Imperial Government was not 
in the slightest degree likely to take any such step, and so 
the Government of Natal could take its dramatic exit with 
safety. Nor on the main question was there the slightest 
justification of. the trial of the natives by martial law ; the 
Governor urged them not to adopt this course, and no 
unprejudiced judge can deny that he was in the right. 
Had the Imperial Go~ernment in the special circumstances 
of the case insisted on the Governor withdrawing the 
proclamation of martial law, a serious issue might have 
arisen bet""eeil the Colonial Government and the Imperial 
Governmer1t, but the action of the Imperial Government 
amounted merely to a suspension of an execution pending 
further information, and the resignation took place without · 
even an .attempt to argue the matter. 
It is right, however, to admit that the Secretary of State's 
telegram was in one matter defective ; it conveyed to the 
Governor an instruction to suspend the executions, and 
this instruction was contrary to constitutional usage.1 After 
1 This may seem a small point, but it appears to be valid: · certainly it 
would have been impossible for any official of experience to draft such 
a telegram. 
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all the Governor was acting as he had expressly stated on 
the unanimous advice of ministers and he had declared 
that no injustice was being done ; these . were specific 
statements, and while the burden of responsibility on the 
Imperial Government in view of the employment of Imperial 
forces de facto to keep the rebellion in check was a heavy 
one, there was no ground on March 28 for the Secretary of 
State to do more than to ·send an invitation to ministers, 
through the Governor, to suspend the execution until he 
was supplied with such further information as might be 
'i1ecessary to place the Imperial Government iri a secure 
position from the point of view of its responsibility to 
Parliament and the country at large, in which a good deal 
of feeling had been excited and in which sympathy for the 
natives was strong. Had such a telegra.m been sent, or had 
the Secretary of State taken the still simpler plan of tele-
graphing in reply that he had learned with concern of the 
necessity to execute the natives on trial by a court-martial, 
but that if the Governor were assured of their guilt he must 
accept his assurance, it 'vould have been wholly impossible 
to criticize the action of the Government in any way. But 
by adopting the form of words cited above, which gave an 
instruction to a Governor to override a decision of ministers 
in which he had concurred, instead of preferring a request, 
the Secretary of State was guilty of an error of judgement; 
which a more expert Governor than Sir Henry McCallum 
would have perhaps been able to make good. It must be 
remembered in fairness to Lord Elgin and to Mr. Churchill 
that both were wholly without familiarity with the conven-
tions of correspondence with self-governing Dominions, and 
that their decision had to be taken in a very brief space and 
without the full advantage of consultation with their per-
manent officials. 
Such as it is the incident stands by itself, and the cir-
cumstances attending it are too peculiar to allow it to rank 
as a precedent of any value for any purpose. The conclusion 
has, however, been drawn by authorities who might have 
been expected to be better informed that the Natal case 
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has established the rule that a Dominion Government in 
any dispute with the Imperial Government has only to 
resign in circumstances which make it certain that the 
Governor cannot find any alternative Government for the 
Imperial Government to give way. For this view there is 
neither any logical ground nor any current of practice. The 
solitary example which can actually be cited is, as has been 
seen, sui generis, and concerned simply with an order to 
a Governor to act independently of ministers in an executive 
act under martial law. In 1892 the Governor of New Zealand 
refused the request of the Ministry of Mr. Ballance to add 
twelve members to the Upper House; the Governor acted 
not on instructions from the Imperial Government but on 
what he understood to be the line of policy laid down by that 
Government in favour of the maintenance of the independent 
character of the Uppel' House of Parliament. The Govern-
ment of the day declined to resign, on the ground that if 
the Governor was acting according to his duty they could 
not take that as a ground for refusing him their assistance 
in the government, and the matter was in due course 
settled in their favour by the Secretary of State.1 In 1907, 
the next year after the Natal incident, the Government of 
Newfoundland found their legislation overridden by an 
Imperial Order in Council made under an Act of 1819, but 
even the very extreme nature of this action did not result 
in the resignation of the Ministry.2 In 1908 the then Govern-
ment of Natal found itself at loggerheads with the Imperial 
Government over their stoppage of the payment of the 
salary of the Chief Dinizulu, whom they had arr.ested under 
the cover of martial law, proclaimed without any justification 
and against the opinion of the Governor and the Secretary 
of State; Natal had agreed not to interfere with that 
salary, save with the consent of the Secretary of State, at 
the time when Zululand was handed over to the colony to 
govern, and the Imperial Government insisted on their 
intention to pay it. The Natal Government yielded and made 
1 Parl. Pap., H.C. 198, 1893-4. 
2 Ibid., Cd. 3765. 
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arrangements to assist the Chief in preparing his defence.1 
The Parliament of New Zealand in 1910 passed a drastic 
Shipping Bill intended to penalize vessels which en1ployed 
orientals in their crew ; the passing of the Bill was asserted 
in Parliament to be essential, but when the Imperial Govern .. 
ment could not give its assent, the New Zealand Government, 
despite the unanimity of feeling in the Dominion, took no 
steps to resign. In 1906 the Parliament of the Common .. 
wealth passed a Bill to give a preference to British goods 
conveyed in ships manned only by white labour and being 
British; the Imperial Government was unable to agree to 
the Bill, partly on treaty grounds, but still more because 
they could not accept a preference which was given in 
a manner to differentiate against British subjects of Indian 
origin.2 Nevertheless, Mr. Deakin, least likely of men to 
acquiesce in any course not constitutional, remained in 
office. In the midst of the very lively discussions between 
the Imperial Government and the Canadian Government on 
copyright, from 1889 to 1894, though the temper of Canada 
ran high, resignation was never hinted at ; 3 nor from 1907 
to 1913 did the Commonwealth ever threaten resignation, 
despite the somewhat unbending attitude of the Imperial 
Government regarding the treatment of merchant shipping.4 
It would be easy to prolong the list of cases, but it is needless 
to do so ; it is certain that no Government has ever resigned 
because of disagreement with the Imperial Government on 
any other subject than martial law executions in Natal. 
Nor is it difficult to see the reason why this is so. The 
Government of the United Kingdom could regard with 
equanimity the resignation of a Dominion Government, 
even if no other Government would take its place ; it is 
not responsible for the carrying on of the Government, and 
all inconvenience to the Governor could be avoided by the 
simple process of giving him leave of absence. It is ludicrous 
to suppose that the Dominion would remain without 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 3888, 3998, 4001, 4194, 4328. 
2 Ibid., Cd. 3523. 3 Ibid., C. 7781, 7783. 
4 Ibid., Cd. 2483, 3826, 3891, 4355 . 
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ministers and that its political life would end because there 
was a disagreement between the Government and the 
Imperial Government. The only means of bringing about 
a really serious state of affairs would be for the Dominion 
to set up as an independent state. The reason why the 
action of the Government inN a tal made the position difficult 
for the Imperial Government was the simple fact that the 
Imperial Government, having troops in the Colony and 
having large and important interests throughout South 
Africa, could not view with equanimity disorder in Natal. 
The question is of importance because it illustrates the 
negative side of responsible government ; while that govern-
ment means the greatest possible exercise .of freedom of 
action for the Ministry, it at the same time involves the 
consequence that the Ministry must be guided by reason and 
moderation, and must be prepared to consider the rights of 
other governments within the Empire and to contribute 
its share of concession in order to reconcile conflicting 
interests, for the conflict of interest from time to time is 
quite inevitable in any group of communities. 
To the rule of action on ministerial advice it has been 
often suggested that an exception exists in cases where the 
power to act is given to the Governor by Imperial statute 
and not by local act ; in these cases it is maintained the 
Governor acts with the authority of an Imperial officer, and 
not as a Colonial officer at all. This proposition will not, 
however, stand consideration. In the first place the possi-
bility of acting effectively without the advice of ministers 
is obviously minimal, and in the second place the only 
sound principle must be that for action in a Dominion 
there must be a minister responsible. Nor on examination 
will any of the statutes be found to be such as to render such 
personal action at all desirable. Thus certain powers were 
given to Governors by the Acts for the protection of 
aborigines in the Pacific wher1 being recruited for work in 
Queensland or elsewhere in the Pacific ; an attempt to 
claim that the Governor of New Zealand ·should act on 
his own discretion 'vas very properly rebuked by the 
F2 
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Governor "'ho pointed out that he could not act in the manner 
laid down except by the aid of his ministers, on whose advice 
he would act. Other cases are the duties of Governors 
under the Extradition and Fugitive Offender Acts, under 
the Merchant Shipping Act, under the Territorial Waters 
, Jurisdiction Act, and minor Acts ; in each of them it will be 
seen on analysis that it is presupposed that the Governor 
acts with the full aid of a colonial administration, which is 
as much as to say that he acts on the advice of his ministers. 
\ 
• 
CHAPTER V 
THE DISSOLUTION OF PARLIAMENT AND THE 
DISMISSAL OF MINISTERS 
1. THE DISSOLUTION OF PARLIAMENT 
IN the cases hitherto discussed the apparent exceptions · 
to the rule that a Governor, like the King, acts on ministerial 
advice rest on two grounds, either the fact that in some 
cases action on such advice may expose the Governor to 
the risk of breaking the law, which it is his duty to uphold,1 
or that he has Imperial interests to consider and Imperial 
instructions to carry out.2 In neither of these cases does 
there seem to be on examination any fundamental reason 
for breaking the rule of responsible government, and the 
Governor might well be freed from legal liability and thus 
not put in the position of having to defy the law, and might 
also well be instructed to act always on ministerial advice. 
The only apparent exceptions to this rule which would 
convert him into a viceroy proper would be cases in which 
joint Imperial and Dominion responsibility was involved, 
as when British and Dominion troops were operating 
together in a Dominion, or when t .he question of the grant 
of Imperial honours was concerned. 
But the question of the meaning of acting on ministerial 
responsibility brings us to a most important and character-
istic difference between the constitutional practice of the 
United Kingdom and that of the self-governing Dominions, 
a difference which is often hardly realized through the 
vagueness of the term ministerial responsibility. In the 
United Kingdom it means in the first place that a minister 
must take responsibility for every act of the Crown; that, as 
the Crown can commit no wrong, if the Crown acts officially, 
1 A hove, chap. ii. _ 2 Above, chap. iv. 
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its action must be countersigned or otherwise adopted by 
ministerial authority. In the second place it means that 
the minister is responsible to Parliament. These two 
considerations are enough to establish a parliamentary 
form of government as opposed to constitutions such as 
the constitutions of the German Empire and of Prussia, 
where the acts of the Sovereign are covered by ministerial 
responsibility, but the minister is not responsible to any 
power except the Sovereign. But in parliamentary govern-
ment as practised in the United Kingdom there must be 
added the further rule that the King can only act on the 
advice of a minister who is actually holding office, and that 
without such advice he cannot act. This further point 
differentiates the constitutional practice of the United 
Kingdom from that of countries like Italy and Greece, 
where the King can constitutionally refuse to accept the 
advice of ministers provided he can find other ministers, 
or, more strictly, persons ready to become ministers . and to 
accept responsibility for the action of the Sovereign. 
It is true that this doctrine is not always accepted as part 
of the received constitutional law of the country. Is it to 
be contended that the Sovereign would have no power to 
dismiss a Ministry which, having forfeited the favour of the 
country, clung to office with the aid of a parliamentary 
majority which had notoriously ceased to be in harmony 
with the electorate, or, still worse, without a parliamentary 
majority at all ? Would it not be the duty of the King to 
decline to accept the advice of such ministers and to give 
the people the free right to exercise their choice of a new 
Ministry through the action of their representatives in 
Parliament? The answer to both these questions is, how-
, 
ever, less difficult than might be expected. The essential 
basis of the British constitution, as it stands at present, 
is the close correspondence between the electorate and 
Parliament, which ensures that at the outset of a Parliament 
the Ministry of the day shall in great measure faithfully 
express the will of the majority of the electorate. · The 
comparatively short duration of Parliament minimizes the 
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possibility of the discord between Parliament and the 
electorate becoming serious, while, it must be remembered, 
as the members of Parliament . are subject to the same 
influences as the electorate, and also to the pressure of their 
constituencies, a clear change of feeling among the electors 
reveals itself among the members of Parliament. Of this 
there can be no more striking example than the resignation 
of Mr. Balfour's Government in 1905 when in possession 
nominally of a decisive parliamentary majority, which, 
however, through the change of feeling in the country, owing 
to the rise of new issues which were not present to the 
minds of the electors of the Parliament, had ceased to be · 
really effective for constructional work. Even in such · 
a case as this the balance of advantage lies in t~e strict 
application of the constitutional rule : any action of the 
Sovereign would have introduced ye_t a new factor into the · 
situation as it existed in 1905 and have obscured the is~ues. 
Moreover, it is, and must always be, a matter of the most 
grave difficulty to decide whether the people really approve 
or ·not the existing Government, and it is not desirable that 
the Crown should be involved in action which must rest on 
doubtful calculation, and which in any case at once submits 
the person of the Sovereign to the bitterness of political 
discussion. In the second case the argument in favour of 
the inaction of the Crown is overwhelming : there is no real 
possibility of any Government defying Parliament for any 
considerable length of time: they cannot but meet Parlia-
ment every few months, and a distinct defeat in Parliament 
must be retrieved by an even more distinct vote of con-
fidence, or resignation must follow. 
In view of these considerations the statements that from 
time to time are made, that the Sovereign has a discretion 
to dismiss ministers 1 and to dissolve Parliament, cannot be 
taken too seriously. It was, of course, very freely suggested 
during the struggle over the Parliament Act that the King 
should decline to accept the advice of the Ministry to give 
an undertaking that he would permit the use of his power 
1 See, e. g., Sir C. Dilke, Journal of Royal Society of Arts, I vi. 344. 
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to create peers with a view to securing the passage of the 
Bill through the Upper House. But, while those who 
pressed this view were frequently indiscreet in their protest 
against the powerlessness of the Crown if it could not act 
as they wished, they ignored the fact that had the Crown 
acted on their advice the inevitable result would have been 
that the political strife would have changed from an attack 
on the privileges of the aristocracy to an attack on the 
monarchy, and the position of the Sovereign would have 
been gravely affected. It is easy to argue that a King 
who must accept the advice of his ministers serves no 
useful purpose, but the argument is as wrong as it is simple, 
and aims at the very existence of the British monarchy. 
The very fact that in the long run the Sovereign will act on 
the advice of ministers places the Crown in a position of 
great influence and effect when it seeks to exercise a moder-
ating control over the action of the Government. The 
discussions between the Prime Minister and the King do 
not assume the difficult and hostile form of a dispute 
between equal authorities, but take the form of a discussion 
in which it is the clear duty of the Prime Minister and of the 
Cabinet of which he is the head to make every effort to 
meet the views of the Sovereign, and to make it clear that 
the action which they are taking is the deliberate will of 
the majority of Parliament and of the electorate. Such 
a position in the long run has far more effect in moderating 
political action than any effort made by one party to play 
the Crown as a pawn in their efforts to meet the tactics of 
the other, however unfair they may deem these tactics to be. 
These theoretical arguments may be applied to the 
specific case of a dissolution of Parliament. It has recently 
been contended 1 that the power to require a dissolution 
is one which rests constitutionally with the K1ng even 
against the desire of his ministers. Put in its most favour .. 
able form the argument runs that no self-respecting Executive 
confident in the support of the country would ever withhold 
1 See the discussion by Mr. James Caldwell and Mr. Swift MacNeill, Times, 
Sept. 22, 24, 29 ; Oct. 1, 1915. 
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its consent to an appeal to the electorate if desired by the 
Crown. If it did withhold its assent it could have no good 
grievance if it were carried out without its consent. If the 
result of the election were that the new Parliament returned 
a new Executive, it would be proof that the Ministry had 
no right to act as the Government : if on the other hand 
the Parliament supported the Executive, it would have 
little to complain of : it would have remai11ed in office, it 
would be armed with a fresh mandate from the electorate, 
and Parliament would have five years to run_. 
·The fatal objection to this view arises in the case of an 
Executive which for some reason is not prepared to dis-
solve in deference to the royal wishes. The Government in 
1910 did so dissolve, but such a result may not always be 
possible: the Government may have very urgent work 
to do, it may think that the appalling cost direct and 
indirect of a general election is unjustifiable, or its followers 
in Parliament may decline to agree to a dissolution possibly 
at an early period after a previous dissolution. In that 
event the King cannot diss~lve Parliament without their 
consent, and they still remain in office. The necessary steps 
for a dissolution of Parliament require ministerial authority, 
and therefore a Sovereign who was determined to dissolve 
Parliament against ministerial advice must dismiss the 
Ministry and appoint another before a dissolution is possible. 
Now for such a dismissal of ministers there is absolutely 
no parallel since the eighteenth century, when jn 1784 the 
King dismissed the coalition Ministry of Fox and Lord 
North. The oft-quoted case of the action of William IV 
with regard to the Melbourne Ministry is normally adduced 
to prove that that Ministry was dismissed and that ex post 
facto the full responsibility for the dismissal was accepted 
by Sir R. Peel, which if true would show that ministerial 
responsibility may be exercised ex post facto. But the 
publication of the Melbourne papers has shown once and 
for all that the example of dismissal is non-existent : with 
his characteristic easy nature Lord Melbourne wrote to the 
King saying that the latter might wish to , change the 
' 
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Ministry, having regard to the losses of personnel it had 
sustained, and it is as clear as possible that this letter Was 
an intimation of consent to change and, if the King desired 
that change, of resignation by the Ministry of the day.l 
Nor is it any more possible to find examples of dissolutions 
forced on governments by the Crown since the establishment 
of responsible government. It is not to be supposed for 
a moment that the Crown accepts all the advice of ministers: 
the Crown, as we know from the letters of Queen Victoria 
as well as from less authentic sources, frequently makes 
objections, especially in personal questions such as appoint-
ments, and ministers withdraw the peccant proposals.2 
But that is not the point: either the ministers of their own 
free will, on consideration of the circumstances, decide 
that a special point is not worth insisting upon in face ef 
the known wishes of the Crown, or in the alternative they 
• 
persist in their advice, in which case it is invariably followed. 
Now in the self-governing Dominions and States the 
position is in marked degree different from the position in 
the United Kingdom, and in two diverse ways. In the 
first place the Governor of the Dominion or State does not 
share in anything like the same degree as the King the 
knowledge of the policy of the Government. It is notorious, 
and is exemplified very well by Queen Victoria's letters and 
the dispute which ended in the decision to afford knowledge 
of affairs to the late King, that the Crown is kept in the 
closest touch with all questions of foreign policy ; doubtless 
the decision and the direction of that policy rest with the 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Prime Minister, 
and the Cabinet, but the Crown is not merely informed of 
everything at once, but all decisions are, if possible, com-
municated to the Crown before disp-atch or immediately 
after dispatch. The close attention of the Crown .to foreign 
affairs is balanced by its attention to all important colonial 
1 See Sir W. Anson, Law and Custom of the Constitution, II. i, pp. xxxi, 
38, 39. 
2 e. g. the case of Mr. H. Labouchere's proposed appointment to minis-
terial rank. 
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, 
or domestic questions, and the Cabinet is expected, when 
any important step in domestic affairs is decided upon, to 
communicate it to the Sovereign for his information and 
consideration. There is no matter on which the Crown is 
not entitled to ask for information if it is not spontaneously 
offered, no matter on which it may not tender advice which 
must be received with all due respect even if it cannot 
always be given effect to. 
The same relation should in theory exist between ministers 
and the Governor of a Dominion or State, but it would be 
idle to pretend that as a rule it does so exist. In some 
senses the Governor is undoubtedly brought into very close 
contact with the management of public affairs. It is the 
practice for innumerable small matters to be disposed of 
by order of the Governor in Council, and in the Australian 
States, New Zealand, Newfoundland, and the Common-
wealth of Australia the Governor normally meets his 
ministers or some of theril in Council once a week to sign 
the many documents which must · be approved in Council. 
In this respect there is close resemblance to the procedure 
of -making Orders in Council in the United Kingdom, but 
there is no comparison between the limited number of 
matters so dealt with in the United Kingdom and the 
number of questions thus treated in the Dominions. The 
report of Sir George Murray on the management of public 
business in the Dominion of Canada, 1 in which, however, 
the Governor-General does not actually attend the Council 
meetings, but merely signs the papers submitted, shows the 
overwhelming number of documents which pass through 
the Council, as a result of the determination of Sir Joh:p. 
Macdonald and subsequent Prime Ministers to endeavour 
to keep control o:q. the action of . their fellow ministers, 
especially in the . matter of appointments and contracts. 
The multiplicity and triviality of the questions dealt witl;t 
render the normal CoUncil meeting purely formal, and 
apart from these meetings the relations of a Governor with 
ministers are often merely ceremonial and social. There 
1 Dated Nov. 30, 1912. · 
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is not in many cases recognized any general duty of informing 
the Governor of the affairs of the Dominion, and he is left 
to judge the policy of his Government from the press. 
Of course, to this rule there are many exceptions : at all 
periods of responsible government an able Governor with 
a sympathetic personality has been able to win the confidence 
of his ministers and to receive full information of their 
policies, but when all is said and done these cases are 
exceptions, and the perfect confidence which should exist 
between ministers and Governor is not often found. Nor 
when it exists is it always uncriticized : the great skill in 
securing · confidence of ministers and in establishing with 
them really cordial relations shown by Sir Gerald Strickland 
in his administration of the Governments of Tasmania, 
Western Australia, and New South Wales was made a subject 
of attack by the opponents of the appointment of State 
Governors from outside Australia, and it was alleged that 
he exercised too decisive a control over his cabinets, prob-
ably the most effective compliment payable to the Governor, 
whose services were also the occasion of a more formal form 
of praise on the opening in Sydney of the Conference of 
State Premiers in 1915. Other cases of marked success in 
establishing close relations with ministers are of course not 
unknown: Lord Grey's indiscretions did not prevent his 
attaining really a considerable place in the regard of the 
Canadian Governme~t, and Lord Gladstone's administra-
. . 
tion as first Governor-General of the Union was marked by 
very close relations with the Government of General Botha. 
But instances to the contrary are not rare : it was shown 
conclusively in the Victorian Parliament that Sir Thomas 
Bent, at the end of 1908, obtained a dissolution from Sir 
Thomas Carmichael under deliberate and grave misrepre-
sentations of fact as to the possession by the Treasury of 
adequate finances in order to carry on the business of the 
State during the period of the general election, and in the 
Queensland crisis of November 1907 a serious factor in 
the disagreement between Lord Chelmsford and the Premier 
was the lack of complete confidence towards the former 
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shown by the latter, which led him into a distinct intem-
perance in his treatment of the situation. .. 
On the other hand, while the Governor in one way is far 
less closely in touch with a Ministry than the Crown with 
the Imperial Government, at the same time the Governor 
is expected to exercise an independent discretion which is 
not attributed to the Crown by anything more formidable 
than occasional dicta. It is perfectly clear that in the 
Dominions and States the . Governor is expected to exercise 
a personal discretion as to the grant or refusal of a dissolution 
of Parliament, and that he is not expected to act on minis-
terial ·advice unless he is satisfied that it is in the best 
interests of the Dominion or State. There are various 
reasons for this position: Dominion Parliaments are nor-
mally of short duration, three years in Australasia, five 
years in Canada and the Union, and frequent dissolutions 
waste time, prevent progress with important private and 
public measures, cost money, and impose upon me·mbers 
of Parliament, who are all salaried, the trouble of defending 
their pecuniary interest by appealing to their electors. 
Moreover, it is argued that Dominion and State ministers 
do not have that high sense of public duty which would 
cause an Imperial Government not to ask for dissolution 
unless it really considered it in the best interest of the 
country. Further, as all Dominion Parliaments are com-
paratively small, a dissolution may often have no pronounced 
result, so that every effort should be made to carry on 
without one, until the next general election comes by 
efflux of time. But, whatever the value of the reasons, the 
practice is wholly beyond dispute, for at the Colonial 
Conference of 1887 the question was formally debated at 
the instance of New Zealand, and any change formally 
decided against by the great majority of opinion of the 
delegates present. Nor is there a single Dominion save 
Canada and the recently formed Union of South Africa in 
which many cases of refusal of dissolution have not occurred 
up to the most recent dates. Indeed there is no doubt that 
the refusal of dissolutions under certain circumstances by 
94 IMPERIAL UNITY ... '-\ND THE DOMINIONS 
Governors is deliberately counted upon. An amusing 
instance of this occurred in December 1913 in the State of 
Victoria.1 The Government majority, which was over large, 
was unruly, and in a division on a Redistribution Bill the 
Government suffered defeat in the Legislative Assembly 
by thirty-one votes to twenty-nine on the question whether 
the numbers of that body should not be raised from sixty-five 
to seventy. In intent to bring his followers into better order 
the Premier, Mr. Watt, resigned office, and advised the 
Governor to send for the leader of the Labour Party, Mr. 
Elmslie. This gentleman accepted the duty of forming 
a Ministry, with the result that the malcontents of the 
Government side, seeing that they had no chance of being 
asked to form a Government. and oust Mr. Watt, came into 
submission. Accordingly, after the new ministers had been 
sworn in on December 9, thus forming the first Labour 
Ministry ever known in Victoria, they were at once defeated 
on the motion for · the adjourn;ment of the House, and 
a week later, when the ministers were absent from Parlia-
ment seeking re-election as required by the Victorian 
constitution which in this matter is old fashioned, they were 
defeated on a direct motion of want of confidence, moved 
by Mr. Watt, by forty votes to thirteen. They then applied 
for a dissolution, which the Lieutenant-Governor promptly 
declined, so that Mr. Watt, who had been able confidently 
to reckon the failure of his opponents to obtain a dissolution, 
was able to return to power and to reconstitute as he 
desired his Ministry. The manreuvre, indeed, was precisely 
similar to that of Sir Elliott Lewis in 1909, in Tasmania, 
when he found · that one of his followers, Mr. Ewing, was 
anxious to supersede him in office. He resigned, and the 
Governor sent for the leader of the Labour Opposition, not 
for Mr. Ewing. The gentleman sent for, Mr. Earle, asked 
for but was refused a dissolution of Parliament, and Sir E. 
Lewis was enabled to reassume office with the assurance 
that he had disposed for the time being of the disloyalty of 
Mr. Ewing. 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 7507, p. 62. 
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The importance of avoiding a dissolution after ~ recent 
election may lead to curious results : thus after the general 
election in Newfoundland in 1908 the equality of parties 
made it clear that it was not possible to carry on the govern-
ment satisfactorily, and Sir Robert Bond, the leader of the 
Government, asked for a further dissolution. The Governor 
declined this request and in his place appointed the leader of 
the Opposition to the post of Prime Minister, on the under-
standing that Sir Edward Morris vvould spare no effort in 
order to secure that the work of government should be 
carried on smoothly. But when all the efforts of Sir E. 
Morris to secure the adhesion of any member of the Bond 
party failed, and when it became, as a result, impossible for 
the House of Assembly to elect a Speaker, though Sir E. 
Morris proposed one of his own supporters for that office, 
he consented to dissolve Parliament once more, . with the 
result that, having the advantage of Government patronage 
and control of the elections, Sir Edward Morris won a marked 
victory. It is clear that, under the exact circumstances 
of the case, the Gover~or acted in the only possible manner 
in giving the dissolution to Sir E. Morris, but an interesting 
position would have arisen' had Sir Robert Bond had the 
good sense to allow one of Sir E. Morris's supporters to be 
elected Speaker, since then he could have defeated him in 
the House and further confused the issues. 
The principle of discretion as regards dissolving Parlia-
ment applies of course to every Executive action of the 
Governor as the head of the Executive. There is no special 
privilege of the Governor as regards dissolutions, and the 
frequency with which he · refuses dissolution and does not 
refuse his assent to other actions of his ministers results 
merely from the obvious fact that he can only refuse to act 
if he can find other ministers to carry on the Government, 
if the ministers whose advice he refuses to accept _resign 
office as a result of that refusal. Normally a Ministry is too 
securely seated to allow the Governor to believe that he 
can find other ministers. He cannot leave his post without 
imperial permission, and if he tried to disregard the advice 
• 
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of ministers without being able to find others, he would be 
compelled to ask them to return to office at much personal 
humiliation. But, if a Government asks for a dissolution 
' ex hypothesi it is not secure, and the Governor has a real 
choice of ministers which he can exercise. Nevertheless 
occasions may arise where the Governor can refuse some-
thing other than a dissolution, and one of these arose in 
New South Wales in July 1911. The Premier was then 
on absence in the United Kingdom, and two of the labour 
party then in power revolted at a decision of the Govern-
ment on the lands question and resigned their seats in order 
to let their constituents have the opportunity of expressing 
their views on the issue. The result was to deprive the 
Government of their parliamentary majority, so that they 
could not carry a motion for the adjournment of the Assembly 
over the period necessary for the holding of new elections 
to fill the vacant seats. The leader of the Government then 
approached the Lieutenant-Governor, who was acting in 
Lord Chelmsford's absence in England, and asked for 
prorogation of Parliament over the interval. This would 
in effect have been to use the prerogative to effec~ what the 
Government had been unable to do in the normal way and 
the Lieutenant-Governor declined to act as desired, and 
asked the leader of the Opposition if he could form a Ministry. 
The latter, however, was only prepared to try if he could 
be given a promise of a dissolution of Parliament if he asked 
for one after his appointment as Premier, and, when the 
Lieutenant-Governor declined to promise this, he declined 
to make the attempt to form a Ministry, with the result 
that the Lieutenant-Governor asked the Labour Ministry 
to remain in office and accorded them the prorogation 
asked for.1 
A further result from the discretion thus allowed to 
a Governor is the fact that he can impose conditions on the 
I 
grant of a dissolution of Parliament, such as that the 
Parliament shall be called together at the earliest possible 
date or that supply must be obtained before the dissolution 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 6091, p. 69. 
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is granted, though in the latter case it is obvious that to · 
wake his condition public might result in the Parliament 
defeating his aim. Nor can he be fettered by any objection 
raised by a parliamentary majority : thus in the _Queensland 
case in 1907, when the Governor declined to give assurances 
as to overriding the Upper House when in disagreement 
with the Lower House, his Ministry resigned, and, as they 
had a large majority in the Lower House, secured from that 
House a refusal of supply and a protest against a dissolution, 
but nevertheless Lord Chelmsford gave the dissolution 
desired. The example is a striking instance of the power 
of the Governor to disregard ministerial advice, for the 
. -
Ministry had so solid support in the country and in Parlia-
ment that the success of the Opposition in forming a Ministry 
which could 'vin an election appeared from the first worse 
than problematical. 
But while it is idle to deny the existence of this discretion, 
which means that ministerial responsibility can be applied 
ex post facto for an act which must really be taken by the 
Governor on his own initiative, it is much more doubtful 
if the continuation of the practice is desirable for an indefinite 
period. It is of course essentia~ly a matter for the develop-
ment of constitutional practice in the Dominions, since it 
has grown up there with the full approval of the electorate, 
who feel that they have in the Governor a shield against the 
vagaries of party politics. But it must be admitted that in 
itself the practice is characteristic of immaturity and of 
defective development. The proper penalty for disobedi-
ence of the laws of responsible government by a Ministry is 
punishment by the electorate : it should not be any part 
of the duty of a Governor to remedy the defects of political 
conscience on the part of ministries, any more than that it 
should be part of the duties of the Crown to remedy the 
defects of ministries in the United Kingdom. Nor can 
a high sense of political obligation be developed so lorig as 
blame can be thrown on the Governor. It is a minor 
matter that the Governor is open to constant imputations 
of error in his actions and that such attacks may be very 
1874 <l 
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strongly worded. Thus, when Sir T. Gibson Carmichael 
refused to accept the view that Sir T. Bent should not be 
given a dissolution in 1908, he was bitterly criticized because 
of failure to safeguard the rights of the electorate who were 
compelled to vote at the Christmas season.1 When, again, 
Sir Harry Barron refused a dissolution to Mr. Earle in 
1909 in Tasmania, he was accused of being under sinister 
influences.2 The action of Lord Chelmsford in the Queens-
land case resulted in his censure by the local Parliament, 
and only the fact that the Premier was about to change his 
policy probably led to the leaving of the matter without 
a formal demand for his recall. The Governor-General of 
the Commonwealth has thrice refused dissolutions of Parlia-
ment and in no case without a good deal of criticism.3 
Indeed, it is obvious that if a discretion exists, the Governor 
will be criticized, ·and no real meaning attaches to the 
phrase that responsibility is accepted by the new Govern-
ment which takes office, for it is open to Parliament to 
censure a Governor, while in the United Kingdom the King's 
conduct cannot be drawn into question in debate. 
Moreover, the practice of allowing a discretion inevitably 
leads to placing Governors in false positions, as was shown 
in 1914 by the case of TaS'mania. The position of politics 
in that State is rendered difficult by the fact that the Lower 
House is very small, containing but thirty members, and 
that these are elected by proportional voting in five six-
member constituencies. The result is that with parties 
nearly equally divided between Labour and Liberal no 
Government has a very secure position. In 1912 Sir Elliott 
Lewis, the then Premier, resigned, as with parties at sixteen 
Liberals to fourteen Labour he could only carry on with 
full support from his party, and that could not be assured 
at least under his leadership. Mr. Solomon, who succeeded 
him, managed to carry on matters through the session of 
1 l\1elbourne Age, Dec. 7, 1908; Argus, Dec. 7, 1908, and subsequent 
• 
ISSUeS. 
2 Hobart Mercury, Sept. 29, 1911. 
3 Turner, Australian Commonwealth, pp. 89, 100, 101, 217-21. 
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1912, though just at the ~nd of the session one of his party, 
who had independent views, proposed to desert him. This 
move he countered by inducing the Speaker of the Assembly 
to intimate his intention of resigning, and, as the independent 
member did not finally suoceed in making an agreement 
with the Labour Party, the proposal to eject the Ministry 
broke down, the .vote of no confidence proposed being 
withdrawn.1 But, in view of the difficulty of carrying 
on, Mr. Solomon asked for, and obtained, a dissolution, 
which resulted in giving him a Liberal in place of an Inde-
pendent Liberal. In the beginning of 1914, however, the 
inevitable defeat occurred, and Mr. Solomon asked the 
Governor to accord him a dissolution of Parliament. It 
was clearly open to the Governor to grant or refuse the 
request at his pleasure : there was clearly a possibility of 
an alternative Ministry, and he had the onus of choi9e 
with the feeling that in either case he would be certain to 
give dissatisfaction. He not at all unnaturally formed the 
opinion that the grant of a dissolution to Mr. Solomon would 
not be likely to result in any clear majority, and he therefore 
refused the dissolution, whereupon of course Mr. Solomon 
resigned. The Governor then on .April 3 offered Mr. Earle 
the leader of the Opposition the post of Premier on the 
distinct agreement that as Premier he would immediately 
advise the dissolution of Parliament, that the newly elected 
Parliament should be summoned before the end of May, 
and that, in the event of the office of Attorney-General not 
being filled by a duly qualified lawyer in practice, the 
Governor must reserve the right to obtain legal advice 
when he considered it necessary from other sources. These 
conditions were accepted by Mr. Earle and also by the other 
members of his Ministry, but on reconsideration Mr. Earle 
and his colleagues came to the .conclusion that it would be 
preferable to carry on with the existing Parliament, and 
they proceeded to execute a complete volte-face. On April 7 
Mr. Earle addressed a memorandum 2 to the Governor in 
which he recalled the fact that he had on April 3 demurred 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 6863, pp. 111, 112. 2 Parl. Pap., Cd. 7 506. 
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to the first two conditions imposed, and stated that he 
commanded the confidence of a majority of the House of 
Assembly and had given an assurance that he could carry 
on the Government. On these facts he respectfully 
submitted (1) that the exaction of the pledge to advise 
a dissolution of . the House of Assembly was contrary 
to the principles and well-established practice regulating 
the conduct of parliamentary government, and (2) that the 
circumstances of the case were not such as to justify the 
Governor in forcing a dissolution on his ministers. To 
enforce the carrying out of the pledge would be to cause 
Mr. Earle to tender advice which he did not consider in the 
interest of the State, and it was not right to demand a dis~ 
solution when there was available a party in Parliament 
which could carry on government, and when there was no 
great issue at stake between the parties in the country. In his 
reply of April 8 the Governor pointed out that he had not 
in any way pressed Mr. Earle to take office, that he had laid 
down clearly the conditions which Mr. Earle had accepted,. 
and that his motive in laying down these conditions was 
simply in order to secure the best advantage of the State 
by taking such action as promised the best chance of a stable 
administration. 
Finding the Governor not inclined to consider their 
change of view as binding him to change his policy, the 
Government appealed to the House of Assembly, from which 
they obtained, Sir Elliott Lewis dissenting, the passing of 
an address in which they very respectfully expressed their 
opinion that the action of the Governor in imposing on 
ministers as a condition of their appointment an undertaking 
to agree to a dissolution of Parliament, whether the House 
approved the policy of ministers or not, was contrary to 
the well-established usage of responsible government and 
was undesirable, and requested the submission of the 
address, together with ~opies of correspondence on the 
subject between the Governor and the Premier, to the King. 
This step was duly taken, and in the meantime the Governor 
permitted his ministers to carry on their functions . 
• 
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The decision of the Secretary of State was intimated in 
a dispatch of June 5, 1914, which was severely criticized in 
Australia as obscure and indecisive, two completely different 
interpretations being placed on its terms. The Secretary 
of State, while recognizing that the condition of affairs in 
Tasmania has been difficult owing to the practical equality 
of parties, definitely pronounced the view that the Governor's 
action in the matter was not in accord with constitutional 
practice. The grounds for this view were stated as follows: 
The observance of the principles of responsible govern-
ment requires that a Governor must be clothed with 
ministerial responsibility for all acts in relation to public 
affairs to which he is party as head of the executive. He 
cannot therefore perform any such act except on the advice 
of his ministers, and for performing it on such advice no 
political responsibility attaches to him personally. The 
question whether or not a dissolution should be granted is 
a purely internal affair and is thus regulated by the general 
rule. A Governor therefore cannot dissolve the Legislature 
except on the advice of his ministers. There have, of course, 
been not a few cases in which Governors have rejected advice 
tendered to them by their ministers that· the legislatures 
should be dissolved. These do not, however, stand on a 
different constitutional footing from any other case on which 
a Governor may have found himself unable to accept the 
advice of his ministers. In all such cases the ministers either 
acquiesce in the Governor's action, in which event they accept 
responsibility for it, or leave the Governor to find new 
ministers who will accept the responsibility. 
A Governor may feel it incumbent on him to consider with 
special care requests for dissolutions, but constitutionally 
he has not special powers in such matters. It follows there-
fore that he is no more entitled to impose on a.n incoming 
Ministry as a condition of admitting them to office that 
they should advise a dissolution of the Legislature, than that 
they should tender any other specified advice.1 A Governor 
is, of course, entitled to discuss the aspects and the needs of 
the political situation freely and fully with his proposed new 
ministers, but he cannot go to the length of requiring them 
to give any particular advice as a condition of accepting 
1 Eee Sydney Daily Telegraph, April 13, 1914; Argus, April 13, 1914. 
The Morning Herald rather supported the Governor. Cf. Round Table, 
1914, pp. 736-8. 
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their services without claiming a personal responsibility 
which does not attach to him. · - . 
I have carefully examined in this connexion the action 
of the Lieutenant-Governor of Nova Scotia in 1860, to which 
my attention has been drawn as affording a possible parallel 
to your action. In that case Lord Mulgrave had rejected the 
advice of his ministers that a dissolution should take place 
on the ground that it was improper thus to interfere with 
the procedure provided by law for testing the validity of 
elections of certain members of the Assembly. Before com-
missioning Mr. Young as Premier in succession to Mr. John-
stone, Lord Mulgrave required from Mr. Young an assurance 
that each case of alleged disqualification should be inquired 
into with as little delay as possible. This assurance was 
duly given by Mr. Young before he was entrusted with the 
duty of forming a Government. Viewed in the light of 
what had happened previously, Lord Mulgrave's action 
was in effect merely a reminder to Mr. Young that in taking 
office he would assume responsibility for the decision that 
the law must take its course. The case thus presents no 
analogy to that under discussion. 
At the same time, while I consider that you should not 
have imposed terms on Mr. Earle, I recognize that he was 
entirely at liberty to decline the duty of forming a Govern-
ment unless he was left with complete discretion as to the 
advice to be tendered to you. Instead of doing so, he decided 
to take office, and thus must be held to have accepted for 
the time being full responsibility for your action. He re-
mained fully responsible until the Ministry determined to 
advise in the contrary sense, when the policy of dissolution 
ceased to be authorized by ministerial advice, but became 
a matter of your personal opinion, that is to say, no constitu-
tional means existed of giving effect to it without another 
change of views on the part of ministers or another change 
of Ministry. 
The dispatch dealt with a very difficult position caused 
by a breach of faith by a minister of the Crown and by 
a mistake on the part of the Governor, and this fact explains, 
no doubt, the obvious difficulties which its terms raise, and 
its apparent inconsistencies. To say · that the Governor 
cannot perform any act as head of the Executive Govern-
ment except on the advice of ministers is wholly incon-
. si.stent with the admission that he may refuse a dissolution 
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of Parliament to ministers, for in refusing a dissolution he 
emphatically does not act on the advice of ministers; and 
even if it is argued per impossibile that a refusal to accept 
advice is negative and is not included in the term act, still 
it is perfectly clear that the new ministers whom he is left 
to seek are not sought on the advice of the old ministers, 
who would not dream of tendering advice to the Governor 
to take others in their place. We must therefore fall back 
on the rule that a Governor must be clothed with ministerial 
responsibility either before or after his action, a position 
in which, as has been seen, he differs essentially from the 
King, who must be clothed to adopt the metaphorical 
language of the dispatch with such authority in advance. 
The rule, however, that ministerial responsibility ex post 
facto covers any action of the Governor renders improper 
the censure passed on the Governor for imposing conditions : 
the censure is one directed on the Ministry, and it is in-
correct for a Secretary of State to censure a Ministry. The 
Governor's error in this reasoning becomes reduced to the 
mistake of not recognizing that his ·ministers were free to 
alter their minds, since there is no relation between ministers 
and Governor which compels them to adhere to plans 
matured beforehand, even for a few days. Moreover, the 
reasoning in the case of Lord Mulgrave's action is, it must 
be confessed, sophistical and unhistorical. Lord Mulgrave 
would certainly not have understood the version of his 
action given by the Secretary of State : he belonged to 
a generation which felt perfectly entitled to treat firmly 
Colonial Premiers in small colonies, and he simply acted _ 
as he reported he did :_ declined a dissolution and made 
Mr. Young Premier on a definite agreement, which he took 
good care, as his report shows, to have carried out. It is 
a blunder to think that the full doctrine of responsible 
government was realized fifty years ago : it is a · plant of 
slow and gradual growth, and the mistake of the Governor 
in relying on that precedent to justify his action was due 
to the lack of historical sense: many things have been 
done in the early days of responsible government which 
• 
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cannot now be done; The argument in the Secretary of 
State's dispatch would have left Mr. Young the option of 
discarding his pledge immediately on his appointment, -the 
last thing which Lord Mulgrave would have permitted·. 
The truth is that these sophistical arguments arise directly 
from the false doctrine which permits a discretion to a 
Governor and allows him tp choose between acting on 
advice from ministers, or disregarding their advice and 
seeking ex post facto for ratification. These voyages of 
exploration into the unknown are a mistake: they are, if 
Dominion statesmen would only realize it, inconsistent with 
full responsibility, and are signs of lack of political strength. 
Nor are there wanting signs that the future may see without 
any formal change some tendencY towards the adoption of 
the more self-reliant and independent mode of procedure. 
This conclusion is based on the striking action of the 
Governor-General of the Commonwealth in 1914 in granting 
the request of his ministers for · a double dissolution of the 
two Houses of the Parliament of the Commonwealth. 
The circumstances of the request were exceptional. At 
the general election of May 31, 1913/ the Labour Ministry 
of Mr. Fisher appealed to the country not merely to return 
them to power, but also to give a verdict on six Bills for 
the alteration of the Constitution of the Commonwealth, 
which, in accordance with that Constitution, had been passed 
by the two Houses of Parliament and were therefore required 
to be submitted to the electorate. The six Bills all dealt 
with matters affecting trade and commerce, and they were 
brought forward because a long series of judicial decisions 
had established the invalidity of much Commonwealth 
legislation on these topics, and had made it clear that the 
Commonwealth Parliament had no power to regulate the 
carrying on of trade within the States either directly or 
indirectly.2 It was therefore proposed by the first of the 
Bills to confer on the Parliament power to legislate as to 
trade and commerce generally and not merely that between 
the States and with other countries. The second Bill pro-
· 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 7507, pp. 59, 60. 2 Below, Part II, chap. i, § I. 
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posed to confer on the Commonwealth a general power of 
dealing with all corporations, whether Commonwealth, State, 
or foreign, in place of the existing power, which was restricted 
to foreign corporations and financial or trading corporations 
formed within the limits of the Commonwealth, and even 
with regard to them was held to be very lin1ited in extent, 
as it was not open to the Commonwealth to regulate their 
mode of conducting trade, that being a matter for State law. 
The third proposed law provided for the conferring on the 
Commonwealth of plenary powers of legislation as to con-
ditions of employment, relations of employers and employees, 
strikes ar1d lock-outs, the maintenance of industrial peace, 
and the prevention of industrial disputes, superseding the 
very limited power of legislation for conciliation and arbitra-
tion for the prevention and settlement of industria~ disputes 
extending beyond the limits of any one State. The fourth 
Bill extended this power of the Commonwealth to deal with 
conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and settle-
ment of disputes in relation to employment on the railways 
of a State. The fifth Bill gave the power to legislate as 
regards trusts, combinations, and monopolies in relation 
to the production, manufacture, or supply of goods, or the 
supply of services; while the sixth Bill authorized-Parliament, 
if both Houses in the same session by absolute majorities 
declared that the industry or business of producing, manu-
facturing, or supplying any specified services was the subject 
of a monopoly, to make laws for the carrying on of the 
business or industry under the control of the Commonwealth 
and acquiring for that purpose on just terms any property 
used in connexion with the industry. The power, however, 
was not to apply in the case of any industry or business 
conducted by the Government of a State or by a public 
authority constituted by a State. Similarly, concessions 
to State feeling were made in the case of the first two Bills 
by excluding from their operation trade and commerce on 
State railways if not otherwise subject to Commonwealth 
legislation and municipal or State governmental corpora-
tions, points in which the Bills differed from the proposals 
• 
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brought forward in 1911 and then rejected by the electorate: 
on ~hat occasion also the proposals were presented as two 
Bills only, a fact which was held by some authorities to 
have militated against their acceptance. 
The result on this occasion was, as in 1911, the rejection 
of all six Bills ; but whereas on that occasion the Government 
were left i11 power, as the proposals were not brought forward 
together with an election, in 1913 the Government suffered 
defeat by one vote, 38 to 37, in the Lower House, though 
in the Senate they carried eleven out of the eighteen seats 
contested, and were in possession of the other eighteen 
which they had swept at the election of 1910, the tenure of 
office of senators being six years. The Government accord-
ingly resigned office, being succeeded by Mr. Joseph Cook's 
Ministry. -
The position. of Mr. Cook was unenviable in the extreme, 
as he had in the Lower House only the Speaker's casting 
vote to rely upon, and in the Upper House was in a minority 
of twenty-two votes, a fact made the more serious by the 
excellent organization of the Labour Party. The only mode 
of action available was therefore to proceed with a view 
to bringing into effect s. 57 of the Commonwealth 
Constitution, which authorizes the Governor-General, if the 
House of Representatives should twice pass a Bill in the 
same or subsequent sessions, three months intervening, and 
if the Senate should on both occasions reject it or amend 
it in ~uch a way that the Lower House would not agree, to 
dissolve both Houses of Parliament; thereafter, if the Lower 
House should again pass the Bill and the Upper again reject 
or alter it, the Bill could be submitted to a joint session of 
the two Houses, and, if approved by an absolute majority of 
the members, be presented for the royal assent. If a double 
dissolution could be obtained, then there was a chance of 
getting rid of the dead weight of the opposition of the 
Senate. Accordingly the Government introduced two Bills 
into the Lower House when Parliament met, the one of 
which was intended to restore the postal vote at elections 
for the Commonwealth which had been repealed in the 
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session of 1911, and the other was to secure that no prefer-
ence or discrimination should be made for or against any 
person in relation to any employment by the Commonwealth 
or by any department or authority thereof, on account of 
his membership or non-membership of any political or 
industrial association. The first of these measures was 
intended to remedy what was believed to be a hardship 
on women desiring to vote, and the second was a protest 
against the preference given by executive action in connexion 
with Commonwealth employment to labourers belonging to 
trade unions. Neither could be said to be a measure of first-
class importance, and the purpose of the latter, as far as 
practical effect was concerned, was given by reversing the 
former executive authority, but both were chosen as brief 
points on which to base graver issues of principle. The Bills 
were pressed on, and, though for a time the Senate declined 
to eonsider them, after they had by the use of the closure 
been forced through the Lower House, on the ground that 
the Government had declined to treat seriously in that 
House two motions of want of confidence in the Government 
and the Speaker respectively moved by the Opposition, 
they finally proceeded with the consideration of both 
measures, rejecting the Bill to prohibit preference to trade 
unionists, and so altering the other Bill that the Lower 
House would not accept their amendments. In the following 
session of Parliament in April 1914 the Government brought 
the two Bills again forward, and promised a programme 
which would have upset a good many of their predecessors' 
actions, including in particular the arrangement by which 
the Commonwealth bank competed with the States' savings 
banks. Great difficulty was experienced in pressing forward 
the Bills, but eventually the Bill forbidding preference to 
unionists was carried through the Lower House, to be 
rejected on first reading by the Senate, and the necessary 
position for asking the Governor-General for a double 
dissolution was created. This application was duly made, 
and on June 5 the consent of the Governor-General to a 
double dissolution was announced. 
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The news of the Governor-General's consent was received 
with much surprise. The late Attorney-General of the 
Labour Government, Mr. Hughes, made public on June 9 
a statement in which he expressly declared that the grant of 
double dissolution was unconstitutional. He laid stress on 
the fact that the Constitution gave the States equal repre-
sentation in the Senate, and thus indicated that the Senate 
was intended to be a real power in the Constitution, and that 
it should not be reduced to a formality. Section 57 of the 
Constitution could not be applied to any Bill whatever 
without reducing the Senate to a nullity and destroying its 
co-ordinate legislative power. If it were right to dissolve 
the Senate for the s~ke of the Preference Prohibition Bill, 
it would be allowable to dissolve it for the sake of any 
measure, however trivial. Even, however, assuming that 
dissolution was constitutional in such a case, still this was 
not a c~se where it was expedient to use the power. The 
·Governor-General of the Commonwealth -had thrice 1 been 
asked to dissolve Parliament and had never before con-
sented, but had instead invited some other statesman to 
form a Government, which had been successfully carried out . . 
It had become an axiom of responsible government in 
Australia that the possibilities of the Parliament must be 
exhausted before a dissolution should be given. The 
first consideration of the Governor-General should be the 
carrying on of the business of the country, and the regular 
practice was to send for the leader of a strong party in the 
House of Representatives and to ask him to form a Ministry. 
There was absolutely no reason to suppose that the Govern-
ment could secure a majority in both Houses. The figures 
of the last election were fatal to such a presumption; and, 
if a double dissolution would not give the Government 
a working majority, there was absolutely no justification 
for the dissolution. The only possible justification for such 
a dissolution must be that the Bill in question on which 
a deadlock had arisen was one which the Government had 
1 By Mr. Watson in 1904, by Sir G. Reid in 1905, and by Mr. Fisher in 
1909. 
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a clear mandate from the people to pass into law, and this 
was not the case in the instance at stake.1 
It is obvious that if the Governor-General had refused 
a double dissolution, the Government would have resigned 
and there would have been little chance of the new Govern-
ment .carrying on without a dissolution. But such a dissolu-
tion would have been only that of the Lower House, and on 
every calculation of probabilities which was possible at the 
time there seemed no reason to doubt that Labour would 
carry a real majority in that House. The country had seen 
without edification the struggles of a Government with 
a majority of but one, and with a solid minority in the 
Upper House. The peculiar mode of voting for the Upper 
House, the State forming one constituency with three seats 
vacant at each normal election made into six at a double 
. dissolution, made it almost incredible that the Government 
could obtain a majority when in 1913 · they had merely 
carried seven out of eighteen seats, and it was therefore 
probable that the country would prefer to give a real 
majority in the Lower House to that party which was 
securely entrenched in the Upper. There was also the 
possibility, perhaps the probability, that the Labour Govern-
ment could have carried on without a dissolution, since · 
the organization of the Government Party was not so 
secure as that of its rival, and some members or member 
of it might have agreed to support a moderate Labour 
policy. 
The position was therefore that all the evidence pointed in 
favour of the Governor-General, if he adopted the Australian 
view of responsible government, deciding to refuse the 
dissolution and to ask the Labour Party to form a Govern-
ment. That with al~ these facts preserit to Sir Ronald-Munro 
Ferguson he should have decided to grant a double dissolu-
tion is only susceptible of explanation on the ground that 
he felt that it was b.est to adhere to the principles of respon-
sible government as they exist in their purest form in the 
United Kingdom. In a very real sense his action, which was 
1 Of. Round Table, 1914, pp. 550-2. 
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not altogether well received by Labour circles, 1 constitutes 
a landmark in the history of responsible government in the 
Commonwealth, for three of his predecessors had declined 
dissolutions in cases where a fair claim for a dissolution had 
undoubtedly been made, and Labour Governments had 
twice been the sufferers by the refusal. 
Recovering from the shock of surprise at the decision of 
the Governor-General, the Senate on June 18 2 presented 
an address asking for the publication of the communications 
between His Excellency and his advisers relating to the 
simultaneous dissolution of both Houses of Parliament, 
a request which was declined on ministerial advice by the 
Governor-General. On . June 19 much more important 
action was taken. In the preceding session of 1913 and in 
the present session the Senate had formally passed once more 
the six Bills regarding the alteration of the Constitution 
which had been rejected at the election of May 31, 1913, 
and they now passed an address to the Governor-General 
praying that in accordance with s. 128 of the Constitu-
tion he would be pleased to submit to the electors on the 
day to be fixed for the taking of a poll for the election of 
members of the House of Representatives to the next 
Parliament the six proposed laws for the amendment of 
the Constitution which had been passed within the statutory 
interval by the Senate and not passed by the House of 
Representatives. The section of the Constitution referred , 
to provides in the case of a proposed law for the amendment 
of the Constitution being twice passed with an interval of 
three months in the same or subsequent sessions by either 
House and rejected by the other, that the Governor-General 
may submit the proposed law to the electors in each State 
qualified to vote for the election of members of the House 
of Representatives. ,Now the wording of the Act is clearly 
permissory, and does not impose any obligation on the 
Governor-General so to submit the law, but it is perfectly 
clear that it gives him a discretion to do so. The question 
1 See Commonwealth Debates, 1914, pp. 1971 seq., 2251 seq. 
2 Ibid., pp. 2257-61. 
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therefore arises whether this discretion is personal or whether 
it is intended to be exercised on the advice of ministers, 
and in this connexion the following consideration is of great 
weight. If the permission to refer is to be made dependent 
on ministerial advice, then the clause definitely places the 
Senate in a false position, for the Ministry of the day must 
and does depend on the majori~y in the Lower House, which 
alone possesses financial initiative, and therefore it would 
r.est with ~he Government of the day, i.e. the Lower House, 
to decide if the Bills passed by the Upper House should be 
submitted to the electors. But the clause manifestly is 
intended to put the two Houses in this regard on ~n equal 
footing, and this is right, for the Senate is representative in 
theory of the States, and the House of Representatives of 
the people at large, and an amendment may be properly 
brought before the people on the volition of either party. 
It must therefore be concluded from the mere terms of 
the Act, no less than from its history it was framed in the 
first instance by men who were not convinced of the necessity 
of responsible government in the parliamentary form ,that 
the discretion was intended to be personal to the Governor-
General, and not to be exercised on the advice of his Ministry. 
Taking this to be the clear meaning of the Act,l the decision 
of the 'Governor-General to decline to submit the Bills could 
hardly be held to be justified. He had decided to give 
a double dissolution, which meant that great issues were to 
be decided and there could be no more appropriate time for 
deciding also the great issue of the referenda ; not to do so 
might easily be held to be unfair to the Labour Party, who, 
if victorious in the contest, would still have to face the trouble 
of the voting on the referenda without the excitement of 
a general election to help the bringing of voters to the poll. 
Qn the other hand, as many good judges attributed the 
victory, such as it was, of the Government at the polls in 
1913 to the fact that the voters came forward in unusually 
great numbers in their favour because they disliked the 
referenda though they did not dislike seriously the Labour 
1 Cf. W. Harrison Moore, Commonwealth of Australia, p. 600. 
112 IMPERIAL UNITY AND THE DO¥INIONS 
Government, it might have been wise for ·Mr. Cook to 
advise the Governor-General to exercise his power. At any 
rate, the fact that the Governor-General accepted the 
advice of his ministers and declined to submit the referenda 
to the electorate, can be explained and justified only on the 
ground that the British principle of responsible government 
should prevail in Australia. Manifestly it is not open for 
any successor without grave injustice to act in future in 
the matter of s. 128 save on ministerial advice. Doubt-
less this was not the view of the fathers of federation, but 
responsible government is too strong to be resisted in the 
long run. 
The final history of the episode is curious : war broke 
out before the elections had actually been held, and the 
Labour Party pressed energetically that steps should be 
taken by means of Imperial legislation if necessary 1 to 
revive the Parliament then defunct. This was refused by 
the Government, apparently under the idea that they could 
secure a favourable result at the elections in view of the 
objections to disturbing a Government in office at such 
a crisis. The view was as short-sighted as ungenerous: 
the Government suffered complete and not undeserved 
defeat and was replaced by a Labour Administration. 
2. THE DISMISSAL OF MINISTERS 
The undesirability and unsoundness of the existing 
doctrine of the discretion of the Governor in granting 
a dissolution is borne out by considerations of the allied 
question of the dismissal of ministers by a Governor. 
There is no conceivable reason why in itself it should be 
more legitimate for a Governor to refuse a dissolution than 
' ~ 
to dismiss ministers, and the only real ground of discrimina-
tion must be that the one course is much less risky than 
another. If a Governor refuses a dissolution, he runs a fair 
1 This was a moot point : mere re-election by agreement of the sitting 
members was also proposed. It was agreed that a dissolution proclamation 
ended the life of Parliament and could not be recalled. Cf. Round Table, 
1914-15, pp. 210, 211. See also Part I_I, chap. i, § 1. 
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chance of seeing his ministers replaced by others who will 
in a sense owe their position to himself, since ex hypothesi 
the Ministry which asked for the dissolution was in an 
unsatisfactory parliamentary position. But it is different 
if he has to dismiss ministers, and he must, before he can 
risk the action, be very sure of his ground. Lord Chelmsford, 
for the much less serious step of refusing to give a pledge 
to swamp the Upper House of Queensland in 1907, narrowly 
escaped a motion for his recall, and a dismissed Government 
would certainly, if returned to power, secure the departure 
of the Governor who dismissed them. But both actions are 
essentially wrong in strict theory, though neither dismissal 
nor still less refusal of a dissolution can be said to be extinct. 
The question of dismissing ministers nearly alway~ arises 
when they seem to have forfeited the confidence of the 
country, but cling to office either because they have still 
a parliamentary majority or Parliament is not in session. 
Reference has been made above to the fact that in the -
United Kingdom the Crown leaves the ministers to work 
out their own ruin in the due course of events, but in the 
Dominions less patience is sometimes shown. In this con-
nexion an extraordinarily interesting account of a hitherto 
unknown incident in Canadian history has been given by 
Sir Charles Tupper in connexion with the fall of the Govern-
ment of Sir John Macdonald in Canada in 1873.1 At the 
autumn session Mr. Mackenzie submitted a resolution of 
want of confidence in the Government. Party feeling ran 
high and the utmost bitterness prevailed. During the 
progress of the debate, according to this account, Lord 
Dufferin, the Governor-General, sent for Sir J. Macdonald 
and asked him to resign. When Sir J. Macdonald took 
Sir Charles Tupper alone of his colleagues into his confidence, 
the latter proceeded to Government House and sought an 
interview with the Governor-General, of which he gives the 
following account : · · 
· I said, addressing Her Majesty's representative, ' I think 
you have made a fatal mistake in demanding Sir John's 
1 Recollections of Sixty Years, pp. 156, .157. 
1874 H 
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resignation. You are to-day Governor-General of Canada, 
and respected by all classes ; to-morrow you will be the 
head of the Liberal Party, and will be denounced by the 
Conservatives for having violated every principle of con-
stitutional government. If Her Majesty would to-morrow 
undertake what you have done she might lose her t hrone.' 
'Well, what do you advise me to do?' asked Lord Dufferin. 
'I desire to recommend that you cable the Colonial Office, 
and ask what it thinks of your action.' 
The result of that interview was that Sir John was aroused 
from his bed at 2 o'clock in the morning, and notified that 
Lord Dufferin had recalled his decision. 
Curiously enough Sir Charles Tupper himself was to suffer 
in somewhat the same way as had been the proposed fate 
of his predecessor. In 1896, when the result of the elections 
seemed to prove that his Ministry was defeated, Lord 
Aberdeen insisted on exercising his own discretion as t o the 
acceptance of ministerial advice : thus his proposals for the 
appointment of senators were rejected, many of his recom-
mendations of appointment of officials were not accepted, 
and Lord Aberdeen declined to approve the granting 
of a contract for a steamship service to the Allan line.1 
In point of fact the new Government would no doubt 
have cancelled any of these appointments which it could 
cancel, as it did many others, and retribution fell on the 
Liberal Party in 1912, when the incoming Government 
cancelled many of their appointments, both important 
-as, for example, the members of the Waterways Com-
mission-and unimportant. Canada has also been the 
scene of repeated dismissals of ministers by provincial 
Lieutenant-Governors, and, though both Mr. Letellier in 
Quebec and Mr. Mcinnes in British Columbia were dis-
missed for their exercise of this right, their fate has not 
deterred others from following with more good fortune the 
same course.2 It was action of this kind by the Lieutenant-
Governor of British Columbia, in · 1903, which terminat ed 
the political chaos of that State, and began the regime of 
stable government, and in 1915 the Lieutenant-Governor 
1 Recollections of Sixty Years, p. 243. 
2 Responsible Government, i. 226-45 . 
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of Manitoba brought about the retirement of his Govern-
ment.1 It had, after a long term of control, been weakened 
at the general election of 1914, when it lost most of its 
majority, and strong allegations were made that the con-
tractors for the Manitoba Parliament buildings had ar-
ranged to find money for electoral purposes, a practice 
which is not by any means unknown in the Dominion. 
The Lieutenant-Governor eventually practically forced 
ministers to appoint a commission of investigation, and 
feeling that, discredited as was his Government, he could 
not continue in office, the Premier resigned office, and 
a Liberal Government succeeded him. 
It is rather curious to contrast the comparative satis-
faction with which such action on the part of Lieutenant-
Governors in Canada is received by the public with the 
indignation which would undoubtedly be excited by similar 
proceedings if carried out in Australia by a Governor, at 
any rate if not an Australian by birth. In Newfoundland, 
also, there is record of a Governor who kept a Ministry 
in power in 1894 against a parliamentary majority, until 
election petitions had reduced that majority out of existence. 
But it may very gravely be doubted if it is ever worth 
while pressing these matters, in place of leaving them to 
be dealt with in the ordinary course of Parliament. The 
view taken by Lord Aberdeen in his dispute with Sir C. 
Tupper was that the Government had not the control of 
Parliament, and therefore should not exercise the full powers 
of an unfettered Government, and Lord Aberdeen's view 
was obviously correct : it was not right for a retiring ad-
ministration for its fate was inevitable to deal with 
public affairs as if it had authority. But that is not the 
question : the point at issue is whether it is necessary 
that the Governor should interpose his authority in the 
matter to prevent the Government acting contrary to pro-
priety. Theoretically a case can be conceived in which, as 
in the case of the United Kingdom, it might be necessary 
for a Governor to break all rules, and interpose for the 
t Times, May 13, 1915. 
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safety of the State, but in all normal cases there can be 
no justification for this action. Time will bring its own 
punishment if necessary for any improper conduct. 
Nor is there lacking recent evidence of the acceptance 
of this view. In the Newfoundland crisis of 1908,1 the 
Governor expressly refrained from putting any pressure 
on his ministers when he found that they had no Parlia-
mentary majority, and declined to act on the request of 
the Opposition, that he should call on the Ministry to resign, 
because it had no Parliamentary majority, a rather amus-
ing request, since the Opposition equally had no majority, 
though it is true that the loss of the Government majority, 
taken in conjunction with the fact that the Government 
had appealed to the people with all the advantages of 
control of the machinery, meant that the Government 
had suffered in effect a defeat. Nor would he accept the 
opinion of the leader of the Opposition, that he should 
not consent to any official appointment or contracts being 
made. But, on the other hand, he declined to commit 
himself to any general approval of anything his ministers 
might wish to do, expressed clear views as to the duty of 
meeting Parliament in due course, though not pressing for 
any unusually early meeting, and finally declined a dissolu-
tion. His conduct throughout was marked by excellent 
judgement, and by as careful an application of the principle 
of responsible government to Newfoundland as is com-
patible with the imperfect development of that principle in 
parliamentary practice there. On the other hand, a singular 
instance of the undeveloped condition of .Newfoundland 
political thought occurred some years afterwards, when the 
Governor, Sir Ralph Williams, was asked to dismiss one of 
his ministers on the ground that he acted improperly in 
several ways, and in particular had misused his position 
in private interests.2 The Governor, in a long examination 
1 See Correspondence between H. E. the Governor, Sir Edward Morris, 
and Sir Robert Bond, St. John's, 1909. 
2 Newfoundland Daily News, June 29, 1912; Daily Telegrapl11, June 28 
and 29, 1912. 
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of the charges brought, was able to satisfy himself that the 
minister had· not forfeited his right to be retained in office, 
though he had acted somewhat unwisely, but clearly the 
position in which the Governor was thus placed was an im-
possible one. There was, however, a precedent in Newfound ... 
land itself, for an earlier Governor had dismissed 1\ir. Morine 
from his office, without the Ministry resigning office.1 
An example of the more normal procedure may be found 
in the case of the reverses suffered by the Ministry of Sir 
Joseph Ward at the New Zealand election of 1911. The 
result was not unequivocal : the Government secured 
nearly half of the seats, but the decision was left in the 
hands of four Labour members, who were not absolutely 
certain to vote one way or the other. There was naturally 
a demand made by the Opposition that the Governor should 
intervene at .least to the extent of compelling ministers to 
face Parliament at an early date, if not to leave office. 
Lord Islington, however, deemed it best to allow matters 
to take their parliamentary course. When Parliap1ent met 
on February 15, 1912, an attractive programme was placed 
before the House, which resulted in the defeat of a motion 
of no confidence by the casting vote of the Speaker. Sir 
J. Ward, however, resigned office, on the ground that he did 
not desire to carry on without a majority, his place being 
taken by Mr. T. Mackenzie. Then followed a period from 
March to July, in which Parliament was adjourned, and 
the Ministry was in office without any real mandate, and 
again it was suggested that the Governor should intervene. 
This step was, however, not taken, and the matter was more 
satisfactorily disposed of by the defeat of the Government 
on July 5 in Parliament by a majority of eight votes, 
a result which had been contributed to in no small measure 
by the delay in meeting Parliament. Mr. Mackenzie then 
accepted the office of High Commissioner for the Dominion 
in London, an office in which he has represented the Govern-
ment with ability and distinction. 2 , 
1 Discussed at length in the Canadian House of Commons on March 29; 
1912. 2 Parl. Pap., Cd. 6091, pp. 68, 69; 6863, p. 116 . 
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It must always be remembered that strong action on 
the part of a Governor is more likely to confuse an issue 
than not : it at once tends to cast in the scales the strong 
feeling which in any community with parliamentary govern-
ment is raised against an appearance of arbitrary authority, 
and thus intervention by a Governor may interfere with 
the natural play of political forces, and do more harm than 
good. The best work of a Governor in these cases can be 
done not by active intervention, but by the use of his influ-
ence in favour of the adoption by his ministers of the true 
constitutional course, and in the majority of instances such 
action is probably more effective in the long run than any 
active use of reserve powers, which, while doubtless existing, 
should be reserved for the most serious cases of trouble. 
A Government may seem weak in suppressing a serious 
strike, as was undoubtedly the case with the labour troubles 
at Adelaide in 1910, but the idea that the Governor should 
on that account dismiss his ministers was an absurd one, 
and would have, if carried out, placed the Government in 
the comfortable position of being able to divert attention 
from their own shortcomings by an onslaught on vice-regal 
interference. 
It is important to note that in order to adopt in its full 
sense the British doctrine of ministerial responsibility · no 
formal change is really necessary. It is true that the royal 
instructions to the Governors of the Australian States, 
Newfoundland, and New Zealand expressly provide that 
in executing his official duties the Governor is to act 
with his Executive Council, but may dissent from them 
if he deems fit, reporting in that case to the Secretary 
of State his reasons, but the practice in the case of the 
federations, of the Union, and the Canadian provinces, where 
no such instructions are given_, is the same as in the cases 
where the instructions permit dissent. The omission of the 
provision of the instructions might therefore be made with- · 
out affecting the actual practice, and, on the other hand, 
it would not be desirable to replace the instruction by 
a general rule that the Gover11or must always act on the 
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advice of Ministers. Constitutionally the proper practice 
is clearly to omit the mention in the instructions of the right 
to act against the advice of m.inisters, and to leave the action 
to be regulated by usage.1 The change from the present 
system might be helped by an agreement or expression of 
opinion at an Imperial Conference, as was suggested, though 
unsuccessfully, by New Zealand in 1887: times have changed 
since then, and the matter is ripe for reconsideration. The 
actual mode of the change becoming operative would 
merely be that on the first occasion of any request for a dis-
solution, in a case where there could be on earlier precedents 
any grounds for the exercise of the discretion to withhold 
it, the Governor should grant it on the express ground that 
he was following the constitutional practice of the United 
Kingdom, leaving it to the electorate to decide if in their 
opinion the dissolution was properly advised by the Ministry. 
1 The omission in the case of Canada is due to the action of Mr. Blake as 
Minister of Justice, and it has been followed for the Commonwealth and 
the Union. In no case has the change made any alteration in the practice. 
B. T H E L E G I S L A T U R E 
CHAPTER VI 
THE LEGISLATIVE SUBORDINATION OF DOMINION 
PARLIAMENTS 
A DOMINION at the present time is essentially, from the 
point of view of international law, not a sovereign State, 
though certain concessions have been made to the prac-
tical position of a Dominion, and the Parliament of a 
Dominion, and a fortiori of a State or a province, is inferior 
to that of a sovereign Parliament. Such a Parliament has, 
in the eyes of international law, an unfettered legislative 
control over all persons actually within its territorial 
boundaries, including in that term a certain area of sea 
adjoining the coast, whether that sea is strictly to be 
regarded as part of the territory of the State or is merely 
subjected for definite purposes to its legislative control, 
and, though it cannot exercise its legislative power over 
foreign territory, it has a right to regulate the conduct of 
its subjects wherever they are, and to punish them for acts 
on foreign territory if it sees fit to do so. Moreover, it has 
a clear right to regulate all persons on board its own ships 
wherever they are, though of course in the territorial waters 
of foreign countries these persons are subject also to the 
foreign jurisdiction, and its own subjects on foreign ships, in 
which case again there is a double jurisdiction. Further, 
in the event of a treaty being made by which a foreign 
State permits the exercise of jurisdiction actually by courts 
established on the foreign territory, a sovereign Legislature 
can provide for the exercise of such jurisdiction, the con-
stitution of courts to exercise it, the code of procedure to 
be applied, and the substantive law. A sovereign Legisla-
ture should in its legislation respect any treaties by which 
the country for which it is the Legislature is bound to other 
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powers, but the obligation is moral and political : it is not 
a legal burden diminishing the sovereignty of the State : 
no court has yet been established in any branch of inter-
national law which can examine the legislation of a sovereign 
Legislature and pronounce it invalid or even incorrect. 
Moreover, a sovereign Legislature is not bound within the 
limits of the State as they exist at any one definite moment : 
it can annex territory, it can cede territory, it can consent 
to the uniting of the State with another State, even though in 
such an act it loses its own sovereign character, and is merged 
in a new body or continues its existence in a new and de- · 
pendent form : it may assent to the creating of a new Parlia-
ment distinct from the former units, which disappear as in 
the case of the union of Scotland, Ireland, and England, or it 
may remain, but surrender part of its authority to a federal 
Parliament. Finally, without any new State unit being 
created a sovereign Parliament may extinguish itself, or 
may transfer all its power to some other body or individual, 
whether directly or indirectly. 
Now, in practice, the differences between the ambit of 
the powers of a Dominion Parliament and a sovereign 
Parliament like that of the United Kingdom are not very 
noticeable. The main object of a Parliament has always 
been in recent times the legislation for the actual territory 
of the State, and for the guidance of the inhabitants of the 
State, and extra-territorial legislation has never been a very 
considerable part of its functions, still less is it normal for 
a Parliament to meditate federation or suicide in any form. 
Nor in its field of legislation is it usual or frequent · for 
the Parliament to be subjected at the present day to any 
form of control, so that the normal working of Parliament 
in the self-governing Dominions is far more analogous to 
that of the working of the Imperial Parliament than might 
be judged from a mere consideration of the differences 
between the legal powers of the one and of the other. In 
this fact lies the explanation why in the main it has been 
possible for so many decades to conduct without serious 
friction · or appreciable difficulty the relations of the 
, 
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Imperial and the Dominion Governments: causes of dispute 
have been on the whole few, and tend to grow fewer. The 
existence of any restraint is naturally, however, objectionable 
in itself to the growing self-respect of the Dominions, and 
it is of importance to examine in detail how far that limita-
tion is necessary, and how far it can be relaxed. 
The first of the legal limitations on the power of Dominion 
legislatures is that arising from the nature of a Dominion as 
a dependency in the sense of international law. It was long 
doubted whether it was in the power of local legislatures 
to deal with the subject of naturalization. It was pointed 
out that the admission of an alien to nationality must be 
an act of sovereign power, and that therefore there could 
be no authority in a local body to grant naturalization. 
The argument was not convincing, and not only was the 
power to grant naturalization freely exercised, but its validity 
was expressly recognized in the Imperial Naturalization Acts, 
of 1847 and 1870, which, however, laid it down expressly that 
the validity of such naturalization was confined to the colony 
in which it was conferred. The Acts thus recognized the 
essential fact that a Dominion is a dependency, and that it 
cannot have inherent in the powers of its Parliament the 
right to make a man a British subject throughout the whole 
of the British Dominions. Nor again can a Dominion Parlia-
ment authorize the dec~aration of war or the making of peace 
with a foreign power, for these are powers which appertain 
to sovereignty, and therefore cannot be exercised by a 
Dominion Parliament as such, under its power to legislate 
for the peace, order, and good government of the Dominion. 
It follows, therefore, that, while a Dominion Government 
might decide to take no active steps to intervene on behalf 
of the United Kingdom in war, and though it might pass 
legislation which would undo the effects produced by a de-
claration of war on the status of alien enemies residing within 
its limits, it could not by Act of Parliament declare itself to 
be neutral, for such a declaration would be to deny that it 
was a dependency of the United Kingdom, and as such would 
be ultra vires the Dominion Parliament. Nor again could 
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a Dominion Parliament alter the succession to the throne of 
the United Kingdom and the British Dominions beyond 
the Seas, or change the title of the King, for these are things 
which only the sovereign Parliament can perform.1 More 
important than these considerations is the fact that a Do-
minion Parliament cannot extinguish itself on its own motion. 
It is appointed to be a Parliament, and it must continue to 
be that Parliament for the Dominion. In the case of pro-
posed federation it is obviously right and proper that the 
Legislature should express its desire to agree to the federation 
and to approve the terms, though that course is not essential 
if it can be ascertained otherwise, e. g. by a referendum, 
what the electorate desire, but the actual power to federate 
must be conferred by the Imperial Parliament, as it was 
conferred in the case of Canada, the Commonwealth of 
Australia, and the Union of South Africa. Nor could a 
Dominion Parliament absolutely merge itself in some other 
form, if that form could not be regarded as a Parliament. 
To take an extreme case, if a Dominion Parliament were 
to transfer all its legislative authority to a single person, 
it would be open to grave doubt whether, assuming that 
all the ordinary formalities for a change of constitution had 
been carried out, nevertheless the change from a Parliament 
which is a deliberative body to a single individual could be 
deemed to be really within the power of the Parliament. 
It will be seen at once that these cases are all very hypo-
thetical and unimportant from the point of view of practice. 
It is more important to realize that the actual powers enjoyed 
by a Parliament of a Dominion without any special delega-
tion of sovereignty for any sovereign power whatever could 
be conferred on a Dominion by the Imperial Parliament-
are extremely wide, and are limited only by the discretion 
of Parliament. The law courts have absolutely no right to 
inquire into the n1otives or purposes of any piece of legis-
lation of a Dominion Parliament.2 
1 See Parl. Pap., Cd. 708. 
2 Attorney-General for Ontario v. Attorney-General for Canada, (1912] 
A. C. 571. 
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To take an extreme case, if the Union Parliament of 
South Africa should impose a tax of £100 a year on every 
person of British origin, the Act might well be one which 
should be prevented from having any operation by the 
refusal of the royal assent, but if that assent were accorded 
no court could annul it, because it was clearly aimed at 
endi11g the connexion of the Union with the United Kingdom 
and bringing to a termination the state of dependency of 
the Union on the United Kingdom. In so crude a form as 
this no issue has ever arisen, but in the case of the Dominion 
of Canada it has been sought to have federal Acts set aside 
on the ground that the legislation, if passed, would have 
a detrin1ental effect on the subordinate divisions of the 
Dominion, and was really an encroachment on the powers 
of the provinces, but such representations have never 
succeeded unless it could be shown that the Act was not 
within the orbit of the legal powers of the Dominion, what-
ever the motive of passing it might be, and whatever 
effect might be likely to result. 
Nothing is more striking as a proof of the wide authority 
of the Parliament of a Dominion in striving for its ends than 
the right which is accorded to it to delegate to other bodies 
some measure of legislative authority. It has long since 
been established law that the maxim delegatus non potest 
delegare has no application to a Dominion Parliament,1 and 
in virtue of this power many corporations, municipal and 
otherwise, have been ernpowered to make by-laws with the 
force of law when made within the limits of authority con-
ferred by the Parliament in each case. A still more daring 
step has recently been undertaken in the form of substitut-
ing for the normal method of parliamentary legislation 
a method in which the popular vote is given full play. 
It was provided by an ·Act (c. 2) of the province of Sas-
katchewan, passed at the first session of the third Legislature, 
that after the coming into operation of that Act no Act of 
the Legislature should take effect, unless it was a supply 
Act, until ninety days after the close of the session, unless 
1 !lodge v. The Queen, 9 App. Cas. 117 . 
• 
• 
SUBORDINATION OF PARLIAMENTS 125 
a contrary intention was expressed in the Act, and unless 
in that case the Act was passed at the third reading by a two-
thirds majority of all the members present at such reading. 
If, however, not less than five per cent. of the number 
actually voting at the last election petitioned for a referen-
dum, the operation of the Act was to be further delayed 
until it could be so referred to the people. Similarly, any 
number of persons not less than eight per cent. of the voters 
at the last election could petition the Legislature to pass 
a measure a copy of which must accompany the petition, 
and if not passed by the Legislature in the next session the 
measure must be presented to the people at a referendum. 
But no such .Bill could be proposed which imposed a charge 
on the public revenue, or was not certified by the Attorney-
General as being in his opinion within the legislative com-
petence of the province. In either case the voters at the 
referendum were to be the electors, and the coming into 
force of the Act was to depend on their decision. If, on the 
other hand, they approved a proposed Act, it was to be 
enacted by the Legislature at the next session witho~t sub-
stantial change, while if they disapproved it no further 
petition for the Act could be made for three years. The 
coming into operation of the Act was, however, made by 
c. 3 to depend on the result of a referendum, and was made 
dependent on the casting of · thirty per cent. of the votes 
polled in its favour, and as this did not happen the Act 
fell to the ground. 
Not discouraged by the proce~dings in Saskatchewan, 
Alberta, by c. 3 of the Acts of 1913, provided for the system 
of referendum and initiative; without following in exact 
detail the ·Saskatohewan Act, the provisions are practically 
identical in substance, but there is no automatic provision 
for deferring the operation of any Act, the power given being 
merely that the Legislature may defer the operation of 
any but the supply Act. The numbers of voters who may 
demand a referendum or propose a law other· than a supply 
Act, are fixed at ten and twenty per cent. respectively, in 
place of the low figures of five and eight per cent. An Act 
• 
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which on the referendum is not approved is to be repealed 
in the next session, and an Act proposed by the electors is 
to be enacted if approved by the voters at the referendum. 
In both cases it will be seen that supply Acts were ex-
cluded from the purview of Acts which were to be delayed 
in operation unless of course this was desired by the 
Legislature and that in both the right of initiative was 
denied in the case of supply Bills, doubtless for the reason 
that ·ail supply must be recommended by the Lieutenant-
Governor under the terms of the British North America Act, 
1867, and that therefore the surrender of this privilege to 
the electors would be unconstitutional, as well as suicidal, 
since no Executive could ever manage the finances of a pro-
vince if it were open to electors to make proposals of supply 
which might or might not be made effective by a referendum. 
In the case of Australia, the initiative and referendum 
form established parts of the legislative proposals of the 
State and of the Commonwealth Labour Parties, but so far 
no progress has been made in pressing through these pro;_ 
posals. An elaborate Bill introduced by the Labour Gov·ern-
ment in Western Australia in 1913 1 providing for initiative 
and referendum was rejected by the Legislative Council. 
It would be premature to express any opinion as to how 
far these proposals of initiative and referendum are con-
sistent with the fundamental legal powers of the Dominion 
Parliaments. The refe~endum cannot be considered as 
seriously open to question: the effect of the referendum is 
simply to decide whether a measure the exact terms of 
which are contained in the Act as passed shall take effect : 
it is, viewed in essence, nothing more than a local veto Bill 
applied to the whole community : it is conditional legis-
lation, which had always been regarded as perfectly valid. 
It is more difficult to feel assured as to the case of the initia-
tive in the form in which the Alberta and Saskatchewan 
1 The Premier ingenuously commended the Bill on the ground that the 
mention of the Sask~tchewan Act in the Report of the Dominion Depart-
ment of the Colonial Office (Parl. Pap., Cd. 6863, pp. 38, 39) showed the 
value attached to the system by the Colonial Office . 
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Acts enacted it. It places a definite constraint upon Parlia-
ment to pass an Act in a form prescribed by the electors : 
it gives them no power to vary the Act in any point of sub-
stance, however defective it may be found to be. It de-
prives, in fact, Parliament of its deliberative function and 
hands that over to the press, and that too in the most un-
fortunate manner, for, while a Bill ·can be amended in Par-
liament, in the case of the initiative it cannot when once 
put in shape be changed in substance. Experience shows 
that practically all Bills, and certainly eyery measure of 
any consequence, require careful amendment, and the new 
procedure prevents that being done. The initiative in this 
form clearly reduces to a farce the proceedings of Parliament, 
and it seems therefore that its validity may be called in 
question on that account. It would be a very different 
thing if the measure as petitioned for were merely to be 
debated by Parliament, or even accepted in principle by 
Parliament, when it could fairly be said that .Parliament 
still retained some useful function. 
Closely connected with the limitation imposed by the 
fact that a Dominion is a dependency is that arising from 
the limitation of the Legislature to the actual territory of 
the Dominion. The rule acts with a certain symmetry 
and convenience, for it leaves the Imperial Parliament the 
sole and undisputed right to deal with such important 
things as the exercjse of jurisdiction over British subjects 
and British protected persons in such places as China, 
Siam, Persia, and the Ottoman Dominions : further, it 
leaves the British Parliament dominion over the high seas 
so far as that power may be exercised at international law. 
But the symmetry is not perfect and the restriction is 
not altogether without disadvantages, apart from the 
question of merchant shipping which will again 1 occupy our 
attention. The nature and the extent of the territories of 
the Dominions for the purposes of jurisdiction is a point of 
the utmost difficulty : it was long in dispute between the 
United States and the United Kingdom to what extent the 
1 Belo·w, chap. x . 
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waters of the bays of North America could be deemed to 
be territorial. It was contended by the Government of the 
United States that the three marine mile limit applied to 
all these bays, that the line must be drawn following the 
sinuosities of the coast, and that no water could be con-
sidered to be territorial which was not within a distance of 
three marine miles measured from some point of the shore 
at low water mark. 011 the other hand, the British Govern-
ment claimed that the term bay meant that the three mile 
line was to be drawn from an imaginary line drawn across 
the bay when it first definitely assumed the configuration 
of a bay. The dispute which caused much bitterness in 
the years 1866-70, was settled for the time by the Wash-
ington Treaty of 1871, and revived after the termination 
of that treaty, was dealt with in detail by the treaty nego-
tiated between Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Bayard in 1888; 
but that treaty failed to be ratified owing to the opposition 
of the Republican majority in the Senate to a treaty which 
had been negotiated by a democratic Government. For-
tunately, after a short period of friction, the matter was 
adjusted amicably until revived by the action of New-
foundland, in 1905, in reopening the fishery question. A 
period of some tension followed, which was relieved by the 
overriding of Newfoundland legislation in 1907, and the 
arrangement for the submission to arbitration of the whole 
question in all its bearings as affecting both Canada and 
Newfoundland. The decision of that tribunal in 1910 
accepted the doctrine put forward in effect by the British 
Government, but recommended for practical purposes 
the acceptance of the definition of bays which had been 
agreed upon between the negotiators in 1888, and this 
recommendation was ultimately accepted. While the 
decision is, in form and substance alike, only one between 
the United Kingdom and the United States, it is most 
doubtful that the position thus established can be upset 
by any other international proceedings, and the limit thus 
accorded may for legislative purposes be deemed to be the 
limits of the legislative authority of the Dominion and of 
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Newfoundland. It has also been laid down authorita-
tively by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in 
the case of Direct United States Cable Co. v. Anglo-American 
Telegraph Co. 1 that Conception Bay in Newfoundland is 
territorial water of that Colony, and the Parliament of 
Canada has asserted in the clearest terms, and so far with-
out protest or dispute, that the whole waters of the Hudson 
Bay are portions of the territory of the Dominion. Parts, 
too, of the seas to the north of the Dominion may well be 
considered as appertaining to the bordering territory which 
is or will be Canadian. 
It is right to note that a certain doubt on the whole subject 
of the control to be exercised over foreigners in foreign 
ships in British waters was cast by the Franconia 2 case, in 
which it was held, after an extraordinary deviation of legal 
opinion, by a majority of the court before which the question 
finally came, that it was not possible under the common law 
to punish a foreign subject for an offence, in the special 
case manslaughter, co1nmitted by means of a foreign ship 
in British territorial waters. The ground of the decision 
and its validity remain very doubtful, but much of its effect 
was done away with by the enactment of the Territorial 
Waters Jurisdiction Act, 1878, which expressly provides 
that an offence committed by a person whethyr or not 
a British subject on the open seas within the territorial 
waters of the King's dominions is an offence within the 
jurisdiction of the Admiral, whether committed on board 
or by means of a foreign ship or. not, but it imposes in the 
case of a prosecution under this provision the condition 
that if the person accused is a foreign subject the consent 
of the Secretary of State must be obtained in the case of 
the United Kingdom and of the Governor in the case of 
proposed trial in any of the Dominions. The rule might 
prove an inconvenient one, and it obviously would be 
a distinct and annoying limitation on the autonomy of the 
Dominions if the Act were to be considered as applying to 
every proposed prosecution of foreigners for violating the 
1 2 App. Cas. 394. 2 R. v. Keyn, 2 Ex. D. 63. 
1874 I 
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fisheries of a Dominion, but the Act has remained a 
dead letter in the case of the Dominions. This is due to 
the fact that by s. 5 of the Act it is expressly provided 
that nothing in the Act shall be construed to be in dero-
gation of the rightful jurisdiction of her Majesty, her 
heirs or successors, under the law of nations, or to affect 
or prejudice any jurisdiction conferred by Act of Parlia-
ment, or now by law existing in relation to foreign ships, 
or in relation to persons on board such ships. These words 
have justly been deemed to cover the jurisdiction exercised 
by the Dominions over foreign fishermen and others who 
frequent their coasts in foreign ships, for it must be remem-
bered that the decision in the Franconia case is in no wise 
binding on the Dominion courts, who are subject only to the 
duty of obeying such doctrines as may be from time to time 
approved by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. 
It is also important to note that the Act expressly recites 
in the preamble that the rightful jurisdiction of the Crown 
extends, and has always extended, over the open seas 
adjacent to the coast of the United Kingdom and of all 
other parts of His Majesty's dominions, to such a distance 
as is necessary for the defence and security of such dominions, 
and the definition of territorial waters given in the Act 
states that it means in reference to the sea such part thereof 
adjacent to the coast of the United Kingdom or the coast 
of some other part of His Majesty's Dominions as is deemed 
by international law to be within the territorial sovereignty 
of His Majesty. This definition is sufficient to cover all the 
cases where the ordinary three-mile limit does not apply, 
such as the cases of landlocked bays, which are so prominent 
a feature of Canada and Newfoundland. In Australia the 
question is different, for the bays there have seldom the con-
figuration which makes them territorial waters, or, where they 
have this configuration, the narrowness of the entrances 
makes it clear that they are not parts of the open sea. 
It has also been held that in certain cases it is possible 
to go further and to violate the strict letter of the provision 
that legislation of a Dominion must be restricted to terri-
• 
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torial limits. For many years the power of the Dominion 
Parliaments to pass Acts authorizing expulsion of aliens 
was in doubt, but this power has at last been conceded by 
the Privy Council, in the case of Attorney-General of Canada 
v. Gain and Gilhula,1 which establishes the doctrine that 
the Parliament of Canada possess the power to deal with 
aliens, and to expel them from Canada to the place whence 
they came, which was in that case the United States, in the 
same full manner in which that power is possessed by the 
Imperial Parliament, the power being conferred by the 
Imperial Constitution Act, and by the Canadian Act assented 
to by the Crown made under the authority of that Act. 
It still remains, however, undecided whether the power of 
Canada to deal with immigration extends to the case of 
British subjects being deported to the United Kingdom 
in a British ship, for there 'is at present no reported case 
which establishes the doctrine that the action of carrying 
such a passenger against his will is legal outside the terri-
torial waters of the Dominion from which he is being ex-
pelled, and there is one case, arising out of the deportation 
of political prisoners from a South American republic, 
which suggests that the detention is not legal. 2 It seems, 
however, probable enough that the Privy Council would 
see its way to exten~ the doctrine regarding aliens to the 
case of British subjects also, and it may be that the British 1 
I' 
Courts, which are not bound by decisions of the Privy 
Council, would nevertheless find that, the origin of the 
detention being legal, the subsequent steps necessary to 
carry it out were also legal. The position was created by 
the famous incident of 1914, when under the authority of 
an Indemnity Act, passed ex post facto by the Parliament of 
the Union of South Africa, certain British subjects were 
expelled from that Dominion, and sent home on a British 
ship. It was proposed by those thus expelled to take pro-
ceedings against the owners of the ship by which their 
1 [1906] A. C. 542. Cf. Robtelmes v. Brenan, 4 C.L.R. 395; Keith, J ourn. 
Soc. Camp. Leg., xi. 235-7. 
2 Reg. v. Lesley, Bell C. C. 220. 
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· transportation to the United Kingdom was carried out, but 
this intention has not resulted in any action. 
It is clear that unless the power to deport ~an be legally 
exercised it would be impossible for the self-governing 
Dominions to carry out their policy of the restriction of 
immigrants, which in many cases is extended to the length 
of expelling persons who have ceased to be in any real sense 
immigrants because they have failed within a specified 
period to make themselves independent of public relief, even 
if this falling into poverty is the mere result of accident, 
and having regard to the importance attached by the 
Dominions to this control of immigration, it would be 
necessary to enlarge the powers of the Legislatures if their 
right to deport, as distinguished from exclusion which is 
conceded as clearly theirs, were seriously to be denied. 
A further possibility of difficulty in the interpretation of 
the powers of Dominions' Legislatures from the point of 
view of their extension in area is that arising from the 
problem of the locus of assets of various kinds. There can, 
of course, be no doubt as to the power of the Imperial 
Parliament to impose such taxation as it thinks fit on any 
property whatever, wherever situated, if it can in any way 
bring its legislation into effective operation, but, as a Dominion 
cannot legislate for matters beyond the Dominion, the 
question arises whether it can lawfully enact a succession 
duty to be charged, say, upon the personal property of every 
kind of a deceased testator, even if he is domiciled in the 
province or Dominion, on the ground tha~ the property, 
being personal, is to be deemed to be notionally present in 
the province or Dominion. It is clear that the Dominion 
or Provincial Legislatures could not impose a tax on real pro-
perty in the United Kingdom in the sense that the property 
could be fettered by the tax, while such a power pertains 
to the Parliament of the United Kingdom. In 1894, when 
the Finance Bill for that year was introduc.ed into the 
Imperial Parliame11t, attention was at once called to its 
terms by the ~High Commissioner for Canada and the 
Agents-General of the Australian Colonies in London, who 
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represented to the Imperial Government that the Bill, if 
passed in the same form as that which it bore on introduc-
tion, would seem to impose taxation .directly on property 
in the Colonies, which was objectionable on constitutional 
grounds as well as on financial grounds,1 and accordingly 
as finally enacted the Finance Act, 1894, contained specific 
provision that no taxation imposed was to act as a charge 
on property in the Colonies. In the case of personal property 
Colonial Legislatures have freely assumed their power to 
adopt the usual rule of taxation in the case of succession 
duties, under which a tax is or may be levied on all property 
locally situated within the Dominion or State of any person 
in respect of the passage of the property on death, while in 
the case of the death of persons domiciled, the whole personal 
property is subjected to taxation wherever it may be situated. 
This assu·mption of power has not been questioned so far 
successfully in the case of any Dominion 2 or State legisla-
tion, but under the constitution of the Dominion of Canada 
the power of the provinces to raise direct taxation within 
the province has been somewhat severely limited. In the 
case of Woodruff v. The Attorney-General for Ontario 3 it was 
held that the Legislature of Ontario had no power to levy 
taxation on the property of a deceased testator, consisting 
of bonds and debentures which had been deposited by him 
in 1902, two years before his death, with the Mercantile 
· Safe Deposit Company of New York, and a bank balance 
at New York, on the broad ground that it was not within 
the power of the Legislature to tax property locally situated 
outside the province, though, on the other hand, it has been 
held by the same tribunal that it is not necessary that the 
testator on whose death the duty is claimed should have 
been either domiciled or resident in the province at the 
time of his death, in order to authorize_ the taxation by the 
Legislature of any of his property movable or immovable 
situated within the province.4 The term situation seems to 
1 See Parl. Pap., C. 7433 and 7451. 
2 Hughes v. Munro, 9 C.L.R. 289. 
4 R. v. Lovitt, [1912] A.C. 212. 
a [1908] A.C. 508. 
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be given a strong local sense, and it is not altogether easy 
to see a precise line of division which can be drawn between 
the case of a Dominion or State and a province in this regard. 
A further striking limitation of the provincial power of 
legislation on the ground of locality is to be seen in the 
Alberta and Great Waterways Railway case, which was 
decided by the Privy Council in 1913.1 In effect the issue 
which was presented in that case was the power of the 
Provincial Legislature of .Alberta to deal with certain 
money on deposit at the Royal Bank of Canada at Edmonton, 
Alberta, in the special circumstances in which that money 
had been deposited there. It had been advanced by parties 
in London on the security of bonds of the Alberta and 
Great Waterways Railway Company, and on the authority 
of the head office of the Bank of Montreal it had been lodge_d 
in the Royal Bank in a special account to the credit of the 
Provincial Treasurer of Alberta, the whole transaction 
taking place on the understanding em bodied in Acts of 
the province that the money would be paid out as the 
process of constructing the railway advanced. The bonds 
of the company were guaranteed by the province. Scarcely 
had the construction of the line begun than the Legislature, 
which viewed with dissatisfaction apparently natural-
the arrangement in ·question, passed an Act in which it 
confiscated the money to the c:r:_edit of the province, repeated 
the guarantee, and indemnified the railway company 
for all claims brought against it. In pursuance of this Act 
the Government of Alberta sued the Bank for the sum of 
six million dollars, with interest, on deposit therein, while 
the Bank disputed the validity of the Act. The case was 
decided in favour of the province by the courts of first 
instance and of appeal in 'the province, the latter holding 
that in any event the case must be decided in favour of 
the province since the Legislature had undoubted power to 
deal with the property and civil rights within the province 
under s. 92 (13) of the British North America Act, 1867. 
The Judicial Committee reversed the decision of the courts 
_1 [1913] A.C. 283 . 
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below, and allowed the appeal of the Royal Bank. The 
argument of the decision appears to be that the aim of the 
Act was to alter the whole basis on which the special account 
had been opened, namely, the carrying out of a defined 
scheme : when the basis of a scheme was altered, on the 
strength of which money had been subscribed, it was open 
to those who had subscribed the money to reclaim the 
money from those to whom it had been subscribed. Thus 
in the National Bolivian Navigation Company v. Wilson 1 it 
had been decided by the House of Lords that when money 
had been subscribed on the s~rength of a scheme which 
involved a Government concession, and, when the Govern-
ment concerned revoked the concession, the money advanced 
could be recovered from trustees in whose hands it was, 
on the ground that there was substantial failure of the con-
sideration on which the advances had been made. In the 
case in question, an action would therefore lie against the 
Bank of Montreal, which was not situated in Alberta, 
in order to enforce the right of the lenders in London, and 
this right of action on the part of the lenders against the 
Bank of Montreal, not being a civil right within the province, 
could not be affected by any provincial Act. As, therefore, 
to give effect to the law of the province would involve de-
priving the Bank of Montreal of its power to meet a lawful 
action, the legislation of the province must be held ultra 
• 
v~res. 
This is a very striking judgement, and it has been inter-
preted by high authority 2 as indicating that where a debt 
is concerned the debtor and the creditor, and all parties 
interested, must be in the province before the Provincial 
Legislature can have any power to affect the debt. If this 
is really the case, the power of the provinces would be gravely 
limited, but it seems more likely that the case must not be 
read as an authority for more than it seems to assert, namely, 
that civil rights outside the province altogether cannot be 
rendered nugatory by a provincial law, though even so the 
1 5 App. Cas. 176. 
2 Lefroy, Leading Oases in Canadian Constitutional Law, p. 77. 
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limitation of provincial power is a serious one, and it is per-
haps not altogether easy to reconcile this doctri11e with the 
doctrine that property in movables owned by some one out-
side the province can be taxed on death by the local Legi~­
lature.1 
It does not, however, seem that in this case, any more: 
than in the case of succession duties, the Judicial Com~1 
mittee is in the slightest degree likely to extend to colonieS'~ 
\ 
proper the rigid limitation of authority which it has imposed 
on the Canadian provinces : if it were to do so, it is clear that 
the limitation would have to be removed by legislation. 
Apart, however, from these cases it is doubtful to what ! 
extent it is really desirable or necessary to retain the ! 
limitation as regards territorial effect. Under that limita- · 
tion it has been held in the case of Macleod v. Attorney-
General for New South Wales 2 that it is not possible for 
a Colonial Legislature to punish· the crime of bigamy, if the 
second marriage takes place outside the colony, and, though 
the Canadian law 3 still makes this offence a crime, and it has 
been acted upon, it is doubtless invalid. Now this limitation 
does not apply to Imperial legislation, but the Imperial Act 4 
which makes it a crime to commit bigamy wherever the 
second marriage takes· place makes no provision for the trial 
of an offender anywhere save in the United Kingdom, and 
it is not clear that such an offence is one for which procedure 
under the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, is available, so -as to 
permit of the sending to England for trial of an offender of 
this class living in a colony. The same difficulty applies to 
the much more serious case of murder or manslaughter com-
mitted by a British subject outside the United Kingdom : 
the Imperial Act 5 makes the offence punishable, but, again, 
apparently only if the man is found in England, where the 
Act can be put in force. Exactly similar difficulties w-ould 
arise if the practice of regulating by law the actions of persons 
abroad were freely resorted to by the Parliament of the 
t R. v. Lovitt, [1912] A.C. 212. 
2 [1891] A.C. 455. 3 Rev·ised Statutes, 1906, c. 146, s. 307. 
4 24 and 25 Viet. c. 100, s. 57. 5 Ibid., s. 9 . 
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United Kingdom as it is by some foreign powers, whose 
criminal law in large measure attaches to a subject wherever 
he may happen to be. The difficulty might be removed by 
the conferring of special powers of legislation in any such 
cases on Dominion or State Parliaments, but such limited 
grants of power are not very convenient. 
Moreover, it must be remembered that in a sense it is 
possible for any Dominion or State Parliament to evade the 
restriction regarding territoriality by adopting a specific 
form of legislation. It is, indeed, not open to these Parlia-
ments to declare an act done on the high seas illegal, but 
they can say that it shall be illegal for any person to enter 
the territorial waters of the Dominion or State, having com-
mitted such an act on the high seas. It is true that in a sense 
this is merely a way of evading the limitation, but the rule 
as we have already seen is that motives cannot be considered 
if the law is otherwise valid, and there is no other ground 
than motive on which an Act can possibly be considered 
invalid, because it forbids the entry into the Dominion or 
State of persons guilty elsewhere of a crime. The principle 
indeed has received the authority of the Judicial Committee, 
for in the case of Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation 
Go. v. Kingston,1 it was expressly held by the Judicial Com-
mittee that it was an offence against the Customs Act of the 
Commonwealth for vessels to enter an Australian harbour, 
having broken the seals placed on excisable goods at her 
first port of call, although the breaking of the seals had taken 
place at sea. In effect, therefore, the imposition of a tax on 
the stores consumed at sea by the passengers, &c., of the 
steamer was held to be valid, although the direct taxation of 
the matter in question was impossible. Having regard to 
this fact, it is possible even for Dominion Legislatures to affect 
matters with which, strictly speaking, they cannot deal: thus 
the Legislature of Newfoundland can effectively regulate, 
as it has done by an Act of 1914, the prosecution of the seal 
fishery, though, strictly speaking, it cannot deal directly 
with some of the points touched upon in its legislation. The 
t [1903] A.C. 471. 
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power is also available in the case of foreign ships taking 
part in fisheries : in their case the Imperial Parliament also 
has no legislative power under international law, so long as 
they remain outside territorial waters, but in their case also 
the necessity of using the harbours of the Dominions or 
States makes it possible to subject them to licensing laws 
and other enactments, as in the case of the fisheries of 
Queensland and Western Australia, and those of Canada 
and Newfoundland. 
I11 these circumstances it must be regarded as extremely 
doubtful whether the retention of the territorial limitation 
of Dominion legislation serves any useful purpose. It cer-
tainly enables many difficult points of law to be discussed, 
without any obvious public advantage : thus it has been 
attempted in the Canadian Supreme Court to save an 
American fishing-vessel from the consequences of capture 
by a Canadian vessel when raiding the Canadian fisheries, 
on the ground that she was captured outside the three-mile 
limit, and that a Canadian vessel could not exercise coercive 
power beyond that limit, a plea disposed of by the court 
on the ground that the doctrine of hot pursuit might properly 
be applied in the case of Canada as well as in the case of 
a sovereign State.1 It would seem, on the whole, wise to 
enact that the territorial limitation shall not be applicable 
to Dominion legislation. To some extent the limitations 
have been already relaxed, to some extent the conferring 
of full admiralty jurisdiction on Colonial courts by the 
Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890,2 renders legislative 
authority less necessary, but the grant of this power would 
be practically convenient, and open to no substantial 
dis ad vantages. 
The third great limitation on Dominion Legislatures 
follows inevitably from their being Legislatures for depen-
1 The Ship 'North' v. The King, 37 Can. S.C.R. 385. . 
2 For criminal jurisdiction see 12 and 13 Viet. c. 96; 23 and 24 Viet. 
cc. 88 and 122 (which authorize the Colonial Legislatures to punish crimes 
of murder, &c., when the act takes place in but death outside the Colony) ; 
37 and 38 Viet~ c. 27 ; 57 and 58 Viet. c. 60, ss .. 685-·7. 
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dencies. The Acts of the sovereign Legislature must be 
deemed by that very distinction between a dependency and 
the State of which a Dominion is a dependency to be superior 
in validity, so that, if the two Legislatures enact provisions 
of different character on one topic which cannot be recon-
ciled, then inevitably the legislation of the dependency must 
be deemed to be of inferior validity. In the early days of 
Colonial history things were carried much further than this : 
it was considered that laws of dependencies must be assimi-
lated as closely as possible to the laws of the mother country, 
England, and the hapless people of Nova Scotia, who in the 
innocence of their hearts enacted the excellent divorce law 
of Scotland in place of the unequal law of England, were 
compelled in observance of this fetish to replace the peccant 
Act, 'vhich was deemed to be invalid, by legislation based on 
the law of England : the case is of interest since it illustrates 
how an old rule can affect future development : since the 
passing of the British North America Act, 1867, the difficulty 
of establishing a law of divorce, in the face of the opposition 
of the Catholic hierarchy of Quebec, has prevented any 
legislation whatever on divorce being enacted by the Parlia-
ment of the Dominion, while the power to enact any law of 
divorce does not now belong to the Provincial Legislatures, 
so that amid a progressive and advanced people the defects 
of the old Englisl1 law must still be tolerated.1 This curious 
idea of repugnancy was gradually weakened by the applica-
tion of common sense, but it was not until the rise of grave 
difficulties in South Australia, where the court took its duty 
of examining laws for invalidities seriously, that the 
matter was placed in 1865 on a perfectly clear basis by the 
enactment 2 that any Colonial law which is in any respect 
repugnant to the provisions of any Act of Parliament ex-
tending to the Colony to which the law relates, or repugnant 
to any law or regulation made under authority of such Act 
1 Early examples of grant of authority to deviate from English law are 
6 and 7 Viet. c. 22 ; 22 and 23 Viet. c. 12 (as to evidence). · 
2 28 and 29 Viet. c. 63 ; c. 64 of the same session deals with Colonial 
marriages, authorizing the validity of Colonial laws as to such marriages. 
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of Parliament, or having in the Colony the force and effect 
of such Act, shall be read subject to such Act or order or 
regulation, and shall to the extent of such repugnancy, 
but not otherwise, be and remain absolutely void and . in-
operative, while any Act not so repugnant should thus be 
free from suspicion of invalidity for any other ground of 
repugnancy. Thus there came to an end the theory that 
there were fundamental British principles which no Colonial 
law could violate, though there ·was no one who could 
possibly tell what these principles were, or what amount 
of divergence would amount to violation. The same Act also 
did away with the suggestion made from time to time that 
no Colonial Legislature could alter its constitution, powers, 
or procedure by expressly asserting the full existence of 
this power in the case of every representative Legislature, 
i.e. one of which at least one-half of the members are elective, 
provided that the mode of alteration prescribed by any Act 
of Parliament, Letters Patent, Order in Council, or Colonial 
Act were duly observed. / 
The question of constitutional alteration will receive 
further consideration later, but apart from that issue, which 
presents special difficulties, the general question can be raised 
whether the application of the Colonial Laws Validity Act to 
the self -governing Dominions can now be justified. The 
matter has not been formally in issue between the Imperial 
and the Dominion Governments, but the delegates who came 
to the United Kingdom in connexion with the passing into 
law of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 1900, 
clearly intimated that in their opinion the application of that 
Act to the laws of great self-governing communities was out 
of date, and in some degree open to objection. This view 
was not in any degree persisted in, and the application of the 
Colonial Laws Validity Act to the Commonwealth has never 
been doubted by the Courts. Nor is there any doubt that 
the same rule applies to the Dominion of Canada. In that 
case a curious doctrine was quite early enunciated that the 
grant of exclusive legislative power to the Dominion Parlia-
ment by s. 91 of the Act in regard to the matters referred to 
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therein meant that in future the Imperial Parliament was 
not to legislate, ar1d that the Dominion Parliament was to 
have power to repeal Imperial Acts covering the matter. 
The theory as applied to merchant shipping was refuted very 
effectively by Sir William Harcourt in a letter to The Times 
of June I ., 1876, which elicited a certain amount of discussion. 
The obvious meaning of the Act was to assign to the Dominion 
Parliament certain powers exclusive of the Provincial Par-
liaments, and the courts have long accepted this meaning of 
the legislation.1 
Now in considering the question of repugnancy it must 
be borne in mind that repugnancy is quite a different thing 
according as the number of laws of the central authority 
affecting the dependency is great or small. It is necessary 
to distinguish between abolishing the doctrine of repugnancy 
itself and between repealing Acts which needlessly and there-
fore improperly fetter the action of Dominion Legislatures. 
It must be further taken into account that the relation of 
federation and state or province automatically carries with 
it the rule that if both Legislatures enact laws in themselves 
valid, and if these laws cannot be read together, the law of 
the lesser body must yield in validity to the law of the greater. 
This is the rule tacitly or expressly in the Federations and the 
Union, and even without express enactment it would un-
doubtedly be the rule in the British Empire, unless its applica-
tion were in set terms to be overridden : legislation expressed 
to extend to a Dominion, and enacted by the Imperial Parlia-
ment, must be deemed to be superior to any Dominion legisla-
tion, if for no other than the simple reason that every Dominion 
constitution can have no higher foundation for its existence 
than an Act of Parliament Newfoundland's constitution 
rests on the prerogative merely and that therefore to deny 
the binding effect of an Imperial Act extending in express 
terms to the Dominion would be to deny the validity of the 
constitution itself. When the validity of the doctrine of the 
inability of a Dominion Legislature to repeal an Imperial Act 
1 See Smiles v. Belford, 23 Gr. 590; 1 O.A.R. 436. Cf. Imperial Book 
Co. v. Black, 35 Can. S.C.R. 488 . 
• 
142 IMPERIAL UNITY AND THE DOMINIONS 
extending to the Dominion was being argued by Sir John 
Thompson 1 on behalf of the Canadian Government, he could 
not deny that an Act legislating for Canada subsequent to 
the British North America Act, by which he asserted the right 
to alter old Imperial Acts was given to Canada, would be 
valid, since it would operate as a sort of alteration of the 
constitution. It follows from this that even if an Imperial 
Act declared that the doctrine of repugnancy would not apply 
in future to Dominion Acts, nevertheless, if in any subse-
quent Imperial Act the measure were stated to apply to the 
Dominions, the former Act would be superseded, since it is 
not possible on the one hand for the Imperial Parliament 
to fetter its own action in any binding way, and since any 
Imperial Act expressed to extend to the Dominions must 
be regarded as valid and as overriding a Dominion Act. 
To repeal the Colonial Laws Validity Act would, therefore, 
merely have the result of leaving the position vague and 
difficult, unless all the clauses in Imperial Acts referring to 
the Dominions were repealed, or the Dominion Parliaments 
were given the power to repeal t ,hem. Even if this latter 
step were taken, the possibility of future legislation binding 
the Dominions would remain. The Act in fact is rather 
a charter of liberties than a fetter : it merely expresses in the 
irreducible form the nature of the relation between the central 
authority and a Dominion. The real end to be aimed at 
is not to abolish the form of repugnancy, but to render 
it innocuous by removing the material in which it takes 
shape. 
While the relation of sovereign state and dependency 
seems almost necessarily to demand that the legislation of 
the sovereign state should overrule that of the dependency, 
should they unhappily chance to concur in dealing with the 
same point in incompatible ways, it is not at all obvious that 
it is necessary that the sovereign state should have a direct 
power of preventing the dependency legislating at all on any 
subject. There may be a federal system without any power 
of veto of legislation passed by the subordinate Legislatures: 
1 Parl. Pap., C. 7783. 
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this is the case with the United States, and it is, as a result 
of the imitation of the United States model, a characteristic 
of the federal system of the Commonwealth of Australia. 
On the other hand, the power of disallowance is possessed by 
the central government of Canada, and naturally, of course, 
by the practically unitary central government of the Union 
of South Africa. In the former case the influence of the 
possession by the United Kingdom of the power of disallow-
ing Canadian Acts, no doubt, was the basis on which 
the power of disallowing provincial Acts was taken, as 
appears most clearly from the terms of the British North 
America Act itself. The revolt of the confederated states of 
the Union had made a deep impression on the minds of 
Canadian statesmen, and they were determined to secure that 
the central authority was not so helpless vis-a-vis the members 
of the federation as the United States had proved to be. 
The direct control of Dominion or State legislation 
possessed by the Imperial Gover11ment can be exercised in 
several slightly different ways. In the first place, the 
Governor is always part of the Dominion or State Legisla-
ture, and the Governor might in theory withhold his assent 
altogether from legislation passed by the two Houses, and 
presented to him for the necessary assent. This case is, how-
ever, in practice negligible : there is no recorded case of its 
use in recent years, and the high respect due to the elected 
Parliament of a Dominion or State makes it clear that it would 
be improper for a Governor, even on instructions from the 
Imperial Government, to withhold assent to a Bill. It is 
conceivable that a Governor might be advised by his 
ministers to withhold assent from a Bill which the two 
Houses had passed, purely as a technical means of reversing 
an error in legislation, which had gone too far to be corrected 
in any other way, and it has been suggested that when a Bill 
had been passed in a defective form through the two Houses, 
and it was desired to alter it, it would be better to let it thus 
fall to the ground, and to bring forward a new measure, 
but the possibility of such action remains hypothetical. On 
the other hand, every Governor may reserve any Bill which 
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is presented to him for the royal assent, and some Bills he 
must reserve, though a distinction is to be drawn under the 
Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, between the consequences 
of his failure to do so according as the instructions are con-
tained in a document having the force of law, or merely in 
the royal instructions, the measure assented to being in the 
first case not brought into operation by the assent which is 
a mere nullity, and in the second the measure having full 
legal validity. The effect of reservation is to place the ques-
tion of assent entirely out of the hands of the Governor: the 
Bill can, if it is to become law, only do so on condition that 
it receives by Order in Council the royal assent. Equivalent 
in -effect to the reservation of Bill is the passage of such a Bill 
with the inclusion of a suspending clause providing that it 
shall not take effect until approved by the Crown : such a 
Bill can be assented to, though sometimes a suspensory 
clause is coupled with reservation. 
The reservation of Bills in accordance with law is prescribed 
in certain cases of constitutional change in the Common-
wealth and States of Australia, and the Union of South 
Africa. Reservation under royal instructions, though possible 
everywhere, is not prescribed in the case of the Federations 
and New Zealand as regards any class of Acts, special in-
structions being sent instead, or the ministers tendering 
advice in favour of reservation. In the case of the Australian 
States there are certain standing instructions for reservation, 
which include all Bills for divorce, for grants to the Governor, 
affecting currency, contrary to treaty obligations, Bills of 
an extraordinary nature affecting the prerogative or the 
rights of persons being British subjects not residing in the 
State, or the trade and shipping of the Empire, and Bills to 
which ass~nt has previously been refused. But reservation 
is . not necessary in these cases if the permission of the 
Secretary of State to assent has been obtained in advance, or 
there is a suspending clause or the matter is urgent, and the 
Bill is not repugnant to the law of England, nor contrary to 
treaty. In the case of Newfoundland, the list of 1876 adds 
differential duties, and the control of the Imperial Forces in 
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the Colony. In the case of the Union the special instruc-
tion is given to reserve any Bill which on the ground of race 
or colour alone excludes from the franchise in the Cape of 
Good Hope any person who under the law of that province 
as it existed in 1910 was or might become eligible as a voter 
for the Cape Parliament. The procedure by suspending 
clause is required in some Imperial Acts, e. g. as regards 
merchant shipping and Admiralty jurisdiction. 
When the reserved Act is not assented to, or the Act con-
taining a suspending clause is not brought into force by 
the signification of the royal assent, the Bill becomes null 
and void. The same result can be produced with regard to 
any Act whioh is passed by the disallowance of the Act by 
Order in Council within a period normally of two years, 
one in the case of the Commonwealth and the Union, the 
date being reckoned either from the time of the Governor's 
assent or from the date of receipt by the Secretary of , State 
for the Colonies, which may be somewhat later, though the 
distinction, of importance in the old days of slow communi-
cation, is now of no real consequence. This form of dis-
approval is the worst possible: the Act having taken effect 
there is no possible justification for upsetting it except in 
. the grave case of necessity, and if that necessity arises it 
should be possible to secure the alteration which may be 
required by the sending of a proper representation to the 
Dominion Government, and not by the use of disallow-
ance. The existence of. that formal power is sometimes 
suggested to be desirable on the ground that it enables the 
Imperial Government, in effect though not expressly, to put 
pressure on a Dominion Government to amend a peccant 
Act, since, if no amendment is made, it can be disallowed, 
but the existence of this power at the present day is in all pro-
bability rather a disadvantage than otherwise, and, though 
it is true that the power to disallow has perhaps resulted in 
amendments of legislation being made, it is certain that 
actual disallowance of laws when passed may be regarded as 
now obsolete in the case of responsible governments. 
The question remains whether or not the power to instruct 
1874 lr 
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the Governor either in special cases or generally by royal 
instructions to reserve Bills of certain classes if they do not 
contain suspending clauses is one which should longer be 
retained with the advance of responsible government. It 
is important to point out that the suggestion made that 
a Ministry may compel assent by resignation is not 
one which need be taken too seriously. The resignation 
of a Ministry on such an issue as the reservation of a Bill 
because it was deemed to affect Imperial interests might be 
inconvenient for the Governor, but he is always at liberty to 
take leave of absence with the consent of the Imperial Govern-
ment, in which case he is relieved from trouble, and the 
officer administering the Government, now normally the 
Chief Justice, would not be likely to feel unduly oppressed 
by the difficulties of the situation. It is perfectly clear that 
no Dominion Parliament would allow the Ministry to remain 
unfilled on the theory that the Imperial Government had 
wrongfully insisted on the reservation of a Bill, and if, as 
a matter of fact, the Parliament preferred that no Govern-
ment should exist rather than permit of the reservation, 
then it would hardly be a matter of much concern to the 
·Imperial Government what happened in the matter of ad-
ministration. The position is clearly that the Dominion 
enjoys full internal control subject to the occasional inter-
ference for Imperial reasons of the Imperial Government. 
A Ministry accepts office, subject to the constitution, which 
expressly provides for the part played by the Governor in 
legislation, and also, it may be added, for the giving of in-
structions to him regarding the reservation of proposed laws. 
Therefore, if a Ministry secure the passing of legislation by 
the Houses, they fulfil their duty when they ask for the 
royal assent, and if this is not at once accorded, then they 
have no constitutional right to resign office, and, it may be 
added, there is no constitutional obligation on the Governor 
to accept their resignation. There is no greater fallacy than 
to imagine that there is any right on the part of a public 
servant to resign his post when he desires : the service of 
the Crown is the paramount duty, and the Ministry can only 
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retire if their resignations are accepted. Constitutionally, 
a Governor can only accept the resignations when their 
action is constitutional, that is when he has refused to act · 
on their advice, not on the ground of imperial instructions, 
but on the ground of his belief that he can obtain other 
ministers to support his refusal. It must be admitted that 
much of the confusion of thought on this subject is simply 
due to the fact of the practice of Governors to refuse advice 
on the ground that the Ministry do not represent the views 
of the country or Parliament : if it had not been for this 
practice the confusion of mind which asserts the right of 
ministers to resign when the Governor acts on Imperial 
instructions would not be possible. 
The argument adduced in support of this theory, when it 
is challenged, is that ministers must have complete responsi-
bility for everything affecting the Dominion, or they cannot 
be expected to serve as ministers. This amounts simply to 
the doctrine that a Dominion must not be a dependency at all, 
that is that the whole constitution of the Empire must be 
changed, and the Dominions become separate and inde-
pendent States, an idea perfectly open to discussion on its 
own merits, but wholly incompatible with responsible govern-
ment in a depend.ency. The theory that the Imperial Govern-
ment must yield is based on the error that the Imperial 
Government is responsible for the internal government of 
a responsible government Dominion, which is not the case. 
It is conceivable there is no recorded instance that in 
some cases a responsible government Ministry might resign 
over a question of reservation, and the Imperial Govern-
ment might give in on the ground that the matter was not 
worth a dispute, a fact which would show that they had 
acted foolishly in allowing or ordering reservation. But 
in serious cases, as in that of the dispute with the United 
States Government over Newfoundlanq in 1906, the Imperial 
Government remained obdurate and refused to allow the 
Foreign Vessels Fishing Act, 1906,1 to take effect, heedless of 
the probability of the resignation of the Government, and 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 3262. 
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the impossibility of a new Ministry being constituted : and, 
indeed, they went so far as to override an Act of 1905, 
which had taken effect, by an Order in Council under the 
old Imperial Act of 1819 passed to secure the carrying out 
of the Treaty of 1818 with the United States.1 Had the 
Ministry resigned, they would simply have left the Colony to 
arrange for the conduct of its internal government as it saw 
fit : for that they had no responsibility, but they had a 
responsibility to prevent war with a great and friendly 
power. 
It may, of course, be further argued that the result of such 
a position would be the secession of the Dominion from the 
Empire on the one hand, or 011 the other the failure of the 
Imperial Government to give effect to its aim in preventing 
the operation of the legislation in question. The latter 
danger may be ignored: the Imperial Government in any 
case cannot act executively in a Dominion territory proper: 
it must leave the matter to be regulated by law and by 
the Courts : if it forbids the operation of the law as in the 
Newfoundland case, then the Courts will give effect to its 
action, and the executive government cannot override the 
courts. In the special case of Newfoundland where action 
at sea was possible, the British Navy could have secured the 
freedom of American vessels from illegal interference by 
Newfoundland executive officers, but it is fair to say that 
no such interference was dreamt of. On tlie other hand, 
if it is really the will of the people of a Dominion to sever 
themselves from the Imperial control and to set up as an 
independent power, it . is impossible to believe that the 
Imperial Government would forbid the carrying out of this 
desire, though it would doubtless take steps to secure that 
the desire was a deliberate one representing the decision of 
a real majority, and to safeguard the interests of those who, 
having gone to settle in the Dominion on the faith of its 
British character, did not desire to remain in it under a change 
of regime. 
Further argument is, however, needless, in view of the 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 3262. 
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absence of a single instance of such a rel;ignation, and in the 
presence of many cases where the refusal of assent has taken 
place without any resignation of Ministers, some of which have 
been referred to above.1 Not to take older examples, which 
may be regarded as out of date, in the brief period from 1906 
to 1912, the royal assent was withheld from one Bill of the 
Commonwealth, one of Tasmania, one of New Zealand, one 
of Newfoundland, two of Natal, and one of the Orange River 
Colony, while one Act of that Colony with a suspending 
clause, and one of the Transvaal were never allowed to come 
into operation. Even in the case of Canada, there remain 
two statutes on the statute book neither of which the Imperial 
Government has allowed to have effect, the Act to amend 
the Copyright Acts, passed in 1889, and the Act to provide 
for the marking of deck and load lines passed in 1891, both 
embodied in the Revised Statutes of 1906. 
Despite, however, the theoretic defences which can be 
made for the retention of the power of preventing a Dominion 
Act having full operation, it is open to grave doubt whether 
the power should not formally be surrendered as being an 
anachronism. The presence of the power is misleading : it 
results in the difficulty that the Imperial Government has 
a power which it in theory can exercise, but which for one 
reason or other it cannot possibly use without creating a 
state of confusion which would be intolerable, as, for instance, 
in the case of Indemnity Acts. Yet the fact that the Imperial 
Government does not disallow imposes on it a responsibility 
which it should not have to bear, and incidentally allows of 
the discussion of questions affecting self-governing communi-
ties in Parliament inamannerwhich, while absolutely justified 
by the present constitutional position, is extremely annoying 
to these communities, who realize, in their own case at least, 
that the discussion of questions without full understanding 
is difficult and unsatisfactory in the extreme. 
It may, however, be deduced from the fact that quite 
recently refusal of assent has been necessary, that grave 
Imperial injury would result from the non-retention of the 
1 Part I, chap. iv. 
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power to refuse assent. The answer to this. is twofold : in 
the first place, it should always be possible in a matter really 
affecting Imperial interest to secure the modification of local 
legislation to such extent as is necessary to meet Imperial 
interests without the question of disallowance necessarily 
arising at all : of this a partial instance at least may be found 
in the case of the arrangements with the Union Government 
regarding the immigration of British Indians, which will be 
discussed below. In the second place, the Imperial Parlia-
ment can always, if it thinks fit, override a Colonial Act by 
paramount legislation, and there is much to be said for the 
taking of this bold course in case of absolute emergency. In 
the first place, it would protect the Dominion from rash inter-
ferenee : there is no more valuable check on hasty action 
tha11 the need of satisfying Parliament of the necessity of 
action. In the second place, the full explanations of the 
case would have their effect in the Dominion, and produce 
a spirit of conciliation, as was the case in 1891, when the 
Imperial Government determined to legislate over the heads 
of Newfoundland, if it would not come to a reasonable settle-
ment of the French treaty rights difficulty, with the result 
that Newfoundland came to terms. In the third place, it 
would make clear to the Empire at large the principles of 
policy on which the Imperial Government had acted. It is 
subject only to one disadvantage, though a grave one. It 
is only too probable that the necessity of bringing the matter 
before Parliament would encourage the Dominion in its 
resistance on the ground that the difficulty of securing 
Parliamentary legislation would deter the Government from 
pressing its views. Some force must be conceded to this 
argument, since it is certain that, until the sense of Imperial 
duty increases, matters affecting the Dominions are apt to 
be dealt with as matters of Party politics, as was shown by 
the very unsatisfactory debate in 1906 over the execution 
of the Natal natives, when the real constitutional position 
was neglected in the desire of the Opposition to attack the 
Government, and the no less great readiness of the Under 
Secretary of State to meet the Opposition with counter 
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attacks. But these faults of immaturity of judgement may be 
expected in due course to be overcome, nor can any one doubt 
that, had it been possible in 1907 to legislate over the heads 
of the Newfoundland Government, that course of action 
would have been preferable on constitutional grounds to the 
issue of an Order in Council under an Act passed thirteen 
years before Newfoundland had even a representative 
legislature. 
From the theoretic grounds set out above, it seems to 
follow that the Imperial Parliament might well relieve 
Dominion and State Parliaments from the present restriction 
affecting the territorial limitation of Dominion legislation 
and might surrender the power of withholding assent to Acts 
now enjoyed. From the point of view of the Dominions the 
latter proposal might be subject to one objection : Ministries 
there from time to time have been glad to avail themselves 
of the interference of the Imperial Government · as a means 
of getting rid of proposals which they have no liking for, 
but which they have not the courage to prevent their Parlia-
ments passing into law. There have been recent instances 
of this, but it may SU;ffice to refer to the frank admission of 
Sir Charles Tupper 1 that he and the Canadian ·Ministry 
generally were anxious to secure, and did secure, that the 
Canadian Bill of 1868 reducing from £10,000 to £6,000 the 
salary of the Governor-General should not receive the royal 
assent, thus behind the back of Parliament upsetting the 
wishes of that body : the incident is of special interest as 
the reduction of the salary was the cause of the failure of 
the proposal to appoint Lord Mayo_to the office. The argu-
ment, however, cannot be seriously urged : it is compatible 
only with a low ideal of responsibility, and may therefore 
be disregarded, and it remains only by examination of 
the various conditions in which the Imperial control has 
been from time to time exercised to ascertain whether there 
is any serious objection to the modification of the powers of 
the Imperial Government, and the grant of greater freedom 
to the Dominions. 
1 Recollections of Sixty Years, p. 95. 
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The question, of course, presents itself whether or not it 
would be possible to invent a list of cases in which the 
Imperial power of preventing a Bill taking effect would be 
operative while in all other cases it would not be open to use 
it. In effect this would amount to determining what are 
Imperial and what are local topics, and such an attempt 
experience indicates would never be successful. If th~ 
separation could have been made it would probably have been 
made when the Victoria Bill, which became law in an amended 
form in 1855 as a schedule to an Imperial Act, was sent home 
· for consideration, as the plan of separation was there adopted 
tentatively, and the question of adopting that proposed de-
finition or of thinking out a new one presented itself. The 
effort to devise any successful plan of discrimi11ation failed, 
though Mr. Gladstone was anxious to see it carried through. 
It would probably have been possible to provide some wide 
clause regarding the right of the Privy Council to decide in 
any case of doubt whether an Imperial interest or not was 
involved, but that would have been very confusing and 
complicated, and the adoption of the simpler plan of making 
no distinction between classes of Acts was certainly wise. 
The attempt would no doubt have overlooked the very Acts 
which in later times have given most trouble, namely, the 
Acts which, like the 'Western Australia Factories Act, 1904, 
contain wholly needless discriminations against Asiatics 
eo nomine, as well as against Chinese. The topics which 
troubled the statesmen of that time were more obvious 
questions . of treaty relations, and the royal prerogative 
a vague term the exact force of which was uncertain. 
It is of interest as indicating a difference of outlook be-
tween the relations of a federal Government to its provinces, 
and of the mother country to self-governing territories, to 
contrast the attitude of the Dominion to the Canadian pro-
vinces in the exercise of their power of legislation. The 
treatment of Colonial legislation has always been that it is to 
be aimed at to prevent any legislation which is not to take 
permanent effect being assented to at all, so as to cause 
doubt and difficulty through the disallowance, and thus the 
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rules for reservation have bee11 carefully planned and widely 
used. In the case of a province, on the contrary, the reserva-
tion of Bills by the Lieutenant-Governors was never at any 
time frequent and of late years has become almost, it may 
be said, obsolete. The reason for this state of affairs is that 
the Dominion does not object specially to interfering with 
the province, and has no marked dislike to allowing the 
working of an Act for a few months to show whether · or 
not theoretical defects are serious in practice and rouse 
opposition to the measure among the people of Canada as 
a whole. 
• 
• 
CHAPTER VII 
INTERNAL AFFAIRS 
PRIOR to the grant of responsible government the Imperial 
Government had been accustomed to scrutinize with the 
most minute care the various enactments of Colonial Legis-
latures. Their supervision was based in the main on no 
motive other than the legitimate desire to afford all possible 
aid to young and struggling communities in their attempts 
to legislate, and the skill of the United Kingdom often 
enabled the Government to point out defects of a serious 
character. With the grant of responsible government the 
duty of supervising internal affairs passed away· from the 
Imperial Government, and, though it took some years for 
the change to become effective, before 1875 it was well 
established that folly in a law in the eyes of Downing Street 
was no possible ground for taking any exception to its terms. 
It must be remembered that. there was temptation to inter-
vene : private individuals who deemed that their interests 
were being wrongly handled by Dominion Parliaments were 
very ready to appeal to the Secretary of State to prevent 
gross injustice being done : nor indeed were their appeals 
always in vain, as Prince Edward Island found in its efforts 
to buy out the proprietors who had been established in the 
island, and for whose expropriation equitable terms were 
demanded by the Imperial Government. The most famous 
case of interference perhaps on record was that in 1897 in 
Newfoundland. The Government of Sir W. Whiteway had 
found themselves in 1894 in an unhappy position: the 
passing of an Act regarding elections had made the practices 
normal in Newfoundland in the case of elections illegal, and 
thus the Government found that its supporters were being 
one by one attacked by election petitions, and found to have 
been illegally elected. They, therefore, in fear of further 
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ills, passed in 1897 a Bill (c. 28) which was, however, reserved 
by the Governor, and never assented to, since the result of 
the assent would have been to condone the very serious mis-
application of public funds which was normal at Newfound-
land elections, and which certainly did not deserve to be 
encouraged.1 But, on the other hand, the earnest attempt of 
a very powerful party in Newfoundland to secure the dis-
allowance of the legislation regarding the Newfoundland 
railway contract,2 though supported by strong arguments, 
was completely unsuccessful, Mr. Chamberlain coming to the 
definite opinion that the matter was one which wholly con-
cerned the Colony, and that accordingly there was no ground 
for refusing to give full effect to the legislation which had 
been passed by the Colony. He did not, however, conceal his 
opinion that the handing over of all the natural sources of 
wealth of the Colony to one firm, however distinguished, 
was a mistake, and to a certain extent events justified his 
view. The feeling against the contract was strong, and Sir 
R. Bond, in deference to it, modified by another agreement 
with Mr. Reid the terms of the contract, securing the 
return to the Colony of the ownership of the railway, which, 
however, was still to be worked by Mr. Reid, and of the 
telegraph system, though only at the expense of the pay-
ment of very considerable sums .of money. The case, how-
ever, is important, as it shows the impossibility of a position 
which leads a strong party in a Colony to seek aid against the 
elected Government by interference from Downing Street. 
So decisive was this refusal, and so clear the repudiation of 
any intention of the Imperial Government to intervene in the 
internal affairs of a Dominion, that it is a matter of surprise 
that cases of such application have not been unknown in 
quite recent times; thus, for instance, petitions for the with-
holding of assent were presented against a New South Wales 
Act, dealing with the settlement of the claims arising out of 
the land scandals in that State under the administration 
of the Lands Department by Mr. Crick, and the land taxation 
1 Parl. Pap., H.C. 184, 1906, p. 4. 
2 Ibid., C. 8867 and 9137 . 
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of the Labour Ministry in the Commonwealth in 1910. T,he 
point of exception taken to the latter legislation was that 
it struck at absentee owners, such as the land companies, 
with double force, and that this change of taxation was unfair, 
as these companies could not be other than absentees in the 
technical sense, and that there was some force in this argu-
ment was admitted by the succeeding Liberal Governme;nt, 
though it was not able to give any remedy, and by the actio11 
of the New South Wales Labour Government in removing 
the discrimination against absentees existing under the laws 
of that State. But interference in such matters would 
obviously be wholly absurd, and it is undesirable that it 
should even be open to individuals to send petitions on such 
· questions as the Navigation Act of the Commonwealth to 
the Imperial Government, a position which merely tends 
to lead to friction. 
Unfortunately, a difficulty arises in this connexion, 
because of the right 1 of a British subject to petition the 
Crown on any matter affecting his interests. In the case of 
a self-governing Dominion it is clear that as the Ministry 
are the responsible advisers of the Governor, who represents 
the Crown, the petition should really be addressed to the 
Governor, and disposed of by the Ministry who advise the 
Governor what answer is to be returned. The right to 
petition the Crown when acted upon places all parties in an 
inconvenient position. The Crown must be advised what 
action is to be taken by his Imperial Ministers, and for 
this purpose they must be advised by the Dominion Govern-
ment, while the Dominion Government naturally enough 
dislikes being asked for reports on such matters. In the 
ordinary instance, however, it is simple to dispose of the 
petition by advising His Majesty to refer the petition to 
the responsible Ministry concerned through the Governor, 
and this course is regularly adopted in the case of applica-
tions for the exercise of the prerogative of mercy in favour 
of a condemned prisoner. But the case of a petition for 
1 Whether it exists by strict law may be doubted, but the questfon is 
not of importance. See 1 Will. & Mary, sess. 2, c. 2 . 
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the disallowance of an Act of a Dominion Parliament cannot 
be met in this way, since the responsibility of disallowing 
rests not with the Dominion Government but with the 
Imperial Government. Thus the necessity of calling for 
a report from the Dominion Government is created, and 
friction is certain to be engendered over a matter which is 
not of Imperial importance. It is impossible to think that 
it is desirable on principle to retain the present practice of 
petitioning the Crown if it is deemed to be desirable, and the 
only means of evading the present difficulty is the removal 
of the Imperial veto, whereupon it is easy to dispose of 
petitions by mere reference to the responsible ministers. 
The alternative suggestion that all petitioners of the Crown 
should be informed that their petitions will not be received. 
if they refer to matters arising in the Dominions is open to 
the insuperable objection that they cut the connexion 
between the Crown and the subject overseas. 
On the other hand, in the case of petitions for leave to 
sue the Crown there is nothing whatever to ~e said for the 
grave anomaly by which these petitions may be addressed to 
· the Crown, and a fiat may be granted despite the objections 
of ministers. This ha~ happened on several occasions in 
the case of the State of Western Australia, and there is no 
doubt whatever that the right of so petitioning the Crown 
exists in every self-governing Dominion and State, unless 
it has been barred effectively by statute. To this rule the 
only possible exception is in those cases where the basis of 
the law of the Dominion is not English law, as in Quebec, 
and the Union of South Africa. The validity of this distinc-
tion is doubtful, and ~ests merely on opinion, as there is no 
decided case which deals with it, and it is indeed a matter 
on which it would be difficult to obtain a legal decision, 
except perhaps by a special reference to the Privy Council. -
The point involved is whether the matter is to be treated 
as one of the royal prerogative, namely the right of the 
Crown to waive immunity to suit, or a matter of procedure 
introduced with the English common law. But in the great 
majority of cases the power need never be invoked, for while 
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the remedy by petition of right is one very limited in extent,l 
the Dominions and States have made much more ample and 
generous provision in their statutes for proceedings against 
the Crown, so that applications to the Crown and the 
responsibility of Imperial ministers can seldom be of any 
advantage. Moreover, the possibility of such applications 
could be wholly prevented by the passing of local legislation 
barring the right whether as part of the prerogative or a rule 
of procedure, and it is surprising that this course has not been 
adopted by Western Australia, to which the position was 
made clear so long ago as at the Conference of 1897. It has 
of course been argued that the Imperial Government ought 
on these occasions simply to act on the advice of the local 
. Ministry as to the propriety of the application, but this is, 
as in the case of the disallowance of Acts, impossible, since 
the Ministry are responsible for the exercise of the po,¥er 
of advice, and, as the matter is one of law, they are bound to 
act on the same principles which guide the Ministry in the 
United Kingdom in advising the grant or refusal of a fiat to 
a petition of right. Moreover, in one case at least, ministers 
have special responsibility if the claim is against the Imperial 
Government, and not the Colonial Government : in these 
instances the fiat alone is the method in which proceedings 
can be taken, as the Dominion Acts deal with claims against 
the Crown in its local aspect, and not with claims against the 
Crown in its Imperial aspect. But this class of cases is 
precisely that one in which the views of the local Govern-
ment are not constitutionally requisite for the guidance of 
the Imperial Government, though they may be valuable, 
and the existence of the procedure by petition of right in 
these cases is both proper and not open to be barred by any 
local Act, except in so far as the local Legislature might in 
theory prevent the local courts from taking cognizance of 
1 It does not refer at all to torts; see Clode, Petition of Right, and 
Robertson, Proceedings by and against the Crown. For New South Wales 
see Act No. 27 of 1912. In the Cape up to 1881 a simple action could be 
brought against any head of a government department with the consent of 
the court. 
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such a case or acting on the fiat. Moreover, the right to grant 
a fiat in this case applies to every Dominion or province. 
These are comparatively trivial .matters, but a good deal 
of feeling long existed in the Dominions in connexion with 
the question of marriage and divorce. The points at issue 
were the strong feeling in the Dominions in favour of extend-
ing the grounds of divorce, and in favour of relaxing the 
restriction on marriage with a deceased wife's sister. The 
opposition to both proposals came in part, no doubt, from 
episcopal feeling, but the real ground of objection was that 
the introduction of the changes might produce confusions 
of law, es1Jecially in cases of inheritance, since the English 
courts could not recognize the offspring of marriages with 
deceased wife's sisters as legitimate for purposes of intestate 
succession to real property or titles of honour, and would 
only accept as legitimate divorces those pronounced by the 
courts of the domicile of the husband. In the end the 
Dominions were permitted to legislate as they thought fit, 
but only after the Governments had adopted in the case 
of divorce the rule of domicile, save in the case of de-
serted wives/ whose husbands had changed their domicile 
without their consent. Moreover, in the long run the 
influence 2 of the Dominions produced first the passing of 
the Act of 1906, which made valid for every purpose within 
the United Kingdom a marriage with the sister of a deceased 
wife which took place outside the United Kingdom between 
persons domiciled in a place where such marriages were legal, 
and in the second place the passing of the Act of 1907, which 
made legal such marriages in the United Kingdom itself. Nor 
has the influence of the divorce law of the Dominions been 
without effect in the United Kingdom : certain of its features 
received endorsement from the conclusions of the majority 
report of the Royal Commission on the law of divorce, though 
the possibility of legislation in the sense of these recommenda-
tions appears to be practically nil. 
1 See Parl. Pap., C. 6006. Domicile must have existed, Brook v. Brook, 
13 N.S.W.R. Div. 9; Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, 21 N.S.W.L.R. Div. 16. 
For Western Australia see Act No. 7 of 1912. 2 Parl. Pap., Cd. 2398. 
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But, while the efforts to control the Dominions in matters 
of social relations are things of the past, the conception that 
the Imperial Government, because it has a veto on legislation, 
is responsible for other internal matters is a persistent one, 
and its inconvenience was shown very convincingly in 
the case of the deportation in January 1914 of certain la hour 
leaders from South Africa. The labour unrest of the preceding 
year, which had come to a head in rioting at Johannesburg, 
broke out again in January in the form of a general strike, 
and as a result the Government of the Union had recourse to 
martial law in several districts, called out the defence force, 
which by this time had been duly constituted, thus rendering 
· the use of Imperial troops as in the preceding year unneces-
sary, and took every step to put down the strike. In this they 
were successful without bloodshed, and so far their pro-
ceedings seem to have received general approval. . They, 
however, went further : on January 27 the Governor-General 
received a notification from ministers that they had decided 
in order to give a lesson which would be effective against 
treasonable and seditious practices, and to secure the peace 
of the Union, to deport forthwith ten specified persons, and 
to forbid their return to the ,Union. They added that they 
would at once ask Parliament to confirm their action. They 
then proceeded forcibly to send to England from Natal the 
men in question, frustrating efforts to invoke the assistance 
of the courts on their behalf .1 · 
· The procedure adopted was wholly illegal : the exact 
extent to which the actions of the Government in suppress-
ing a dangerous position may go under the common law of 
South Africa is as doubtful as it is in England, and it is 
perfectly clear that much that was done in the case at issue 
might well have been perfectly legal under the maxim salus 
reipublicae suprema lex. But in the particular case in ques-
tion the men were in prison powerless for evil, and their 
remoyal from the country was flagrantly illegal: 2 the justi-
fication given by General Smuts was merely that if the 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 7213 and 7348. 
2 Of. Round Table, 1914, pp. 567- 81. 
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Government had not taken the step they would never have 
obtained in cold blood from Parliament the right to expel 
the prisoners, whose deportation then was not necessary as 
a deterrent but merely as a punishment. The only possi-
bility, therefore, of legalizing the action was that of passing 
a Bill of Indemnity, and that step was accordingly at once 
taken by the Union Parliament in Act No. 1 of 1914, in which 
provision was made for the withdrawal of martial law from 
those districts in which it had been brought into operation, 
to'indemnify the Government, its officers, and other persons 
in respect of acts advised, ordered, and done in good faith, 
for the prevention and suppression of i11ternal disorder, 
and the maintenance of good order and public safety 
and in the administration of martial law, and to declare 
that the persons specified who had been deported ·from 
the Union should be liable to deportation if they again 
entered it. 
The lawless and somewhat unwise action of the Govern-
ment in deporting men who should have been tried by law 
was deeply disapproved by some of the best minds of South 
Africa, such as that of Mr. Merriman, and it raised a feeling 
of . such indignation in the United Kingdom ,I that from 
a British Dominion, on which millions of British money 
and lives had been spent, ten British subjects had been 
expelled without due process of law, whereas if they had 
been proved to be criminals the Governor-General would 
under the royal instructions have been precluded from par-
doning them on condition of their being sent to England. 
It was realized that the passing of an Indemnity Act would 
preclude the men receiving justice from the Courts of the 
Union or the Courts of the United Kingdom, and that the 
plan of bringing an action against the steamship company 
who owned the steamer by ·which they had been brought 
home, or the captain of the steamer, was an ineffective 
way of proceeding to vindicate them, even if legally such an 
1 See the debate in the House of Commons, Feb. 12, 1914. Most of the 
organs of the press disapproved the action taken. See e. g. Morning Post, 
Jan. 31, 1914. 
1874 ~ 
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action were to be successful. Two complaints were therefore 
made against the Imperial Government : that the Governor-
General should have informed the Ministry that they must 
not deport the men, and that the Imperial Government 
should intimate that the Indemnity Bill would not be 
allowed to come into operation if the men were not secured 
their legal right of testing the validity of their deporta-
tion, or, as that would have been impossible, that the 
Indemnity Bill should not be allowed at all to take effect. 
The case was a crucial test of the doctrines of responsible 
government. It was pointed out that a New Zealand In-
demnity Act · in 1867 had been refused the royal assent, 
because its terms were too wide and were not limited to 
cover only acts done in good faith, and that a new Indemnity 
Act had therefore to be enacted by the Parliament, but it 
was not realized that there was all the difference in the world 
between the case of an Indemnity Act in New Zealand, when 
persons affected were Maoris, who were not at all likely to 
have recourse to the courts of the Colony for redress for 
acts done during the rebellion which had been put down, 
and when the men were British subjects of a pugnacious 
type, prepared to attack at once the officers of the Union 
in the Law Courts, which would no doubt have given them 
swift redress. The position in effect was that the Govern-
ment had placed themselves by their hasty action in a most 
difficult position, from which nothing but an Indemnity Act 
could extricate them, but that that Act had been forthcom-
ing with a degree of unanimity in the Parliament which 
speaks more effectively for the terror raised in the Union 
by the general strike than for the sense of liberty possessed 
by members of the Union Parliament. But the Act was 
there, the matter with which it dealt was obviously one of in-
ternal politics only, to refuse assent would be to create inex-
tricable confusion, and to discredit a government which had 
certainly been faced by a grave danger, and which in the 
main had met that danger without needless violence. The 
preservation of internal order is clearly the main duty of 
government, and it is impossible to undertake to scrutinize 
• 
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too closely its methods if the local Parliament approves 
them. The Imperial Government, therefore, while strictly 
disclaiming any intention of expressing an opinion on the pro-
priety of the measures taken by the Government of the Union, 
declined to withhold assent to the Bill. But they sJhowed 
their interest in the matter by pointing out during the 
process of the passing of the Bill that as first drafted it 
appeared to provide for the legislation of future action under 
martial law, that this course was open to the same objections 
as had been urged to s. 9 of the Natal Indemnity Act, No. 50 
of 1906, and that it would appear better to restrict the Act 
on the model of the Transvaal Ordinance, No. 38 of 1902, to 
transactions of the past. The suggestion was accepted by 
the Government of the Union, and the Act as passed and 
assented to referred only to the exercise of martial Jaw in 
the past.1 
While it is impossible to deny that the action of the Im-
perial Government was the only possible course to be adopted 
in the best interest of South Africa, it is plain that their 
attitude was rendered possible only by the fact that the 
deportees were all British subjects. Had the deportees been 
aliens, there would undoubtedly have arisen a question 
of the gravest importance : no self-respecting foreign 
Government would have acquiesced in the expulsion of its 
subjects without trial, and a demand for arbitration on 
the point could not have been declined. This fact would at 
once have given the Imperial Government a direct Imperial 
interest in the case, and while it doubtless would not have 
prevented the giving of assent to the Act, that assent could 
only have been given on the express understanding that the 
Union Government was prepared to pay damages for the 
injuries done to the men, if an arbitration decided against 
them. But a further conclusion follows from this obvious 
fact : as matters stand the subjects of the British Crown 
have less effective protection from acts of illegality in self-
governing Dominions than in foreign countries, for in foreign 
countries they have the support of the Imperial Govern-
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 7348, p. 103. 
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ment, and such support cannot be effectively accorded 
to them in the case of ill-treatment in the oversea 
Dominions, since there is no mode by which the Imperial 
Government can prefer a demand for compensation upon 
a Dominion. 
This fact is merely an extreme case of what is universally 
true, that in many matters it is less possible for the Imperial 
Government to bring effective pressure to bear upon the self-
governing Dominions than it is to bring pressure to bear 
on foreign States. The latter for reasons of high policy, for 
good fellowship, or other consideration, a:r:e often willing to 
receive representations on the behalf of individuals, and if 
not the network of arbitration treaties permits of reference 
to arbitration. If a firm or individual complain of actjon in 
a Dominion, he can only be referred to the courts which in 
the event of the passing of Indemnity Acts may be powerless 
to accord relief. An excellent example of this is afforded by 
the famous case of the Cobalt Lake in Canada: the Govern-
ment of Ontario secured the passing of a local Act which was 
alleged, rightly or wrongly, to cancel existing rights without 
compensation: an appeal was made to the Federal Govern-
ment to disallow the Act, but, while the Federal Government 
did not deem the Act desirable or fair, it declined to disallow 
it on the ground that it was not the province of the Federal 
Government to deal with provincial Acts with regard to 
their intrinsic merit, but merely on grounds affecting the 
Dominion in some vital way. Similarly in the Alberta and 
Great Waterways Railway case, where the Legislature of 
Alberta confiscated certain moneys for the provincial revenue, 
though this action was modified by other portions of the 
same legislation, the Federal Government again asserted the 
position that it was not its function to judge of the propriety 
of measures of the provinces on grounds of morality alone.1 
In either case the company or person affected by the action 
of the provincial legislature could have received no compensa-
tion of any sort through the action of the Imperial Govern-
ment, which, had the transaction been done in foreign 
1 
· Parl. Pap.~ Cd. 6091, pp. 66, 67. 
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countries, could have claimed to intervene in their behalf. In 
the latter case,' curiously enough, the Judicial Committee of 
the Privy Council found itself able to give relief,1 but this was 
an accident pure and simple, though one not applicable to · 
a foreign country, and in the former case the Privy Council 
had no such power, and refused leave to appeal from the 
decision of the court in Ontario affirming the validity of the 
act of confiscation. 
The difficulty recurs in another form in the matter of the 
treatment of British Indians in the self-governing Dominions. 
In the case of the Union of South Africa, the contrast is 
made more emphatic because part of the Union, the part 
most concerned at the present day, was formerly foreign 
territory and the full weight of the Imperial Government 
was lent to the efforts to secure for Indians there a better 
position. In point of fact, their position since annexation 
has deteriorated in practice though not altogether in law, 
and there is no tribunal which can be invoked to settle the 
differences of opinion between the Imperial and the Dominion 
Government, nor one to which India could appeal against 
the action of the self-governing Dominions in treating harshly 
resident Indians.2 In some cases the use of the power of 
veto has prevented difficulties of this type so far arising, 
but there may well be in the future further cases where the 
Imperial and the Dominion Governments differ in good faith 
on points which between foreign countries would be referred 
to arbitration for discussion and settlement. 
The proposal naturally suggests itself that the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council should be used in these 
cases as the means of adjusting differences. ·It would no 
doubt be desirable that for this purpose the tribunal should 
be strengthened by a stronger admixture of the element of 
Dominion judges, and, if questions rather of statesmanship 
than mere law are to be decided, it might be better to refer 
the dispute by the statutory power of: the Crown to a special 
1 [1913] A.C. 283. 
2 e. g. the _dispute as to the deportation of alleged domiciled Indians 
via Lorenzo Marques; House of Lords Debates, July 26, 1910. 
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committee which might consist in part of high legal officials, 
and in part of statesmen, chosen from the United Kingdom 
and the Dominions. The possibilities of development of such 
a body are obvious, and the nucleus of such action is present 
in cases like the reference of intercolonial boundary disputes 
to the consideration of the Privy Council. The sub .. 
stantive law to be considered by such a body would be the 
general principles of international law as accepted by the 
British Empire, but doubtless they would have to evolve a 
- good deal of law of their own, to meet the abnormal conditions 
of the Empire. But it would be a real advantage to have 
some recognized way of submitting questions to arbitration 
in a satisfactory manner. The decisions of the arbitral body 
• 
would not be legally binding on any party, but they would, 
like the decisions of an arbitral tribunal at international law, 
doubtless be acted upon. To make the scheme effective it 
would, no doubt, be essential to confine its scope to definite 
complaints by one Dominion against another, or by the 
United Kingdom against a Dominion, or vice versa, of injury 
inflicted upon a British subject belonging to one part of the 
Empire in some other under circumstances, which in inter-
national law would afford a cause of claim for damages.1 
The institution of such a form of procedure would only be 
another recognition of the obvious fact that the position of 
the self-governing Dominions tends in an ever-increasing 
degree to be assimilated to that of fdreign states, while the 
choice of tribunal would be a sign of the other essential fact, 
the real unity of the Empire. 
In the particular case in question, the deportation of labour 
leaders from the Union, the situation in the Union changed 
sufficiently later on to permit the Government to reconsider 
its decision to keep the deportees permanently out of South 
Africa. The suggestion that the Governor-General should 
have himself intervened to prevent the action of his ministers, 
or should have been instructed to intervene, cannot be re-
garded as convincing. The Governor-General was evidently 
1 The restriction to such classes would be essential, as a body of this 
type could not deal with policy. 
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deeply convinced of the necessity of the stern enforcement 
of the law, as he showed in his careful statement of the situa-
tion, and probably he did not feel that the action of 
ministers was in its essence such as to call for his interven-
tion, as they proposed at once to ask Parliament to 
ratify their acts. The Secretary of State had certainly 
neither the necessary time nor knowledge to interfere in the 
matter. But there can be no more singular example of the 
curious effects of the declaration of martial law than that 
the Governor-General should have solemnly used h~s power 
under royal warrant 1 to convene and confirm the sentences 
of General Courts .Martial, assembled for the trial of persons 
subject to military law, to convene a General Court ,Martial 
to try accused persons who under the martial law regulations 
were declared to be subject to military law. The power 
granted to Lord Gladstone by the Crown was one referring 
to troops who become subject to the provisions of the Army 
Act,2 and had nothing whatever to do with civilians who 
might be declared by invalid and illegal regulations to be 
subject to military law, nor could the Indemnity Act make 
Lord Gladstone's use of his warrant in this way anything 
but manifestly absurd: doubtless in the haste of the action 
takeri, the point of the legal propriety of the measure was not 
considered with adequate care by the law advisers of the 
Government. The serious point about the action of course 
was that Lord Gladstone, whose power under the warrant 
was, strictly speaking, a personal power, not to be exercised 
on ministerial advice as a matter of course, was thus led to 
make himself personally responsible for a wholly illegal trial, 
which should have been carried out under martial law pure 
and simple, and should not have been clothed with an 
apparent legality to which it had no possible claim. 
1 Parl. Paper, Cd. 734R, pp. 200, 201. 
2 The power was given as it might be useful in cases of troops of the 
Imperial forces in the Union, and was therefore not a power of the Governor-
General as a colonial official at all. 
• 
CHAPTER VIII 
THE TREATMENT OF NATIVE R~ACES 
THERE is no more striking exam pie of the difficulties of 
the carrying out of responsible government than the con-
stant.Iy recurring questions which have arisen as to the 
right of the Imperial Government to interfere with the 
actions of a Dominion in respect to its treatment of native 
races. The problem has arisen from the fact that the 
growth of a large white population has often seemed to render 
the concession of such a form of government necessary, 
while at the same time the white population has not been 
able to rise to a really high view of its duty towards the 
native peoples which it must control. In the case of the 
Union of South Africa a still more complicated aspect has 
been given to the matter by the fact that by conquest two 
republics which set up the fundamental doctr'ine of the 
inequality of the white and the black races have been 
included in the Empire on terms which forbade the grant 
of the franchise to the native races before the est.ablishment 
of representative government. 
In Canada, indeed, and in Newfoundland, the question 
of the native races presents little enough trouble : the 
Boethucs of Newfoundland had disappeared before t.he 
grant of a Legislature, and the natives of Labrador present no 
problems for policy to deal with. In Canada the Imperial 
Government established in its management of the Indian 
tribes a record that has been worthily maintained by the 
Dominion Government which takes care of all the Indians -
throughout the Dominion, and secures their rights against 
any serious encroachment. The Indian settlements have 
been respected, and the necessary surrenders of lands from 
them for occupation by white settlers have been acquired 
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by agreements which have been faithfully kept, and in 
which the interests of the natives- are fully considered. 
Indeed until quite recently the Indian Act 1 did not contain 
authority for the Government to take land compulsorily 
from an Indian band, and the power was only given by an 
Act (c. 14) of 1911 after it had been found necessary to pay 
quite excessive rates . to remove the Songhees Indians from 
their reserve near Victoria, British Columbia. This Act 
provides that in the case of a reserve within the area of an 
incorporated city of not less than 8,000 inhabitants, if the 
Indians will not surrender their rights the Governor-in-
Council may, on the recommendation of the Superintendent., 
refer the question to a judge of the Exchequer Court, who 
shall have power to decide whether the Indians should be 
required to surrender the reserve and the amount of com-
pensation to be paid. The amount so awarded shall be spent 
in providing the Indians with a new reserve, in compensating 
any of those dispossessed for any houses or improvements, 
in transferring the Indians to the new reserve, and in 
establishing them there, any balance of the amount being 
placed to their credit. The same Act provides a more 
effective means of securing the recovery of possession of 
Indian reserves from persons encroaching upon them by 
means of proceedings in the Canadian cou:rts : it also makes 
the annuities payable to Indian tribes a direct charge on 
the consolidated revenue fund of Canada, and it expressly 
provides that, if any reserve is taken from the Indians 
under the decision of a judge of the Exchequer Court, the 
Indians shall not be removed until a new reserve has duly 
been marked out for their use. 
The only serious difficulty as regards the rights of the 
Indians to their lands which is now outstanding is that in 
British Columbia. The question of the precise nature of 
the Indian rights in the other_ provinces of Canada has not 
been definitely determined, but it is clear that the Indians 
are not full owners of the land, but that they enjoy the use 
of the land which they occupy by the benevolence of the 
1 Revised Statutes, 1906, c. 81. See Parl. Paper, Cd. 6091, p. 20. 
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Crown,! a fact which of course is for most purposes as good 
as a fuller title. In the case of British Columbia the claim 
of the Indians is that all the land of the province is theirs 
by law, and that they have a right to it except in so far as 
they have by proper means been induced to part with it. 
They claim that by the royal proclamation of 1763 issued 
by the King after the cession of Canada the native rights 
'in land were expressly preserved, and that at no time has 
the Indian title to the lands been defeated. They point out 
that in the case of Canada the procedure of extinguishing 
the Indian title by agreement with the tribes has always 
been faithfully followed, and that the same procedure 
should have been adopted, but was not adopted, in British 
Columbia. They recognize that the Government of British 
Columbia has allotted certain reserves to the Indians, but 
they complain that these reserves are only at the rate of 
about twenty acres a head in place of from 160 to 180, 
the amount considered proper in Alberta and Saskatchewan 
by the Government of the Dominion, which controls the 
public lands of these provinces. They say that they are 
willing to treat with the Dominion Government for the 
surrender of lands, but not to allow it to be assumed that 
they have no right to the lands and only such a claim on 
the benevolence of the Crown as the provincial government 
rna y deem fit to allow. 
The Government of British Columbia, on the other hand, 
bases, it appears, their claim to be the judges of the needs 
of the Indians and their denial of the Indian title on the 
fact that the proclamation of 1763, which had certainly been 
of importance in the direction adopted by the procedure 
in Canada, had no application to the territory of British 
Columbia, whieh was not then British territory at all and 
was hardly known. They also point to the terms of the 
agreement on the faith of which Canada was extended by 
the inclusion of British Columbia, and which under the 
British North America Act, 1867, have the force of an 
Imperial Act. It is there provided that the charge of the 
1 St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber Co. v. The Queen, 14 App. Cas. 46. 
THE TREATMENT OF NATIVE RACES 171 
Indians and the trusteeship of the lands reserved for their 
use and benefit shall be assumed by the Dominion Govern-
ment, and a policy as liberal as that hitherto pursued by 
the British Columbia Government shall be continued by the 
Dominion Government after the Union. To carry out this 
policy tracts of land of such extent as it had been the 
practice of the British Columbia Government to ~ppro­
priate for that purpose were from time to time to be con-
veyed from the local government to the Dominion Govern-
ment in trust for the use and benefit of the Indians on 
application of the Dominion Government, and in case of 
disagreement between the two Governments respecting the 
quantity of such tracts of land to be so granted, the matter 
should be referred for the decision of the Secretary of State 
for the Colonies. 
The result of this reference to an eventual right of the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies has inevitably been 
appeals to the Secretary of State to use his influence to 
improve the position of the Indians. But the clause 
merely provides for an appeal to him in case of disagree-
ment between the two Governments, and it is practically 
impossible that such an appeal should ever arise, for the 
simple reason that the policy of British Columbia before the 
union in regard to grants of land was so extremely far from 
generous that it is certain that the amounts of land which 
it has from time to time handed over as reserves exceed the 
amounts contemplated in the agreement, which seems to 
have been passed on an erroneous view of the policy of 
British Columbia. From the legal point of view of the 
Indian claim it is clear that the agreement treats the Indians 
as in the position of persons who have no claim on the 
Government of British Columbia other than that of friendly 
consideration, marked by the grant of reserves, and it 
seems that from the beginning of colonization in British 
Columbia that was the view taken to the land rights of the 
Indians : they were savages, the territorial possession of 
the land and the sovereignty being vested in the Crown, 
and not in the natives at all, a view with which may be 
• 
172 IMPERIAL UNITY AND THE DOMINIONS 
compared the attitude of the Hudson Bay Company towards 
the natives in the vast lands of which possession was given 
to them by the Charter of Charles II in 1673. This con-
ception of native rights is clearly very old-fashioned, but 
. it is difficult to deny that it was the basis of the proceedings 
of the British Columbia Government before union, and the 
Dominion Government, in their efforts to arrive at a friendly 
settlement of the n1atter with the provincial government by 
means of negotiation with a view to provide for the allot-
ment of further reserves for the Indians, do not seer.a to 
have been prepared to admit that the Indian claim to the 
property of the soil of the province can be upheld in point 
of law. In any case, indeed, it must be plain that the 
widest form of the Indian claim, that to the ownership of 
the soil of the whole of the province except such parts as 
have been formally parted with, is absurd: it would be at 
most reasonable for them to argue that their possessions 
extended to such parts of the soil as were fully occupied 
by them : the mere wandering of tribes in the process of 
hunting over wide areas cannot form a reasonable basis of 
title, and in view of the British Columbia practice since 
the existence of the Colony and its stereotyping by the 
terms of union, it is difficult to see how any v_alid title could 
be made out by the Indians.1 In Canada proper, it must 
be remembered, to which the King's proclamation of 1763 
applied, the position merely is that the Indians have a c]aim 
to consideration from the Crown, and therefore, while the 
procedure by means of extinguishing the ·Indian title pre-
vails, the procedure is based on consideration, not on 
necessity. The mere passing of the Act of 1911, to which 
reference was made above, is proof that the Indian title can 
be defeated by Dominion but not by provincial legis-
lation, so that assuming even that the proclamation · of 
1763 can be held to have applied to British Columbia, 
none the less it merely gave the Indians a claim to con-
sideration, which has been left to the Crown to deal with 
as it thought fit prior to union, after which the terms 
1 Cf. A. H. F. Lefroy, Canada's Federal System, pp. 711-14 . . 
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of its action were defined by the agreement with the 
Dominion. 
Curiously enough, the question of the land rights of the 
natives in New Zealand, as a result of the annexation of 
the colony and the treaty made with the chiefs for the 
annexation, has recently formed th.e subject of a somewhat 
unexpected decision in the Supreme Court of New Zealand. 
In the case of Tamihani Korokai v. The Solicitor-General,1 
which came before the Court of Appeal as a special case 
stated under rule 245 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the 
question was raised as to the right of certain native tribes 
occupying land adjoining Lake Rotorua in the North Island 
to occupy exclusively certain defined portions of the lal~e 
as fishing-grounds. On the part of the Crown it was alleged 
that no such right existed, and that the lake was open to 
public fishing. No agreement had been made at any time 
between the Crown and the natives for the sale or cession 
to the Crown of the bed of the lake or any part thereof) and 
the natives claimed, therefore, customary title to the bed 
which the Crown denied. In the alternative to claiming 
the bed of the lake as customary native land, the natives 
advanced claims of freehold based on their tenure of the 
adjoining land, or at least to customary exclusive rights of 
fishing and navigation. The main question in the court 
was whether the mere assertion of the Solicitor-General 
that the bed of the lake was Crown land, free from native 
customary title, was conclusive on the count that no native 
title or right of user existed, as upon this answer depended 
the question what remedy the natives had for the native 
customary land recognized as theirs by the treaty of 
Waitangi, o£-1840, as against the Crown, and in what manner 
the legal right to their land, if any, could be extinguished 
by the Crown. 
The case made for the plaintiff expressly admitted that 
the seisin of all land in New Zealand was vested in the 
Crown, by virtue of the prerogative, but there was nothing 
in the claim inconsistent with that seisin. The treaty 
1 32 N.Z.L.R. 321. 
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of Waitangi had ceded to the Crown the sovereignty of New 
Zealand and the seisin of all the land in New Zealand, but 
the cession was subject to the land rights enjoyed by 
custom by the natives, as was expressly recognized by the 
treaty which gave the Government alone the power to 
acquire lands by purchase. The mere assertion by the 
Solicitor-General of the right of the Crown was contrary to 
the whole purpose of the treaty, which evidently contem-
plated that rights of this kind should be subject to the 
courts, and to the whole machinery of the Native Land 
Acts which were passed to regulate the mode of ascertaining 
and modifying such rights. On the other hand the Solicitor-
General contended that the native claim was never a legal 
one which could be enforced by action against the Crown : 
it was merely for the Crown to say if it recognized the claim. 
Any other procedure would throw into doubt all titles in 
New Zealand, since it would be open to raise questions as 
to whether the native claim in any individual case had been 
duly disposed of. It had been laid down by the court in 
New Zealand in the case of Wi Parata v. The Bishop of 
Wellington 1 that the validity of the title to land in New 
Zealand, once granted by the Crown, could not be called into 
question on the ground of the failure to extinguish the 
native customary title. This decision was still valid, despite 
the decision of the Privy Council in the case of N ireaha 
Tamaki v. Baker.2 In that case the Privy Council did not 
decide as to the question whether the native title was 
available as against the Crown, but only decided that the 
native title was a ground upon which an action could be 
brought in the Supreme Court. They had decided that an 
action could be brought, but the decision was based on the 
Native Rights Act, 1865, s. 3, which had been repealed by 
the Native Lands Act, 1909. The native title was analogous 
to a possessory title, e. g. the title of an alien to land in 
England before the Naturalization Acts, and was good 
against all the world except the true owner. The New 
Zealand title was therefore analogous to that in force in the 
t 3 N.Z.J.R. (N.S.) A.C. 72. 2 [1901] A.C. 561. 
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United States and Canada. The principles there were that 
absolute ownership of Indian land was vested in the state 
subject to a possessory title ~n the Indians : the Government 
had exclusive rights of pre-emption and could grant the 
fee of land without the extinguishing of the native title, 
but the native title was not available against the Govern-
ment. The two cases differed, however, in so far as the 
American natives were looked on as separate political 
communities, and under American law a treaty was part of 
the supreme law of the land and prevailed over statute, 
whereas the Treaty of Waitangi was not a treaty at all, but 
a contract with certain individuals, and a treaty by English 
constitutional law had in itself no legal effect, without 
legislation. The legislation of New Zealand had never 
made the native title legally enforceable against the Crown. 
In reply the plaintiff laid stress on the fact that the mere 
.assertion of title by the Attorney-General was a mere 
matter of pleading, which for validity must be supported 
by evidence of the right of the Crown. Assuming that the 
customary rights of the natives rested on the favour or 
grace of the Crown, the Crown could not, in a constitutional 
country, grant Crown lands or purchase native land except 
by virtue of an Act of Parliament. All the judges were 
unanimous in the decision of the case in favour of the plaintiff. 
· The Chief Justice pointed out that the only question at 
issue was whether the assertion of the Crown that the land 
was Crown land concluded the matter and prevented the 
native land court from making any inquiries. The question 
arose under the Treaty of Waitangi by which a large number 
of chiefs ceded their sovereignty and in return received 
a guarantee to the chiefs and tribes, and to the families and 
individuals thereof, of the full exclusive and undisturbed 
possession of their lands and estates, forests, fisheries and 
other properties, retaining, however, an exclusive right of 
pre-Eimption. It was agreed that every part of land had 
a native owner, and the course of legislation had assumed 
that lands were vested in the Crown, and that until the 
Crown issued a freehold title customary titles could not be 
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recognized, but the Crown would give a freehold title to all, 
which proved that the land could not be taken or kept by the 
Crown unless the natives ceded their rights to it. S. 73 
of the Constitution Act of 1852 recognized the native title 
as existing: the Act of 1862, the first Act to provide for 
the ascertainment of ownership of native land, contained 
a preamble reciting the Treaty of W aitangi. An Act was 
passed in 1863 for the taking of lands from natives com-
. mitting rebellion or guilty of insurrection, and no doubt 
there had been interference by legislation with native lands, 
but that was based on. the right of eminent domain, and was 
based on the same principle as the Irish Land ACts, and the 
Scottish Crofters statutes. 
The decision in the case of W i Parata had not altered 
· that position. It only emphasized the decision in Reg. v. 
Symonds 1 that the Supreme Court could take no cognizance 
of treaty rights not embodied in statute, and could not deal 
with native customary title. In the case of N ireaha Tamaki, 
the Privy Council had, however, recognized that the natives 
had rights, under the New Zealand statute law, to their 
customary lands. These rights were clearly recognized 
in his opinion by ss. 84-89 of the Native Land Act, 1909, 
which gave exclusive jurisdiction to the native Land Court 
and required that court to deal with the matter in accordance 
with the ancient custom and usage of the Maori people. 
The Solicitor-General or the Attorney-General had no power 
to declare that land was Crown land in the absence of any 
statutory authority, and he must prove any plea to the 
contrary. The only thing that could prevent the native 
Land Court entering on an inquiry as to the customary 
title was a proclamation of the Governor under statute as 
provided for in s. 85 of the Native Land Act, 1909, or a pro-
hibition by the Governor under s. 100 of that Act, or proof 
that the land had been ceded by the true owners or that 
a Crown grant · had been issued. The formal decision of the 
court was therefore that the native Land Court had juris-
diction to entertain and determine a claim by natives to 
1 Parl. Pap., Dec. 1847, p. 64. 
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ownership of land claimed by the Crown, and to determine 
such a claim by an order binding the Crown unless its 
power to do so were brought to an end by a proclamation 
under s. 85 of the Native Land Act, 1909, or some such 
similar statutory provision, or the Crown showed title to 
the land. It was for the Native Land Court to decide 
upon evidence whether any particular piece of land was 
native customary land or not, and also whether according 
to native custom Lake Rotorua did or did not belong in 
ownership to the Maoris, or whether they had merely a right 
to fish in the waters of the lake. 
Williams J. pointed out that, even assuming that all the 
land in New Zealand became vested in the Crown by virtue 
of the prerogative and that the treaty was binding only 
upon the honour of the Crown, it did not follow that the 
Solicitor-General had any right to perform an act of sove-
reignty: any power he had must be derived from the 
Governor in the right of the Crown, and the judgements 
of the Privy Council in Musgrave v. Pulido 1 and Cameron 
v. Kyte 2 showed that even the Governor had no power to 
interfere to prevent the exercise of rights given to natives 
by the statute law of the Dominion. The treaty was one 
with the Sovereign of the Empire, who would normally act 
on the advice of his ministers in Great Britain unless the 
power of deciding had been expressly delegated, and no 
evidence of delegation to the Governor or action by the 
Governor under such delegation had been adduced. But 
in addition it was clear that the Crown by statute had 
parted with the power to do what was alleged and the 
right had been given by ss. 90-93 of the Act of 1909 under 
which natives were entitled to have a legal estate in fee 
simple, and any possession of such rights was valid against 
the Crown. 
Edwards J. concurred that the claim of the Attorney-
General or Solicitor-General could not be supported, and 
Cooper J. also concurred. He pointed out that the Act of 
1909 expressly showed the difference between native lands 
1 3 Knapp, 332. 2 5 App. Cas. 102. 
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and Crown lands, and that technically the legal estate in the 
lands was vested in His Majesty, but subject to the right 
of the natives to the possession and ownership of their 
customary lands, which they had not ceded to the King. 
Chapman J. concurred in the previous judgements. He 
pointed out that it was doubtful whether the chiefs who 
signed the Treaty of 1840 could be regarded as sovereign 
chiefs, but the matter did not appear to be of essential 
importance. The legislation of New Zealand had repeatedly 
recognized the existence of the native rights over the land, 
and had referred to the Native Land Court the investigation 
of titles to native land. The lands might be Crown lands, 
but they were not vacant Crown lands. To the objection 
that, if this were the case, there would be no means of 
reaching finality in land transactions, he pointed out that 
the express power was given by s. 85 of the Act of 1909 
to declare that the native title had been extinguished and 
that, while it was presumed that the power would be honestly 
exercised, when exercised the exercise was final. As regards 
the claim of the Solicitor-General he pointed out that 
whether or not the Crown had a prerogative right the right 
could not be exercised by the Attorney-General : evidence 
must be adduced of some deliberate and formal act in 
exercise of the prerogative. It was further doubtful 
whether the prerogative still existed, and whether in view 
of s. 85 of the Act of 1909 there now existed any other mode 
of putting a limit on the jurisdiction of the Native Land 
Court than a proclamation under that section. 
The importance of the decision is obvious, inasmuch as 
it shows the stress laid on the fair treatment of native title 
in New Zealand, where a long series of Land Acts has been 
passed aimed at securing that the natives shall not part 
foolishly with their lands, and that they shall retain sufficient 
land to secure their reasonable subsistence. The natives 
recognize in the main the fairness of their treatment, and, 
though from time to time petitions are addressed to the 
Crown against the native land legislation, they have of course 
been powerless to effect any interference with the work 
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of the Legislature, which is based on a deliberate considera-
tion of the best interests of the natives themselves. In 
New Zealand as in Canada the question of the grant of land 
in individual titles to natives has long been discussed, and 
opinion in New Zealand tends to approve the system if 
applied with due precaution. 
In the case of Australia the question of the land ownership 
of the aborigines ha~ never become one of the first impor-
tance, as a result of the feeble hold of the aborigines on civili-
zation. In Tasmania the aborigines have disappeared; in 
New South Wales, Victoria, and South Australia 1 they are 'no 
more than a feeble and dwindling remnant under the care 
of a Government department, provided with doles. In 
Queensland, the Northern Territory, and in Western Aus-
tralia they possess more vigour, and their stock-stealing 
habits have constantly brought them into trouble with 
the police. The habit of handcuffing these natives and 
conveying them on long journeys in this condition has been 
from time to time a source of protests by residents in the 
States, and of late a real effort to prevent their lapse into 
criminal habits has been made by the allotting to them of 
very considerable reserves and the presentation of stock. 
But all Imperial responsibility for them was abandoned by 
the Imperial Government in 1897 after a period of seven 
years, in which the department dealing with aborigines had 
been placed under the independent control of the Governor. 
The Colonial Government objected strongly to this restraint 
on the power of the Government, and the Governor for his 
part represented that the result of having a department shut 
off from ministerial responsibility was that it was isolated 
and could not effect much for the welfare of the natives, 
and accordingly though in 1894 an attempt by the Legis-
lature to amend the Constitution Act in this respect was 
frustrated, in 1897 after the Colonial Conference of that 
year, the Imperial veto was withdrawn and the Colonial 
Government given full authority.2 There is no reason 
1 Act No. 1048. 
2 Parl. Pap., C. 8350. Of. Acts No. 14 of 1905; 42 of 1911. 
M2 
180 IMPERIAL UNITY AND THE DOMINIONS 
whatever to believe that the result has been disadvantageous 
to the natives : the form of independent control without 
the reality is never worth retaining. In the Northern 
Territory of Australia, now under the care of the Common-
wealth, but formerly controlled by South Australia, recent 
legislation has been passed first by the State 1 and later by 
the Commonwealth 2 with a view to prevent as far as 
possible the ill-treatment of the aborigines, whose importance 
for the stock farms in the country is fully recognized. In 
that territory, however, many of the tribes are wholly wild 
and not under control: their numbers are really unknown, 
but probably not very high, and their standard of civiliza-
tion is certainly low. In Queensland, the natives are also 
protected by law, but the latest reports of the Protector of 
Aborigines reveals that there ·also the process of gradual 
extinction is going on, though the loss even economically 
is very far from negligible. The cause of this decline is 
partly no doubt heedless treatment on the part of the 
settlers, but probably it is more an inevitable or practically 
inevitable result of the contact of very inferior races with 
an advanced civilization. 
In all the self-governing Dominions other than the Union 
of South Africa the native problem is one of no fundamental 
importance save from the point of view of local duty. 
In South Africa it is a question of infinite difficulty, and the 
most ~erious problem, which the country has to face, lies 
in the fact that the native race tends to grow more rapidly 
than the white race, and that this tendency must be expected 
to accelerate in proportion as the enforcement of the rule 
of peace and the efforts made to improve the conditions 
1:1nder which the natives live diminish the needlessly great 
mortality which now takes place among them. Unlike the 
aborigines of Atlstralia, and even of Canada, the native of 
South Africa appears to be essentially hardy, though 
normally inferior in mental development. The problem is 
further complicated by the presence of a large coloured 
class, varying very much in admixture of blood, and of very 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 5582, p. 33. 
• 
2 Parl. Pap., Cd. 6091, p. 41. 
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mixed origin. This class is clearly distinguished from the 
white class on the one hand and the native class proper on 
the other, but its sympathies lie, as is natural, on the whole 
with the white class to which it seeks to belong, rather 
than with the native .· class from which it · desires to rise. 
The attitude is repaid by the natives by a marked dislike 
in many cases, which is not shown to the ··white class proper. 
But the two classes, coloured and native, both steadily 
advance in civilization, and become economically more and 
more important. The position is illustrated in an interesting 
manner by the two different policies followed in the Trans-
vaal and the Cape with regard to the coloured skilled 
workers : in the Cape they are accepted as members of the 
trade unions, and they are encouraged to throw in their lot 
with the white workers; in the Transvaal they· are excluded, · 
• 
but the exclusion is the constant subject of objection(t 
The natives, again, are anxious to attain the rank of skilled 
workers, and indefinite depression of their position is beyond 
the sphere of possibility. These facts are far n1ore serious 
from the point of view of the future of the Union than the 
possibility at some far dis·l;ant date of a native rising. 
The military organization of the Union, however, is under 
the Defence Act 1 based on the rigid exclusion from the duty 
of bearing arms of the members of the population who are 
not of European descent, a fact which is of importance 
when it is remembered that Maoris from New Zealand have 
been used in the European War along with the other forces 
of the :Dominion. 
• 
The native question has been treated in different ways 
in the several parts of the Union and with varying success. 
The wise decision by which the franchise was given to 
natives as well as white persons by the Constitution Act 
of the Cape has definitely influenced the whole treatment 
of the natives in that province, where it has set the ideal 
of Cecil Rhodes of equal rights for every civilized man. 
Though subsequent legislation in 1887 and 1892 · modified 
1 No. 13 of 1912, s. 7. Natives may be allowed to volunteer if the 
Govern1nent so prescribes. 
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the effect of the franchise, the restrictions imposed were 
merely in harmony with that ideal, for they reinforced the 
view that the civilization should be the test by requiring 
that the property qualification necessary for a vote should 
be property owned by a native personally and not as 
a member of tribe, and that each voter should have a slight 
tinge of education. The differential legislation of the Cape 
against natives has accordingly bee11 directed with fairness 
and good sense, and the territories which are practically 
purely native have been gQverned on lines different fro~ 
those of the rest of the province. In Natal, on the other hand, 
the franchise was practically not conceded to natives at all, 
for though it could be obtained on certain conditions these 
were so strict that they were almost never fulfill.ed by the 
native, and the attempt to mitigate the disadvantages of 
this position by the plan of reserving to the Governor an 
independent position with regard to the natives was a com-
plete fiasco. The Governor was authorized in his capacity 
as supreme chief of the natives to act without regard to the 
advice of ministers if he saw fit, but it was neither prac-
ticable nor reasonable to expect him so to do, and he cer ... 
tainly did not attempt to do otherwise than as his ministers 
advised. It is clear that the executive government of 
a colony cannot be divided between two sets of hands. 
In the Transvaal and the Orange Free State the native 
was definitely declared to be inferior to the white in Church 
and State, and the Churches of these provinces deny the 
native the equality conceded by the Dutch Reformed 
Church in the Cape, insisting, even when the Churches were 
united in one body, after Union on providing that the union 
of the Churches should not confer on the Cape province native 
members the rights of members in the Transvaal and the 
Orange Free State. In revenge the movement of Ethiopian-
ism, the native Church of South Africa, has struck strong 
roots in the two provinces, though the political danger 
feared from it seems no longer to be rated so high as it was 
some years ago.1 In practice the Orange Free State was 
1 Cf. Parl. Pap., Cd. 2399. For the Church Act see Act No. 23 of 1911. 
• 
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more retrograde than the ~ransvaal, for it not merely 
refused to allow a native to acquire land, but shut him out 
from the practice of professions and skilled trades, an 
exclusion which persists. In both countries the pass laws 
by which the movements of the natives are regulated were 
onerous in the extreme, and there was no effective repression 
of ill treatment of natives by their masters. The advent 
of British rule was of no great advantage to the natives : 
it is true that there has been stricter enforcement of the 
personal rights of natives to freedom from assault, the 
notorious de Wet attributing much of his anger against the 
British rule to his being fined for an assault on a native, 
which was of course contrary to every Boer idea of pro-
priety, and certain minor alterations were made in the 
way of relaxing the severity of penalties for evasions of 
the pass laws/ which still, however, remain onerous in the 
extreme. Other points of complaint of differential treat-
ment are the severe penalties imposed on the illicit inter-
course of natives with white women, but not vice versa, 
the differential administration of the law regarding assaults 
of black on white and vice versa, the rules which forbid 
natives to use sidepaths on streets, to ride inside tram 
cars, to travel first-class on railway lines, and similar 
other matters. Exemptions from the effect of the 
numerous disabilities imposed on natives can be obtained 
by specially qualified persons, but such exemptions are 
not very freely granted in the Transvaal and Orange Free 
State. 
With the advent of Union one distinct diminution of the 
status of the natives was brought about: the Union Act 
not merely makes n.o provision for native voting in the 
Union generally, though it preserves the Cape native vote 
for the present, but it excludes from membership of the 
Union Parliament any native or coloured man. This is 
a retrograde step since the Cape Parliament was open to 
native or coloured members, though it was not the practice 
for them to be elected even by those constituencies where 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 714 and 904. 
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the native vote was a factor of importance.' Moreover it 
must be admitted that even the native vote \n the Cape 
is less secure than it was. The vote could be taken away 
by the action of Parliament, but, in deference to the strong 
.feeling in the Cape on this question, such a law must be 
passed by not less than two-thirds of the total number of 
the members of both houses at a joint sitting of the two 
houses~ a provision which gives a certain security for the 
permanence of the vote. Moreover, in deference to the 
expression of opinion on this subject in the course of the 
passing of the measure through the Imperial Parliament, 
it was expressly provided in the royal instructions issued 
to the Governor-General that~ any Bill so passed by the 
requisite majority must still be reserved for the signification 
of the royal pleasure. But no other solution was possible : 
the Transvaal and the Orange Free State would not hear 
of the grant of the franchise, and indeed there has been, 
especially since the inclusion of these territories in the 
Empire, a steady tendency of opinion in .favour of the 
abolition of the Cape vote for natives: thus in the report 
of the Native Affairs Commission 1 of 1903-5 it was recom-
mended by a majority that in place of the vote being 
allowed to natives, they should have a small and defined 
representation in Parliament on the analogy of the Maori 
vote in New Zealand. It is, however, very doubtful 
whether, if this plan were adopted, there would be any 
likelihood of the grant of the New Zealand scale of repre-
sentation, without which the New Zealand scheme would 
be wholly unsatisfactory. Moreover the New Zealand 
plan is effective because in effect the Maori electorates 
are homogeneous in a marked degree, and in most parts 
of South Africa it would be difficult to produce any 
satisfactory result of elections of representatives of natives, 
while if the alternative of nomjnee representatives were 
adopted the result would be still more unsatisfactory. 
Even in the case of the first Senate of the Union, in 
which there were eight Senators nominated by the Govern-
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 2399. 
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ment, half of whom should be chosen for their special 
knowledge of native problems, one of the Senators was 
given the appointment because he represented Natal, and 
was unable to secure election to the Lower House, his 
knowledge of native affairs being by no means extensive or 
valuable. 
As practically everywhere in South Africa also, the native 
question centres in the question of land. - The Orange Free 
State in the period of its separate existence as a colony 
commenced to deal with the question in one of its aspects, 
the unrestricted squatting of natives of lands, which had 
been condemned on excellent grounds by the South African 
Native Affairs Commission. But the Act for this purpose 
(No. 42 of 1908) did not receive the royal assent, without 
which it could not take effect as it contained, in accordance 
with the instructions to the Governor, a suspending clause. 
The Secretary of State for the Colonies considered 1 that the 
matter should stand over for general action in the Union, 
the question being one which arose everywhere 'vhere there 
was a settled white population. The Union Parliament in 
1913 passed an Act No. 27 to deal with this problem on 
the basis of segregation of the two races to a defined extent, 
too close contact being deemed disadvantageous for both. 
Under this Act a commission has been appointed to report 
what areas in the Union should be set apart as areas within 
which land may not be acquired by purchase or hire by 
natives, and what areas should be similarly set apart as 
areas in which interests may not be acquired by persons 
other than natives. Pending the report of the commission, 
no person save a native may without the special consent 
of the Governor-General acquire any interest in land within 
the native areas which are scheduled in full detail in the 
Act. Conversely, save with the same permission, outside the 
scheduled area no European can acquire interests in land 
from a native, nor a native from a European. The harsh-
ness of these provisions is, however, modified by the fact 
that existing contracts are not interfered 'vith and mav be 
' &I 
1 Parl. Pap., H.C. 160, 1912, p. 3. 
• 
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renewed except in the case of the Orange Free State, that 
any number of labour tenants may reside on a Transvaal 
farm, if they give not less than ninety days' work and do 
not pay any rent, and that in the Transvaal and Natal no 
native resident on a farm may be removed under the Act 
if he or the head of his family is duly registered under the 
Native Affairs Department of the Transvaal for taxation 
or other purposes. In the Orange Free State the position 
of squatters is assimilated to that of master and servants, 
as was at one time the case. 
The principle of the Act caused much heart burning among 
the natives of the Union, and it was decided to petition 
the Imperial Government for assistance in securing more 
favourable terms. The burden of the representations made 
by the natives was that the principle of separation could 
not be carried further than it was already carried, that the 
effect of the law would be to deprive natives who had been 
saving money in order to acquire land of the legitimate 
result of their labours, that the aim of the law was to compel 
service by taking away the means of independence, and 
that the result of compulsory service at reduced wages and 
high rents would not be separation, but an intermingling 
of both races of the most injurious character.- In reply the 
Government laid stress en the fact t,hat in due course it 
·was proposed gradually to improve the existing system 
by expropriating European owners in native areas, by 
settling such areas on a definite system, by encouraging 
the acquisition of holdings in such areas by natives, and by 
permitting through native councils the local administration 
of affairs in native areas. It was also pointed out that 
the decision to separate interests was deliberate, but that the 
utmost care had been taken to avoid unnecessary hardship 
to individuals. What is more important, however, is the 
fact that strong exception was taken to the proposal to 
appeal on the measure to the Imperial Government: it was 
pointed out to the petitioners that the matter was one 
which essentially concerned the Government of the Union, 
and that, therefore, it must be settled in South Africa, and 
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the somewhat undiplomatic warning was given that any 
other course of action would tend to prejudice the good 
and liberal administration of native affairs in the Union. 
The warning presumably was merely meant by General 
Botha to imply that the generosity of the Union might not 
be proof against annoyance caused by an appeal to the 
Imperial Government, as it cannot be supposed that the 
administration of native affairs would be allowed to be 
conducted badly, but in any case it failed of its effect. 
The-Imperial Government, however, very naturally refused 
to intervene.1 
While, however, the Imperial Government is clearly 
dive~ted of any right to interfere in native policy in the 
Union, and while the right of veto on Union legislation 
in this regard is merely an inconvenient anomaly, the 
Imperial Government is still responsible for the adminis-
tration of the colony of Basutoland and the protectorates 
of Swaziland and Bechuanaland. By a somewhat illogical 
procedure an attempt has been made ih the schedule to the 
Act of Union to prescribe the form of government which 
is to be enjoyed by these territories when they are handed 
over to the Government of the Union. The scheme of 
government proposed is an ingenious one, based on the view 
that the constant change of ministers of native affairs is 
a grave drawback to the proper management of such affairs, 
that continuity in such management is essential and that 
it will best be produced by the giving of the control of the 
territories to the Prime Minist,er of t~he Union, who shall 
be advised by a council of non-political advisers of stand-
ing and ability : while the final control is reserved to the 
Prime Minist.er, act,ing t,hrough the Governor-General in 
Council, it is contemplated that the advisory council will 
normally have the right to have laid before the Parlia-
ment records of the points on which they disagreed with 
the Prime Minister. Provision is also made for free trade 
and freedom of intercourse between the territories if taken · 
over and the rest of the Union, for the prevention of the 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 7508 . 
• 
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sale of intoxicants, and the preservation of native land 
rights. 
The scheme is ingenious and the plan of handing over 
territories on conditions of administration agreed upon has 
a parallel in the case of the handing over in 1896 of British 
Bechuanaland to the Cape Government.1 But it, is cer-
tainly open to grave doubt whether the transfer of the 
territorieS to the Union would in any way make for the 
benefit of the natives or of the Union. Basutoland has 
been preserved as a native reserve, in which the Basutos 
prosper and very slowly advance in civilization, and Bechu-
analand is inhabited in large measure by feeble tribes who 
are preserved merely by the lack of contact with a rougher 
civilization. If the present regime is to continue, the 
Union would reap no special benefit. from taking over the 
administration, while, if it is not t.o continue, the territories 
would certainly from the native point of view be the losers. 
The case of Swaziland is different : the folly of the rulers of 
the land has so divided it up amongst white and native that 
its merger in the Union is only a matter of time. 
Should, however, it be decided to abandon Imperial control 
over the territories, on the mere ground that the Imperial 
Government has no interest in retaining that control in face 
of the strong desire of the Union to take it over, despite the 
fears of the natives, it seems to be unwise to attempt to lay 
down for the Union any method of governing the territories. 
It cannot be too clearly realized that a government should 
be entrusted with full power or not entrusted with any 
power at all, since it will prove in practice quite impossible 
to maintain the restrictions which it is desired to impose. 
The elaborate provisions of the schedule will not be upheld 
if the Union Government dislike them, and, that being so, 
it seems that it would have been wiser to leave them alone. 
It is indeed open to argue that the constitution there laid 
down is a good one, which will be necessarily tried by the 
·union, and may be adhered to, but, on the other hatid, 
must be set the fact that any constitutional form imposed 
1 Parl. Pap., C. 7962. 
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from above is necessarily unpopular and suspect, and that 
in any case the circumstances when the actual transfer is 
made are very likely to render the schedule valueless. But 
the fundamental error lies in seeking to surrender control to 
responsible government, and yet to make conditions of the 
exercise of that control. 
• 
CHAPTER IX 
COLOURED IMMIGRATION 
No problem of the present day presents more serious 
difficulties than the question of the immigration of coloured 
races into the self-governing Dominions. The cause of the 
difficulty lies in the fundamentally different aspect~ from 
which the people of the United Kingdom and of the 
Dominions must view the question, and the resulting in-
ability to make full allowance for the attitude of the other 
party to the controversy. The inhabitant of the United 
Kingdom sees the oriental immigrant in the form of students 
seeking knowledge of law, or medicine, or business, and of 
European culture : he hardly ever comes across any re-
presentatives of the lower classes, unless it be an occasional 
lascar seaman: the inhabitant of a Dominion rarely comes 
in contact with an Indian of superior education or rank, 
and sees either the Indian of the pedlar and petty trader 
species or the agriculturist, who has been introduced under 
indenture, or is descended from such an immigrant. Moreover, 
it must be admitted that a certain lack of culture and good 
breeding on the part of the average inhabitant of a Dominion 
renders him incapable of appreciating the fact that oriental 
civilization, however different from that of Europe, is not 
therefore inferior eo facto, and that it is ludicrous to classify, 
as mentally he often does, every kind of man of colour as 
a coolie. Unfortunately the existence of this ignorance 
and prejudice on the part of the people of the Dominions 
diminishes the possibility of their learning to know better 
the people of the East, since it is not to be expected that men 
of high rank, princes, who in Europe will be treated with 
distinction at every court, will visit countries where they will 
certainly, if they obtain entrance at all, find hardly any one 
who understands their true position. 
• 
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At the same time it is fair to remember that this attitude 
of contempt in the case of Australia and New Zealand covers 
a considerable amount of uneasiness, especially in connexion 
with the development of the Empire of Japan, which mani-
fested itself in the almost ludicrous affection of the greeting 
shown in both Dominions to the fleet of the United States on 
its famous voyage of intimidation to Japan. The fear of 
China, which was so marked a feature of the end of the second 
last decade of the nineteenth century, has . in the twentieth 
developed into a much more rational fear of Japanese expan-
sion, a fear which has spread to Western Canada, though 
hardly yet in the East, and to the Pacific coast of the United 
States. This fear has doubtless encouraged the feeling of 
objection to the entry even of coloured British subjects, 
and has intensified the devotion to the ideal of white 
Australia. Nor is it in the slightest degree re1narkable that 
this ideal should be held with increasing vigour as time goes 
on, for the fact is patent that nothing but the rigorous 
exclusion policy which is now followed would have any effect 
in preserving Australia for the European race. Nor is it, again, 
possible to deny that the exclusion is based on racial grounds, 
pure and simple. It is, of course, common to assert that the 
objection to oriental labour is that it is cheap, and that it 
brings down the wages of European workers, and lowers 
their standard of living, or that it defies the laws of sanita-
tion, and spreads disease. But both these things apply to 
many of the lower-class foreign emigrants like the Lithuanians 
and Galicians, who have for many years been welcomed into 
.their land by Canadians, despite the aberrations of the 
Dukhobors, whom an ordinary judgement would put 
down as very undesirable aliens/ and there has been no 
determination to exclude these nations wholesale on the 
ground of nationality alone. Nor is it obvious from any 
standpoint of morality that it is fair to blame a worker if he 
demands less wages when his subsistence, owing to his tem-
perate habits and his abstention from beef and beer, costs 
. 
1 Cf. Parl. Pap., Cd. 7507, pp. 56, 57; Mitchell, Western Canada before 
the War, pp. 11, 12, 133 sq. 
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him far less than his European rival. But these considerations 
do not invalidate the view that as it is clear that Indian and 
Japanese workers would speedily oust British workers on 
an equal field of competition in such climates as those of 
Australia, and as they are dangerous competitors even in 
Canada, the European workers are entitled, in obedience to 
the law of self-preservation, and the desire to perpetuate 
the type, to secure that they shall be left in free occupation 
of the territory they have. This fact, of course, mean~ that 
Australia and New Zealand must hold firmly to the Imperial 
connexion, since otherwise they could have not the slightest 
chance of remaining in possession of lan.d which they have 
not the men to keep, and which they cannot hope adequately 
to people for many years to come, especially as the birth-rate 
in both countries is regrettably low for newly settled 
- lands. 
The difficulty has of course been enhanced in recent years 
by the growing national consciousness of India, and by the 
power of India to express her feeling through the elective 
members on her legislatures. The position is at once ren-
dered more easy and more difficult for the Imperial Govern-
ment. It has, on the one hand, the consciousness that it is 
supported not merely by vague theories but by local public 
opinion, while on the other it suffers in India the grave charge 
of being unwilling to remedy the unfair treatment meted 
out to British Indians in the self-governing Dominions. 
There is no more cogent reason than this for pressing for 
the representation of India at the next Imperial Conference: 
it is desirable on every ground that the statesmen of the 
Dominions should learn direct from those who can express 
for India the feelings of India on this point. _Nor, indeed, 
would it be a bad lesson for Dominion statesmen to meet as 
equals in a great assembly of the Empire the representatives 
of a race whom they are accustomed to regard as undesirable 
immigrants. 
The difficulty of oriental immigration seemed to be disposed 
of for a time by the adoption, on the suggestionof .Mr. Cham-
berlain and with the concurrence of the Government of 
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India and of the Government of Japan,1 of the device of 
exclusion of oriental migration by means of a language test. 
Th~s the Acts of New South Wales, South Australia, Tas-
mania, and New Zealand, which were passed in 1896 but not 
allowed to come into operation, were superseded after the 
Colonial Conference of 1897,2 when Mr. Chamberlain enforced 
the principle of adopting the Natal Act as a model, by legis-
lation which left the exclusion to be carried out by the 
device of a language test, and the Cape of Good Hope 
adopted this principle also in 1903. Nor has the principle 
been without value : for some years it certainly sufficed 
well enough for the purpose it sought to attain, but there 
are abundant signs that it is falling into disrepute, and that 
the exclusion is being felt bitterly by those against whom 
it was directed. 
The case of Cana~a has presented recently special features 
. of its own, thanks to the desire of the Dominion to take 
advantage of the terms of the treaty with Japan. The 
acceptance of this measure necessitated the free entry of 
Japanese into Canada, and the accidental circumstance of 
events in Hawaii, which encouraged an exodus of Japanese 
thence, produced a serious crisis in the Dominion, culminating 
in riots in Br:itish Columbia in 1907.3 This episode brought 
the question of oriental immigration to a head, and it was 
decided, after a careful investigation of the whole question 
by the Dominion Government, to seek an understanding with 
Japan, which was happily brought about, with the aid of the 
British representative at Tokio, by Mr. Lemieux and Sir 
Joseph Pope. The result of this arrangement was to secure 
the entry to Canada of every Japanese immigrant who came 
with a passport in proper form from the Japanese Government j 
while that Government gave a pledge that the total number 
of passports issued to persons going to settle in Canada 
for the first time should be confined to a definite number 
a year the figure being unofficially put at 400 annually. 
The arrangement has worked satisfactorily, and has been 
1 See Commonwealth Parl. Pap., No. 41 of 1901. 
2 Parl. Pap., C. 8596. a Parl. Pap., Cd. 4118. 
1874 N 
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continued in force under the new position created by the 
termination of the old treaty with Japan and the substitu-
tion of the Treaty of April 3, 1911, which was accepted 1 by 
Canada on May 1, 1913, with the express addition that the 
acceptance of the treaty should not affect the operation of 
the Canadian Immigration Act. The settlement is so far 
satisfactory to both countries: Japan has no desire to see 
carried out an unlimited emigration to the Dominion, while, 
on the other hand, it is not prepared to find its subjects 
denied entrance into any country if that country is to be in 
close commercial relations with the Empire. In the case 
of Australia the disadvantages of exposure to the higher 
Japanese tariff have to be accepted as a penalty for refusing 
a similar arrangement, and this fact is, as reported by the 
Trade Commissioner of New South Wales in the Far East, 
a grave disadvantage to trade. Even this limitation is not 
satisfactory to all Canadians : the Legislature of British 
Columbia has repeatedly attempted to exclude, either directly 
or by the passing of a language test, the entry of all Japanese 
whatever, but these efforts have both been unsuccessful, 
for the Dominion Government has disallowed the Acts, and 
the Supreme Court of British Columbia pronounced invalid 
the Immigration Act of 1908, based on the language test, 
on the ground that it ran counter to the Dominion Act (c. 50 
of 1907) bringing into force the treaty with Japan, and cen-
sured the action of the Provincial Legislature as being a breach 
of federal obligation.2 The Federal Government have also 
successfully intervened to prevent the enactment by the 
Legislature of measures vetoing the employment of Japanese 
and other orientals on public works and similar enterprises, 
but they have allowed to remain in operation legislation de-
priving Japanese and other orientals of the vote, and this 
legislation has been pronounced valid by the Supreme Court 
of British Columbia and the Judicial Committee of the Privy · 
Council. 
The position ~£ the British Indian is rendered the more 
1 For the modus vivendi of 1911-13 see Cd. 5734. 
2 In re Nakane and Okazake, 13 B.C. 370. 
COLOURED IMMIGRATION 195 
difficult in comparison with that of the Japanese, because 
of the impossibility of the adoption by the Indian Govern-
ment of any system of restraint of emigration to Canada on 
the same lines as that adopted by the Government of Japan. 
The result has been that, especially since the economic set-back 
in Western Canada, which has been marked in the last two 
years, the Canadian Government has been determined to pre-
vent the entry of any British Indians at all into the Dominio11 
on its western side. This plan has been carried out by the 
adoption of rules which in effect bt1t not in form discriminate 
against Indians and other orientals. In the first place a rule 
was made that no person could be allowed to enter Canada 
who did not come in by a continuous journey from the place 
of origin whence he migrated, and on a through ticket pur-
chased in advance : that rule evidently rendered it impos·-
sible for any one to enter Canada from India in the absence of 
any direct passenger steamship connexion. Further, it was 
laid down that immigrants of Asiatic race ~ust possess in 
their own right not less than two hundred dollars apiece, 
but from this rule were excepted natives of countries as to 
which special arrangements were in force, like Japan, or as 
to whom special statutory provision was made, such as 
Chinese, who are admitted on a payment of five hundred 
dollars a head as an immigration fee, intended, but not alto-
gether successfully, to prevent Chinese immigration. Finally, 
to settle the matter definitely, it was ordered that no immi-
grant of the artisan or skilled or unskilled labourer class· 
should be admitted to British Columbia for periods defined 
in the orders, but in effect continuous.1 The ground for the 
passing of these orders was expressly specified as the lack of 
employment in British Columbia, and there is abundant 
evidence to prove that there was such unemployment and that 
the immigration of any kind of workers there was no racial 
discrimination of any kind in the orders was to be depre-
cated. Even the earlier order regarding the possession of 
two hundred dollars by an Asiatic immigrant was only a more 
1 See for the causes leading to these orders the debate in the Canadian 
House of Commons, March 2, 1914. 
N2 
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severe form of a rule applied to all immigrants, and \vas 
based upon the undoubted fact that an Asiatic immigrant, 
often unable to speak English, required more money i11 his 
possession than a British immigrant. Further, the money 
was not required to be deposited or paid to the Canadian 
Government: the emigrant had only to prove that he had 
the sum. 
The result of the prohibition was the famous voyage of 
the Komagata Maru from Hong Kong with a miscellaneous 
body of Indians collected, many of them no doubt under 
false pretences, but others collected with revolutionary intent. 
The Indians in Canada were under the influence of the revolu-
tionary section of the Indians in the United States, and in the 
minds of these revolutionaries was concerted the device of 
the voyage of the vessel, with the idea either of compelling 
the Canadian Government to permit their entry, or in the 
alternative of intensifying indignation in India. The vessel 
duly arrived, the law courts were invoked, but of course, in 
view of the clear requirements of the law, in vain, in favour of 
the Indians, save a few who, being domiciled in Canada, were 
allowed entry, and after an effort to defy the law, the Canadian 
Government, which, it should be recorded, behaved with 
dignity and restraint, reprovisioned the vessel, and sent it 
away on its return voyage. The subsequent history of the 
revolutionary members of its passengers is well known, 
and Canada could not help feeling that her wisdom in re-
pressing the entry of Indians was amply justified by the 
event. The same feeling was intensified by a series of 
murders of anti-revolutionaries by the revolutionary section, 
and in particular the brutal murder in open court of 
Mr. Hopkinson, who, on behalf of the Dominion and Indian 
Governments, had been engaged in the attempt to protect 
the peaceful Indians from the revolutionary section of the 
populace. 
On the other hand it is to be admitted that the settlers in 
British Columbia had some real ground of grievance.1 Apart 
from the general question of the entry of Indians, which must 
1 Round Table, 1914, pp. 330-4 . 
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be decided by the fundamental principle that a community 
in the interest of its own preservation must protect its in-
dividuality, there was the fact that these immigrants, many 
of them Sikhs, soldiers of the Crown, had entered Canada in 
good faith without let or hindrance, had made good in the 
country, and desired that they should be rejoined by their 
wives and children. The difficulty felt on this head after the 
adoption by the Government of Sir Wilfrid Laurier of the 
policy of restriction after the riots in British Columbia led to 
the sending of a delegation to the Minister of the Interior in 
the new Ministry of Mr. Borden, and feeling was made more 
bitter by the assertion that Mr. Rogers then promised the 
deputation to relax the restrictions, and afterwards failed 
to keep his promise. It is clear from the express denial of 
any such promise ever having been made, which Mr. Rogers 
issued, that there was misunderstanding, and it is probable 
enough that the allegation of bad faith which was spread 
widely over India was a deliberate invention of the revolu-
tionary section of the Indian population. In point of fact 
the Government saw their way in a couple of individual cases 
to relax the rig our of the law against the entry of the wives of 
the immigrants, but the whole question had not been settled 
by the time of the outbreak of the war, when the gallantry 
of the Indian soldiers produced a feeling in the country 
that there must be some effort made to relax the stringency 
of the rules without endangering in any substantial way the 
racial purity of the country. 
Apart from the question of entry·, and the attempts, mainly 
unsuccessful, of British Columbia to hamper the operations 
of Indian and Japanese settlers, the Dominion has been 
free from any substantial amount of differential legislation. 
Some annoyance was caused both in India and in Japan in 
1912 by the enactment in the province of Saskatchewan of 
an Act 1 which pr:ovided that no person should employ in any 
capacity any white woman or girl, or permit any white 
woman or girl to reside or lodge in, or to work in, or, save as 
customer in a public apartment, to frequent any restaurant, 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 6863, p. 37 (c. 17 of 1912). 
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laundry, or other place of business or amusement. owned, 
kept, or managed by any Japanese, Chinaman, or other 
oriental person. The strictness of this law was such that the 
most distinguished Japanese or Indian firm could not have 
employed a typist, and the form of legislation was obviously 
as offensive as its intention was doubtless good. As a result, 
both Japanese and Chinese restaurant-keepers had -to dismiss 
their white employes, a result which was naturally repre-
sented by them as being devised by their white rivals in 
business as a mode of interfering with their trade. Fortu-
nately these considerations appealed to the Dominion and 
Provincial Governments, and in due course the Act was 
amended by one passed in 1913 to omit all reference to 
Japanese and other orientals, and to restrict the operation 
of the measure to Chinamen, who are throughout the Do-
minions treated as being in an inferior position to any other 
oriental peoples. A similar Act of Manitoba passed in 1913 
(c. 19) has not been made operative.1 
The Commonwealth of Australia shuts its doors firmly 
on ~II entry of British Indians and Japanese, though it has 
done so merely by a language test, and it has very sensibly 
thought out a procedure in which provision is made for . 
the grant of temporary permits of entry to Indian students 
and persons of similarly high education. Even these 
persons, however, cannot settle as of right in the Common-
wealth, nor would, in fact, permission for them to remain 
there be accorded. Nor can even a domiciled oriental suc-
ceed in obtaining permission for his children, if they have 
not legally acquired as residents a domicile in the Common-
wealth, to stay in the country; the Commonwealth Govern-
ment persisted in one case in expelling the wife of a Chinese 
citizen of standing and long residence whom he had married 
in China and who had been allowed to enter the Common-
wealth for a period, though a strong agitation was got up 
by more moderate persons in the Commonwealth against the 
absurdity of insisting on her departure with her child. In 
these cases there is no doubt much room to see an exaggerated 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 7507, p. 25. 
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spirit of exclusion, while on the other hand the very rigorous 
provisions taken to prevent the smuggling in of Chinese 
immigrants were doubtless necessary and cannot be regarded 
as too drastic in view of the established examples of clever-
ness of Chinese in evading the letter of the law.1 The 
position of captains of steamers with Chinese crews is, how-
ever, rendered very difficult : they have no adequate means 
of preventing them deserting in many cases, and when such 
desertion takes place the imposition of a fine of £100 2 for 
each deserter ma·y be unjust, though in practice the Common-
wealth Government has on several occasions remitted 
penalties thus imposed if satisfied of the bona fides of the 
captain. On the other hand, it is impossible not to consider 
as undesirable and needless in the long run the tendency 
which is showed to restrict the rights of the resident orientals 
to exercise trades freely and in other ways to expose them 
to disabilities. The composition of the Australian popula-
tion is a matter of the highest importance from any point of 
view, but the oppression in minor ways of persons lawfully 
resident is unworthy of a great people, and every now and 
then the fact receives sonie recognition, as, for instance, by 
the Parliament of Western Australia rejecting in 1910 a Bill 
which was introduced for the purpose of forbidding marriages 
between Europeans and orientals. The Commonwealth Old 
Age Pension Act 3 excludes Asiatics, but not those born in 
Australia, a very sound principl~, and it does not penalize 
a woman for marrying a man who is excluded from the old 
age pension on that ground. The most serious feature of 
the present day is the tendency of the Parliament of Queens-
land to extend beyond the sphere of immigration which is 
covered by Commonwealth legislation the principle of the 
exclusion of Asiatics from employment because they cannot 
pass a language test. It is not a case of the mere passing 
of a factory Act, or, as in the case of Western Australia, 
a mines Act requiring that the employes should have 
1 See Act No. 38 of 1912. 
2 Or even £200, if a previous offence has occurred. 
3 No. 17 of 1908. 
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a knowledge of the English language : such a rule has obvious 
advantages and may well be treated as of importance for 
the safety of those employed in the mines. But when it is 
provided in an Act regarding the manufacture of margarine 1 
that no person who, not being of European descent or an 
aboriginal native of Australia, has not obtained in the pre-
scribed manner a certificate that he is able to read and write 
from dictation not less than fifty words in the English lan-
guage shall be employed in any factory licensed under the 
Act, and, when it is remembered that the language test when 
applied in Australia is not a test to examine knowledge but 
a courteous mode of exclusion, it is perfectly obvious that 
the possibility of a few orientals being employed on work on 
whjch· an aboriginal may be employed is a singularly absurd 
example of jealousy of orientals. The existence of legisla-
tion hampering Chinese in the control of their business stands 
in a different position, because it is true that Chinese are 
very difficult to supervise in matters like the observation 
of factory Acts, and the treatment of Chinese has long been 
left to the care of the Dominions. 
The differences between the Imperial and the Common-
wealth Governments as to the treatment of British Indians 
has been confined in essence ~o the question of lascars on 
British ships,2 and the British Government severed its con-
nexion with the Commonwealth Government in the mail 
service rather than accept the view that the giving of a mail 
contract to ships which employed lascars must be forbidden, 
though of course they did not contest the right of the 
Commonwealth to provide by law that no contract for the 
carriage of mails in which the Commonwealth was con-
cerned should be given to such ships. The effect of the 
passing of the Navigation Act, 1913, of the Commonwealth 
into operation, when it is brought into effect, will be to 
make it practically impossible to employ lascars in the 
1 Act No. 9 of 1910; cf. No. 18 of 1904. But contra Parl. Deb., 1912, 
pp. 2092-7; Western Australia Parl. Deb., 1912, pp. 2642 sq.; New South 
Wales Parl. Deb., 1912, p. 567. 
2 Parl. Pap., Cd. 1639. 
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coasting trade, which includes any trade done between Com-
monwealth ports by oversea vessels, since the requirements 
of the Commonwealth laws regarding conditions of space 
are such as to be impossible of convenient application to 
lascar crews. More serious, however, is the fact that the 
Royal Commission of the Commonwealth on the pearl 
fishery is anxious to see the participation of Japanese in 
thit trade brought to an end by replacing the Japanese 
with Australian divers and excluding them from the waters 
of Australia, a recommendation which has not so far been 
acted upon.1 But by joint action of the Commonwealth 
and Queensland the sugar-growing trade has been closed 
to Asiatics, with compensation for vested rights.2 
In the case of New Zealand, while immigration has been 
prohibited in large measure by the use of the language test 
in the Immigration Act, in 1913 there was a good deal of _ 
agitation on the ground that natives in considerable numbers 
had succeeded in entering the country from Fiji, despite 
the protection of the Act. The same feeling had manifested 
itself earlier, in 1910, when the effort of the shipping interests 
succeeded in obtaining the passing of a Bill 3 which provided 
for penalizing vessels which carried lascars as part of their 
crew, and which traded from New Zealand to Australia, by 
imposing on the passenger tickets and freight charges made 
in respect of passengers and goods carried by them a duty 
of 25 per cent. ad valorem, unless the vessels complied with 
New Zealand conditions of coastal shipping as regards the 
wages and treatment of the crew. The Bill was reserved 
for the signification of the royal pleasure and was not 
assented to, after it had been discussed at . the Imperial 
Conference of 1911 on general grounds. The measure was 
open to serious objections as regards its proposed operation, 
from the point of view of constitutional law, but it was 
more directly objectionable by its attempt to drive lascars 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 7 507, p. 66. 
2 Queensland Act No.4 of 1913; Commonwealth Nos. 25 and 26 of 1912; 
Cd. 6863, p. 113. 
3 Parl. Pap., Cd. 5582, p. 178. 
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out of the shipping trade. Had the proposal been made by 
a foreign power, it is clear that the British Government would 
have been entitled to protest and to retaliate, and therefore 
it was not less open to objection when the persons aimed at 
were British subjects and the Dominion concerned a British 
Dominion. The force of the position taken up by the Im-
perial Government seems to have been recognized in the 
Dominion, where the failure of the Bill to receive the royal 
assent has not been taken very seriously. More objectionable 
even is the suggestion in 1913 that the immigration legisla-
tion should be strengthened by legislation affecting Asiatic 
eo nomine, but though promised in Parliament such legisla-
tion has not been passed, and, in view of the fact that com-
- plete exclusion is ·effected in the Commonwealth without 
discrimination eo nomine, the need for any such measure 
cannot be asserted. 
But the real crux of the Indian problem lies in the Union 
of South Africa.1 In that case the aim of the Government 
and the people cannot be racial purity nor the danger of the 
introduction of natives of an inferior race, for the South 
African negroes are far inferior to the British Indian in all 
regards, and indeed many of the Europeans who oppose 
their successes as traders so bitterly are really Jews of very 
low and undesirable class, who do not know English, and 
who therefore only obtain entry into the country because 
Yiddish, for purposes of the Immigration Act, is classed as 
a European language. In this case the only ground for the 
exclusion of the British Indian must be merely that the 
appalling difficulties arising from the colour question in the 
Union must not needlessly be added to by the creation of 
a .further difficulty in the shape of a large resident British 
Indian population. The position of the Imperial Govern-
ment is, however, rendered the more difficult, since · before 
. 
the Boer War the ill-treatment of the British Indians formed 
a subject of severe remonstrance to the Boer Government 
at Pretoria, and as high an authority as Lord Lansdowne 
1 The Round Table, 1914, pp. 351-64 has a good article, written from the 
South African point of view. 
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expressed the view that the treatment of the British Indians 
was the worst of the crimes of the Transvaal Republic. The 
irony of fate resulted in the failure of Lord Milner, as Gover-
nor of the Transvaal after the war, to remedy even one of the 
D"rievances which the Indians had, while the administration 
~£ the laws _with the strictness of the new regime, as con-
trasted with the laxity of the old, made the position of the 
Indians a good deal less favourable than it had been before · 
the war. To crown all, Lord Milner actually suggested the 
passing of legislation which would have made the conditions 
for the Indians much worse than before, but happily _Mr. 
Lyttelton declined to accede to this discreditable suggestion.1 
It is, indeed, impossible to resist the conclusion that either 
the protests made before the war with the approval and aid 
of the High Commissioner, Lord Milner, were unjustified, 
or that the policy of leaving these wrongs unredressed after 
the war was unjustifiable. 
For the period after the war the Crown Colony adminis-
tration kept the British Indians effectively out of the country 
by the use of its wide powers under the Peace Preservation 
Ordinance, 1902, and one of the first acts of the responsible 
• 
Government of the Transvaal after it had been appointed 
and met Parliament, was to pass an immigration Act, No. 15 
of 1907, which absolutely excluded the entry into the Trans-
vaal of any Indian who was not already domiciled there. 
This legislation was accompanied by an Act, No. 2 of 1907, 
which compelled registration of all Indians, a rule which 
was declared to be necessary to prevent evasion of the 
Immigration Act, but which was bitterly resented by the 
Indian community and marked the beginning of a grave 
struggle between the Indians, who adopted a passive-
resistance policy, and the Government.2 Out of the neces-
sary incidents of the struggle further grievances arose : 
Mohammedan prisoners confined for breaches of the law 
were refused any consideration in respect of observing 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 2239. 
2 Parl. Pap., Cd. 3887. Act No. 15 of 1907 was amended and made 
more severe by No. 36 of 1908. 
• 
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religious festivals, such as the Fast of Ramazan, and Hindus 
were compelled to do tasks degrading them in caste. The 
Transvaal Government pleaded that the miscellaneous 
population of the jails prevented discrimination, but the 
Indian Government pointed out that in India with a more 
miscellaneous population in the prisons it was found unneces-
sary to compel prisoners to add religious degradation to 
civil punishment. Moreover, one device adopted in the 
summer of 1909 by the Transvaal Government, the putting 
of B1"itish Indians outside the borders of the Transvaal into 
Portuguese territory, whereupon the Portuguese officials 
promptly deported them to India, was bitterly resented 
as an improper use of a foreign government as a pawn in 
the game of oppressing British subjects. The situation was 
aggravated by the persistent attempts of Natal, in 1908, to 
limit further the rights of Indians in that colony. Natal 
has attained prosperity through the work of her Indian 
immigrants, and her determined attempts to exploit these 
people by forcing them out of the country when they ceased 
to be under indenture cannot be regarded with anything 
except dissatisfaction. The first effort was that made in 
1895, when an annual licence fee of £3 was imposed on every 
Indian of whatever age or sex who was not reindentured, 
and it was imposed simply for the purpose of securing the 
departure of the Indians after indenture. In 1897 there 
followed a policy of leaving the dealing with the renewal of 
the grant of trading licences in the hands of the munici-
palities, on which the British Indians were not represented. 
The parliamentary franchise was also, in 1896, taken away 
from Indians on the ground that they belonged to a race 
who had not the franchise in their native country. In 1905 
the further proposal was made to remove the municipal 
franchise totidem verbis, and to rank Indians with uncivilized 
people generally, but this Bill was not assented to by the 
Crown, and in 1911 a further effort to exclude the Indians 
from the franchise failed. In 1908 two further efforts were 
made to deal with . the matter : in the first place it was 
proposed that no further licences for trading purposes should 
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be issued to Indians after the end of the year, and in the 
second, that all licences held by Indians should cease to 
have effect after ten years from the end of the year: neither 
Bill, however, was allowed to become law. It was also com-
plained that by excluding all Indian children from secondary 
schools they were deprived of any chance of higher educa-
tion. In the Cape there was little to complain of under the 
generally reasonable control of the Cape Government and 
the non-differential treatment of Indians, but minor points 
were made 1 with regard to the hardship imposed on Indians 
who wished to visit India, and who were only allowed one 
year of absence without forfeiting their right to return, the 
practical discrimination practised in municipalities in regard 
to granting trading licences, and the fees charged for cer-
tificates permitting temporary visits to other parts of the 
Union.2 In the case of the Orange Free State, the complete 
exclusion 3 of Indians was resented, but that fact prevented 
any other grievances, such as the forbidding to hold land 
or trade, being of much consequence.4 The land question 
was of importance in the Transvaal. · All ownership was 
prohibited by a law of the South African Republic, bitterly 
protested against by the British Government, but deliber-
ately acquiesced in by both Liberal and Conservative 
Ministries, and it was possible to compel Indians to live 
for sanitary reasons in locations, but they were pronounced 
by the Supreme Court of the Transvaal free to trade out-
side locations. Minor grievances related to the regulations 
putting British Indians on a par with natives regarding the 
use of trams, sidewalks, railways, &c. 
The Imperial Government, strengthened by the growing 
indignation of India and by the effect produced throughout 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 6283, pp. 7, 12. The right to regulate trade licences 
was conceded to the provinces by Act No. 10 of 1913, but their power to 
remove any appeal against a refusal to the Supreme Court was negatived, 
in order to avoid injury to Natal Indians. 
2 Parl. Pap., Cd. 6283, pp. 5, 6. 
3 Law No. 18 of 1899 ; Ordinance No. 25 of 1902. 
4 Law Book, ch. xxxiii . 
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the Empire by the disastrous differences of opinion between 
the Indians and the Government, which exhibited a position 
fatal to any cohesion or Imperial unity, made a determined 
effort to induce the new Union Government to which the 
control of matters differentially affecting Indians passed, 
under s. 147 of the South Africa Act, 1909, on the formation 
of a united South Africa to take up in a new spirit the whole 
question and reac:h a reasonable solution. They indicated 
in a dispatch of October 7, 1910,1 that the solution of the 
difficulties should not be of insuperable difficulty, having 
regard to the expressed wish of the leaders of the Indian 
community to arrive at a settlement based on the repeal 
of the Act of 1907 of the Transvaal, which discriminated 
directly against Indians, and by the enactment in its place 
of legislation based on the language test principle, it being 
understood that, while as a rule the test would be adminis-
tered in a differential manner, nevertheless the Govern·ment 
would admit a limited number of educated Indians every 
year with a view to the meeting of the spiritual and other 
needs of the Indian community. The Imperial Government 
also expressed the hope that it would be found possible to 
make South Africa a single unit for immigration purposes. 
It was further urged that some steps should be taken to 
meet the grievances in Natal, and satisfaction was expressed 
that it had been found possible, by giving an appeal in the 
case of the refusal of the renewal of existing licences, to 
mitigate the complaint of unfair treatment in Natal in the 
matter of the withholding of such licences. It was also 
intimated that the Government of India had decided from 
July 1, 1911, not to allow further emigration under indenture 
to Natal, on the ground that it appeared that the Government 
of Natal was not prepared to accept the immigrants as a per-
manent element in the population, and that temporary 
emigration was considered undesirable in the interest of the 
emigrants themselves. 
The Union Government met the proposals of the Imperial 
Government in a spirit of compromise: they consented to 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 5579. 
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introduce a Bill based on a language test, namely, dictation 
in a European language, at the request of the immigration 
officer, and expressed their willingness to admit some edu-
cated Indians every year. But they declined to allow free 
migration among the different parts of the Union. There 
were no Indians in the Orange Free State, and it was mo8t 
undesirable that either there or in the Transvaal it shot1ld 
be possible for the large population of Natal to penetrate. 
On the other hand, the Government were anxious to miti-
gate as far as practicable the objectionable parts of the 
Registration Act of the Transvaal, by abandoning the 
demand for the prints of all the fingers in every case, and 
by asking no finger-prints at all in the case of an Indian vvho 
could write well . . As a result of this attitude, in April1911 1 
a stop was put for a time to the passive-resistance move-
ment, but in 1912 it was not found possible to carry out the 
proposed legislation. Further progress to an understanding 
was made in the course of a visit by Mr. Gokhale to the 
Union, and at the beginning of 1913 the legislation was at 
last ready for introduction into the Union Parliament, where 
the Government pressed it forward after receiving most 
urgent representations from the Imperial Government to 
the effect that it was of Imperial importance that the legis-
lation should be passed, without further postponement, 
to alter the extremely unsatisfactory position of the Indians.2 
The Act was assented to on June 14, and came into effect 
on August 1, but it did not effect the settlement desired. 
On the contrary, not only did Mr. Gandhi take exception 
to certain of its provisions, but popular feeling was much 
excited by the case of one Kulsan Bibi, who was pronounced 
by the Court 3 not to be eligible for entry into the Union, 
though she was the wife of a person domiciled therein. The 
Act-which contained provision for a stringent language 
test in the form of ability to read and write any European 
language, including Yiddish,4 to the satisfaction of an 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 6283, pp. 3, 4. 
2 Parl. Pap., Cd. 6940. 3 Parl. Pap., Cd. 7111, pp. 39, 40. 
4 Yiddish as European was introduced by the Cape Act No. 30 of 1906. 
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immigration officer, or, on appeal, an immigration board, 
and which also empowered the Minister to exclude any 
person or class of persons considered by him, on economic 
grounds or on account of standard or habits of life, unsuited 
for the Union or any province permitted the entry of the 
wife and children under 16 years of age of any person who 
was lawfully domiciled in any province, including the wife 
and child of a lawful and monogamous marriage duly cele-
brated according to the rites of any religious faith outside 
the Union. There is no doubt that this clause was intended 
to permit the entry of wives of Indians who in fact were 
monogamous, but it was held that in law no Indian mar-
riage could be deemed monogamous if by the religious faith 
of the Indian in question he could have more than one wife 
without illegality. It was felt that the Government, in 
taking the case of Kulsan Bibi to the courts, was deliberately 
defeating the intention of the Act, and at the same time 
a grievance which had not been dealt with in the Immi-
gration Act came to a head. Mr. Gandhi had expected the 
repeal of the £3 tax imposed in Natal on Indians who did 
not reindenture, and he believed, as most of the Indians 
in Natal believed, apparently with good reason, that a 
promise of this repeal had been in effect made to Mr. Gokhale 
on the occasion of his South African visit. At the instigation 
of Mr. Gandhi, a passive-resistance campaign was begun 
in Natal, which in October ended in serious rioting with 
loss of life to t.he Indians. The situation was serious ; the 
riots were put down very firmly, and Messrs. Gandhi, Pollak, 
and Kallenbach, the leaders of the movement, put in prison; 
but the Government of the Union recognized that the situa-
tion did no credit to the Union, and that some more effective 
steps were necessary. They decided accordingly to submit 
the examination of the cause of the riots to the judgement 
of a judicial commission, and appointed accordingly such 
a commission. To some extent the purpose of the Com-
mission was foiled, as the leaders of the Indians, for reasons 
which are now of secondary importance, declined to accept 
the constitution of the Commission as satisfactory, and 
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withheld all evidence, leaving it impossible for the Commis-
sion to investigate the stories of oppression of native Indians 
which had been freely spread over India. But on the subject 
of Indian grievances which led to the strike, the Commission 
were able to arrive at very definite results. 
The Commission dispelled the erroneous impression which 
had prevailed that the effect of the Act of 1913 was in any 
way to weaken the position of the Indians in Natal who 
after indentures settled in the country : it had been sug-
gested that these Indians might under the definition of 
domicile in the new Act be liable to be regarded as not 
domiciled in the Union or entitled to remain there, and 
after three years to acquire the right to leave the country 
and return as domiciled persons. They also laid stress on 
the fact that the provisions regarding the Orange Free 
State merely preserved the status quo under which the State 
was closed to Indian immigration of a permanent character, 
while educated Indians could be permitted to enter on the 
understanding that during their stay they must not engage 
in trade or farming. But they definitely recommended that 
the difficulties of the marriage question should be dealt with 
by legislation. In the first place, they considered that it 
was necessary to permit the entry of the wife and minor 
children of a union which was in fact monogamous, though 
the man might have power to marry more wives than one 
under the law of his religion. In the second place, they 
urged that in the case of a certain limited number of old 
residents of South Africa, who had more than one wife, 
these wives might be allowed to leave South Africa and 
travel to India and to return again so long as their husband 
was resident in the country. In the third place, they 
recommended that the law should be altered to provide 
a means by which natives of In<!ia could be married before 
a marriage officer, who might be a priest of their religion, 
that marriage having the effect of a monogamous marriage. 
Fourthly, they recognized the right of Indians who had 
de facto but one wife to have their marriages registered ex 
post facto, on the understanding that thus they had in law 
1874 0 
210 IMPERIAL UNITY AND THE DOMINIONS 
the effect of monogamous marriages. The question of 
recognizing polygamy, which was pressed upon the Com .. 
mission by the representatives of the Mohammedans in the 
Union, was negatived on the ground that the country was 
monogamous, and that it could not be expected to alter 
its fundamental view of marriage, but they expressly stated 
that they did not see any reason to penalize such a man if 
he subsequently performed a religious marriage, while, how-
ever, such a marriage could not be allowed to have any 
effect in law. They also examined in detail the complaints 
which had been made that the Act in effect diminished the 
rights as to migration into the Cape of Good Hope of natives 
of other provinces of the Union. Prior to the passing of 
the Act of 1913, it was open to any British-Indian in South 
Africa to enter at pleasure the Cape, but the Act of 1913 
restricted the right to those who could pass the examination 
test as laid down by the Cape Act No. 30 of 1906, which 
required the writing of an application in a European 
language. Though it seems clear that the change of law 
was a deviation from the agreement made between the 
Government and Mr. Gandhi in 1911, they concluded that 
the grievance was in fact negligible, as the migration to 
the Cape was very small, and the examination test one 
which any Indian educated in the schools of the provinces 
could easily pass. They further examined large numbers 
of minor representations as to the working of the I mmigra-
tion Act, and suggested remedies for difficulties : the chief 
of these were the advice that identification certificates given 
to persons leaving the Union for temporary purpose should 
be allowed three years' validity instead of one, that greater 
rapidity should be introduced in dealing with applications 
for permits for certificates, that greater facilities should be 
given for temporary visits to other provinces, and minor 
matters. They also recommended that, in order to avoid the 
loss of time and money entailed on women and children 
coming to South Africa only to find themselves . rejected as 
prohibited immigrants, officers of the Indian Government 
should be empowered to examine cases in which women 
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and children claimed to be the wives and children of persons 
domiciled in the Union, and that these persons who were 
provided with certificates of their identity by such officers 
should be admitted without question. 
The Commission also explained at great length the ques-
tion of the £3 tax in Natal imposed under Act No. 17 of 
1895 1 on all indentured Indians coming to the Colony after 
the date of the coming into operation of the Act, who 
declined to reindenture or to leave the Colony, and under 
Act No. 3 of 1903 on all their children after attaining the 
age of 16 for boys and 13 for girls who did not indenture 
themselves or leave the Colony. They pointed out that, 
whatever the doubt might be as to the understanding of 
the condition by the natives who indentured, it was well 
understood by the Indian Government, and that it · might 
be argued that the tax was defensible in the case of the 
immigrants themselves as a matter of contract. But they 
declined to settle the matter on narrow grounds, and exam-
ining the arguments adduced in favour of the tax they 
found that in point of fact it did not secure the reindenturing 
of many of the immigrants, and that it did not induce many 
to leave for India. On the other hand, it was most difficult 
to collect, and it encouraged vagrancy and roused ill-feeling. 
Moreover, it was wholly inequitable to apply it to children, 
and it even appeared that in 1895 it was not the intention 
to apply it to women at all, nor did any one doubt that it 
was improper to apply it : indeed, in 1910 the Natal Govern-
ment had given power to exempt women on grounds of age 
and other causes, and in 1913 the Union Government intro-
duced, but failed to carry through Parliament, a Bill to 
exempt them altogether.2 On all these grounds, therefore, 
the Commission decided to recommend the repeal of the 
Act in toto as regards this point. 
The report 3 of the Commission was happily accepted by 
the Government a.nd by the British Indians as affording 
an honourable ground of a settlement, and the sobering 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 7111, pp. 75, 76. 2 Ibid., Cd. 6940, pp. 30, 31. 
a Ibid., Cd. 7265. 
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effect in the country of the outbreak of rioting in Natal 
contribt1ted t,o render Parliament anteilal>le to consider the 
question dispassionately. It was recognized that the activity 
of the Government in suppressing the riots showed that 
they were not afraid of the British-Indian population, while . 
their willingness to accept the findings of the Judicial Com-
mission told in favour of their moderation. Accordingly, 
Act No. 22 of 1914 1 was therefore passed to amend the 
Act of 1913 in so far as changes were necessary to secure 
the aim of the Government. It provides for the appoint-
ment of priests of any Indian religion as marriage officers, 
with power to solemnize the marriage of Indians in accord-
ance with the rites of that religion, such marriages to have· 
the usual results of other legal marriages, and due registers 
of such marriages to be kept. It also provides for the 
validation by registration of marriages which are de facto 
monogamous, such registration to be followed by all the 
results of a monogamous marriage. It further authorizes 
the introduction into the Union of the wife and children 
of any domiciled person, notwithstanding that the religious 
law of that person would allow him to have several wives 
at one time, but subject to the condition that -there is no 
person within the Union to whom he is united in such 
a religious marriage, and that he has no offspring in the 
Union by a woman still living. ·It is thus rendered legal 
for an Indian who does not wish to have his marriage treated 
as n1onogamic still to bring freely into the Union and to 
take out of the Union, without losing the right to bring back 
there, one wife and her children. The Act also repeals 
entirely the provisions regarding the licence fee of £3 in 
Natal, and forbids the taking of proceedings for arrears 
accumulated before the repeal. The measure was received 
with lively satisfaction by the Imperial Government aster-
minating the movement of passive resistance and promising 
well for the settlement by agreement of future difficulties. 
Some of these difficulties are alluded to in the report of 
the Commission. Into most of them they felt that they 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 7644. 
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had no power to inquire, as they could not be held to have 
stood in causal relation to the riots, as for example the pro-
hibition in the Transvaal of landholding by Indians, and 
their exclusion from the acquisition of :rights under the 
Gold Law, the insertion by the Government of the Trans-
-vaal in grants and leases of land in townships of clauses 
forbidding transfer or leasing to Asiatics,! the alleged want 
of proper educational facilities for Asiatics, the prohibition 
to carry arms, their exclusion from the inside of trams in 
the Transvaal, and so forth. They did, however, examine 
the question of the grievances regarding the issue and 
renewal of dealers' licences in the Cape and in Natal.2 In 
the former case they found that the City Council of Cape 
Town in effect refused the necessary recommendation for 
the grant of new licences to Indians, or the transfer of an 
existing licence from one Indian to another, but allowed 
annual renewals without question. In the Natal boroughs 
the grant of licences to Indians was restricted in the main 
to those carrying on their work in Indian quarters, while 
renewals were not, as in the Cape, granted as a matter of 
course, but might be refused, in which case, however, an 
appeal was allowed to the Supreme Court. Outside the 
townships and boroughs in Natal there was no complaint, 
the matter being in the hands of a Government licensing 
officer, who acted with perfect impartiality. ,While recog-
nizing the difficulties to be faced by the Indians in the case 
of the Cape municipality and the boroughs and townships 
of Natal, the Commission felt that it would not be practicable 
to interfere with the municipal control of the matter. 
1 See Parl. Pap., Cd. 6087, as to the position of British-Indians under 
the Gold Law, and the Townships Amendment Act. 
2 Parl. Pap., Cd. 7265, pp. 38, 39. 
CHAPTER X 
MERCHANT SHIPPING 
THE rule by which the legislation of a Dominion is re-
stricted within strict territorial limits carries with it the 
consequence that all legislation by a Dominion for the control 
of shipping must a priori be invalid whenever a ship pro-
ceeds beyond the limits of territorial waters. It would there-
fore follow that all legislation for merchant shipping to be 
effective would require to be Imperial, and in point of fact 
the Imperial Legislature long controlled merchant shipping in 
a very minute degree. But as early as 1854 legislation was 
passed allowing Colonial Parliaments to regulate the shipping 
registered in the Colonies, and in 1869 power was given to 
these Parliaments to deal with the coasting trade, but subject 
to certain conditions. As re-enacted ins. 735 of theM erchant 
Shipping Act, 1894, the Legislature of any British possession 
may by any Act confirmed by His Majesty repeal wholly or 
in part any provisions of the Act (other than those in Part III 
regarding emigrant ships) relating to ships registered in that 
possession, but such an Act cannot take effect until the ap-
proval of His Majesty has been proclaimed in the possession. 
By s. 736 the power to regulate the coasting trade is given, but 
any Act must contain a suspending clause, must treat all 
British ships alike, and must respect any treaty rights granted 
to foreign ships before May 13, 1869, and any renewal of 
these rights. The wording of neither clause is free from 
obscurity, but it may be assumed that the clauses are suffi-
cient to allow the Legislature to make laws which bind the 
ships concerned while on the high seas. , 
In the earlier days of the self-government of the Dominions 
few questions arose out of merchant shipping: the Colonies 
were not then in any way anxious for more rigid rules than 
those enforced in the United Kingdom, though a dispute of 
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an energetic kind developed itself with the Government of 
the Dominion of Canada over the question of load lines, the 
Canadian Government contesting that as regards registered 
vessels the Dominion Parliament could alter the Imperial 
standards of load line, and that a vessel marked in accord-
ance with the Dominion standard was entitled to enter ports 
of the United Kingdom free from question, although it did 
not comply with the Imperial rules, while the Imperial 
Government replied that this contention ignored the fact 
that specific provision 1 was made as to load lines which 
clearly negatived the idea that the power to repeal applied 
to these rules in such a way as to render the new rules made 
by the Dominion Parliament valid in ports of the United 
Kingdom : neither party would give way, and the Act 2 still 
remains on the Canadian statute boo~, but is not in operation. 
The position, however, has undergone a very considerable 
change since the growth of Australia and New Zealand, and 
the rise of their advanced legislation regarding the privileges 
of labour. In 1903 New Zealand enacted a new shipping 
code, which went in many respects beyond the Imperial Act, 
and applied much of its legislation to ships other than 
registered ships and the coasting trade,3 and a Royal 
Commission in the Commonwealth in 1904 4 made recom-
mendations for legislation in much the same sense. The 
New Zealand Act was assented to in 1905, but with a clear 
intimation that much of it might be held to be ultra vires, 
and as the result of prolonged correspondence it was decided 
to convene in 1907 in London a Navigation Conference, at 
which the Imperial Government and the Governments of 
Australia and New Zealand were represented and there were 
present representatives of the shipping interests of the three 
countries.5 The result of the prolonged discussions which 
ensued was to lay down the rule that the vessels to which 
Australian and New Zealand conditions should be applied 
1 57 and 58 Viet. c. 60, s. 444. 
2 C. 40 of 1891. Cf. Parl. Pap., C. 6239. 
3 Parl. Pap., Cd. 2483. 4 Ibid., Cd. 3023. 
5 Ibid., Cd. 3567. 
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were vessels which were registered in ·these Dominions while 
trading therein, and all vessels while engaged in the c~asting 
trade, including vessels from oversea which took up passen-
gers or cargo at one port of a Dominion for delivery in 
another, with a saving for the case where passengers or cargo 
were landed at one port to be taken to their destination by 
another steamer.' 
The result of this Conference in the case of New Zealand 
was the passing in 1909 of a Bill 1 which was reserved for the 
signification of the royal pleasure and assented to in 1911, 
under which the operation of the earlier Act was limited to 
such vessels as were deemed to be within the power of the 
Legislature in the terms of the agreement of-1907. The only 
point of importance which arose in the discussion was that 
concerning the claim of the New Zealand Parliament to regu-
late the rules of interpretation of bills of lading entered into 
in England for the carriage of goods to New Zealand, and 
this claim was withdrawn in 1911 by an amending Act.2 
But in 1910 difficulty arose over the Bill then passed requir-
ing that seamen employed on ships trading to the Cook 
Islands or to Australia should be entitled to receive the same 
rate of wages as was current in New Zealand, while if this 
condition were not complied with a duty of twenty-five per 
cent. should be levied on the amount paid for passages or 
freight from New Zealand. The Bill raised questions of 
importance as regards the differentiation against Asiatics,3 
and on that ground was never assented to, but it also raised 
serious difficulties apart from that consideration. .· 
In the case of the Commonwealth difficulties arose which 
had not made their appearance in the case of the Dominion. 
The first of these arose from the fact that the Constitution 
Act of the Commonwealth dates from 1900, whereas the 
Merchant Shipping Act was passed in 1894. On the strength 
of this fact the Commonwealth Government put forward 
the claim that the power to deal with navigation given by 
1 No. 36 of 1909; Cd. 5135, pp. 73- 83. 
2 No. 37 of 1911; Cd. 6091, pp. 84, 85; N ew .Zealand Shipping Co. v. 
Tyree, 31 N.Z.L.R. 825. 3 Above, Chapter IX. 
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the Constitution was a paramount power, which enabled it 
to legisl~te without regard to the restrictions of the Act of 
1894, and even to repeal the provisions of that Act in its 
application to the Commonwealth. The obvious reply to 
this contention was that the Constitution merely dealt with 
the distribution of powers between the States and the 
Commonwealth, and that the-re was no possibility of attri-
buting to it the sense that it emancipated the Commonwealth 
from the effect of the Imperial Act of 1894. Finally, indeed, 
the Commonwealth Government acquiesced in this view : 
the Bill as formally passed by the Parliament in 1912 was 
reserved for the signification of the royal pleasure, and 
contained the necessary suspending clause. In the second 
place, the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 
following the precedent of the old Act of 1885 constituting 
the Federal Council of Australasia, gives to the laws of the 
Commonwealth a wider effect than is possessed by the 
ordinary laws of the Dominions, for it expressly provides that 
the laws of the Commonwealth shall be in force on all British 
ships, the :King's ships of war excepted, whose first port of 
clearance and whose port of destination are in the Common-
wealth. The exact meaning of this provision is far from being 
clear, but it has twice been considered by the courts of 
the Commonwealth, and the definite sense which seems to 
belong to it is to give the laws of the Commonwealth effect 
on these ships which commence in Australia a round 
voyage which brings them back to Australia, after absence 
from Australian waters. The obvious nature of such a 
round voyage is that of a voyage from the Commonwealth 
to the islands of the Pacific and New Zealand, and this was 
the case in the more important of the two cases decided in 
the High Court of the Commonwealth. A dispute arose 
between the Merchant Service Guild of Australasia v. The 
Commonwealth Steamship Owners' Association,! over the wages 
and conditions of service of the master and officers of a steam-
ship, The Fiona, belonging to the Colonial Sugar Refining 
Company. The ship was registered in Sydney, and was 
1 16 C.L.R. 664. 
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used to make voyages to Fiji and Auckland without any 
regular itinerary : the essence of its business was, however, 
to take stores, &c., from Sydney or Auckland to Fiji, and 
to carry sugar from Fiji to Auckland, whence it returned to 
Sidney either in ballast or with sugar on board. Another 
vessel of the Company in question traded from Melbourne 
to Ocean Island, and the points brought before the High 
Court was whether there was thus in existence a dispute 
which extended beyond the limits of one State, and there-
fore a matter which could be dealt with by the Common-
wealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration. If this 
question were to be answered in the affirmative, two further 
questions arose : if the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration 
should see fit to impose duties to be observed on board 
ships outside Australian waters, could the conditions be 
enforced by penalty whether by virtue of the Commonwealth 
Constitution Act or otherwise, and if this question were to 
be answered in the affirmative, could the Court, in default 
of an amicable settlement, compulsorily prescribe terms 
which were to be deemed to be inserted in agreements of 
services made by the respondents with members of the 
claimant's organization? 
The case was first argued before the High Court in March 
1912, when the members of the Court were equally divided 
in opinion. It was therefore reargued before five justices 
in March 1913, when it was impossible to secure a decision, 
as the Judiciary Act, passed in 1912 (No. 31), required that 
the decision on a constitutional point should not be given 
by less than a majority of the total number of justices of the 
Court, that is four. It was therefore reargued a third time 
with a definite result. For the claimants it was contended 
that the case was covered by s. 5 of the Commonwealth 
Constitution Act, which clearly contemplated this class of 
case, and that the requisite was merely that there should be a 
single voyage, while the port of <:festination could not be de-
termined by the mere customs clearance, but must be decided 
by the intention at the outset of the voyage. Apart from s. 5, 
in the interpretation of which they had the support of the 
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Commonwealth Government, which as usual intervened in the 
case because of its interest in the interpretation of the powers 
of the Commonwealth Parliament, it was contended that the 
power of conciliation and arbitration for the settlement of 
industrial disputes extending beyond the limits of one State 
given by s. 51 (xxxv) of the Constitution implied that where 
necessary for its effective enforcement the Parliament had 
powers of extra-territorial legislation. The respondents, on 
the other hand, contended that the power in s. 5 merely 
referred to cases of simple voyage from one port in Australia 
to another, a contention which had been put forward by the 
delegates to the Imperial Parliament from the Colonies before 
federation, when they defended the clause from the doubts 
of the Imperial Government, and that the power under the 
Constitution, s. 51, was confined to real Australian disputes ; 
there could be no industrial dispute simply because a com-
pany employed coloured seamen all over the world, and the 
white seamen in Sydney and Melbourne were to claim that 
coloured labour should not be employed. 
The Court was divided in opinion. The Acting Chief 
Justice, Sir E. Barton, adhered to the view which had been 
expressed by the delegates to the Imperial Parliament on the 
occasion of the passing of the Constitution Act. He held that 
the clause applied merely to coasting ships, that the port of 
destination was that named in the ship's entry outwards, 
and her port of clearance that whence she started her voyage, 
thus restricting the extension of the term in the closest sense 
to the coasting trade. Still less did he hold that there could 
be any industrial dispute in respect of things happening out-
side Australia. Isaacs · J. dismissed the argument from the 
necessary implication of s. 51 (xxxv), on the ground that 
it was a confusion between the fact that when a power was 
given there was necessarily given the subsidiary authority 
required to make the power effective, and the failure of 
a power when fully exercised to attain all the results at which 
it was desired to arrive. In the former case the power to 
expel aliens had been held by the Privy Council to authorize 
the deportation of aliens beyond the limits of the Dominion, 
, 
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but in this case the position was that despite the full exercise 
of the power the result desired was not achieved, and there 
was no authority for the view that the Act could be pressed 
to yield the power. On the contrary, the Act when con-
sidered carefully gave no such authority, and must be held 
in the absence of a quite express ground to be subject to the 
general territorial limitation of Dominion legislative power, 
which followed from the distinction between a sovereign 
state and a dependency. Otherwise it would be difficult to 
avoid conflict of legislation. It was not sufficient to argue 
that the dispute existed on Australian territory : it must 
be a dispute about the carrying on of an Australian industry: 
a dispute about wages to be paid in England would not fall 
within the meaning of the power given by s. 51, and indeed 
any other result would be absurd, for it would result that by 
engaging temporarily in trade with Australia all foreign ship-
owners would become subject to Australian jurisdiction for 
acts done on the high seas. But in his opinion s. 5 of the 
Constitution Act did deal with ships engaged in round voyages, 
and was not confined to the coasting trade, nor could the 
destination be limited to the destination shown in the ship's 
papers. He considered that the judgement of O'Connor J. 
in Merchant Service Guild of Australasia v. Archibald ·currie 
& Co. Proprietary Ltd.1 Already before the formation of 
the Commonwealth the legislation of New South Wales (42 
Viet. No. 19) contained references to the intercolonial and 
South Sea Islands trade as being on the same footing. His 
answer, therefore, to the first question was that by virtue of 
the covering section 5 of the Constitution a dispute was not 
less a dispute extending beyond the limits of any one State, 
merely because some of the operations in respect of which 
the dispute existed were performed extra-territorially. The 
second question he felt inclined to answer, but as the majority 
of the Court held otherwise he left it unanswered. The third 
question he answered to the effect that the Court had power to 
require that any of the terms and conditions which it decided 
1 5 C.L.R. 737. Cf. on the whole subject Keith, Journ. Soc. Comp. Leg., 
ix. 202 sq. 
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should be in operation should be incorporated in written 
agreements. Higgins J. agreed with Isaacs J. in his answer 
to question one, this being the only point on which four jus-
tices among those by whom the case was heard agreed. He 
also held the same view as to the meaning of s. 5, but he did 
not argue the matter at length as the majority of the Court 
declined to answer question two, as to the power of the Court 
to impose duties enforceable by penalty on vessels outside 
Australia. He agreed with the answer to the third question 
as given by Isaacs J. Gavan-Duffy and Rich JJ. held that 
the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration had power to con-
trol the parties to a dispute even as regards conduct in places 
beyond territorial limits. The Imperial Parliament might 
assume the right to bind British subjects or even foreigners 
without the territorial limits of Great Britain, and might 
confer the same right on any subordinate Legislature, and 
British Courts would recognize legislation to this effect. 
They were inclined to think that the power to settle disputes 
necessarily implied a power to prescribe terms and conditions 
for labour to be performed outside the territorial limits, but 
in any case the covering section 5 of the Constitution Act 
enabled the Court to settle the dispute by imposing obliga-
tions with respect to duties to be performed on British ships 
engaged on voyages coming within the terms of that section, 
though they did not desire to express a judicial opinion on 
that subject. They held that they were not at liberty to 
answer the second question, and the answer to the third ques-
tion was they thought that the power in question was clearly 
intra vires. The answer of the Court therefore was confined 
to the first _and third questions, and was to the effect that 
a dispute was not less a dispute beyond the limits of any 
one state, merely because some of the operations in respect 
of which the dispute existed were performed beyond the 
territorial limits of the Commonwealth, and that the Court 
had power to require that any of the terms and conditions, 
which it lawfully determined should be in operation between 
the organization and the respondents to the plaint, should 
be incorporated in a written agreement between them. 
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The total effect of this judgement is clearly that in the 
case of round voyages the Commonwealth has power to 
regulate conditions of employment of masters and seamen, 
and the Commonwealth Navigation Act, No.4 of 1913, agrees 
with the judgement in including such ships in its purview. 
The power thus possessed goes, it must be admitted, a good 
deal further than that possessed by any other Dominion, and 
the question of its compatibility with the power possessed or 
claimed by the ·New Zealand Parliament and courts is open 
to doubt. In two cases 1 decided in the Supreme Court of 
New Zealand, the doctrine has been laid down that it lies 
with the Parliament of New Zealand to control the rates of 
wages and similar points in respect not only of ships regis-
tered in New Zealand and trading from New Zealand to 
Australia and the Pacific, but also in the case of vessels regis-
tered in Australia though subject to the rules laid down by an 
award of the Commonwealth Court of Arbitration, and com-
plying with these rules, so that these vessels while engaged 
in the coasting trade of New Zealand shall be obliged to pay 
the rates of wages provided for in New Zealand. The validity 
of this provision would appear to be open to grave doubt, 
and the converse rule that the ships registered in New Zea-
land while coasting in the Commonwealth must comply with 
Australian conditions will also apply to the detriment of 
New Zealand awards in industrial matters. New Zealand, 
however, appears to be in a disadvantageous position in so 
far that the Australian law would appear under s. 5 of the 
Constitution to have validity over any ship falling under 
its terms even in New Zealand waters, so that the subjecting 
of such ships to New Zealand conditions is really ultra vires 
the Dominion. If this is the case, however, the discrimina-
tion between the two Dominions seems unjustifiable, and 
New Zealand seems clearly entitled to have conferred upon 
it the same power of dealing with ships on round tours as is 
assigned to the Commonwealth. It could then be allowed 
to rest with the two Dominions to decide in what way 
they would arrange for the enforcement of their laws : the 
1 See Keith, J ourn. Soc. Oomp. Leg., xi. 294-9 . 
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obvious plan would be to provide that compliance with the 
rules in force in New Zealand would exempt a vessel from 
compliance with those in force in Australia while that vessel 
was engaged in the Australian coasting trade, and vice versa. 
But it would be impossible in any case to enforce such a pro-
posal as was made in the reserved Bill of New Zealand, 
No. 85 of 1910, which claimed to put New Zealand rates of 
wages in force on every ship which traded from New Zealand 
to Australia : such a rule could have applied to all ships 
whether Australian or connected with the United Kingdom, 
and apart from the territorial limitation of New Zealand 
legislation would have been impossible to enforce, and 
obviously unworkable: if every country provided that all 
ships which left its ports were to pay wages prescribed by 
it the result would be chaos. 
Even in the admitted case of the right to control the 
coasting trade the difficulties of the position are serious 
enough. In the first place, the term coasting trade is cer-
tainly ambiguous, and the obvious difficulty has alread~y 
arisen in New Zealand whether a vessel, which spends a cer-
tain amount of time on the coast of the Dominion, and to-
wards the end of that period carries some cargo gathered in 
one port to another port and discharges it there, can be held 
to have been engaged in the coasting trade for the whole 
period of its presence in New Zealand waters, or only when 
actually coasting. 
In the case of The Captain and Owners, SS. Durham v. 
The Collector of Customs, Wellington,! the Supreme Court of 
New Zealand had under its consideration the question of 
the power of the Dominion to regulate the coasting trade. 
The SS. Durham commenced her voyage in England, 
where she shipped her crew at the rates of pay ruling there. 
In January 1911 she arrived at Auckland, New Zealand, 
from the west coast ports of England with general cargo. 
Having discharged all her Auckland cargo she loaded some 
cargo for the west coast ports of England which was her des-
tination. From Auckland she proceeded first to Wellington 
1 31 N.Z.L.R. 565. 
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and then to Lyttelton, and at each port discharged further 
cargo from England. She then went on to Port Chalmers, 
where she discharged a further part of her outward cargo 
and loaded cargo for English ports. She next proceeded 
to the Bluff, where further cargo was discharged and where, 
prior to loading any cargo, instructions were received by 
cable from London on February 3 varying the steamer's 
destination in England to the Port of London. After 
receiving these instructions, some cargo which the shippers 
had intended to be sent to west coast ports was loaded on 
board at the Bluff, and this, together with what had been 
collected at the other ports, was carried to Wellington, 
where it was unloaded into the steamship Sussex, a vessel 
belonging to the same owners, destined for the west coast 
ports of England. 
The question arose on an application for an order against 
the Declaratory Judgements Act, 1908, interpreting s. 75 of 
the Shipping and Seamen Act, 1908, with a view to ascer-
taining whether the movements of the SS. Durharn brought 
it within the rules affecting the coasting trade and, in 
particular, the requirement of the Shipping and Seamen 
Act of paying coastal rates to the seamen while engaged in · 
the coasting trade. The plaintiffs admitted that they were 
liable to pay coastal rates to the seamen with respect to the 
voyage from the Bluff to Wellington, while the Collector 
of Customs claimed that the vessel was engaged upon 
coastwise trade for the whole time when she left Auckland 
on January 20, 1911, until her return to Wellington on 
February 14, 1911. 
On the other hand, the Solicitor-General for the defendant 
pointed out that the validity of the provisions of s. 75 
depended upon s. 736 of the Imperial Merchant ~hipping 
Act, 1894, and argued that if the vessel once took part in 
the coasting trade it fell within the provision of the New 
Zealand Act. He argued that there were various possible 
meanings of coastal trade, namely, firstly, that it included 
every ship which went from one port of the coast to another 
on a trading venture : secondly, that it included an~ ship 
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which loaded cargo at one port of the coast and discharged 
it at another, and thirdly, that it included only ships which 
were habitually engaged in those occupations. The last 
meaning was too narrow a sense, and the Legislature must 
be taken to be authorized to deal with all ships which carried 
cargo from one New Zealand port to another. On the other 
hand, it was replied on behalf of the plaintiffs that, if the 
meaning of coastal trading were as suggested, theN ew Zealand 
Legislature would have the right to control any vessel from 
overseas which landed cargo at more than one port in New 
Zealand, and the power to regulate shipping referred only to 
the time when ships were actually engaged in the coastal trade. 
Chapm~n J., in deciding the case, pointed out that the 
question turned on the interpretation of s. 75 of the Shipping 
and Seamen Act, 1908, which had to be construed with 
reference to s. 2 of that Act and s. 736 of the Merchant 
Shipping Act, 1894. S. 2 of that Act, which was originally 
passed in 1896, while declaring that the Act should apply 
to all British ships registered at, trading with, or being at, 
any port within the jurisdiction of New Zealand, and to the 
owners, masters, and crews thereof, declared that the 
provisions of the Act were . to be so construed as not to 
, exceed the legislative powers conferred on the General 
Assembly by the Constitution Act, a term which no doubt 
included s. 736 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, as that 
Act modified the Constitution Act by enlarging its scope 
and so extending the ambit of the expression 'peace, order, 
and good government of New Zealand '. Now s. 7 5 of the 
Shipping and Seamen Act provided that when seamen were 
engaged in Ne'v Zealand, or, having been engaged abroad 
were employed in New Zealand, the seamen while so em-
ployed should be paid the current rate of wages for the time 
being ruling in New Zealand. In this absolute form the 
sentence would be ultra vires, as it did not relate exclusively 
to the coasting trade of New Zealand, but a proviso was 
added : 'Provided also that this section shall not apply to 
ships arriving from abroad with passengers or cargo, but not 
trading in New Zealand further or otherwise than for the 
1874 p 
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purpose of discharging such original passengers or cargo in 
New Zealand and there shipping fresh passengers or cargo 
to be carried abroad.' In a sense a ship which navigated 
from port to port for the purpose of discharging its cargo 
or picking up cargo for the outward voyage was employing 
seamen in New Zealand, but it was at least doubtful whether 
such a vessel was . engaged in the coasting trade. He 
referred to this as doubtful because it might be that else-
where in the Empire conditions existed which rendered it 
necessary to impose on all British ships the duty of taking 
a tug or of carrying pilots or of doing other things which 
entered into the conception of the coasting trade. But in 
the case before him the matter to be settled was simply 
whether or not the SS. Durham came within the benefit of 
the proviso. In his opinion the question must be con-
sidered from the point of view of the time when the Collector 
of Customs had to consider under s. 75 whether or not it was 
his duty to detain the final clearance of the ship on the 
ground that the proper wages had not been paid. It was 
admitted that at that time the vessel had been engaged in 
coastwise trade, but it was argued by the plaintiffs that the 
obligations and the proviso were distributive and that 
a vessel carrying cargo coastwise might be at one time 
within and at one time without the protection. That was 
not, in his opinion, the intention of the Legislature, and it 
was not the intention of the Legislature that the matter 
should depend on the intention with which the cargo had 
been shipped originally (namely, that it should be conveyed 
from New Zealand in the SS. Durham to west coast English 
ports). It would be a matter of great inconvenience if 
a vessel were merely to be required to pay coasting rates 
for the time when it was actually engaged in carrying coast-
wise traffic between two ports, and a vessel might thus for 
short periods be within the provisions of the law and for 
short periods be without it. It was, in his opinion, clearly 
within the power of the Legislature to provide, as it had 
provided, by making two distinct classes those which never 
fell within the coastwise trade, and those which fell within 
MERCHANT SHIPPING 227 
it, and, in his opinion, the SS. Durham during the whole 
period between its departure from Auckland on the 20th 
of January and its return to Wellington in February was 
engaged in the coasting trade. 
It is of particular interest to note that Chapman J. 
treated the whole question of merchant shipping as being 
one in which the Dominion Parliament had none except 
the express powers conferred by the J.l! erchant Shipping Act, 
1894. Thus he stated that earlier Imperial Acts reserved 
the whole subject of shipping legislation to the Imperial 
Parliament, and he treated the Merchant Shipping Act of 
1894 as if it for the first time conferred upon the Dominion 
Legislature any power to deal with coasting trade, though 
the Act of course dates back to 1869. 
The second question of importance which arises is that 
of the mode in which the effective enforcement of the law 
as to the regulation of the coasting trade can be carried out. 
It is clear that so far as accommodation is concerned there 
is no difficulty, but the question of wages seems insuperable. 
The owner is not subject to the jurisdiction of the Common-
wealth outside the coasting trade, and, if he chooses to 
arrange with the seamen that in consideration of the higher 
wages which they will receive while on the coast they are 
to be paid less wages elsewhere, it is difficult effectively to 
prevent his so doing. The difficulty is met in the Common-
wealth Act by providing that a seaman shall not be deemed 
to receive the due wages if he is paid less when outside the 
jurisdiction of the Commonwealth, on the ground that he 
has been paid more within, but the effectiveness of such 
a provision may be doubted if the payment of lower wages 
takes the simple form of decrease in the normal rates for 
the main part of the voyage, based on the commercial fact 
that higher wages will be paid for the coasting portion of 
the voyage; and it is obvious on economic grounds that 
the mere intervention of one legislature cannot affect really 
the wages of the sailors for the voyage as a whole. The 
main object of the Commonwealth Parliament is doubtless, 
however, to discourage the use· of lascars as crews of vessels 
P2 
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which desire to do coasting trade, and, while in their case 
the difficulty of pay might easily be overcome, the real 
obstacle will be the conditions of structure which are required 
from all coasting trade vessels. 
The Commonwealth Act, indeed, frankly recognizes that 
its validity as a whole is not free from doubt, and an amend-
. ment introduced by the Government in 1912 expressly pro-
vided that the Act was to be construed in the sense which 
gave it legal validity. The same sense of doubt as to its 
effect is shown in the elaboration of the provisions which 
are inserted to secure the fulfilment of the rule regarding 
wages: a memorandum of the new rate of wages is to be 
made on the agreement, and the wages must be paid before 
the ship leaves its last port in Australia : moreover, if the 
ship does not conform to the conditions in question, it may 
be disqualified from ever again engaging in the coasting 
trade, which it can only do under a licence. Further doubt 
is also thrown on the powers of the Commonwealth by the 
decision in the case of the Kalibia,1 in which the High Court 
laid it down that the power of the Commonwealth Parlia-
ment to enact a law giving compensation to seamen was 
confined to seamen engaged in inter-state or foreign trade, 
and did not apply in the case of mere intra-state trade. It 
is also clear that despite the constant discussions with the 
Imperial Government since 1908, it has not been found 
possible to eliminate all the cases of ultra vires legislation 
from the measure. It was, indeed, only in 1912 that the 
Commonwealth Government consented to withdraw a clause 
which provided that the cancellation of an officer's certi-
ficate by a Court of Marine Inquiry in the Commonwealth 
should debar an officer from serving in that capacity in 
Australia, even if his certificate had been returned to him 
under the statutory power conferred on the Board of Trade 
by s. 474 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, a provision 
which, unless limited to ships within the legislative com-
petence of the Commonwealth, was clearly ultra vires. Even 
then the Government could not see their way to delete 
1 SS. Kalibia v. Wilson, 11 C.L.R. 689. 
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a clause which prescribed the adoption at all seasons of the 
year of the winter load-line, or, in the case of sailing vessels, 
the North Atlantic load-line in respect of cargoes of dead-
weight cargo other than coal, although, apart from the 
impossibility of defending the Act in this regard from the 
charge of ultra vires, the Board of Trade adduced arguments 
to show that the proposal was one which could not be 
defended on grounds of seamanship. It is a minor matter 
that many other provisions are open to doubt of their legality, 
such as the transfer to the Attorney-General in place of the 
Governor-General of the authority to permit prosecutions 
for sending unseaworthy ships to sea, and the appropriation 
to the Commonwealth of the proceeds of wreck which by 
an intricate course of legislation are really the property of 
the Imperial Treasury, being Crown rights surrendered by the 
Crown under the Civil List Act in exchange for a civil list. 
In the case of Canada also there has been difficulty arising 
from the doubt as to the validity of the legislation of the 
f 
Dominion regarding shipping/ and a Bill to reiL 3dy the 
doubts by expressly securing that the laws of the lJominion 
regarding shipping should be applicable to all vessels regis-
tered in the Dominion or engaged in the coasting trade 
was introduced by the Government but delayed by the 
outbreak of war. The difficulty in the main arose from the 
failure to observe the terms of the legislation regarding the 
conditions on which the coasting trade and registered ship-
ping could be governed, the necessity of suspending clauses 
in the Acts having been overlooked after the earliest ship-
ping legislation. In that case the confusion which formed 
the subject of representation by Mr.- Brodeur, Minister of 
Marine, at the Imperial Conference of 1911, was due to the 
carelessness of the law officers of the Dominion, but the 
trouble which has arisen in this case is a proof of the com-
plication of the position. Even in Newfoun~land, shipping 
legislation has proved provocative of difficulty, though of 
a minor kind.2 
1 Parl. Pap.; Cd. 5745, pp. 419, 420. 
2 See Parl. Pap., H. C. 160, 1912, p. 3. 
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A further difficulty which arises even when the powers 
of the Dominions are duly exercised requires consideration. 
If the Dominion have power to regulate merchant shipping 
registered in these Dominions, as seems only proper, can 
they insist that their rules shall hold good in the ports of 
the United Kingdom, and if so, can their rules be enforced 
there and in the ports of other Dominions by the local 
courts on the authority of the Dominion Acts ? The answer 
to this question is far from obvious, and it is not covered 
by any judicial authority. In the case of the Canadian 
load-line question above referred to, it was denied by the 
Imperial Government on the ground that there was express 
provision in the Merchant Shipping Act for the recognition 
under certain conditions of load-lines marked by Colonial 
Governments as equivalent to the British-marked load-line, 
and that this provision excluded the application of the 
doctrine that the Colonial Parliament could make any load-
line it thought fit valid, in respect of ships registered in the 
particular colony concerned, throughout the Empire and in 
the courts of the United Kingdom. The same principle was 
adopted in the case of the Wireless Telegraphy Act, 1904. 
By Order in Council of February 29, 1908, it was ordered, 
in virtue of the power conferred by the Act to extend its 
operation to British ships on the high seas, that the Act 
should apply to all British ships on the high seas, provided 
that a person on board a British ship registered in any 
British possession should not be deemed to commit an 
offence against the Act by reason of the installation or work-
ing of wireless telegraphy on such a ship, if the authority in 
such possession, having power by law to do so, had granted 
a licence for the installation and working of wireless tele-
graphy on the ship and the person was acting in accordance 
with the terms of the licence. It is clear that this contem-
plated a state of things under which it would be open to 
each Dominion to regulate the use of wireless telegraphy on 
board its own ships, but left the use of wireless telegraphy 
in the territorial waters of the United Kingdom to be regu-
lated in each case under the law of the United Kingdom, 
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and the use in the territorial waters of the Dominions to be 
regulated .by the law of the Dominions. In practice, how-
ever, it was considered by the Dominions and the United 
Kingdom unnecessary to interfere with the use of wireless 
telegraphy if the ship was licensed by one party and was 
using its wireless telegraphy in accordance with the licence. 
There was thus a perfect state of reciprocity in the matter. 
This condition is not, however, observed in the Merchant 
Shipping (Convention) Act, 1914, the last important Act 
bearing on the subject. That Act provides many rules 
regarding the safety in navigation of British ships, regis-
tered in the United Kingdom, embodying the results of the 
International Convention signed on January 20, 1914, as 
a result of the lessons of the Titanic disaster. By s. 23 of 
the Act, compliance with the provisions of Parts II and III 
of the Act relating to the manning, construction, or equip-
ment of passenger ships, or relating to the provision of 
wireless telegraphy and wireless-telegraph watchers and 
operators on a ship, and representing provisions of the 
Convention, shall be required in the case of a foreign ship 
or a British ship not registered in the United Kingdom 
which comes into and proceeds to sea from a port in the 
United Kingdom in the same manner as compliance would 
be required in the case of a ship registered in the United 
Kingdom. A certificate of safety granted by the Govern-
ment of such a ship, if recognized by the Board of Trade 
• 
as granted in accordance with the Convention, shall have 
the same effect as a safety certificate granted to a British 
ship registered in the United Kingdom. Moreover, such 
ships shall be entitled in the British Islands to exemption 
in whole or part if they hold certificates duly granted under 
the terms of the Convention and recognized by the Board 
of Trade. It is of course the case that these provisions are 
necessary in accordance with the terms of the Convention 
in order to make it really effective, but the fact remains 
that the British legislation will be effective on registered 
ships throughout the Empire, and even in territorial waters, 
while the Dominion legislation would not be effective in the 
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waters of the British Islands to override the provisions of 
the Imperial Act. From the practical point of view, as the 
three great Dominions, Canada, the Commonwealth of 
Australia, and New Zealand, were duly represented at the 
discussion, the Convention was certain to be adopted by 
the legislation of these Dominions, and so the law would 
be uniform throughout the Empire ; but the theoretic dis-
tinction of the Imperial and Dominion powers remains as 
an anon1aly. Moreover, the Act is unhappily silent on the 
question whether the rules of the Dominions can be enforced 
in the courts of the United Kingdom and of the other 
Dominions, and this is a matter of very considerable impor-
tance because of the provisions of the first part of the Act. 
These sections impose on the master of any ship registered 
in the United Kingdom the obligation to report derelicts, _ 
to observe certain rules of careful navigation near ice, and 
to render assistance on receiving a wireless call of distress ; 
and it also imposes obligations on owners of a fleet of such 
ships to publish notices of their Atlantic routes. Not one 
of these provisions is made applicable to a self-governing 
Dominion's ships, for, though by s. 24 they do apply to 
the vessels registered in the possessions without self-
government, they are by that clause excluded from opera-
tion in the self-governing Dominions and also British India. 
The result is that, if no legislation is passed in the Dominions 
regarding ships registered therein, the owner of a British 
ship who wishes to save the master of his ship the liabilities 
imposed by Part I of the Act need merely register his ship 
in such an oversea Dominion. But if he does so, and the 
Dominion legislates, the question at once arises whether 
tl1e legislation can be enforced in any court of the United 
Kingdom. The point is of some interest, for though the 
offence of not complying with the provisions of the Colonial 
law could be punished in the Dominion, nevertheless, as 
the ship need never go near the Dominion, it might avoid 
compliance with the Act in toto and yet be exempt from 
penalty, unless such a penalty could be enforced in the courts 
of the United Kingdom or of another Dominion. To take 
. ---- --
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a concrete case, ships registered in Newfoundland might 
trade only between Canada and the United Kingdom and 
disregard the rules of the Atlantic navigation without 
penalty. The alternative theory is to hold that as the power 
to regulate the registered shipping of a Dominion must be 
meant to supersede the Imperial Act which it is allowed 
expressly by s. 735 of the Merchant Shipping Act to amend, 
it must be assumed that it takes the place of the sections 
of the Act and can b~ enforced in the courts of the whole 
of the Empire, just as the Merchant Shipping Act itself can 
be enforced. The argument may be correct, and if not, it 
is clear that there is a lacuna of some importance in the 
network of shipping legislation. 
It does not seem that there is any ground of theory or of 
practice which stands in the way of the adoption of a perfect 
reciprocity between the self-governing Dominions and the 
United Kingdom in the matter of shipping legislation. This 
perfect reciprocity does not at present exist, because of the 
rule that the United Kingdom can regulate shipping regis-
tered in a Dominion when within the waters of the United 
Kingdom, while the Dominion Parliaments can do this only 
if the ship registered in the United Kingdom is at the same 
time engaged in the coasting trade of the Dominion. To 
effect perfect reciprocity it should be provided that the 
Dominion legislation regarding the shipping registered in 
the Dominion shall be applicable to any registered ship in 
the United Kingdom, save when such a ship is engaged 
in the coasting trade, or in the alternative, it should be 
provided that the Dominion Legislatures have full power 
to deal with all British shipping which comes to their coasts 
while on their coasts, which is the position of the Imperial 
Parliament with regard to Dominion-registere4 shipping in 
point of practice. The former proposal seems by far the 
more reasonable, since to interfere with the registered ship-
ping of a country save on some serious ground, such as 
competition with the local coasting trade, is contrary to 
international practice, and there is no good ground for 
differentiating between the relations of the United Kingdom 
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and the Dominions and the relations of the United Kingdom 
and foreign countries in this question. 
A further reform, which is surely desirable in the consti-
tutional relationships between the United Kingdom and 
the Dominions in this regard, is the abolition of the absurd 
rules regarding the insertion of suspending cl,auses in legis-
lation regarding registered and coasting shipping : 1 these 
clauses ought not to be necessary if _the principle of the 
division of powers of legislation is clearly recognized, ap.d 
there is no just ground on which the autonomy of the 
Dominions in this matter should be hampered and fettered. 
The proper mode of dealing with objections to the terms 
of intra vires legislation is _by representations from the 
' interested parties, supported where proper by the views of 
the Board of Trade, as is done in the case of foreign shipping 
legislation affecting British vessels through the Foreign 
Office. It is not unnatural that the Legislature of a Dominion 
should feel some surprise that legislation which is freely 
passed by the United States should be questioned and held 
in suspense when enacted by the Dominion. Moreover, 
the United States precedent is an unhappy one, for that 
country in its merchant-shipping legislation frequently con-
travenes the rules of international comity, as in the famous 
Harter Act, which in its application in the Commonwealth,2 
New Zealand,3 and Canada, has been much modified and 
limited in operation to shipping documents entered into 
in these Dominions, or in respect of the carriage of goods 
from these Dominions, while the American Act pur-
ports to regulate both carriage to and carriage from the · 
States. 
It is of course certain that with increased freedom of 
legislation British shipping might be exposed to some ham~ 
pering rules, but it may be doubted if these would prove 
1 Also as to Admiralty jurisdiction, 53 and 54 Viet. c. 27, s. 4, but ap-
proval before enactment is allowed in that case, which is far more con-
venient and is usually resorted to. 
2 Act No. 14 of 1904. 
a Act .No. 37 of 1911, amending Act No. 36 of 1909. 
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very serious in practice: the difficulties imposed by American 
legislation, however severe in theory, have hitherto always 
been overcome. What is probably more serious is already 
in progress : the cessation of Imperial legislation for Domi-
nion shipping outside the United Kingdom, which is seen 
at its full development in the case of the Merchant Shipping 
(Convention) Act, 1914, has led to the danger that Dominion 
legislation will lag seriously behind the British legislation. 
In Ca11ada, for instance, the improvements of the 1906 Act 
regarding merchant shipping have not yet been adopted, 
and the law regarding accidents and collisions and salvage, 
which introduced a new standard for the apportionment of 
damage, remained unaltered in the Dominions long after 
the passing of the necessary legislation in 1911 in the United 
Kingdom. This failure to act, however, is a mistake which 
in due course Dominion Legislatures will outgrow : it is 
probable that part of their slowness of movement has been 
due to the complications of the form of legislation. An 
instance of the possible danger of this position can be seen 
in the recent Imperial British Ships (Transfer Restriction) 
Act, 1915/ which provides that with effect from February 12, 
1915, any transfer of a British ship or a share therein to 
persons not qualified to own a British ship shall be subject 
to the approval of the Board of Trade on behalf of His 
Majesty, and the attempt to make a transfer without such 
permission shall be a misdemeanour, apparently wherever 
the attempt to transfer is made, whether within or without 
the British Islands. But the Act applies only to 
British ships when not registered in one of the self-governing 
Dominions,2 and accordingly the position is that the passing 
of legislation with regard to their registered ships is necessary 
to bring about a similar prohibition, and such legislation 
would apparently have to be reserved or to contain a sus-
pending clause, and cannot come into force t1ntil the pleasure 
1 5 Geo. 5, c. 21. 
2 For this purpose and that of the Act of 1914 the Commonwealth 
includes Papua and Norfolk Island, these being territories under the Com-
monwealth Parliament, the latter since 1913, Parl. Pap., Cd. 7507, p. 63. 
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of the Crown is formally signified in the Dominion. This 
position of affairs is not so serious as might be thought, 
since probably the actual number of ships which would be 
transferred to undesirable owners is small, but it re1nains 
the fact that if legislation were to be passed it would be 
a slow business. 
CHAPTER XI 
COPYRIGHT 
THE subject of copyright is of considerable interest, inas-
much as no question ever raised more heated feeling between 
Canada and the United Kingdom, and in no matter did the 
United Kingdom adhere more firmly to a point which con-
stitutionally it had no right to press as a matter of right. 
The question is also curious as showing the remarkable 
power of the publishing interest in the United Kingdom, 
which was able for years to thwart the demands of Canada 
urged on grounds of constitutional law which can hardly 
possibly be gainsaid. 
The fons et origo mali was the Imperial Act of 1842 ( 5 & 6 
Viet. c. 45), which, enacting the principles of the law of copy-
right, applied the principle to the colonies then existing, 
and thus gave to any work which was copyright in the 
United Kingdom a copyright which was automatic and 
unconditiona~ in Canada. The difficulties of the position 
were soon felt ; and the Imperial Government in 1846 
~dmitted that the colonies must be given the right of regu-
lating the terms on which reprints of works issued in the 
United Kingdom should be allowed to be imported from 
the United States into the colonies, the rule being laid down 
that provision must be made for charging a royalty to be 
paid to the author of the original work. In 1847 this was 
carried out by an Imperial Act which allowed of the suspen-
sion of the prohibition in the Imperial Act of any importa-
tion of copyright works in pirated copies, where arrangements 
were made that the importation of reprints should be charged 
with a suitable duty. This solution of the question was, 
however, temporary only, for more acute questions developed 
with the coming into operation of the Berne Copyright 
Convention, and the anxiety of the Imperial Government to 
• 
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secure some measure of protection for foreign copyright in 
the United States of America, a country whose policy of 
blackmail in copyright matters was then at its most perfect 
stage. The Dominion was consulted and definitely agreed 
of its own will to join the Berne Convention,! and thus it 
bound itself, so long as it should be a member of that Con-
vention, to refrain from passing any law which made the 
recognition of copyright in foreign works protected by the 
Convention dependent on the printing of the work in the 
Dominion. This disability would have been of little impor-
tance, had it not been that the Imperial Government suc-
ceeded in obtaining from the United States a very feeble 
measure of protection for British works, on the understanding 
that the law of copyright throughout the Empire forbade 
the insistence on printing in any special place as the con-
dition of copyright.2 The agreement was ludicrously unfair, 
as the American copyright conceded was essentially depen-
dent on printing in the United States, while the United 
States author had merely to publish his book in the United 
Kingdom, which meant putting a few copies on sale there, 
and by that act he attained a copyright co-extensive with 
the British Empire. The result to Canada was obvious : 
the printers saw that the author of a Canadian book found 
it more convenient and preferable in ·every way to set up 
the type in the United States and then to publish the work 
in the United Kingdom, by which he obtained copyright 
for his book in Canada. The author of a work in the United 
Kingdom similarly, when he desired United States copy-
right, had the type set up there, and then, by pllblishing 
in the United Kingdom, obtained copyright in the Dominion. 
The matter was made more annoying by the action of British 
publishers, for they used regularly, even when a book was 
printed both in the United Kingdom and in the United States, 
to sell the Canadian market to the American publisher 
instead of supplying it with the English edition. 
The resentment felt by Canada took its shape in 1889 in 
1 Parl. Pap., C. 4606, 4856, 4910, and 5167. 
2 Parl. Pap., C. 2870 and 6425. 
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the form of the enactment of a measure which would have 
refused copyright save on terms of printing in the Dominion, 
and the request for the release of Canada from the terms 
of the Berne Convention, on the ground that Canada had 
been repeatedly assured that her continuance in any treaty 
arrangements of this kind would be subject to her own 
desire to withdraw at any time, on giving the prescribed . 
notice. On this point the Canadian Government was in an 
unassailable position : to refuse to arrange withdrawal was 
a clear breach of the understanding on which the adherence 
in such a case was given. But the desire to withdraw was 
obviously merely connected with the desire to secure the 
abrogation of the rule that publication in the United King-
dom gave copyright in Canada, and this desire the I~perial 
Government were determined not to concede, for the simple 
reason that they were persuaded by the publishers that the 
result would be the loss of even the limited American copy-
right, a fear probably reasonable enough in itself. The ' 
royal assent was th-erefore refused to the Canadian .4;\ct, 
which still remained a dead letter on the Canadian statute 
book. This was not naturally acceptable to Canada, and 
Sir John Thompson in 1891 and again in 1894, on his last 
visit to the United Kingdom, urged most strongly the 
unfairness of the position.1 His excursion into constitu-
tional law, in which he argued that the British North 
America Act gave Canada the power to repeal Imperial Acts 
passed before 1867, was supported by invalid instances, and 
was probably a mere tour de force ; but his constitutional 
claim could not possibly have been resisted for a moment 
if seriously examined. To insist that Canada should con-
form . her copyright legislation to that of the United King-
dom merely to please the publishers in the latter was con-
stitutionally a monstrous doctrine, nor can it be wondered 
that the minister described the state of the law as odious 
and unjust. It is possible that the energy of his represen-
tations would have had effect in the long run, but his death 
at Balmoral terminated for a time the movement : the 
1 Parl. Pap., C. 7783. 
240 IMPERIAL UNITY AND THE DOMINIONS 
politics of the Dominion fell into less effective hands, and 
by the time the Government had come into the control of 
Sir Charles Tupper the troubles of the Ministry over the 
question of the Manitoba schools had become so pressing 
as to allovv all else to disappear. The matter would pre-
sumably have again raised its head, when the establishment 
of Liberal government in Canada left the way clear for 
further action, but by that time the British publishers and 
authors, realizing the danger of their position, had taken 
the necessary steps to place themselves on terms with the 
Canadian publishers, who, satisfied with the new position, 
and not interested in the mere question of printing in itself, 
ceased to press the question on the attention of the Dominion 
Government, nor does it appear that the matter would have 
been raised again by the Dominion if circumstances occur-
ring elsewhere had not called the matter into prominence. 
These circumstances were in the main the growing desire 
· of the publishers and authors of the United Kingdom to 
secure better terms of copyright : with this object several 
pilgrimages were made to Canada in the hope of winning 
approval there for new legislation which would be applicable 
to the Dominion, but without much result ; and it was not 
until the conclusion of the new Berlin Convention in 1908 
that further legislation became necessary, and the Govern-
ment were faced with the need of examining the problem 
afresh. A little consideration showed that there was no 
possibility of maintaining the old status of things, that the 
Government of Canada were in a completely conclusive 
case, and that there must be -a reconsideration of the whole 
affair. The reconsideration took the form of a Conference 
held in London in 1910,1 being the first subsidiary Conference 
held under the scheme of Imperial Conferences arranged in 
1907, and it was agreed that in a11y further copyright legis-
lation the Dominions must be left unfettered to do what 
they thought fit, though the general feeling of the Conference 
was in favour of the acceptance of the Berlin Convention, 
subject to the making of such provision as would prevent 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 5272. 
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the possibility of an American author obtaining copyright 
in Canada by mere publication in a Union country. 
In the Imperial Copyright Act, 1911, accordingly, the 
application of the Act was declared not to include the self-
governing Dominions unless the Act were declared to be 
in force therein either as it stood or with such modifications 
as related to procedure and remedies and other adaptations 
to fit the Act to the circumstances of the Dominion. But 
even if this were not done, if the legislation of the Dominion 
were certified by the Secretary of State to be such as to confer 
on works whose authors were British subjects resident else-
where than in the Dominion or, not being British subjects, 
resident in those parts of the British possessions to which 
the Act extended, the Dominion was to be treated for the 
time while this state of affairs lasted as being a Dominion 
to which the Act extended for the purpose of the rights 
conferred by the Act. It was further provided that a 
Dominion legislature could repeal any of the Imperial copy-
. right legislation, including · the Act of 1911 itself, while, until 
the legislature did do, there would be left in operation the 
~cts previously in force. If the Act did not extend to any 
Dominion, the King was empowered by Order in Council to 
grant to works first published in that Domi11ion and to 
authors who were resident therein at the time of the malring 
of their works, the protection of the Act on such conditions 
as seemed proper, if the Dominion gave adequate protection 
to the works, published or unpublished, of authors who were 
resident being British subjects in some place other than the 
Dominion at the time of the making of the work. Such an 
Order in Council was not, however, to apply to any self-
governing Dominion to which the Act might extend, but 
the Governor in Council of the Dominion was authorized to 
extend the like rights within the Dominion. It was further 
provided that any legislature of a British possession might 
modify or add to the Act, but save where the additions or 
modifications related to procedure or remedies, the changes 
must apply only to authors resident in the possession at 
1874 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 6863, pp. 130-3. 
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the time of mal{ing the work .and to works first published in 
the possession. In the case of Part II of the Act authorizing 
the grant of foreign copyright on certain conditions, the 
same power of granting the right was conferred on the 
Governor in Council of any Dominion to which t he Act 
extended. 
This mass of legislation \vas clearly confused in the 
extreme, and the only mode in which it could have been 
rendered reasonably simple would have been the immediate 
adoption of the Act with necessary changes as to procedure 
by the legislatures of the several Dominions. But here, as 
usual, there was considerable d{!lay and divergence of pro-
cedure. Australia finally, in 1912, legislated by Act No. 20, 
which, while adopting the Imperial Act, provides in a satis-
factory way for the necessary local changes : it must, how-
ever, be noted that the provision for the establishment of 
a system of voluntary registration, with special advantages 
in the way of procedure to those whose works are registered, 
seems hardly to be consistent with the principle of the Berlin 
Convention, to which accession has been expressed in respect 
of the Commonwealth. Newfoundland legislated in the 
same year (c. 5), but the Act is defective, inasmuch as it 
makes no provision" at all for the necessary modification of 
the measure to meet local circumstances. In 1913 New 
Zealand legislated, but in this case the Act was not expressed 
to extend the Imperial Act to New Zealand, but legislation 
was passed based on the same principle as the Imperial Act, 
though there were slight omissions in it, of no great import-
ance. In respect of these Dominions also has adherence 
been expressed to the Convention. . 
By a curious irony of fate Canada, which was for years 
so eager to get rid of Imperial control, has sunk into indiffer-
ence, or comparative indifference to the issue, and no legis-
· lation has yet been pas~ed to repeal the Imperial Acts which 
fettered her right of action. Indeed, it has become necessary 
to issue an Order in Council in the case of both Canada and 
the Union to protect the works of authors there, since it is 
clear that in the absence of such orders these works could 
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obtain no protection from the Imperial Act ; while, on the 
other hand, there is accorded, it would appear; protection 
to works produced in the United Kingdom in so far as that 
the old Imperial Acts are still in force therein. 
Moreover, the wishes of Canada, as expressed at the 
Conference of 1910, have been carried into effect by the 
negotiation of an additional protocol to the Convention of 
November 13, 1908. This document,! signed at Berne on 
March 20, 1914, by all the powers signatory to the Con-
vention of 1908, and ratified by the King on July 18, pro-
vides that, where any country outside the Union fails to 
protect in an adequate manner the works of authors who 
are subject to the jurisdiction of one of the contractin_g 
countries, nothing in the convention of 1908 shall affect 
the right of such contracting country to restrict the pro-
tection given to the works of authors who are at the date 
of the first publication thereof subjects or citizens of the 
non-union country in question, and who are not effectively 
domiciled in one of the countries of the Union. The right 
accorded by the protocol to contracting States belongs 
equally to any of their oversea possessions. No restriction, 
however, introduced in virtue of the protocol shall affect 
the rights which an author may have acquired in respect 
of a work published in a country of the Union before the 
application of such restriction. Notice of the restrictions 
imposed shall be given to the Government of the Swiss 
Confederation by the States which restrict the grant o.f copy-
right in accordance with the protocol, and the declarations 
shall be communicated to the States of the Union by the 
Swiss Confederation. The protocol is to take effect one 
month after the deposition of the ratifications which were 
to take place not later than one year from the date of 
signature. 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 7613 • 
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CHAPTER XII 
NATURALIZATION AND NATIONALITY 
N OTIDNG seems more characteristic of the sovereign 
character of the Imperial Parliament than its power to 
legislate regarding nationality, but the view that the grant 
of legislative authority to a colony carried with it the right 
. 
to confer upon that person the status of a British subject, 
was quite early developed, and it received its full approval 
in the Imperial Naturalization Act, 1870, re-enacting an 
Act of 1847, in which the validity of the naturalization of 
aliens within the limits of the British possessions under 
enactments of these possessions was recognized. The Act, 
however, in doing this merely confirmed what has been the 
accepted view : that the local legislature had power to 
confer the status of a British subject, but only within the 
limits of the Colony. Indeed, the principle was carried many 
years after a good deal further, for, by Order in Council, 
provision was made for the naturalization of aliens in the 
Protectorate of Southern·Rhodesia, though this was obviously 
a somewhat strong step to take in respect of territory, the 
~ssential feature of which is that it is not British.1 On the 
other hand, the grant of naturalization in the United ''King-
dom was held to confer the status of a British subject 
throughout the whole of the Empire, though this position 
was long doubtful, and though the contrary view was held 
to be supported by the language of the statute itself. The 
question was never authoritatively decided in the self-
governing Dominions : parts of their legislation seemed to 
suggest that a person naturalized in the United Kingdom 
might not be a British subject in the British oversea posses-
sions, but other parts suggested . the opposite conclusion, 
1 Cf. R. v. Crewe, ex parte Sekgome, [1910] 2 K.B. 576. 
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and it is most probable that the general impression was 
that such a person was a British subject for all purposes.1 
The position of the person naturalized in a British posses-
sion had very obvious disadvantages, partly of sentiment 
and partly of substance. In the Dominion of Canada, for -
instance, it was easy for any immigrants from the United 
States to become naturalized as citizens of Canada, but this 
fact did not convert them outside Canada into British 
subjects ; and though they might become loyal Canadians, 
excellent judges like Sir Wilfrid Laurier could feel doubt 
whether they were equally sure to become excellent British 
subjects. From the practical point of view the difficulty 
has no doubt been exaggerated from time to time. The 
grant of naturalization in the United Kingdom is not 
sufficient to enable the United Kingdom to protect a 
foreigner naturalized therein unless he has under the law 
of his place of origin ceased to be a subject of that State, 
and the foreigner who had naturalized himself in Canada 
was therefore in theoretically just the same position with 
regard to British protection as was the man naturalized in 
the British Islands. It is, however, true that this similarity 
of position was often misunderstood,2 and British diplomatic 
officers have been sharply criticized in Dominion Parlia-
ments for not protecting persons naturalized in the Domi-
nions, ori the ground that they were so naturalized, when, 
as a matter of fact, the case of the persons concerned was 
precisely similar to that of a person naturalized in the 
United Kingdom. There was, indeed, a formal difference 
in the case of the passport issued to naturalized persons in 
the oversea Dominions and the ordinary form of passport, 
which made it appear that the naturalized person was only 
entitled to the assistance of the British representatives 
1 So asserted by Lord Emmott in House of Lords March 17, 1914, and 
Mr. Harcourt in House of Commons, May 13, 1914. The opposite opinion 
has often been expressed in England and Canada, e. g. House of Commons 
Debates, Jan. 29, 1913. 
2 In practice also in France; at least some difference of treatment seems 
to have been accorded as regards liability to military service. 
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abroad as a matter of courtesy. The words were perhaps 
inserted on the ground that in a foreign country a person 
naturalized in a Dominion was without any nationality, or 
at least, without any British nationality, and the British 
Government could not as of right afford him good offices ; 
but whatever the origin of the words, the practice was pre-
cisely the same in every case : the assistance of the repre-
sentatives of the Crown abroad was as fully accorded as it 
was to natural-born British subjects. 
So far, therefore, as executive action mattered, the posi-
tion of the person naturalized in a British colony was 
assimilated to that of a person whose British nationality 
prevailed throughout the Empire. But there were certain 
provisions of law which could not be evaded in whole by 
the action of the executive. It was not possible to confer 
a peerage or a privy councillorship on an· alien, and a person 
naturalized in a Dominion was in the United Kingdom an 
alien, though he might have held ministerial office in the 
Dominion in which he was naturalized.1 Moreover, such 
a person was not qualified for the parliamentary or the 
municipal franchise in the United Kingdom, nor, until 
special permission was given in the Merchant Shipping Act, 
could he own a British ship. A will made by him did not 
fall under the benefit of Lord Kingsdown's Act, and he was 
not a British subject in the meaning of the .Foreign Juris-
diction Act, 1890, and the Orders in Council issued under it, 
though he might be treated as a British protected person 
in some cases. Thus criminal jurisdiction exercised over 
him by virtue of the Act would have been, strictly speaking, 
unlawful. On the other hand, he would not be entitled in 
a country like China, if not ranked as British subject, to 
the protection of the extra-territorial jurisdiction of the 
Crown. He would not fall within the penal clauses of Acts 
punishing British subjects for such acts as murder and 
bigamy committed -outside the British Dominions, nor be 
liable to the penalties imposed by the Official Secrets Act, 
1 e. g. Sir G. Perley, Honorary Minister in the Canadian Government, 
one of the first to be naturalized imperially under the Act of 1914. 
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1911, on British subjects for offences against that Act, 
wherever committed. 
It was natural that with a growing sense of nationhood there 
should arise a growing sense that there should be one com-
mon naturalization for the whole Empire. The naturaliza-
tion law was considered in great detail by a Committee · 
in 1901,1 and many of its defects were rendered obvious. 
A distinct movement towards final agreement with :regard 
to the matter was made at the Colonial Conference of 1907,2 
when the question was dealt with in some detail, and the 
outlines of the proposed new legislation considered. It was 
realized on all sides that the fundamental root of the diffi-
culty was the absolute separation of the two kinds of 
naturalization : the British naturalization could only be 
obtained either by service under the Crown or by residence 
in the United Kingdom, -while the Dominion naturalization 
was restricted to cases where the residence had taken place 
in the Dominion. No length of mere residence in a Dominion, 
despite naturalization there, as the law stood would be of 
the slightest aid to a man in becoming naturalized in the 
United Kingdom, but, like any newly-arrived alien he 
would have to reside for five years and declare his intention 
to continue to reside or to serve abroad under the Crown. 
The obvious mode of dealing with the question at issue 
would have been that suggested by Sir Wilfrid Laurier to 
declare that every person naturalized in any Dominion 
should have the status of a British subject throughout the 
whole Empire; but in 1911 the Imperial Government was 
not ready to take this course. There were considerable 
difficulties in the way, especially as regards the period of 
residence which was required to elapse before naturalization 
could be accorded. The United Kingdom period of five 
years was equalled nowhere in the Dominions : New 
Zealand prescribed no fixed time ; Australia, where by 
Act No. 11 of 1903 a uniform Commonwealth naturalization 
was prescribed, two years ; this period was adopted by the 
Union of South Africa when laying down a universal South 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 723. 2 Parl. Pap., Cd. 3523 and 3524, pp. 94-9, 
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African naturalization, and Canada alone demanded three 
years. Nor in all cases was it certain that Dominion naturali-
zation was not to some extent abused in the desire to obtain 
passports. There were certainly a certain number of aliens 
who became naturalized in Canada, on the strength of resi-
dence and of declaration of intent to reside in the Domir1ion, 
who shortly after started for travels which seemed to indi-
cate an intention of a very distant return to Canada. 
Another con~ideration, not without importance in some 
aspects, was the fact that, for example in the case of Aus-
tralia 1 in the grant of naturalization, a discrimination was 
made between Europeans who were eligible and non-
Europeans who could not be naturalized, and it was held 
that recognition by an Imperial Act of these differences of 
treatment might be deemed to be equivalent to introducing 
into Imperial legislation the hateful principle of a colour 
bar. Nor again could it be doubted that many of the 
persons who obtained Colonial naturalization appeared to 
have done so without adequate consideration by the local 
authorities of the probability of their becoming good citizens. 
Not a few of them, at any rate, were disgracefully illiterate, 
and in many ways undesirable. 
The Imperial Conference 2 accordingly agreed on a com-
promise, under which, while local naturalization was to go 
on as before at the unfettered discretion of each Dominion 
Parliament, there should be created a new entity, Imperial 
naturalization, which would have the effect of conferring 
British nationality throughout the Empire and, so far as 
international law permitted, throughout the world. The 
period of five years would be retained as the condition for 
this nationality, but residence in any part of the Empire 
should count in this period, while the decision whether any 
individual deserved the grant should be entrusted to the 
Government of that portion of the Empire in which he had 
spent the last twelve months before the grant. Further, 
1 Act No. 11 of 1903; so Natal Act No. 18 of 1905, superseded by Union 
Act No. 4 of 1910. 
2 Parl. Pap., Cd. 57 45, pp. 249-71. 
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in order to meet the susceptibilities of the Dominions, the 
Act should not legislate for them, but should be framed so 
as to allow them to make it effective within their boundaries 
by their own legislation. Finally, it was agreed that it 
should be made clear that the mere question of nationality 
as dealt with in the Act should not affect the validity of any 
Dominion legislation dealing with immigration or differen-
tiating against different classes of British subjects. This 
last proposal was due to the widespread fear that in some 
way the grant of Imperial nationality would give an 
imm-qnity from all laws affecting immigration or imposing 
disabilities in naturalized persons, and so forth, quite 
a number of Australian State Acts 1 differentiating for pur-
poses of political rights between persons natural born and 
naturalized. 
The resolution of the Conference ·was only tardily carried 
into effect, a result due to the change of government in 
Canada and the somewhat long time taken by the Canadian 
Government to make up its mind on the question at issue. 
The objections of Canada were based, as might be expected, 
on constitutional grounds : 2 the Government were most 
anxious not in any way to seem to interfere with the power 
of Canada to prescribe its own conditions of nationality or 
to determine what was the position in Canada of persons 
having Imperial nationality. Finally, agreement was 
reached, and the Imperial British Nationality and Status of 
Aliens Act, 1914,3 deals with the question on the agreed 
basis. It provides for the grant by the Secretary of State 
of a certificate of naturalization to any alien on proof of five 
years' residence in the British Dominions in the eight years 
preceding his application and one year's immediately pre-
ceding residence in the United Kingdom, or, in lieu, five 
years' service under the Crown. An applicant must be of 
good character and have an adequate knowledge of the 
English language, and must intend either to reside in the 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 57 46, pp. 248, 249. 
2 Cf. Canada House of Commons Debates, Jan. 29, 1913. 
a 4 and 5 Geo. V, c. 17. 
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British dominions or to serve under the Crown. In the case 
of a woman whose alienage is due to marriage, and whose 
hUsband is dead or is divorced from her, the period of resi-
dence may be dispensed with, and in any special case the 
rule regarding the limitation of eight years may be relaxed. 
A person thus naturalized is given all the privileges of 
a natural-born British subject, the few restrictions on the 
rights of naturalized aliens preServed by the Act of Settle-
ment 1 being abolished. The name of a minor child may 
be included in the certificate granted to an alien, but such 
a child may renounce British nationality within a year of 
attaining full age, and in any case the Secretary of State 
may grant a certificate to a minor if he sees fit. Any 
certificate issued rna y be revoked if granted on false 
representations or fraud. 
The powers of the Secretary of State to grant a certificate 
may be e:xercised by the Government of any British posses-
sion on the same terms mutatis mutandis, and with the 
addition that, where another language is recognized as being 
on the same official footing as English, that language may 
be accepted as an alternative to English, as is the case wit.h 
French in Quebec, and Dutch in the Union of South Africa. 
Any certificate so granted shall have the same effect as one 
granted by the Secretary of State. But the legislative 
authority of the Dominions is preserved by the enactment 
that this part of the Act and any certificate of naturaliza-
tion granted under it shall not have effect within any of 
the Dominions enjoying self -government unless it is adopted 
by the Dominion legislature. Such adoption may be 
rescinded by the legislature, but without prejudice to legal 
rights existing at the time of rescission, and in adopting 
the Act the legislature may make provision as to how the 
powers of the Government are to be e:xercised. 
The Act further lays down and this generally and with-
out reference to legislation by the Dominion rules for the 
nationality of British subjects. A natural-born 1 British 
subject includes any person born within His Majesty's 
1 For· the old law cf. Edwards, J ourn. Soc. Oomp. Leg. xiii. 314-26. 
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dominions and allegiance, thus excluding the child of a 
foreign ambassador who owes no allegiance; any person 
born out of His Majesty's dominions whose father was 
a British subject at the time of his birth and either was born 
within His Majesty's allegiance, or was a person to whom 
a certificate of naturalization was granted ; and any person 
born on board a British ship, whether in foreign territorial 
waters or not. It is expressly provided that . the child of 
a British subject, whether born before or after the passing 
of the Act, is to be deemed to have been born within the 
allegiance if born in a place where the Crown exercises 
extra-territorial jurisdiction, and that a person born on 
a foreign ship in British territorial wa-ters shall not by that 
mere fact acquire British nationality. These two .provisions 
are new : ·the first covers the case of children of British 
subjects in protectorates and in places like Turkey, where 
there is a resident British community of old standing. More-
over, the new provisions replace the rules of the Acts of 
1730 and 1772 1 regarding the nationality of the children and 
grandchildren of British subjects born abroad. British 
nationality may be lost by_ being naturalized by any volun-
tary act outside the British dominions, and in the case of 
any person who has by birth two nationalities by a declara-
tion of alienage made within a year of attaining majority. 
The national status of women who marry ·follows that of 
their husbands ; but, if he changes his nationality in his life, 
the wife may by declaration retain her British nationality, 
and neither death nor dissolution of marriage shall per se 
affect nationality. Where British nationality is lost, it shall 
also be lost by minor children unless they would thus lose 
all nationality, but on reaching full age they may recover 
it by a declaration, and a widow's remarriage to an alien 
shall not alter the nationality of any children of the first 
marriage. These provisions are in part new, and in part 
far more precise and less open to doubt than the old pro-
visions of law. 
The status of aliens is regulated by the giving of all rights 
1 4 Geo. 2, c. 21 and 13 Geo. 3, c. 21 • 
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in regard to real and personal property, but this is qualified 
by the express provision that an alien shall not thus be 
qualified to hold real property outside the United Kingdom, 
not to own a British ship, nor to have any rights save such 
as are expressly conferred on him. His mode of trial is to 
be the same as that of a British subject, a provision of law 
which need hardly have been retained as binding the whole 
Empire. On the other hand, the penalty for false repre-
sentations is made to apply to the United Kingdom only. 
The general powers of the Dominion Parliaments are pre-
served by the express provision that nothing in the Act 
shall take away or abridge any power vested in or exercis-
able by the legislature or government of any British posses-
sion, or affect the operation of any law at present in force, 
or prevent any such legislature or government from treating 
differently different cases of British subjects. Local naturali-
zation is expressly authorized, as in the Act of 1870, and to 
remove doubt as to the validity of State legislation dealing 
with the rights of aliens and naturalized persons, it is pro-
vided that the power of the legislatures of British possessions 
shall apply to both the central and local legislatures where 
there are several, but subject to the proviso that no law 
regarding naturalization made by a local legislature shall 
be valid if the central legislature alone has authority to 
legislate in regard to naturalization. 
The Act is of great importance for many reasons. It was 
passed with the full assent of the Dominion Parliaments 
and Governments, and it is expressed in large measure 
in terms which show that it applies without adoption by 
the Dominion Parliaments to the whole Empire. Indeed, it 
is a little difficult to see why the special case of naturaliza-
tion should have been selected for Imperial legislation only 
to have effect with Dominion concurrence, were it not 
for the fact that British nationality generally had not 
been the subject of any Dominion legislation, and, as a 
Dominion is a dependency, it may be that no legislature in 
a Dominion would have been able to legislate so as to deprive 
a natural-born British subject of his nationality, though it 
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might deprive him of all civil rights of every kind. As it is, 
the law is now fixed by a measure which no Dominion legis-
lature can in any way affect, as the saving of the powers of 
Dominion legislatures and governments in s. 26 cannot be 
construed as giving them any power to repeal express pro-
visions of the Act, which thus fixes immutably the position 
of natural-born .subjects, the status of wives and widows, 
and of children, the right of alienage and so forth. The one 
point of some doubt is the constitutionality of the provisions 
giving an alien a right to own personal property in the 
Dominions, and forbidding any other mode of trial than is 
practised for a British subject ; in the Act of 1870 by a 
heading these sections were applied only to the United 
Kingdom ; they seem not to be alterable now by a Dominion 
Parliament, and thus are placed beyond the control of the 
Dominions. As a matter of fact, it cannot be said that the 
law is already complied with in the Dominions, where it is by 
no means universally the rule that all personal property 
may be taken, acquired, held, and disposed of by an alien 
in the same manner in all respects as by a natural-born British 
subject, and it would seem that in the case of the Dominions 
it was not thought that the provisions to this effect in the 
Naturalization Act of 1870 were applicable ipso facto to the 
Dominions. Thus these provisions are not given as applic-
able to Queensland in the revised edition of the Statutes, and 
they were enacted in Tasmania as a new Act as No. 12 of 
1913, and have also been enacted elsewhere. It is just possi-
ble that the power to alter these provisions may be supposed 
to be saved by the terms of s. 26, but that appears very 
doubtful. 
While British nationality is in one sense indivisible, there is 
an inevitable tendency to make a distinction between British 
subjects in regard to their connexion with the United King-
dom or a Dominion. The term British is often applied in the 
Dominions to a native of the United Kingdom, and the terms 
Canadian, Australian, New Zealander, South African, and 
Newfoundlander, are regularly applied to the classes of 
British subjects born in these Dominions, or identified with 
• 
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them by residence. In Australia there is a strong Aus·h·alian 
Native movement, which consists not of aborigines, as might 
fondly be supposed, and as newly imported Governors are 
most unjustly credited in the popular mind with a desire 
to believe, but persons who being Australians were also born 
there. The use is significant, as it proves that there is felt 
to be need of a term to distinguish between the Australians 
by adoption and those by birth. 
Nor is this practical distinction of everyday life without 
a result in law. In the case of the Commonwealth the power 
of the Parliament is confined to immigration, and, by reason 
of the division of powers between the States and the Common-
wealth, it is not open for the Commonwealth Parliament to 
make of immigration a term of vague meaning sufficient to 
cover any person entering a State of the Commonwealth. 
It has definitely and very properly, it would seem, been held 
by the High Court of the Commonwealth that a man cannot 
be an immigrant if he is a native of Australia, so that while 
an Australian law can shut out from entry an ordinary British 
subject it cannot shut out an Australian British subject, and 
this connexion would of course include any person do1piciled 
in Australia, for such a person cannot be held to be an im-
migrant by any effort of the imagination.1 Similarly by the 
Immigration Act of Canada (c. 27 of 1910),2 it is expressly 
provided that any person who has Canadian domicile or is 
a Canadian citizen shall have an absolute right of entry into 
Canada, and a Canadian citizen is defined as a person born 
in Canada, who has not become an alien, a British subject 
. who has Canadian domicile or a person naturalized under 
I 
the laws of Canada who has not become an alien or lost 
Canadian domicile, while Canadian domicile is acquired by a 
person having his domicile for at least three years in Canada. 
These provisions are of course in part very artificial, for that 
three years' domicile should be necessary to confer Canadian 
1 Cf. Ohia Gee v. Martin, 3 C.L.R. 649; Ah Skeung v. Lindberg, [1906] 
V.L.R. 323; 4 C.L.R. 949 ; Ah Yin v. Christie, 4 C.L.R. 1428; Potter v. 
Minahan, 7 C.L.R. 277. 
2 Also c. 12 of 1911 . 
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domicile for the purposes of the Act is at first sight wholly 
anomalous, the rule of domicile being merely change of abode 
to Canada with permanent intention of residence, but the 
anomaly is explained by the fact that the Act permits the 
removal from Canada within a period of three years of any 
immigrant who proves unable to support himself, so that had 
the right to enter Canada been given to any domiciled person 
the Government would have been under the necessity of 
allowing the entrance into Canada of persons whom it had 
just expelled. It may be adde? that the reason why, unlike 
the Commonwealth Parliament, the Parliament of the 
Dominion has power to define as it pleases the nature of 
immigration is because, unlike the Commonwealth, the 
Dominion has plenary powers of legislation on all matters 
save the excepted powers of the provinces, and in particular 
has plenary power of legislation regarding immigration, though . 
a power in legislation in this connexion is also bestowed 
on the provinces. In the other parts of the Empire also the 
principle that the immigration laws should not be allowed 
to exclude a native of the Dominion in question has been 
borne in mind : it is recognized by the Immigration Act, 
1913, of the Union of South Africa, and also in practice by 
the Government of New Zealand, and the general fairness 
of the principle has been expressly observed by the High 
Court of the Commonwealth of Australia. Nor indeed is the 
matter open to reasonable dispute. 
From the unity of British nationality certain advantages 
are derived by the inhabitants of the oversea Dominions, 
such as the protection of the British power in the other States 
of the world, the free right of entry into the United Kingdom, 
and full political rights in that country. They also derive 
a somewhat remarkable advantage which has perhaps not 
always been realized. In the modern treaties of commerce and 
navigation no less than in older documents it is the custom 
to make express stipulations for personal rights of various 
kinds. Thus, to take a modern case, the treaty with Japan 
of 1911 assures to those entitled to its benefits the same 
rights as native citizens as regards entry and residence, and 
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the carrying on of commerce, manufacture,, and trade, most 
favoured nation treatment in the matter of the pursuit of 
industries, professions, and trade, permission to own and 
hire premises and warehouses, and to lease lands, to have 
full access to the law courts on the same conditions as native 
subjects, and to enjoy exemption from military service, 
forced loans, and military requisitions, except such as are im.-
posed on native owners of immovable property. The estates 
of deceased nationals may be administered by consular 
officers and so forth. These personal privileges as opposed 
• 
to such privileges as are directly connected with goods such 
as the duties to be levied on goods on entry are held to accrue 
to every British subject, wherever he may have been born 
or be domiciled, even although the Dominion in which he was 
born or is domiciled may not have been brought under the 
operation of the treaty at all, as, in the case of the Japanese 
treaty, is the position as regards Australia, New Zealand, 
and the Union of South Africa. 
There seems at first a very curious anomaly in this position, 
for reciprocity would seem to demand that if an Australian 
has a treaty right to settle in Japan, and if on the score of 
his nationality he has a treaty right to have protection for 
his industrial property in Japan under the Industrial Pro-
perty Convention, apart from the fact whether that Conven-
tion is applicable to Australia or not, Japanese subjects 
should have in Australia the same rights. The answer to this 
argument must be based on the fact that the treaties do 
not contemplate any distinction between British subjects 
because of their connexion with a Dominion: they merely 
deal with questions of goods on a geographical basis, 
and, unlike merchandise, a British subject cannot be expected 
to have a geographical mark of origin. Moreover, it may be 
urged, in practice it would be in the extreme difficult to devise 
any system by which a distinction could be made between 
classes of British subjects. That of birth is irrelevant for 
the purpose : if a child is born in England but is taken at an 
early age to Australia, what better right should it have to 
entry into Japan than a child born in Australia? The more 
' 
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obvious test of domicile would be impossible to work as the 
domicile of merchants, and more so that of other persons is 
difficult to decide. If a man has houses of business both in 
England and in Australia, is his domicile to be decided by the 
relative importance of these houses or by his domicile as an 
individual? Moreover, in any case domicile is a matter 
affording grave room for doubt in any particular case. 
Strong as these arguments doubtless are, it is impossible 
to assume that they can remain permanently satisfactory to 
foreign governments, if they deem the refusal of personal 
rights to natives or persons domiciled in oversea Dominions, 
which stand aloof from British treaties, a matter which is 
worth while carrying out. While domicile is doubtless not 
a very easy criterion, it is after all a criterion which has to 
be constantly applied in the common business of life, and it is 
perfectly clear that it could be adopted as a criterion if desired 
by a foreign government. Any theoretic difficulties of this 
sort can be solved in practice with very little trouble to 
the government concerned, even if individuals suffer incon-
venience.· Moreover, it must be remembered that firms and 
partnerships have often a very definite local habitat, 
especially if they are formed as companies or partnerships 
under the law of any Dominion, a fact which at once gives 
them a local habitat which they cannot deny. It is, of course, 
possible to argue that the question is one of no great impor-. 
tance for any foreign country, and that various means of 
evasion might be invented, but none of these considerations 
would avail to prevent the removal of the present anomaly 
if any foreign country objected to the one-sided arrangement 
now in force. It is in this connexion not unimportant that 
the recent treaty with Switzerland, carried out in accor-
dance with the wishes of the Dominions at the last Imperial 
Conference, does not permit the retirement of the Dominions 
from all the treaty of 1855 regulating relations with the 
Empire, but only from the purely commercial clauses. 
While the advantages flowing from British nationality 
to inhabitants of the Dominions are very considerable, it 
can hardly be said that British nationality in itself confers 
1874 R 
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upon any British subject in the Dominions any special 
rights. The express provisions of the British Nationality 
and Status of Aliens Act, 1914, allow any Dominion or State 
or Provincial Legislature and Government to exercise any 
rights they choose in the differential treatment of British 
subjects, and, unless the wording of the Act is strained, seems 
even to confer on all aliens a right as to personal property 
·which is not conferred on all British subjects. In point of 
fact, moreover, it is impossible to deny that the Dominions 
treat various classes of aliens better than they do British 
subjects. The European alien is, in Canada and Australasia 
and in South Africa, treated mt1ch better than coloured 
British subjects, the latter country showing a tenderness 
towards the speaker of Yiddish which is peculiarly pathetic. 
It is true that the Privy Council have laid it down that an 
alien has no right enforceable by law to enter a British 
Dominion, but the right of the coloured British immigrant 
is in all the Dominions, save Newfoundland, where ·he does 
not want to go, as nugatory as that of the alien, and in point 
of fact the alien is admitted in many cases freely where the 
British Indian is rejected. Even the alien Japanese has 
a distinct preference de facto over the Indian in Canada, 
though it must be noted that this preference is due to the 
inability of the Government of India to adopt the same rules 
of restricting emigration from that country as the Japanese 
Government finds it possible to do in the case of the emigra-
tion of her subjects. Nor in any cases is it obvious that the 
immigrants welcomed by the Dominions are really superior 
to those whom on colour grounds they reject : the Galicians 
of Canada are aliens in speech, in race, in religion, in social 
customs, and in habits, and their competition with Canadian 
labour is at least as disadvantageous as that of coloured 
British subjects. The Yiddish-speaking immigrants in South 
Africa do no credit to the name of European or the alleged 
European languages which they speak ; years of South 
African residence and natul"alization under the la 'vs of South 
Africa not rarely leaves them devoid of a word of intelligible 
English. The conclusion from these facts is not of course 
• 
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that the Dominions should endanger their racial composition. 
or that they should attempt to mingle European and Asiatic 
in one community, but that, .possessing as they do the prin-
ciple of racial purity, they should be more particular in 
choosing the class of European immigrant who is likely to 
be a real element of value in the future, and should avoid the 
absurdity of rejecting British Indians, and in some cases 
European British workers, in favour of persons of inferior 
race, mainly becat1se they are able to provide for a time cheap 
sweated labour for the rapid development of industry. In 
this regard Canada has been the worst offender, with South 
Africa a good second. The self-respect of Australia has of late 
years done much to preserve a higher standard of immigra-
tion, though the special favour there shown, and indeed 
generally displayed, to German immigrants, because of the 
many excellent industrial and agricultural qualities, has by 
no means always received its due reward in the European 
War. In Canada, indeed, there is cumulative evidence of 
open disloyalty among the German communities 1 in the 
western provinces, and some efforts have been made .to 
promote in the Dominion the same anti-British propaganda 
which have marked the progress of the War in the United 
States. 
It is doubtless disappointing to realize that there is nothing 
that British nationality can be said to carry with it as an 
advantage in the oversea Dominions of the Crown : the pro-
tection of the Imperial ·Government for a British subject is 
far more effective in foreign countries than it is in the oversea 
Dominions, as was justly pointed out on several occasions by 
sympathizers vvith the British Indians in the long controversy 
over the rights of such Indians in the Transvaal.2 It is due 
to this realization of the little value which attaches in these 
Dominions to the status of a British subject that feeling 
in India has turned somewhat strongly against the self-
governing Dominions, and it is therefore matter for sincere 
1 Certain German organs of opinion in the West have systematically 
extolled German and ignored British successes. 
2 e. g. Lord Ampthill, House of Lords Debates, July 26, 1910. 
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congratulation that the service of British Indians side by side 
with the forces of the Dominions in the European War have 
enabled the people of these Dominions to realize that there 
is another side to the people whom they know only in their 
own countries as undesirable immigrants, whom they seek 
to deprive of every privilege . 
• 
CHAPTER XIII 
TRADE AND COMMERCIAL TREATIES 
THE development of self-government in the Dominions 
was greatly promoted -by the fact that, at the time when cir-
cumstances rendered its concession on political grounds 
desirable in the interest of the internal order of the colony 
of Canada, events in the United Kingdom were leading to 
the introduction of principles of economy which fqrbade the 
further preservation of the rule of controlling the trade of the 
colonies, and counselled leaving that trade to be managed by 
the Parliaments of the newly established responsible govern-
ments. Naturally it was hoped, in the middle of the nine-
teenth century, that epoch of confidence in the automatic 
working of economic maxims, that the new countries would 
realize to the full the merits of the system of free trade, and 
that they would 11ot dream of imposing upon themselves the 
fetters of protection. As a matter of fact the new countries 
in some cases tried free trade, and then decided to fall back 
on protection, and as early as 1859 the doctrine was expressly_ 
asserted by Canada, and accepted by the mother country, 
that the fiscal policy of a colony enjoying responsible govern-
ment was a matter for its own discretion. At the same time 
the rule was still maintained that no discriminating duties 
were to be imposed on imports, and the constitutional action 
of New Zealand, and of the Australian colonies, were ex-
, 
pressly fettered with this restriction on their powers of 
independent action.1 This position was by no means alto-
gether attractive to these colonies when in the process of 
their growth they desired to effect more close relations in 
customs matters with each other, and with the colony of 
New Zealand, and in the years 1869-1873 a vehement 
1 13 and 14 Viet. c. 59, s~ 27, forbad this for Australia and the royal 
instructions for New Zealand. 
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discussion arose between the Imperial Government and the 
governments of the colonies on this question of differential 
duties, in the course of which attention was drawn to the 
undoubted fact that there had been in the days before 
Canadia11 federation a number of cases where such duties had 
been allowed to exist. The Imperial Government were hard 
to move, but at last they ;yielded 1 to the extent of allowing 
the Colonies and New Zealand to arrange for special duties 
inter se, but they declined to extend the practice further, or 
to permit the conclusion of treaties of c·ommerce between 
the colonies and foreign powers, or any differentiation in 
favour of foreign powers by the colonies. The concession 
thus hardly won was,like many other concessions which have 
formed the subject of bitter controversy, made no use of 
by the governments concerned, which turned out to have 
different interests in the matter, despite the apparent 
unanimity with which they had handled the matter when it 
was merely a question of arguments with the hated tyrant, 
the Secretary of State for the Colonies. 
The treaty question having emerged, it was bound to lead 
to further developments. The initiative came in the main 
from Canada, wl1ere, on the defeat of the Liberal Government 
'vhich was contented with a low tariff in 187 8, Sir John 
Macdonald came into office with an active policy on tariff 
matters. Sir A. Galt, sent to London as High Con:tmissioner 
· for Canada, was instructed to open negotiations with foreign 
countries with a viewtoenterintotariff agreements with them 
for the benefit of Canadian trade : the Imperial Government 
were approached on the question of the negotiations, and 
they laid down that the negotiations with Spain, which was 
to be approached at once, should be conducted by the British 
representative there, who would however be largely guided 
in his attitude by the views of Sir A. Galt. This was in effect 
to concede the position as negotiator to Sir A. Galt, and at the 
same time the consent that negotiations should be opened 
was an intimation that the old policy of forbidding the im-
position of differential duties which was enforced by the 
1 36 and 37 Viet. c. 22. 
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requirements in the Canadian royal instructions against the 
grant of assent to any such Bill; would not be adhered to. In 
1883 this . fact was frankly admitted in correspondence with 
the Government of the Dominion, and in 1884 the further 
point, mainly one -of form, was conceded, and Sir Charles 
Tupper, now High Commissioner in London, was allowed to 
act not merely as adviser in negotiations, but also as negotia-
tor, though his efforts at that time were not successful in 
bringing about any treaties. In 1893, however, he had the 
pleasure of succeeding in bringing about the .signature of a 
treaty of commerce with France, regarding the commercial 
relations of Canada : he signed this treaty in conjunction 
with the British Ambassador and Sir Joseph Crowe, who had 
been associated with the Ambassador in the negotiatio11 
of the treaty: in point of fact, however, the main work of 
the negotiation was that of the High Commissioner, who was 
however aided by Sir J. Crowe throughout, and especially 
~ 
in the fact that the latter \vas a fluent speaker of French, 
which the High Commissioner was not.1 
Moreover, it became clear that it was no longer possible, in 
view of the attitude of the Colonies, to continue the practice 
of making commercial treaties binding on the Empire as 
a whole. The practice was therefore introduced of making 
treaties subject to a clause providing that they should only 
become applicable to the self-governing Colonies on notice 
being given within a period of one or two years : the first 
treaty actually so concluded seems to have been one with 
Montenegro of January 21, 1882. It was not always possible 
to secure the agreement of foreign powers to such a limitation, 
and thus the Anglo-French treaty of 1882 ignores the Colonies, 
but from that date no treaty made with a foreign power on 
commercial matters has ever bound a self-governing Dominion 
without its consent. It followed, however, that it was anoma-
lous that the Colonies should remain bound by treaties with 
regard to which they had never been consulted at all, and the 
difficulty of these treaties was increased by the desire of 
Canada to arrange preferential trade with the United 
1 See Sir C. Tupper, Recollections of Sixty Years, pp. 174, 175 . 
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Kingdom. It was early realized in the examination of the 
matter that the treaty of 1862 with Belgium, and that of 1865 
with the North German Confederation, were fatal to any Sllch 
proposals, for they made it clear that any concessions given 
by any government in the Colonies to the Imperial Govern-
ment would have to be accorded to these two countries, and 
therefore of course to all countries having most favoured 
nation clauses in their treaties. It had been formerly the 
practice of the Imperial Government to press for the in-
clusion of such clauses in British treaties, and it was there-
fore the case that quite a number of such treaties of impor-
tance existed. 
These circumstances led to an elaborate discussion of the 
whole position as to the possibility of closer union among the 
several parts of the Empire as regards trade questions at a 
Confere11ce held at Ottawa in 1894,1 which was nearly though 
not entirely representative of the whole of the self-governing 
parts of the Empire. The Conference represented that it was 
desirable to establish preferential trade among the various 
parts of the Empire, and that pending such time as the United 
Kingdom might adopt this policy the self-governing Colonies 
should be allowed to enter into closer relations in this regard, 
and that for this end the treaties with Belgium and Germany 
should be got rid of so as to permit of the giving of preferences 
to other parts of the Empire and the United Kingdom. The 
reply 2 of the Imperial Government was that they were not 
prepared to a.dopt preferential trade within the Empire as 
a desirable course of policy, as it was contrary to the natural 
movement of trade, and threatened _even apart from foreign 
retaliation no clear advantages, that they would withdraw 
all objections to differential duties among the Colonies 
generally, and for that purpose had procured the repeal of 
the Imperial Act 3 imposing restrictions on the Australian 
Colonies in this regard, and that the treaties in question, as 
they did not prevent the grant of intercolonial preference 
or preference by the United Kingdom to the Colonies, and 
1 Parl. Pap., C. 7553. 2 Parl. Pap., C. 7824. 
3 36 and 37 Viet. c. 22, repealed by 58 and 59 Viet. c. 3. 
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as the United Kingdom did not desire a preference in the 
Dominions conditionally on their denunciation, were not in 
their opinion suitable for denunciation, especially as the 
denunciation might involve serious losses on the Colonies, 
since there was a large export trade to Germany and Belgium 
in colonial produce such as wool. 
At the same time the Imperial Government intimated their 
views on the question of the possibility of the making of sepa-
rate commercial arrangements with foreign powers as regards 
the trade of the Colonies. They insisted on the principles that 
a treaty must be between sovereigns,that the Imperial Govern-
ment must be the channel through which a treaty must be 
negotiated, as the Imperial Government was the Government 
to which any demand for redress must be made, that to give 
the colonies powers of independent negotiation of treaties 
would be to give them an international status as separate 
and sovereign states, and would be equivalent to breaking 
up the Empire into a number of independent states, a result 
equally injurious to the Colonies and to the mother country, 
and desired by neither. A11y negotiation therefore must be 
conducted by His Majesty's representative at the foreign 
court, aided by a colonial representative as a second pleni-
potentiaryor in a subordinate capacity as might be considered 
desirable in each case, and any treaty concluded would have 
to be subject before ratification to the approval of the Im-
perial Government, the Colonial Government and the Colonial 
Parliament, if legislation were made requisite by its terms 
before ratification could take place. At the same time the 
terms on which such negotiations could be carried on were 
· explicitly set out : in the first place the concessions made 
to any foreign country must be made also to any other foreign . 
country entitled by treaty to most favoured nation rights in 
the Colony, and the Imperial G-overnment would require to 
be satisfied of the due passing of any necessary legislation 
before they could ratify a treaty ; . in the second place any 
concessions to foreign powers, and therefore also to any 
foreign nation with a most favoured nation treaty, must be 
extended without compensation to the whole of the British 
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possessions, since it was not to be supposed that any Colony 
would wish"to prefer foreigners to British subjects: in the third 
place no concession could be accepted from a foreign power 
which would be disadvantageous to another part, of the Em-
pire: if a concession were sought which might have this charac-
ter, the Imperial Government 'vould feel bound to endeavour 
to secure the extension of the concession to the other parts 
interested, and, if this were impossible, unless the other part 
were indifferent to the concession, it would be doubtful if it 
could be proceeded with. These rules were enforced by 
arguments drawn from the unity of the Empire, and the 
isolation and political attraction to a foreign community 
which might result from the establishment of close relations 
between one commu11ity and a foreign country. It was also 
pointed out that in 1892 Canada had refused to discrirr1inate 
in favour of the United States against Newfoundland, and 
in return had been assured that the Imperial Government 
would not allow that Colony to discriminate against Canada. 
The advent to office of the Conservative Govern1nent in 
1895 was followed by the adoption of a more yielding attitude 
in regard to the two treaties with Belgium and Germany. 
After the Colonial Conference of 1897 1 the insuperable ob-
jections hitherto urged to any alteration in this regard were 
waived, and the two treaties were denounced. The action 
was made the more needful since the Liberal Government 
in Canada was pressing forward with proposals for Imperial 
preference, and all attempts to evade the effect of the treaties 
was clearly futile. The result of the denunciation in the 
case of Germany was, however, as had been predicted, the 
attempt 2 of Germany to injure Canadian trade by the refusal 
to accord to that trade the same terms as were accorded to 
British trade generally, and in 1903 Canada definitely re-
taliated against this policy and imposed a surtax of a third 
on German imports. 
It was inevitable that, once the question of permitting 
the withdrawal of the Colonies from treaties was raised, the 
older practice by which treaties were concluded with pro-
1 Parl. Pap., C. 8596. 2 Parl. Pap., Cd. 1630. 
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vision for separate adherence in respect of the Colonies, but 
without provision for separate withdrawal, should be revised, 
and the first-fruits of this revision were seen in conventions 
with Uruguay in 1899, and Honduras in 1900, permitting the 
withdrawal of any British possessions from the operation of 
the treaties of 1885 and 1887 with these countries. Further 
impetus to ·this proposal was given at the Colonial Confer-
ence of 1902,1 when a resolution was passed in favour of the 
examination of the navigation laws of the Empire and other 
countries, and the desirability of closing coastwise trade, in-
cluding trade between the United Kingdom and the Colonies, 
to those countries which closed their trade to British vessels. 
The resolution "\vas taken seriously by New Zealand which 
legislated in 1903, taking power to close the coasting trade to 
countries which closed it to British ships, and as this clause 
would have run counter to the treaty with Greece of 1886, 
ne'v agreements of November 10, 1904, and May 4, 1905, were 
negotiated by which the right to witl1draw the self-governing 
Don1inions and.other possessions from the treaty was secured. 
The passing of a Bill by the Commonwealth Parliament in 
1906, which proposed to give a preference to British goods 
imported in British ships manned by white labour raised 
new treaty problems in its restriction of the right to British 
ships, and on the advice of l1is Ministers 2 the Governor-
General reserved the Bill. It was fairly clear that the 
measure contr;:tvened the treaties with Austria-Hungary of 
1868, that with Italy of 1883, with Russia of 1859, and per-
haps those with Egypt, Greece, Morocco, Colombia, Salvador, 
Honduras, Paraguay, and Liberia. The result of the dis-
cussion of the question at the Colonial Conference of 1907,3 
when the Imperial Government in clear terms intimated its 
inability to accept a preference given on conditions which 
penalized British Indian subjects, was that the prefer-
ence actually accorded in 1907 was not hampered by any 
reference to the mode in which the goods were imported.4 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 1299. 2 Parl. Pap., Cd. 3339. 3 Parl. Pap., Cd. 3523. 
4 Canada has power to close her coasting trade in toto, and freely exer-
cises it. 
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It was nevertheless still desirable in the eyes of the Co-m .. 
monwealth and the other Governme11ts concerned to proceed 
with the question of freeing the self-governing Dominions 
fron1 the ties of old treaties whicl1 had been. entered into 
before the new regime regarding the autonomy of the 
Colonies in commercial matters, and in accordance "'ith 
. this view, which was reinforced in 1911 by the Imperial 
Conference of that year, a long series of treaties has been 
concluded· which permit the King to withdraw from the 
old treaties in respect of any one of the self-governing 
Dominions on giving a year's notice of intention, without 
affecting the validity of the treaty as regards the other 
parts of the Empire. This concession was made by Egypt 
in 1907, by Liberia and by Paraguay in 1908, while the 
treaty with Salvador was denounced by that Republic and 
ceased to matter. In 1911 t.he consent of Sweden to the 
proposed arrangement was obtained, followed in 1912 by 
the consent of France in respect of an old treaty of 1826, 
of Denmark, and of Colombia, in 1913 by agreements with 
Norway and Costa Rica, and in 1914 by one with Switzer-
land. The treaties with Austria have been brought to a 
termination by the operation of the war, and the only 1 
treaty of outstanding importance which remains unassailed 
is that with Italy of 1883, and in this case it must be remem-
bered that the colonies to which it applies became parties 
to it by their full assent, and that they are under the same 
difficulties with regard to it and no other as the United 
Kingdom. All modern treaties, such as those with Nicaragua, 
Rumania, and Bulgaria, of 1905, with Serbia of 1907, with 
Montenegro and Honduras 2 of 1910, and with Japan of 
1911, contain clauses providing for separate adherence and 
separate withdrawal in respect of the British possessions 
generally. But as has been seen above, even in cases where 
the Dominions are not included in the operation of the 
treaty by adherence in respect of them, the personal rights 
flowing from the treaty are claimed by the British Govern-
1 That with Russia of 1859 is of less consequenc~. 
2 Ratified only in 1915; see Parl. Pap., Cd. 7964. 
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roent to belong to the status of British subjects per se, and 
not to be affected by the fact that a British subject is born 
in or don1iciled in or carries on business in a part of the 
Empire to which the treaty is not applicable, and this claim 
has not hitherto bee11 effectively disputed by any foreign 
country except Switzerland. 
At the same time there has been a marked development 
in the question of the making of commercial agreements 
separately for the benefit of the self-governing Dominions, 
and this ir1 two rather different ways. In the first place, the 
doctrine of formal negotiations through the n1edium of t.he 
ordinary diplomatic channel has been developed in. detail. 
In a dispatch of July 4, 1907,1 Sir Edward Grey intimated 
t,o His Majesty's representatives at Paris and Rome the 
wish of the Canadian Government to initiate negotiations 
with the French and Italian Governments for th~ conclusion 
of more i11timate comrnercial relations between Canada and 
these countries. He recalled the conditions as to such 
negotiatio11s laid down by the Imperial Government in 
their reply to the resolutions of the Ottawa Conference in 
1895, but stated that he did not consider it necessary to 
adhere in the present case to the strict letter of the regula-
tions then laid down, the object of which was to secure 
that the negotiations should not be entered into and carried 
through by a colony unknown to and independently of His 
Majesty's Government. The selection of the negotiator 
was principally a matter of convenience, and in the present 
circumstances it would obviously be more practicable that 
the negotiations should be left to Sir Wilfrid Laurier and 
to the Canadian Minister of Finance, who would doubtless 
keep the British Charge d'Affaires informed of their progress. 
If the negotiations were brought to a conclusion at Paris 
he was to sign the agreement jointly with the Canadian 
negotiator, who would be given full powers for the purpose. 
In accordance with this arrangement the treaty was nego-
tiated in Paris and finally approved after it had received 
the careful consideration of the Imperial Government, the 
1 Parl. Pap., H. C. 129, 1910. 
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signature being deferred until that consideration had been 
accorded: 1 the signatures appended were those of the 
British Ambassador, Mr. Fielding, and Mr. Brodeur, both 
ministers of Canada. In 1909, in. view of the failure of the 
Convention of 1907 to secure the acceptance of the French 
Chan1bers, Mr. Fielding visited Paris a11d engaged in con-
fidential discussions with the French Government, which 
resulted in the preparation of a draft convention excluding 
from the benefit of the French minimum tariff fat cattle 
in condition for butchering, the French agrarian interest 
having blocked the passage of the treaty into effect on 
account of this concession. The draft was prepared and· 
sent by the Foreign Secretary to the British Ambassador 
with authority to sign jointly with Mr. Fielding. In this case 
again the proposed change had received the most careful con-
sideration from the British Governme11t. So also in 1911 2 and 
1913 respectively, the arrangements regarding trade between 
Japan and Canada were concluded by Sir E. Grey on behalf 
of the Crown, although the terms of both had formed the 
subject of discussion between the Canadian Government 
and the Japanese Consul-General at Ottawa. In both cases, 
of course, the treaty was subject to the fullest considera-
tion at the hands of the Imperial Government before it was 
concluded. 
Ample as these arrangements seem to be for the purpose 
of securing the wishes of the Dominion being given full effect,. 
some discontent was expressecl in Canada, and in debate in 
the House of Commons on February 21, 1908, it was con-
tended that the power of making treaties independently 
should be conferred on the Dominion, a proposal which Sir 
Wilfrid Laurier declared to be unnecessary as the existing 
arrangement worked '\veiL In 1910 a step of some conse-
quence was taken by Canada which deviated somewhat from 
the precedents of commercial treaties. The action of Ger-
many in penalizing Canada for her British preference had 
been rese11ted in Canada, and retaliation had been imposed 
in 1903. Germany had come to be wearied of the struggle, 
1 See below, p. 274. 2 Parl. Pap., Cd. 5734. 
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and the German Constll-General at Montreal was empowered 
to propose that, i11 retur11 for the concession of Gern1any's 
conventional tariff on those Canadian imports which nlat-
tered to Canada, Can.ada should revoke the surtax on Gern1an 
imports. The agreement was concluded direct between the 
Consul-General and Mr. Fielding on Februar~y 15, 1910,1 a11d 
was carried into effect by Order in Council remitting the 
surtax, as was possible under the existing legislation of the 
Dominion. As the Order in Council received the assent of 
the Governor-General, it was, of course, not beyond the power 
of the Imperial Government to intervene in the matter, but 
the full control exercised when the negotiations were placed 
formally on record in the form of a treaty \Vas not possible. 
This was followed by further cases of informal arrangement, 
but in this instance the proposal for such negotiatio11s came 
through the British Embassy at Washington : the tariff of 
the United States as amended provided that the minimum 
tariff could be granted to countries which did not discriminate 
against the United States, and the question had arisen 
whether the effect· of the convention with France, which had 
to extend automatically to all countries with most favoured 
nation rights, did not constitute an undue discrimination 
against the United States. The position of the States was not 
in equity a strong one, but it was felt desirable by Canada 
to meet their views, and the promise was made of legislation 
to lower the duties on certain articles which had been i11cluded 
_in the Anglo.:.French convention. No treaty was signed, but 
both sides took the necessary action, Canada by an act which 
lowered the duties on these articles to the whole world. Later 
in the year an agreement was made with the Royal Consul of 
Italy regarding Italian trade, and concessions were made to 
Belgium and the Netherlands without asking for any return. 
In all three cases Orders i11 Council were issued, on tT une 7, 
1910, and so, as in the case of the concessions to the United 
States, the action taken was not without opportunity of 
objection on the part of the Imperial Government.2 
Little comment was made on these agreements in the 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 5135. 2 Parl. Pap., Cd. 5582, p. 9 . 
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. United Kingdom, but in January 21, 1911,1 an agreement 
was reached between Messrs. Fielding and Paterson on 
behalf of the Gover11ment of Canada, and the United States 
Secretary of State, which proposed that a large programme of 
reciprocal lowering of duties should take place between the 
two countries in order to pron1ote freer trade, especially in 
natural products, tl1e great question of the entry of fish to the 
United States being disposed of on the basis of free entry of 
fresh fish in either case and of preserved fish on a low basis of 
duty, The p11blished correspondence shows that the proposal 
was based on discussions which had taken place in }-,ebruary 
1910, between the representatives of Canada and the United 
States, when discussing the question of the admission of 
Canada to the minimun1 tariff of the United States. It was 
proposed in May 1910 by the United States Government 
througl1 the British Ambassador to renew the discussions at 
that time, but this could not be arranged as the Canadian 
ministers "'ere separated, and Mr. ].,ielding had gone to 
England. On January 6, 1911, however, the Canadian 
ministers, Messrs. Fieldi11g and Paterson, appeared at Wash .. 
ington, and were introduced to the President an.d the Secre-
tary of State of the United States. The discussions with 
the United States Government were carried on direct, but 
the Arr1bassador was in constant communication with the 
Canadian ministers. Unexpectedly the negotiations, which 
had been expected to be of somewhat limited type, resulted 
in tl1e arrival at a very striking amount of agreement, and 
on January 19, Mr. Bryce could telegraph that the negotia-
tions were well advanced: on January 22, he was able to 
send the substance of the agreement concluded. No formal 
treaty was arrived at : the proposals made were for con ... 
current legislation, and, unlike a treaty, no fixed time was 
prescribed for the continuance of the arrangement, 'vhich 
thus rese1nbled rather an agree1nent on policy carried into 
detail than a treaty proper. 
In sending the text of the arrangement on Ja11uary 22, the 
Ambassador expressed the opinion that British interests were 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 5582, p. 9 and 5523. 
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not to any appreciable extent prejudiced and stated that he 
had the assurances of the Canadian ministers to this effect,. 
No opportunity was lost in the course of the negotiations 
of reminding them of the regard which it 'vas right and fitting 
they should have to Imperial interests, while doing their best 
for Canada, a11d such reminders had received a frank and 
cordial response. The arrangement rested on a realization of 
the fact that a high tariff 'vall between contiguous countries 
whose products were economically interchangeable was an 
injury to both, and opposed to sound fiscal principles. This 
was specially so in the case of food tariffs, with which the 
agreement chiefly dealt. The arrangement would probably 
be justified and defended in the United States as an outcome 
of the traditiona~ policy of increasing the economic relations 
between the States of the 'vestern l1emisphere, but this policy 
has no infl11ence, either in the states of America or in Canada, 
on the sense of nationality and in.ternational importance, 
and there was no likelihood that a freer interchange of com-
modities would lead to closer relations of a political kind. 
The Ambassador also noted that in some cases the duties 
charged on Canadian imports into the United States 'vould 
be less than those on British imports, but he had the 
assura,nce of Canadian ministers that the British imports 
would not suffer from this fact. 
The result of the negotiation. "ras embarrassing to the Im-
perial Government, which had, it is clear from the published 
papers, no really effective chance of controlling the negotia-
tions. A good deal of blame was in some quarters attributed 
to Mr. Bryce 1 for his share in the 1natter, but no accusation, 
it is clear, could have been more unjustly made. It is obvious 
that J\ir. Bryce was in the very difficult position of being un.-
able effectively to control negotiations carried on by the 
United States Government in close relation with the Canadian 
1ninisters, and at so rapid a pace that no time was allowed for 
full effect being given to any views "rhich he might 'vish to 
offer. It appears indeed fro1n the corresponden.ce that he 
was very in1perfectly informed of the details of the scheme, 
1 Cf. House of Commons Debates, May 6, 1912. 
1874 s 
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·and had not the full result in his hands before signature. It 
is idle to blan1e an ambassador in these circumstances : his 
mission was one of settling the many outstanding difficulties 
which existed between the United ·Kingdon1 and the United 
States, and no useful purpose would have been served by any 
effort of his to insist on a more leisurely 1node of carrying on 
the negotiations. Indeed, as Sir E. Grey pointed out in his 
defence, the only result of his interference would have been 
to stimulate the demand for the concession to Canada of 
the treaty power. 
At the same time it was perfectly clear that the spirit and 
manner of the conduct of the negotiations departed seriously 
.from the spirit laid down in the dispatches of 1895, and from 
the procedure followed in 1907 and 1909. In both the cases 
in question the negotiations had been, before a treaty was 
signed, carefully scrutinized by the Imperial Government; 
the assertion 1 that this \vas not the case is a complete 
blu11der : indeed the scrutiny was with effect for British in-
.terests. In 1911 the agreement was concluded with all regard, 
no doubt, for such interests, but by two ministers of Canada, 
who could not know 'vhat Imperial interests really were 
involved. No one could doubt the patriotism of Mr. Fielding, 
or his devotion to the interests of the Empire as well as of 
Canada, but his wide knowledge of Canadian agriculture and 
in.dustrial conditio11s was not accompanied by any similar 
knowledge of conditions in the United Kingdo1n, and the result 
was, therefore, that a treaty was negotiated \vhich could be 
fairly argued to be likely, by promoting extremely close rela-
tions economically bet,veen the United States and Canada, to 
attract Canada into the influence politically of the United 
States. It was the exact danger which l1ad been foreseen 
by the Imperial Government in 1895, and it arose because of 
the regrettable deviation from the actual principles-laid down 
· ·by that Government, a11d 11ever relaxed by the Imperial 
Governme11t. The actual preference to the goods of Canada 
which would have bee11 accorded by the United States over 
other British goods was probably not a very serious matter, 
1 Mr. A. J. Balfour, House· of Commons Debates, July 21, 1910. 
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though even that was denied by tin plate ma11ufacturers; but 
the broad fact 'vas that the result of the negotiation was to 
realize the ideal of contine11tal free trade 'vhich had been an 
aim of the Liberal part~y in Canada, and which had, in 1891, 
led to the resignation of the Hon. Ed,vard Blake, as he felt 
that it might not be compatible with the autonomy of Canada 
and the integrit~y of the Empire. The situation was rendered 
more difficult by the imprudence or candour of the President 
of the United States,1 who gave it to be understood that he 
considered that the policy 'vould tend to lead Canada into 
political union with the United States of America. The same 
,varning was given by leaders of the Conservative Party in 
the Dominion, who felt that the old policy of Sir John Mac-
donald was being cast into jeopardy, and that the time had 
come when they could attack the Government on a broad 
national as opposed to mere party issues. The Opposition 
had the support in this movement of the great manufacturing 
industries of Ontario, who held that there was risk of their 
ruin under the influence of the influx of cheaper goods from 
the United States, while many were troubled by reason of the 
obvious injury "vhich the agreement would inflict on the 
British preference and the British connexion, even assun1ing 
that no political ill results "rere to be feared. The result was 
the complete overthrow of the Liberal Government, after it 
had failed to pass the amend1nents of the tariff necessary to 
carry the agreen1ent into effect, and after it had decided, in 
response to the challenge of the Opposition, to obtain the 
ratification of its policy by the people of the Don1inion. 
Parliament was dissolved without the necessary supply being 
obtained, and the general election of September 21, 1911, re-
turned a majority of forty-five members for the Opposition in 
place of a majority of forty-o·ne: eight ministers were defeated, 
and the loss of the leaders of the Liberal Party was so over-
whelming, that the Prime Minister, who resigned office with-
out meeting Parliament, decided that he must assume the 
burden of leadership in opposition, though he had decided 
before the election.to retire from politics if his Government 
1 Cf. Sir C. Tupper, Recollections of Sixty Years, pp. 172, 306. 
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were overthrown. The main cause of the victory was the 
feeling in Ontario, where the Opposition won six-sevenths 
of the seats, that the American n1anufacturers would capture 
the Canadian market ; the loyalty of the Maritime Pro-
vinces, where the Opposition greatly improved their position, 
and of British Columbia, where no Liberal could obtain 
a ·seat; while the popularity of the policy of free e11try 
of agricultural products into the United States was seen 
in. the middle provinces, the Government improving its 
position in ·Manitoba, Alberta, and Saskatchewan. It 
must, however, be remembered that in these provinces 
there is :hot merely a strong non-British European element, 
but there is also a very marked American influence, clerived 
from the migration of men from the United States, attracted 
by the rich lands opened to settlement in the prairie provinces 
and urged on by the comparative lack of equally attract:ive 
land in the United States. The result was, it is clear, the 
best vindication of the principles laid down in 1895: had they 
been observed, there would have been no risk of the con-
clusion of a treaty which would have endangered the political 
allegiance of Canada. It is fair, in examinir1g the situation, 
to realize that the Canadian delegates went to Washington 
with no very clear idea 1 that there 'vas much to be attained, 
and that the proposals of the President, who took the matter 
largely into his own hands, were rather a surprise to them. 
The action of the President "ras, it is clear, based on the fact 
that his party were in desperate need of some n1eans by which 
they might diminish the very high protective tariff which 
they had secured in l909,without, at the same time, abandon--
ing the principles for which they had fought in that year. 
Had they been able to secure the passing into force of the 
agreeme11t with Canada, they would have lo,vered the highest 
and most serious of the burdens on the American consumer, 
ar1d .they would at the same time have been able to p·oint to 
their action, as the President did point to it, as motived by 
high political no less than economical considerations. 
'Vhatever the cause, there has been, since the fiasco of 1911, 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 5523, p. 3. 
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no further attempt in any Dominion to arrange serious com-
mercial negotiations on any independent basis. On the other 
hand, a very important innovatio11 has been arranged in very 
recent times, and one "\vhich reflects the growing importance 
of the Dominions. It has long been the practice of the self-
governing Dominions to send representatives to a vast mass 
of miscellaneous congresses on every conceivable sort of social 
question,1 but these congresses were not such as directly to 
produce political results, and therefore no question of treaty-
making arose. It was, and is, therefore, possible for govern-
ments like the states of Allstralia and the provinces of Canada, 
which have no international status at all, to take part in these 
congresses. On the other hand, where an international agree ... 
ment was to result, it used to be the invariable practice that 
the Dominio11s should not be represented at all, or that at 
most they should be included as advisers in the representation 
of the Imperial Government. Of the latter n1ode of pro-
cedure an excellent instance is that of the International 
Conference of June a11d July 1911, at which the representa .. 
tives of the United Kingdom, the United States, Japan, and 
Russia devised a system of protection for fur seals which it was 
hoped later to extend to other countries : at this Confere11ce 
the Canadia11 Under Secretary· of State for External Affairs 
was associated 'vith the other British representative, Mr. 
Bryce. On the other hand, in the case of the International 
Opiun1 Conference convened at The Hague at the end of 1911, 
the labours of which resulted in an important convention, 
signed on January 23, 1912,2 though the Dominion Govern-
ments 'vere i11vited by the Irr1perial Government to send 
representatives to assist the Imperial representatives, they 
thought it needless to do so. The convention was, therefore, 
not signed by the British <.lelegates on behalf of any Dominion, 
but the power was reserved to sign separately in respect of ·any 
Dominion, colony, possession, or protectorate, and the assei~t 
of the self-governing Domi11ions to the signature of tl1e con-
vention in question was obtained in the course of 1912. 
1 See, e. g., Parl. Pap., Cd. 6863, pp. 7, 8 ; 7 507, pp. 8, 9. 
2 Parl. Pap., Cd. 6038. 
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A new procedure was, however, to appear. In July 1911 an 
international co11ference was summoned by the United States 
Government to be held at Washington for the revision of the 
International Convention respecting the protection of in-
dustrial property, and the arrangement for the prevention 
of the false indication of origin upon goods. A special invita-
tion to be present at the Co11ference was sent 1 to the Govern-
ment of Canada through the usual channel, the Ambassador 
at Washington and the Governor-General. The Conference 
resulted in a convention, but the delegates sent by Canada 
were unable to see their way to agree to the convention, and 
therefore the difficult question of their status a11d position 
never arose. The difficlllty 'vas one under the constitution of 
the existing international convention which made no pro-
vision for the separate representation of tl1e Dominions, but 
elasticity of international arrangements is shown by the fact 
that the United States gave the invitation, and it was not in 
the interest of any power to quest~on the presence of the 
Canadian representatives. The British delegates, however, 
not only secured the usual power to adhere or withdraw from 
the convention in respect of the British possessions of every 
kind, but they made a formal declaration that certain British 
Dominions, which adhered to the convention, and which 
possessed legislative allthority. on the subject of industrial 
property, should be re_presented at the Conference of -the 
International Union by delegates who should have the san1e 
right to vote as was accorded to the delegates of contracting 
countries, it being understood that the Dominions would con-
tribute in the same man11er as other unionist states to the 
expenses of the international bureau. 
A further step ii1 progress was taken in the following year. 
It became desirable to convene an international radio-
telegraphic conference at London, and the question of the 
}Josition of the representatives of the self-governing Do-
minions at once arose. Already in the case of Postal Con-
ferences, .it had been found possible to secure certain votes 
for the British Colonies, and in 1906 2 the self-governing 
I Parl. Pap., Cd. 5842. 2 Parl. Pap., Cd. 3556. 
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Dominions, except Newfoundland, were represented by 
delegates appointed by their governments and not included 
in the British delegation. These tlelegates were thoroughly 
anomalous in status. They did 11ot act, as has been supposed, 1 
under t.l1e ~uthority of the appointment of their local govern-
ments only: to avoid trouble arising, each colonial delegate 
was presented with a curious document, signed by the Secre-
tary of State for the Colonies, purporting to confer on him 
full power to act in the matter. The procedure was in every 
way undesirable: the British delegates also had not full 
powers, but authority from the Postmaster-General, and 
the arrangements arrived at were 11ot ratified but approved, 
and confirmed b_y the administrations concerned. The 
anomaly of the colonial delegates' position was thus 
lessened, but the whole plan of action seems to be badly 
arranged. 
At any rate, the same mode of action was not followed in 
the case of the Radio-telegraphic Conference: the four great 
self-governing Dominions were each represented at it by 
delegates who carried with them as their credentials full 
powers 2 under the great seal of the United Kingdom, differ-
ing 011ly from the full powers granted to the Imperial delegates 
in having the words ' 011 behalf of the Dominion of Canada', 
or as the case might be, added after the words' Commissioner, 
Procurator and Plenipotentiary '. The excellent precedent 
thus set was followed less than two years later when, at the 
International Conference 3 on the safety of life at sea, held 
at I~ondon in December 1913 and ~January 1914, the self-
governing Dominions of Canada, the Commonwealth of 
Australia, and New Zealand were all represented by pleni-
potentiaries. 
The essential difference from the new as compared with the 
old practice lies of course in the fact that the plenipotentiaries 
of the Dominions are now r1o longer merely plenipotentiaries 
1 J. S. Ewart, Kingdom Papers, ii. 234. 
2 See the extract from the full powers in Ewart, Kingdom Papers, ii. 235. 
3 Parl. Pap., Cd. 7426. Ewart, Zoe. cit., is misinformed as to the position 
of the Canadian delegate. 
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for the United Kingdom. In the case of their bei11g included 
in the British delegation, the vote of the British delegation 
must be cast in the same sense,1 "rhatever the views of the 
different n1embers : in the case of separate plenipotentiaries 
the votes of the several plenipotentiaries might be very 
differently cast. This involves, of course, the curious posi .. 
tion that His Majesty may through one set of plenipoten-
tiaries declare one view and, through another, another view, 
but it is merely a common-sense recognition of the diversity 
within the uniformity of the Empire. · It is no more curious 
than the existence of independent governments within the 
Empire pursuing different policies i11 many respects. Nor 
must it be ignored that the grant of full powers is advised by 
the Imperial Government, and that the ratification of any 
convention rests with the King on the advice of the Imperial 
Government. Thus the Imperial Government retains an 
effective n1eans of control on the action of the Dominion 
Governn1ents, however little such control may be lilrely to be 
required. 
1 In a case in 1883, on a conference on submarine cables, Sir C. Tupper 
opposed-the other British delegates and induced them to accept his view, 
Recollections of Sixty Years, p. 175. 
CHAPTER XIV 
POLITICAL TREATIES. 
FROl\'I the political point of view, few points remain doubt-
ful in the rules regarding the treaty power. It is at present 
settled law that a treaty proper can be made only by the 
Crown on the advice in the long run of his Imperial ministers, 
that responsibility for the carrying out of treaty rests on the 
Imperial Government, to which demands for redress must 
be sent by foreign powers, and that the mere making of a 
treaty has no effect to alter the law of the United Kingdom 
or any Dominion. The Imperial Government, therefore, 
if it makes a treaty, must be prepared to secure that the 
treaty shall be put into force, and to interpret the treaty 
unless it is required or induced by t.he other party to submit 
the meaning of the treaty to arbitration. But the main duty 
of dealing with treaties which affect a Dominion must lie 
with a Dominion, and any treaty which requires action by 
a Dominion has normally been made subject to legislation 
therein, as in the case of the treaties with the United States 
affecting fishery matters in Canada in 1~54 and 1871, as well 
' 
as the abortive treaty negotiated by Mr. Chamberlain in 1888 
and the agreement made by the Canadian mjnisters and the 
United States Secretary of State on January 21, .. 1911, which 
never came to fruition. The theory that none but a sovereign 
legislature and executive can deal with any matter affecting 
treaty rights was nevertheless. actually put forward by the 
- . ~ 
Government of the United States5n 1886, when that Govern-
ment was annoyed by Canada, but was at once refuted by the 
British Government, and Mr. Bayard, who put it forward,1 
is shortly afterwards to be found writing to Sir C. Tupper 2 
expressing his regret at the troublesome procedure of not 
1 Parl. Pap., C. 4937, p. 37. 2 Recollections of Sixty Years, p. 177. 
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dealing direct with Canada on the 1natter. A -similar protest 
against colonial action in 1891-2 by the French Government 
in connexion with Newfoundland was met by a similar reply,t 
and the Hague arbitral tribunal of 1910, in settling the 
fishery dispute between the United Kingdom and the United 
States, provided for the case of the carrying out of British 
legislation by the Imperial Parliament and the Parliaments 
of Canada and Newfoundland.2 
The questio;n has been raised in the Dominions, by no less 
a person than the present Prime Minister of Canada,3 whether 
any treaty which requires legislative action to make it effective 
should not be expressed to be subject to the approval of any 
Parliament whose action would be concerned. The circum-
stances of the case on which his remarks were based were, 
however, very exceptional in international relations. In the 
United States th~ treaty-making power is vested in the Presi-
dent of the United States, and until the Senate approves a 
treaty i.t is contrary to practice that its terms should be 
published, though de facto thetreatyis printed in all the news-
papers from a copy lent by some Senator. This happened in 
the case of the Treaty of 1909 with the United States regard-
ing boundary waters, which was published in the United States 
at a time when the Canadian House of Commons had been 
unable to obtain any details of its terms. The occasion was 
made a ground of complaint against the theoretic ignoring 
of Canada in the negotiations. Mr. Borden thought that by 
making treaties subject to parliamentary ratification such an 
incident would be avoided, but it does not appear that this 
would in any way be the case, so long as the United States 
Government continue to refuse official publication before 
consideration by the Senate, and so long as the Senate allows 
the treaties submitted to it to be divulged. The rest of Mr. 
Borden's speech of May 14, 1909, was devoted to sho,ving 
the necessity of legislation to give effect to the treaty in 
question, the desirability of ratification being made subject 
to Parliamentary approval, and the enumeration of cases 
1 Parl. Pap., C. 6703. 2 Parl. Pap., Cd. 5396. 
3 Canada House of Commons Debates, May 14, 1909. 
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where treaties had been expressed as not taking effect unless 
legislation should be passed. His arguments, however, are not 
altogether convincing, if it is remembered that a treaty must 
be ratified, and that it is easy enough to secure discussion of 
a treaty before it is ratified, and that such a practice has 
grown up in the United Kingdom, where even if legislation 
is not required before ratification opportunity is given to 
allow of discussion, while if legislation is needed it is duly 
introduced and carried before ratification is accorded, as was. 
the case with the Copyright Act of 1911, passed in order to 
allow of ratification of the Berlin Copyright Conventi_on of 
1908. Whether it is worth while making the treaty formally 
dependent on parliamentary approval, as in the case of the , 
cessions of territory in the Anglo-German Treaty of 1890 1 and 
the Anglo-French Treaty of 1904,2 is in the main a matter of 
form. The important part of the question is the securing of 
parliamentary approval 3 and the closer control of the treaty 
power by Parliament, of the value of which a striking instance 
has been given by the European War, which vindicates the 
action of the Upper Chamber in rejecting in 1911 the Bill 
which would have enabled the Government to ratify the 
unhappy London Convention regarding naval warfare. 
The ultimate right of the Imperial Government to inter-
pret treaties was contested very bitterly at various times by 
Newfoundland, but the Imperial Government· have twice 
asserted their right in a convincing manner. On the first 
occasion, an episode in ·the long ·discussion over the French 
fishery rights in the colony,4 the Newfoundland delegates 
would not yield to the views of the Imperial Government 
-until not only was a modus vivendi with the Republic passed 
over their heads, but the Imperial Government, having 
enforced it without legal authority, and havjng thought it 
1 53 and 54 Viet. c. 32. 2 4 Edw. VII, c. 33. 
3 So in 1914 the Act 5 Geo. V, c. I, was obtained to allow of the ratification 
of the Portuguese treaty of Aug. 12, 1914. In 1911 the Geneva Convention 
Act . was passed to allow of adherence in full to the Convention of 1906 
regarding the Red Cross. 
4 Parl. Pap., C. 6703; Baird v. Walker [1892] A.C. 491 . 
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best to compensate those whose property they had inter-
fered with, brought a Bill forward which would have 
settled the dispute in their favour. In the second case, that 
of the dispute over the American fishery rights in Newfound-
land in 1905-7, the resistance of Newfoundland went so far 
as to leave no option to the Imperial Government but to 
override the legislation of the Colony by an Imperial Order 
in Council of September 9, 1907, made under the powers 
.conferred by the old Act of 1819, which was passed in order 
to enable the Crown to carry into effect the Treaty of 1818 
regarding the American fishery rights in the waters of North 
America. . The resentment of Newfoundland against the 
United States arose from the failure of the United States 
Senate to ratify the treaty which was arranged between Sir 
R. Bond and Mr. Hay in 1902 and concluded by the British 
Ambassador at Washington. That treaty, which was marked 
by the extraordinary provision that Newfoundland bound 
herself to give the United States national treatment in regard 
to all imports whatever, was blocked in the Senate by Senator 
Lodge on behalf of the interests of the New England fisher-
men, and in retaliation Sir R. Bond began an energetic policy 
of enforcing in the strictest manner p~ssibl,e the laws in force 
against American fishermen, and secured the passing of a 
further Act, in 1905, under the terms of which extensive 
powers of boarding and. bringing into port for examination 
foreign fishing vessels were conferred on officers of Newfound-
land, and it was enacted that the presence on board such a 
vessel of caplin, s.quid, or other bait fish, ice, lines, seines, or 
other outfit, should be presumed to show that they had been 
purchased "\vi thin the waters of Newfoundland, it being, under 
the Bait Act of 1887 of the Colony, an offence to make any 
such purchase. These provisions were much resented by the 
Government of the United States, and the situation assumed 
an appearance of considerable grayity, which was compli-
cated by the fact that the Newfoundland fishermen were, in 
many cases, most anxious to remain on friendly terms with 
the Americans who employed them to catch fish for them, 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 3262 and 3765. 
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thereafter selling the fish thus caught in the United States 
as American caught fish, and so passing them through the 
customs free of the heavy duty levied on Newfoundland fish. 
The situation was composed at last by means of a modus 
vivendi after every effort had been made in vain to induce the 
colonial government to agree to terms pending the reference 
of the dispute to arbitration, which the Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs had undertaken to arrange. As the New-
foundland Government would not yield and, as it would have 
been disastrous to allow strife to occur in the period before 
arbitration, a modus vivendi 1 had to be concluded over the 
head of the Government, and to render it effective it became 
necessary to override the law of Newfoundland. The period 
when action became unavoidable was in September 1907, 
when no meeting of Parliament was possible, and it was 
therefore necessary to resort to the powers gi·v·en in the Act 
of 1819. In accordance with these powers an Order in Council 
was therefore issued, the effect of which was to forbid the 
boarding and bringing into port of an American fishing vessel 
in the exercise of the treaty right, to put the onus of proof of 
purchase in the limits of Newfoundland of bait, &c., on the 
person alleging such purchase, and not on the ship, and to 
forbid the serving of process on American ships or the seizure 
of ships or gear without the consent of the senior naval 
officer on the Newfoundland station. The effect of the Order 
was admirable: the Government of Newfoundland pro-
tested, but the arguments adduced by the Secretary of State 
were so convincing that there was not even a discussion in 
the Imperial Parliament on the subject: it was felt in Canada, 
as elsewhere, that the deliberate plan of endeavouring to 
annoy the United States when arbitration had been agreed 
upon was not one which could ·be supported, and the corre-
spondence published showed that every effort had been 
made to bring about an agreement between the two Govern-
ments, and that no failure of communicating with the 
Colony at every stage had occurred. Indeed, the 1'imes, 
never inclined to regard with approval overruling of colonial 
I Parl. Pap., Cd. 3754. 
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·governments, was constrained to express approval of the 
attitude and action of the Government. Nor did any of the 
.other Dominions endeavour to intervene in support of New-
foundland; the exposition of affairs given was clearly con-
vincing to these governments also, and, indeed, it is well 
known that Canada was unable to sympathize in any way 
with Sir Robert Bond. 
While in political1natters treaties have never been to the 
same degree subject to the control of the Dominions as in 
commercial matters, it would be a mistake to imagine that 
there has ever been any tendency since the rise of self~ 
government to deal with important political questions affect-
ing the Dominions save in close conjunction with these 
Dominions. Thus in 1857 Mr. Labouchere gave to New-
foundland, after her attainment of self-government, the 
assurance that her position would not be affected by treaties 
without her consent being obtained. In the great series of 
negotiations which took place at Washington in 1871 Canada 
was represented by Sir John Macdonald, who was one of the 
British delegates, and who was unable to agree with . his 
colleagues on all points.1 Not only was the promise as to 
France faithfully kept, but Canada was represented on the 
delegation which arranged the abortive Treaty of 1888 with 
the United States, and on the Joint High Commission which 
in 1898-9 made a determined but unsuccessful effort to settle 
the Alaska boundary and other difficulties outstanding be-
tween the two countries. After the crisis of 1907 was over, 
Newfoundland was induced to co-operate in arranging a modus 
vivendi for 1908, when the Order in Council passed in 1907 was 
revoked, and both that Dominion and Can.ada concurred 
in the wording of the terms of reference to arbitration of 
the fishery dispute in 1909.2 In the case of the New Hebrides 
efforts to keep in touch with the Governments of Australia 
and New Zealand proved less successful,3 and the two Govern-
1 .See J. Pope, Sir John Macdonald, ii. 104 sq. Contrast Sir C. Tupper, 
Recollections of Sixty Years, pp. 371, 391. 
2 Parl. Pap., Cd. 4528 and 4815. 
a Parl. Pap., Cd. 2385, 3160, 3288, 3300, 3525, and 3876. 
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roents protested with much vigour against what they con-
sidered the inadequate consultation of them in this regard, 
though New Zealand consented to take a part in the drawing 
up of detailed regulations under the Convention of 1905. Curi-
ously enough, in 1914, when a fresh conference on this question 
took place, though the Dominions were consulted, the grave 
mistake was made of having no representative of either on 
the body of British delegates, an omission which might have 
led to serious friction, but for the more important events 
which rendered the work of the Commission in endeavouring 
to introduce some order in the affairs of the New Hebrides 
unlikely to bear much immediate fruit. 
In 1908 a further step in emphasizing the independent 
character of the Dominions was taken. In the arbitration 
treaty with the United States, concluded in that year,- it was 
expressly provided that the Imperial Government reserved 
to itself the right, before accepting an agreement for refer-
ence to arbitration in the case of any matter affecting the 
interests of a self-governing Dominion, to obtain the con-
currence of that Dominion in the agreement. The provision 
was intended to place the British Government in the same 
position in regard to such matters as the Government of the 
United States. Any treaty negotiated by the Government of 
the United States may fail to receive the approval of the 
Senate, and thus it falls to the ground, and under the arbitra-
tion treaty· the approval of the compromis in each case 
was required from the Senate. It thus became possible for 
the Senate to refuse to accept arbitration, and by the 
treaty the same right was secured to any self-governing 
Dominion in a case in which that Government was concerned. 
The same principle was adopted in the Pecuniary Claims 
Treaty of 1910,1 and again in the Treaty of 19142 regard~ng 
the establishment of a Peace Commission to consider ques-
tions in dispute between the two Governments, not only were 
the Dominion Governments consulted before the treaty was 
accepted, but it was provided that in the case of a dispute 
affecting a self-governing Dominion the member of the 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 5803. 2 Parl. Pap.~ Cd. 7963. 
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Commission chosen by the British Government could be 
changed so as to secure the presence of a representative of the 
Dominion on the Commission. But this principle has not yet 
been embodied in any other arbitration treaty, whether first 
concluded or renewed, since that date, as its acceptance 
was only secured because of the very ·exceptional position 
occupied by the Senate in the United States. On the other 
hand the doctrine of asking the consent of the Dominions 
before any arbitration treaty is concluded or renewed has 
been definitely and successfully adopted, as in the case of the 
renewal of the treaties with Spain and Italy i11 1913, Switzer-
land in 1914, and the Netherlands in 1915. The gain in this 
mode of procedure is obvious, as if dispute arises it i~ not 
a question of the Imperial Government having to press the 
Dominion Government to accept arbitration for the sake of 
the Empire, but merely asking the Government to carry out 
an arrangement made by its duly authorized predecessor. 
Nor, so far, has it seemed necessary to obtain parliamentary 
sanction for such treaties. 
At the Imperial Conference of 1911 the question for the 
first time was raised in concrete form as to the right of 
the Dominions to be consulted in the case of the negotia-
tion of the great international conventions regarding war 
and peace, the Hague Conventions. The point arose in 
a rather curious way. The London Naval Conference 1 dealt 
with questions of the first interest to the Dominions, questions 
of contraband and captur·e at sea, and the results of the 
Conference, . which were summed up in the Declaration of 
London, excited rrr~1ch interest in the United Kingdom, 
where they provoked a lively polemic and helped to focus 
the attention of the Dominions on the topic. The result was 
the formal motion on the part of the Commonwealth at the 
Imperial Conference 2 regretting the failure to consult the Do-
minions regarding the Declaration of London, and the frank 
admission of the Imperial Government that the omission 
to consult arose directly from the fact that the Dominions 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 4554, 4555, and 5618. 
2 Parl. Pap., Cd., 5745, pp. 79 sq. 
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were not represented at the Hague Conference of 1907, nor 
of co:urse at that of ·1899. Nor indeed had any suggestion of 
their representation at these Conferences previously been 
1nadeby the Dominions. The Conference accordingly agreed 
that, when framing the instructions to be given to the British 
delegates at the next of such Conferences, the Dominions 
should be afforded an opportunity of consultation, and that 
when conventions affecting the Dominions had been·. provi-
sionally assented to at the Conference they should be circu-
lated to the Dominions for consideration before signature, 
and that a similar procedure, where time and circumstances 
permitted, should be adopted in the case of other international 
agreements affecting the Dominions. 
It is impossible to avoid raising the question whether the 
position of the Dominions should not be definitely recog-
nized by their separate representation by plenipotentiaries 
at the next Hague Conference or similar Conferences. The 
proposal is, of course, new, and it does go a good deal beyond 
anything contemplated at the Conference of 1911, when Sir 
Wilfrid Laurier1 hinted reluctance to advise in these matters, 
since advice meant backing up that advice with assistance in 
war, and since Canada did not hold the view that she must 
necessarily send men and ships to engage in all British wars. 
The proposal then made did not go so far as even to suggest 
that Canada or other Dominion representatives should be 
included among the number of British representatives 
appointed as plenipotentiaries. But in that position it may 
be doubted if they would be a source of much strength: if 
they disagreed with the British delegates they would have 
to be overruled, and on the other hand their agreement with 
these delegates would hardly add much to the force of the 
British position, if they were merely regarded as classed with 
the British delegation. 
There are undoubtedly difficulties in the way of any such 
proposal. In the first place it would be necessary for the 
Dominion Government to be invited, but it is certainly not 
an insuperable difficulty : it would always be possible for 
1 Parl. Pa:p., Cd. 5745, p. 117. 
1874 T 
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the British Government to intimate that an invitation to the 
Dominions was expected, and, if not received, that theBr:.tish 
Government would not find it possible to be present. Or, if 
desirable, before the next such Conference, this invitation of 
the Dominions could be secured by formal negotiations with 
the great powers. In the second place it is possible to object 
that such representation would be inimical to the unity of 
the Empire, and the position of the British Government. 
This view seems open to serious doubt: while on occasion 
differences of opinion :plight arise if it is true 1 that the 
Dominions would have supported the exemption of property 
from capture at sea at the last Conference, it is proof that 
their absence from it was an excellent thing btit in the 
main it would be advantageous to the United Kingdom to 
have its views reinforced by those of representatives of 
populations of over fifteen million white people. At the last 
Hague Conference, of forty-four peoples represented, only 
thirteen had populations larger than Canada. It is, however, 
true that the spectacle of the separate representation of the 
Dominions might emphasize in a marked way the separate 
character of the elements of the Empire, but it is ·doubtful 
whether this would be more the case than at present, when 
the self-government of the Dominions has become notorious, 
and the unity of the Empire is already in some measure 
definitely broken up. But it must be remembered that in 
point of fact the full powers to act on these occasions would 
be issued by the Crown on the advice of the Imperial Ministry, 
and that the power of ratification again rests with the King 
on the advice of the Imperial Ministry, and thus in effect the 
presence of these delegates would attest the real unity in 
foreign matters of the Empire, in so far as it represents one 
sovereignty, and one controlling power for foreign affairs. 
It is also to be noted that not only in commercial matters 
such as merchant shipping, but also in the matter of radio-
telegraphy, which has close relation to national defence, the 
precedent of the separate representation of the self-govern-
ing Dominions has already been. set. 
1 J. S. Ewart, Kingdom Papers, ii. 239. 
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The more serious objection to be urged to the proposal is 
the fact that it would in such matters as those regulating 
the rules of war be a necessity that the result decided upon 
by the self-governing Dominions should harmonize with the 
views of the Imperial Government. It is perfectly clear that, 
if certain rules as to the conduct of war, whether naval or 
military, are laid down, it is impossible for a Dominion to 
refuse to allow the rules to be applicable in her case. If 
the Empire is at war any enemy would treat it as one, and 
could not be expected to discriminate between different 
parts, just as it would in fact be impossible for the different 
forces of the Crown to carry on the war according to different 
rules. The most simple case that can be thought out is that 
of the question of the capture of merchant ships at sea. It 
might be agreed by the majority of the powers and by one 
of the Dominions that this power should not be exercised, 
while other powers, including the United Kingdom, retained 
the power. Now the Dominion war vessels, if any, might in 
theory not be used to capture such merchant vessels, and 
in return the Dominion might expect that the foreign power 
would not capture her registered merchant ships. Obviously, 
however, the other power would at once be able to object 
that the British disposition of forces would place the 
Dominion vessel, with its inability to capture enemy mer-
chant vessels, in some part of the field of operations where 
it would have other work to do, and would send a British 
vessel instead to the point where merchant vessels could .be 
expected to be captured, and would not for a moment agree 
to spare Dominion ships because -they were registered in 
such a Dominion. In any other case which can be imagined 
the absurdity would become more palpable. If military or 
naval forces act together they must act under one code of 
international law, or confusion will be endless. The strength 
of this reasoning can be illustrated by an obvious case : on the 
occasion of the European War it was found essential for 
France and the United Kingdom to assimilate as closely as 
possible their laws as to naval prize, and that despite the 
fact that the two fleets were in every way distinct and not so 
T2 
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closely allied in action as any Dominion and British flee~s 
must be. 
· This consideration, however, is not an argument which 
is conclusive against the concession of separate plenipoten-
tiaries : in these Hague Conferences, it is notorious that 
allied powers go with the intention of supporting the views 
which they have agreed upon before the meeting, · and the 
same arrangement could easily be made among the r~pre­
sentatives of the several Britannic Governments. · It is only 
necessary that the final action to be taken should be agreed 
upon, so that if the delegates in the first instance cannot 
agree, it is open for the final decision of the different Govern-
ments to be arrived at after the discussion at the Conference, 
and after it is known how the majority of powers have decided 
to a_ct. This is rendered easy by the fact that signature 
of the Hague Conventions can be delayed for a certain time, 
which can be varied by agreement, and that if there arose 
a difference of view among the delegates the matter could 'be 
finally arranged by discussion with the governments con-
cerned. The position would for all practical purposes be 
just as difficult if the Dominions were only allowed to send 
members to serve on the British delegation. Such delegates 
would certainly not consent to serve if they were simply to 
agree with the British delegates : as early as 1883, at a con-
ference regarding the protection of submarine cables, Sir C. 
Tupper voted differently from the other British delegates, 
and won them round to his view,1 and in the negotiations 
at Washington in 1871, Sir John Macdonald engaged in a 
vehement controversy with the British delegates. Nothing 
would thus be gained by the refusal to create the delegates 
plenipotentiaries, and there would be lost the weight given 
by the· effective appearance of the representatives o~ coming 
11ations, two of which are already sufficiently large in popu-
lation to count as important powers even in an international 
sense, while they have before them prospects which promise 
the one a commanding position in the future comparable to 
that of any power in the world, and the other a place of 
1 Recollections of Sixty Years, p. 175. 
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honour and dignity among the nations. It is doubtful if the 
sense of authority of such communities can ever be adequately 
satisfied by mere !nclusion in any British delegation, how-
ever much they might be able to influence that delegation. 
It must be borne in mind that the making of conventions 
tends more and more to require legislation in the Dominions, 
and the time when the Dominions could be expected to pass 
legislation -in this regard "\\rithout knowledge is past. It is 
also equally out of the questio:p. to expect the Dominion 
Parliaments longer to acqujesce in the passing of Imperial 
legislation on these topics without consultation, and in most 
cases the passing of local legislation will be doubtless pre-
ferred. The Geneva Convention Act, 1911,1 indeed was passed 
without any such reference to the Dominions, _ but provision 
was made in it for adaptation by Order in Council to the 
Dominions, and it was accordingly adapted in consultation 
with the Dominion Governments, but even so the pass.ing 
of such a measure which actually interfered with Dominion 
trade-marks was obviously unconstitutional. 
. There is every ground to prefer the extension of the 
authority _of the Dominion Governments under the form of 
the appointment of plenipotentiaries by the King, and his 
ratificatiop. of their actions with, in each case, the advice_ 
of the Imperial Government. The latter qualification is of 
course essential : if the advice on which the representatives 
of the Dominion were appointed plenipotentiaries and their 
acts ratified was that of Dominion ministers alone, then the 
Crown would cease to be an el-ement of unity, but would 
become a different personality for each part of the Empire, 
and nothing could result but inconvenience from a position 
which converted the King resident in the United Kingdom 
into an inqependent and di:fferer1t sovereign, living indeed in. 
the United Kingdom, but acting in a totally different capacity. 
The exercise . of the power of appointment and ratification 
ultimately on· the advice of the Imperial Ministry, though 
1 It was passed to permit of the withdrawal of the reservation made by 
the United l(ingdom to the Geneva Convention of 1906; Parl. Pap., 
Cd. 7715. 
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that Ministry would normally act as desired by the Dominion 
Governments, retains in the Crown a centre of unity in the 
Empire, and some unity is essential to the existence of the 
Empire. Moreover, the observance of these forms would 
avoid the disadvantages which now arise from .attempts at 
separate treaty-making, such as that of the Canadian minis-
ters in 1911, whose action, had it been ratified by the Par-
liament of Canada, would have undoubtedly tended to 
diminish the unity of the Empire, and perhaps ultimately 
to destroy that unity altogether. 
It is a n1atter of some importance that the demand for the 
right to make treaties independently of the Imperial power, 
though it has been claimed now a.nd then, as for instance, in 
the proposal for the neutrality of the Colonies made in 1870 
by certain members of the Royal Commission appointed by 
the Governor of Victoria to consider questions of federal 
union, and though it has on several occasions been the sub-
ject of discussion in the Parliament of Canada,1 has never 
led to the definite adoption by a responsible Parliament 
of the Empire of the demand as justifiable and desirable. 
It is, however, clear that the policy of the Liberal 
Government in Canada in the years 1910 and 1911 in 
·negotiating so freely with the Consuls-General of the foreign 
powers resident in Canada was one of some danger to the 
unity of the treaty power, and the sense of the changing 
position thus accorded to consular officers was shown by the 
debate which took place in the Canadian House of Commons 
at the end of 1910,2 when the proposal was made that the 
consular officers of the great powers should be given a 
quasi-diplomatic rank and recognition, a proposal which Sir 
Wilfrid Laurier neither accepted nor refused outright, con-
fining himself to a statement of the development in the 
position of these officials, which had taken place. It must, 
however, be regarded as doubtful in the extreme whether the 
1 See House of Commons Debates, Oct. 3, 1874; April21, 1882; Feb. 18, 
1889 ; April 7, 1892; Feb. 20, 1908 ; Willison, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, i. 
206 seq. 
. 2 Cf. Canadian Annual Review, 1910, p. 89. 
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development of the diplomatic position of consular officers 
is in any way to be desired. It is indeed argued in favour of 
this course that it is thus possible to ascertain more accurately 
the views of the foreign powers than can be done through 
the diplomatic channel, but the strength of this view cer-
tainly seems to be very slight, and to be contradicted by 
probability and by facts. Quite as much as any diplomatic 
officers, consuls have to refer back to their Governments at 
every point for instructions, and detailed arrangements of 
any kind are not matters in which they seem to be com-
petent to give any great deal of assistance. At any rate, 
when the first adherence of Canada to the Japanese treaty of 
commerce was given. in 1906 the Canadian Government seem 
to have acted on the views of the Japanese consular officer in 
Canada to the effect that there need be no fear of any con-
siderable Japanese immigration, and, when his predictions 
were falsified by the considerable influx of Japanese fron1 
Hawaii which culn1inated in rioting in British Columbia, it is 
significant that it was to Japan that Mr. Lemieux was sent 
with instructions to negotiate with the assistance of the 
British Ambassador an arrangem_ent for the purpose of avoid-
ing any recurrence of the difficulty, and it 'vas in Japan that 
the satisfactory arrangement was arrived a.t. The two con-
ventions with France of 1907 and 1909 were both negotiated 
direct with French ministers by Mr. Fielding, and it was at 
Washington with the President and his Secretary of State 
that the Canadian ministers in 1911 negotiated. Even 
assuming that consular officers of specially high qualifica-
tions were sent to the Dominions,it would always seem better 
for the Dominion Governments to get into direct touch 
with responsible ministers in the foreign countries concerned, 
and only thus of course, when they act formally and under 
the control in the long run of the Imperial Government, can 
they have any security that they are not inadvertently in-
juring other Imperial interests. Nor of course can the fact 
be overlooked that the Imperial interest is often of the 
greatest assistance to the Dominions in negotiating treaties. 
It is not to be supposed for a moment that the same terms 
• 
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would, for instance, be given to Newfoundland 1 as are given 
to the United Kingdom without the intervention of the latter, 
and for most of the Dominions the Imperial Government has 
already been able to win considerable commercial advantages 
by associating them with herself in trade negotiations. In 
fact it may fairly be said that a separate negotiation is really 
one which is conceived from a purely selfish point of view, 
and that if any Dominion is anxious not to neglect Imperial 
interests at large she will normally and naturally seek the 
support of the Imperial Government, which must have a 
special knowledge of the interests of the other parts of the 
Empire. 
There is a matter of recent date which points to the realiz .. 
ation by the Dominions of the advantages which are to be 
derived from close co-operation with the Imperial Go,rern .. 
ment. The practice of appointing trade agents to perform 
in the foreign countries to which they are sent trade func-
tions for the benefit of Dominion su"Qjects has been carried 
to a considerable extent by .the Doniinion of Canada, and 
to a much less extent in Australia. It is now clear that these 
appointments have seldom much success in the purposes for 
which they are intended. The propensity of Canadian trade 
agents for getting into trouble with the Governments of the 
countries where they are .posted by injudicious action in 
tempting people to emigrate from countries whence emigra-
tion is forbidden is notorious, and "Tas the cause of a very 
grave dispute in 1914 with the Government of Austria-Hun-
gary, which, though due in the main to intrigues on the part of 
the German rivals of the Canadian railways, was in part, no 
doubt, caused by connivance at prohibited emigration. In 
this case the persons involved were not Government em-
ployees, but it was currently reported on excellent authority 
that so distinguished a man as the late High Commissioner 
for the Dominion was unable to visit Germany in view of 
proceedings which the German authorities were anxious to 
take against him in respect of contraventions of German law. 
1 e. g. the concessions on Newfoundland fish secured in the Portuguese 
treaty of commerce. 
I 
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Further, the Conservative Government when taking office 
in 1911 found that the conduct of the work of the agencies 
in Europe was in considerable measure unsatisfactory, and 
it decided to make more free use of the facilities offered by 
the Foreign Office for the employment of British consular and 
diplomatic officers in connexion with the advance of Canadian 
trade. The wisdom of_ the decision in question is obvious : it 
would be hopelessly expensive for any Dominion to duplicate 
the system of consuls, and even if the men were appointed 
they could not receive any consular status, as the right to 
appoint consular officers is one which appertains only, and 
is accorded in treaties solely, to the sovereign power in the 
Empire. If it were desired to give them consular status, 
this could indeed be done by securing their appointment by 
the Crown as His Majesty's consuls for Canada, or whatever 
other Dominion was concerned, but such an appointment 
would mean that the holders of office were appointed on the 
advice of the Imperial Government, and would have to be 
subjected to the control of the Imperial Government, since 
that Government would be responsible for them vis-a-vis the 
foreign Government, as it is not now responsible for mere 
commercial agents. The same result can be attained more 
effectively and easily and much more cheaply by the use of 
British consuls by the Dominions, who can pay if necessary 
any extra clerical expense caused by their employment. 
The same consideration, it may be added, applies to the 
representation of the Dominions by diplomatic officers in 
the foreign capitals : these officers could not, as long as the 
Empire is constituted as at present, be other than appointees 
of the Crown on the authority of the Imperial Government.1 
One class of treaties presents a special interest, that re-
garding extradition, by reason of the curious fact that up to 
the latest date these treaties have been regarded as sonle-
thing on which the Dominions do not need to be consulted, 
1 The statement in the Canadian Annual Review, 1910, p. 90, that in 
the case of Mr. Preston's appointment as Trade Commissioner in Holland 
he was given a British status without British control is a mistake. This 
was not done in any way. 
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and which therefore become applicable to the Dominions 
without reference to their wishes. There is, of course, no 
logical reasoning for this procedure, which will doubtless 
follow the example of similar illogical procedures and dis .. 
appear for good. The principle that a criminal should be 
extradited, to whichever part of the world he may fl~r for 
refuge, is doubtless sound, and the British Dominions are 
hardly likely in any case in which they are consulted to seek 
to refuse the surrender of a criminal by remaining outside the 
scope of an extradition treaty, but that is clearly no reason 
why they should not be allowed the option of deciding for 
themselves, and similarly it should be possible for any 
Dominion to be withdrawn from the operation of such a 
treaty by due notice if it so 'vishes. In s·uch a case, there 
would of course be perfect mutuality of rendition : if the 
Dominion were not affected by the treaty her criminals 
could enjoy safety in the country affected by the refusal, and 
vice versa. Moreover, it may be desirable that the views of 
the Dominions should be consulted as to the exact nature 
of the crimes to be inserted in the schedule to the treaty in 
which the offences covered by it are enumerated. 
·A further deduction from logical principles leads to the 
view that the Imperial Government must not hesitate when 
desired to conclude special conventio11s for the extradition 
of fugitive offenders for the benefit of special Dominions, 
which may have special conditions not within the existing 
treaties. It is probable enough that this could not effec-
tively be done under the terms of the existing Extradition Act, 
which does not appear to contemplate any such procedure, 
but to recognize only a general extradition treaty. But it 
is obvious that should two countries, one a Dominion and 
one a foreign cou11try, have conterminous boundaries, the 
effect to a treaty could always be given by the simple process 
of reciprocal legislation without recourse to the terms of the 
Extradition Act at all. More difficulty would arise if the 
person to be extradited were being conveyed through British 
territory outside the Dominion affected, since in such territory 
he would ·appear clearly not to be in any legal custody what-
• 
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ever, and to legalize his detention either an extension of the 
Imperial Act or local legislation would be required. It is, 
however, obviously doubtful whet he~ such a case could easily 
arise, since the conclusion of special treaties would almost 
always be required because of the necessity of meeting some 
crime specially common in two adjoining countries with 
common interests. 
. Special interest attaches to the Canadian legislation on 
extradition, because alone of Dominion Legislatures that of 
Canada has insisted on so legislating to cover the whole 
ground as to allow of the suspension by Order in Council of 
the Imperial Act in respect of the Dominion of Canada. 
This suspension has, however, one real disadvantage: a 
fugitive offender when being conveyed through the United 
Kingdom en route to a foreign state on extradition cannot, 
it seems, be said to be in legal custody in the United Kingdom 
under a warrant of the Dominion. Of course, however, in so 
far as the crime for which he is being extradited is one which 
would render him liable to extradition under the treaty 
from the United Kingdom, he could be rearrested, if he 
attempted to secure his freedom by writ of habeas corpus; 
under a British warrant. There is, however, the possibility, 
decidedly remote and theoretic, that a crime might be one 
for which a man could under the Canada Act be extradited 
from Canada, and yet not under English law be technically 
an extraditable offence, as the list of offences in the two 
Acts does not quite perfectly correspond, but this is a case 
of quite minimal possibility. 
_Canada is also of interest for her attempt to adopt in 1889 
a system of extradition without treaty,1 a system which was 
recommended for England by a Commission in 1878, but 
which has never actually been made effective in that country. 
In Canada also the part of the Extradition Act affected has 
remained a dead letter, though it is legally ready to be put 
1 It was actually in force in Upper Canada before the first extradition 
treaty of 1842 by 3 Will. IV, c. 6. See now Revised Statutes, 1906, c. 155, 
Part II. Its need was diminished by the passing of the new treaty of 
1889 with the ·unit~d States into force in 1890. 
• 
• 
300 IMPERIAL UNITY AND THE DOMINIONS 
in force if and when the Domi11ion Government deem it 
desirable to take this course. The procedure would be easily 
available for cases of crime in the United States : the 
Dominion Government in this regard showed an admirable 
promptitude of action in the famous case of the entry of the 
criminal Harry Thaw into Canada on his escape from the 
asylum in which he was then confined. The Minister of 
Justice took the control of the question into his own hands, 
and promptly under the powers of the Immigration Act de-
ported Thaw, and left him in the hands of the police on the 
other side of the border, his personal action confounding the 
efforts of Thaw's legal advisers to secure legal process pre-
venting his removal from the Dominion. The effectiveness 
of the Minister's conduct 1 in preventing the scandal of pro-
tracted legal proceedings was admiringly noted in the United 
States press. Nor could there be any doubt of the correct-
ness of the action of the Minister, as no alien has any statutory 
right 2 to enter the Dominion, and the question of whether he 
was guilty of an extradition crime, in view of his having 
been found insane at the time of the murder he committed, 
would have afforded abundant theme for dispute before 
the courts. 
1 Cf. C~nada House of Commons Debates, March 4, 1914; New York 
Tribune, Sept. 11, 1913; Canadian Annual Review, 1913, pp. 239-41.· 
2 Musgrove v. Chun Teeong Toy, [1891] A. C. 272 . 
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CHAPTER XV 
THE QUESTION OF DEFENCE 
1. MILITARY -DEFENCE 
THAT a self-governing Dominion should protect itself 
from inter11al disorder, and that it should, as circumstances 
allowed, make some provision for its own defence, was a truth 
which was rather slow to receive quite definite formulation 
after the grant of responsible government. Th_e view was, 
however, at last attained in 1862, when this doctrine was laid 
down by a resolution of the House of Commons. Its execu-
tion was, however, far from hurried, and passed through_ the 
stage when the colonies might have Imperial troops if they 
chose to pay for them to the period when the Imperial troops 
were strictly confined to the necessities of Imperial as opposed 
to local defence. It was never for a moment doubted that if 
any part of the British Dominions was attacked the whole 
force of the Empire must be used to protect it: that prin-
ciple was reiterated time after time, and not a single utterance 
to the contrary can be traced, but it was felt that except for 
the needs of Imperial defence (including -in this term the 
defence of the colony against external attack) Imperial forces 
could not properly be used. The conception of what was 
necessary for Imperial defence naturally differed from time to 
time. In Australasia the experience of the use of Imperial 
troops . in putting down Maori wars was unfavourable: a 
New Zealand Government actually endeavoured to lay down 
the rule that the troops must be employed as they thought fit, 
and that the policy to be adopted towards the natives must 
be precisely as they wished, a proposal which would of course 
have reduced the Imperial Government to the level of 
a tributary of New Zealand. The view was indignantly re-
pudiated by the Imperial Government of the day, a precedent 
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which might have been borne in mind in the case of the 
similar demand of Natal in 1906,1 and the result was the with-
drawal of the Imperial forces, in the confidence that on the 
one hand the power of the natives had been so broken that 
there was no danger of the colonists being unable to hold 
them in subjection, while on the other hand the need of carry-
ing on their own wars of repression at the cost of their own 
lives would impress on the colonists the desirability of ·sub-
stituting, for a policy of blood and fire, a milder and better 
considered regime. The result was, as expected, to the great 
benefit of the colony and all its inhabitants. In Australia 
there was still less need to keep Imperial troops, and the 
unwillingness of the colonies to agree to a plan for concentrat-
ing the troops, in case of need, led to their withdrawal also. 
In Canada, on the other hand, the Imperial Government 
recognized other obligations, and spent money freely on the 
defences of Quebec, even after confederation, while it guaran-
teed a Canadian loan to improve the militia, and provide 
fortifications for Montreal. In later times the Imperial forces 
were still available for defence : in 1870, when the Riel 
rebellion seemed for a time to threaten the intervention of 
the United States, and the dismemberment of the west of 
Canada, it was an Imperial force which after a most difficult 
journey arrived on the scene and ended the revolt at once. 
In 1885, on the contrary, when the north-west rebellion broke 
out, the building of the Canadian Pacific railway had made 
things easy, and the Canadian forces performed without 
difficulty the work of suppression themselves. The Imperial 
forces, however, continued down to the period of the Boer 
War to man Halifax and Esquimalt, on the ground that these 
were important naval bases, and therefore of Imperial con-
sequence. But as a result of the pressure for troops in that 
war, the Canadian Government decided to offer to relieve 
the British Government of the need for retaining a garrison 
there, and after the conclusion of the war arrangements were 
made for the final handing over to Dominion control of the 
two -places, and the naval docks there on conditions which 
1 Above, Part I, chap. iv. 
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secured their retention as naval bases open to the use of the 
British fleet whenever required.1 With the departure of the 
British forces finally from Canada, the former practice by 
which the officer commanding the Canadian militia was 
always an Imperial officer ceased to have effect, and the post 
became open to · officers whose military experience was 
Canadian, one of whom, General Otter, held the post with 
great distinction. In South Africa, on the other hand, the 
final removal of the Imperial forces was only carried out at 
the beginning of the European War, and the outbreak of 
the grave rebellion in the Union, as a result in part of this 
removal, proved that the retention of troops had not been by 
any means unduly prolo11ged.2 
During the long period after the practical 'vithdrawal of 
the Imperial forces from Canada and Australia, attempts were 
steadily made by the Imperial Government to induce the 
Dominions concerned to take seriously the necessity of main-
taining their forces in good condition, and Imperial officers 
worked energetically in positions as commandants of these 
forces to secure good results. The task was, however, prac-
tically impossible of realization. The officers themselves 
were apt to misunderstand the limits of their authority and 
power : the Canadian Government, indeed, found it almost 
impossible to avoid quarrelling with its Imperial officers: it 
dismissed one, and the otherswere always at variancewith the 
extraordinary methods by which officers were appointed on 
political grounds alone. Moreover, in all the Dominions it was 
hard to obtain funds for any serious military work, and there 
prevailed the feeling that the British navy was the true basis 
of defence and that local forces should just be sufficient to 
keep down riots or disorder of an internal nature. It was 
not until the twentieth century that anything effective was 
done. The formation of the Australian Commonwealth had 
been expected to me_an a serious effort to reconstitute the 
scattered forces of the states, but for years the expectation 
was disappointed, and in 1908 the military efficiency of the 
Commonwealth was certainly not superior to what it had 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 2]565. 2 Cf. Parl. Pap., Cd. 7874 . 
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been in 1900, and indeed, may have been inferior. The trans-
continental railway to connect Western Australia with the 
east of the country was still unbegun, and Australia could 
not claim, as Canada claimed, both through its Liberal and 
Conservative Governments, that with its limited resources it 
was doing far more useful work for defence by its railway 
policy than by training a few thousand more· recruits 
annually for a few weeks.1 Indeed, the obvious necessity 
for military purposes of a single railway gauge had never 
been recognized, and the gauge adopted by the several 
states was a different one. 
The distinct menace of European complications which 
arose in 1909 had a considerable effect in fixing the views 
of the Governments on defence questions. Canada indeed 
remained practically unmoved, but in New Zealand 2 and 
Australia 3 the view definitely presented itself that there 
should be some system by which men should be trained for 
the defence of the country, and in that year both countries 
adopted defence systems of training which compelled the youth 
of the country to undergo such training. But the schemes 
were dominated by the fear of political consequences, 
and both stopped compulsion at the age when the youth . 
became a voter, an interesting example of the timidity of 
even the Dominions in dealing with the duty of defence of 
the country. ·These schemes, however, were revived when 
Lord Kitchener visited both the Commonwealth and the 
Dominion at the end of 1909 and beginning of 1910: he 
made a careful survey in each case of the existing conditions, 
and insisted that if there were to be possible any adequate 
defence scheme the training must not stop at the exact period 
when a _ youth became valuable from a military point of view:. 
The result was that both Dominions 4 amended their laws 
in 1910, and have since then, despite modifications in detail, 
adhered fixedly to the general plan then laid down. 
1 Sir C. Tupper, Recollections of Sixty Years, p. 283. 
2 Act No. 28 of 1909. 3 Act No. 15 of 1909. 
4 Acts No. 21 of 1910 and 37 of 1910. See Parl. Pap., Cd. 5582, pp. 16, 
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As a result of this report, New Zealand established a system 
under which all male inhabitants of the Dominion after six 
months' residence became liable for military training, pro-
vided they were British subjects: the periods were from 
twelve years of age to fourteen years of age or . the date of 
leaving an elementary school in the junior cadets, from that 
age to eighteen years or the date of leaving a secondary 
school in the senior cadets, and from that age to twenty-
five either in the general training section or in the territorial 
force, the distinction being due to the fact that it was con-
sidered impracti~able to insist on all those eligl.ble going 
through the full training, as it would cost too much money, 
and therefore the general training section was to be limited 
to about 30,000 a year. The scheme, however, was modified 
later 1 in three important respects: in the first place, after 
further consideration, the military training of the junior 
cadets was abandoned as useless, and a training und.er the 
education department on the methods of the boy scout move-
ment substituted. In the second place it was found prac-
ticable so to arrange the times of drill and training that an 
average youth by the age of twenty-two would be free from 
further training, though of course under liability to serve in 
case of need, and in the third place exemption was accorded 
to persons whose religious beliefs prevented them consenting 
to military training, on the condition thatthesepersonsshould 
be called upon to perform such work for the public service, 
other than military, as might be determined by the Governor 
in Council. For the conscientious objector no place could, 
however, be found, unless he could show that his conscience 
rested on religious convictions. 
The trainee from twenty-five to thirty years of age serves 
in the reserve, and in time of war not only can these forces be 
called out, but all male inhabitants of New Zealand between 
the ages of seventeen and fifty-five may be called upon to 
serve if they have resided six months in the country. 
In the Commonwealth the scheme has been less modified 1 
1 Act No. 20 of 1912 ; 
pp. 12, 13. 
1874 
Parl. Pap., Cd. 6863, pp. 15, 16, 134-43; 7507, 
u 
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than in New Zealand. All male inhabitants who have resided 
for six months and are British subjects are liable for training 
from age twelve to age fourteen in the junior cadets, from age 
fourteen to age eighteen in the senior cadets, from age eighteen 
to age twenty-five in the citizen forces, and from age twenty-
five to age twenty-six in those forces; but, except in time of 
imminent danger of war during the last period, the service 
shall be limited to one registration or one muster parade in 
each year. All male inhabitants between the ages of fifteen 
and sixty years, after six months' residence, if British sub-
jects, are also liable for service in case of war. It has not been 
found possible to make any exception in the case of liability 
to military service even for religious objectors, and the work 
of enforcing the military training on the cadets has Ilecessi-
tated some additions to the criminal law, in the shape of the 
invention of a process of military detention for boys who will 
not obey the regulations. The periods of service at first 
exacted have been considerably lowered, but the value of 
such training as is given has been asserted on all hands.1 
' 
The example of Australia and New Zealand was followed, 
but with innovations of an interesting character, by the 
Union Government on its establishment. Under the Defence 
Act, 1912,2 every citizen is liable between his seventeenth and 
sixtieth year to render in time of war personal service in 
defence of the Union, and he is also liable to undergo a course 
of peace training for military service, and may be required' 
to commence that training in his twenty-first year, and to 
complete it not later than his twenty-fifth year, but he may 
voluntarily com1nence it in any year between his seventee11th 
and twenty-first year, in which case, of course, he may even 
finish his training before his twenty-first year is completed. 
Of the total number liable to peace training only fifty per · 
cent. shall actually undergo the training unless special pro-
vision is made otherwise by Parliament. ·But every citizen 
who has not been entered in his twenty-first year and is liable 
1 Acts Nos. 15 of 1911 ; 5 of 1912; Parl. Pap., Cd. 6863, pp. 126, 127 ; 
7507, pp. 11, 12. 
2 Parl. Pap., Cd. 6863, pp. 144-63; cf. 6091, pp. 88-106. 
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to training must serve as a member of a rifle association from 
his twenty-first year for a period of four years. The privilege 
of such service and the duty of so serving is, however, not 
accorded to other than Europeans·, a distinction resting on 
the fundamental conditions in the Union. 
In the case of Canada no change has been made . for many 
years in the conditions of service in the militia. All Canadian 
inhabitants of British nationality are liable for such service 
ii1 the period bet,veen·age 18 and age 60, and th·e Governor-
General may require all the male inhabitants of Canada 
capable of bearing arms to serve in the ease of a levee en 
masse. But the militia is recruited in effect by voluntary 
enlistment, though the power to use the ballot exists, and 
every proposal to make the condition of service in the militia 
compulsory would be resisted to the utmost by the province 
of Quebec, as well as by many other elements in the Dominion. 
The training of the militia, about 40,000 of whom serve 
annually, is in many respects defective, the equipment is 
deficient, and political influence has done its best to deprive 
the force of efficiency; but the raw material of the militia has 
always been as excellent as the spirit of patriotism in the .. 
forces. Moreover, the efforts of Sir Sam Hughes, the Minister 
of Militia in the Borden administration, have undoubtedly 
borne much fruit.1 
The constitutional relations between the forces of the 
Crown in the Dominions and those in the United Kingdom 
are happily in the case of the Army of a very simple kind. It 
was long ago recognized that in militia armies the exact code 
of discipline of the regular British forces was out of place, 
and a distinction has been drawn by Dominion legislation be-
tween the small permanent forces retained for instructional 
purposes, or in South Africa in the main as a police force of 
military character, and the mass of the forces. But the disci-
pline thus applied is based on the Imperial Army Act, and it 
follows it closely in most of its principles. When the forces 
of the Dominion are employed outside the Dominion in 
1 Revised Statutes, 1906, c. 41. A most important report of Gen. Otter's 
is summarized in Parl. Pap., Cd. 7 507, pp. 10, 11. 
U2 
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operations it is provided bys.177 oftheArmyActthat, where 
any force of volunteers or of militia or any other force is raised 
in~ colony, any law of the colony may extend to the officers, 
non-commissioned officers, and men of such a force whether 
within or without the limits of the colony, and any such law 
may apply, in relation to such force, and to any officers, non-
commissioned officers, and men thereof all or any of the 
provisions of the Army Act, subject to such adaptations, 
.modifications, and exceptions as may be specified in such law, 
and where so applied the Army Act shall have effect in relation 
to such force, subject to such adaptations, modifications, and 
exceptions as aforesaid, and where any such force is serving 
with part of his Majesty's regular forces, then, so far as the 
law of the colony has not provided for the governmen.t and 
discipline of such force, the Army Act, and any other Act for 
the time being amending it, shall, subject to such exceptions 
and modifications as may be specified in the general orders 
of the general officer commanding his Majesty's forces with 
which such force is serving, apply to the officers, non-com-
missioned officers, and men of such force, in like manner as 
they apply to the officers, non-commissioned officers, and men 
·of the regular forces. This, however, is not applicable in the 
case of any officer belonging to any colonial force when he 
is attached to or doing duty with, or to any non-commis-
sioned officer or man belonging to any such force when 
attached to, or otherwise acting as part of or with, any 
portion of the regular, reserve, or auxiliary forces in the 
United Kingdom. The last provision is of value, since other-
wise it would appear that when an officer or man was attached 
to an Imperial unit he would be governed by the colonial law, 
which might result in complete confusion, since the unit itself 
could not be subjected to that law. 
. In the case of officers lent and men placed at the disposal 
of Dominion Governments by the Imperial Government 
the Army Act remains applicable to them, but they fall also 
under the law of the Dominion and its military regulations, 
thus being subject to joint jurisdiction, which, however, 
is a disadvantage of little special importance. Moreover, 
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legal provision has been made for a11d by the Dominions 
to cover the case of recruits for the Imperial forces raised in 
the Dominions, and to secure their discipline and control 
before joining these forces, and on the way back to the 
Dominions from such service, while of course it is still open 
to recruit men directly for the Imperial forces in any Do-
minion, in which case the Army Act is directly applicable, as 
in the case of Canada at the beginning of the war. 
While the arrangements made by law to facilitate and 
legalize the co-operation of the Imperial and the local forces 
is now satisfactory, it must be recognized that the obligation 
of such service imposed on the inhabitants of the Dominion 
is service for domestic purposes, and not service for oversea 
purposes, though men may volunteer for that purpose. It 
follows, therefore, that not only has the Imperial Government 
no power to move a single Dominion soldier, but that the 
local Government has no power without fresh legislation to 
compel service oversea. The principle of the autonomy 01 
the Dominion is thus preserved in full perfection : any men 
who serve overseas serve by the free will of themselves, and 
if organized by the free will of their Government. It is true 
that no Government has the power by law to prevent recruit-
ing for the British Imperial forces in the Dominion, but to 
assume such a power would obviously be incompatible with 
the constitution of the Empire, as it would mean that a portion 
of the Empire could forbid a subject of the Crown from 
fighting voluntarily in its cause, and such a claim could not 
exist in the present circumstances. If the Government and 
Parliament desire to assist actively in the war the Govern-
ment encourages recruiting, and spends money on the equip-
ment and pay of the forces, which it obtains from Parliament. 
The necessary similarity of training which should exist 
between the forces of the Empire is attained in such measure 
as is available by the means of inspection, interchange, and 
instruction of Dominion officers in schools of instruction in 
the United Kingdom or in India and the creation of a general 
staff.1 The inspection of the forces of the oversea Dominions 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 4475 and 5746, II. 
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is and must be exercised on the request of these Dominions, 
and the last important visits of inspection were those of the 
Inspector-General, Sir Ian Hamilton, in 1913-14, to Canada, 
to Australia, and to New Zealand. The value of these inspec-
tions by trained Imperial officers with practical experience of 
war is greatly valued in the Dominions. The interchange of 
officers is also sometimes possible with excellent results for 
the Dominion officers on the one hand and with some profit to 
the Imperial officers on the other, especially if the latter have 
Dominion connexions of any kind. But the most frequent 
mode of allowing Dominion officers to attain knowledge 
must be the use of schools of instruction, and attendance at 
the Staff Colleges at Camberley and Quetta, since it would 
be difficult for any Dominion Government to afford the same 
educational advantages to a student of war. The appoint-
ment of trained British officers to the chief commands in the 
oversea forces is almost always advantageous to tl1ose forces, 
and in the future the existence of large numbers of Dominion 
trained officers will supply adequately all needs, and will 
probably render exchanges more frequent and effective than 
they have hitherto been. The Dominions also are learning 
to make the ·necessary supplies of munitions of war of all 
kinds, including artillery, and in this, of course, they follow 
the teachings as a rule of the Imperial War Office : the chief 
exception to this rule in Australia, a cartridge factory en-
trusted to American hands, has not been an unqualified 
success. 
2. NAVAL DEFENCE • 
The essential characteristic of naval action as operating 
extra-territorially has resulted in the raising of grave ques-
tions of constitutional law for which no parallel has evinced 
itself in the case of military defence. These questions have, 
however, become of importance only of very recent years, 
since the development of naval activity on the part of the 
Dominions dates back in effect only to 1909. But the first 
difficulties arose as early as 1860, when the Parliament of 
Victoria, in view of the fact that they had under their control 
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an armed vessel, the Victoria, which was employed as a trans-
port to convey troops to New Zealand to suppress the Maori 
rebellion there, found it necessary to establish the legal 
position of the crew by legislating for the government of the 
ship, its officers, and men. The passing of the Act, which the 
Governor assented to on the ground of urgency, led to a full 
consideration ~of the matter, and to the decision that it was 
impossible for a colonial legislature to pass an Act which 
would have extra-territorial validity, and that a vessel thus 
acting under a mere colonial authorit-y would therefore not 
be a vessel of the Crown in the view of international law, 
since her authority to do warlike acts, even in case of war, 
· would be limited to the territorial limits of the colony. To 
remedy this defect, there was passed in 1865 an Act, the 
Colonial Naval Defence Act, which governed the position in 
Australia for ·many years. It authorized any colonial legis-
lature, with the approval of the Crown in Council, to maintain 
ships of war, and naval forces, including volunteers, who 
were to be bound to serve in the Royal Navy as required, 
to regulate the conduct of such forces while ashore or afloat 
in the li_mits of the colony, and to apply to the forces when 
ashore or afloat within the colonial limits, or €lsewhere, the 
regulations in force regarding the Royal Navy. It also 
authorized the acceptance by the Admiralty of offers of 
colonial governments of vessels and men, in which case the 
vessels and men-would fall under the rules in force for the 
Navy. It will be seen that the intention of the Act was to 
leave the colonial legislature, if it desired, to make any regu-
lations which it wished for the government of the men within 
the limits of the colony, but if they went without they would 
fall under the regulations for the Royal Navy, and the same 
result would be attained, but ina different way, if the men and 
ships were transferred to the control of the Admiralty : in 
the former case the control of the ships would remain with 
the colonial government, . in the latter with the Admiralty, 
but, of course, the control of the Admiralty would in effect 
have been exercised evenrin the first case had the vessel been 
-aeting where there was a senior officer of the Navy presen~~-
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The provisions of the statute were made effective in 
Victoria in 1872 by the passing of Colonial Acts Nos. 389 
and 417, and in 1884 further Orders in Council were issued 
under the Act in respect of the Victoria, Albert, and Childers, 
vessels of war which had been built in England for the 
Government of Victoria, the vessels being placed under the 
Admiralty for the time of their voyage to their destination, 
when they fell under the control of the Victorian Government. 
In 1900 Orders in Council were again issued to accept the ser-
vices of men offered by New South Wales and Victoria, and 
a vessel, the Protector, offered by South Australia to the 
Admiralty for service in China, and in 1884 an Order in 
Council was issued in accordance with a South Australian 
Act of that year to authorize the maintenance of the 
Protector, while in 1885 two Orders in Council were issued 
in accordance with the Queensland Act, No. _27 of 1884, 
to provide for the maintenance of the Gayundah, and 
its being placed for the time at the disposal of the 
Admiralty. 
It would, however, be erroneous to suppose that the whole 
of the armed ships of very miscellaneous character and 
not much value which the Commonwealth found owned by 
the States when it came into existence were raised under the 
powers of the Act of 1865. In the majority of cases the vessels 
were raised simply under the general power of the colonial 
legislatures to regulate their own affairs within territorial 
limits, and therefore their right to maintain a naval defence 
force in these limits. It is beyond all doubt that internationally 
within these limits the ships were as much ships of the Crown 
as the Royal Navy itself, and the officers had internationally 
all the powers of the officers of the Royal Navy in the matter 
of the resistance of hostile attack and the capture of prize, 
though luckily no need for the exercise of these powers 
could well arise. 
The Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 1900, 
raised a new question. It conferred on the Commonwealth 
power to legislate as to naval defence, and that mere fact 
was a clear ;·hint that the purely territorial limitation of 
.. 
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colonial laws did not apply to this specific power. It was 
obvious that the power to legislate must extend at least 
to cover the case of any naval force operating to such extent 
as was necessary to drive away enemy ships from the coast 
of the Commonwealth, and this meant extra-territorial action 
in many cases. This conclusion was greatly aided by the 
fact that s. 5 of the Act expressly provided that the laws of 
the Commonwealth should be in force on all British ships, 
the King's ships of war excepted, whose first port of clearance. 
and whose port of destination should be in the Common-
wealth. The very nature of a defence force of the Common-
wealth meant that it would move from one point of Australia 
to another, and therefore that it would always fall within 
that clause, unless, indeed, it was contended that it was 
exempt from Commonwealth control altogether by reason 
of being one of the King's ships of war. Such an interpreta-
tion would obviously have been unreasonable, for it would 
have rendered invalid the whole of the naval defence legis-
lation of the Commonwealth and made its power to legislate 
for naval defence unmeaning. In point of fact, by an Act; 
No. 20 ,of 1903, the naval defence of the Commonwealth was 
fully regulated, and thereupon the state Acts fell to the 
ground, and with them the Orders in Council based on them. 
Doubtless it was still open for the Commonwealth to obtain 
Orders under the Act of 1865, but that Act was not in any 
way a necessary mode of procedure, and it was not surprising 
that the Commonwealth Parliament, in its naval legislation, 
No. 30 of 1910, relied solely on its own power of legislation, 
and the same course was followed in that year in Act, c. 43, by 
the Parliament of Canada. In the case of Canada the legal 
validity of the power was hardly so clear as in that of the 
Commonwealth, as the Canadian constitution contains no 
clause similar to that of s. 5 of the Commonwealth Constitution 
Act, but there could be no legitimate doubt as to the right 
of the Dominion Legislature thus to establish its own naval 
defence . . Doubt was only possible as to what extent the right 
could be carried, and how far from the shores of a Dominion 
the defence could be exercised, without exceeding the lawful 
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powers of the Parliament and the authority vested in it.l 
Clearly, so far as these powers were lawfully exercised, any 
Dominion ship was an Imperial man of war, but when they 
were exceeded she ceased to have that character. 
·· The solution of this legal difficulty was necessary, and it 
was provided by an adaptation of the procedure laid dow11 
ins. 177 of the Army Act. By theN a val Discipline (Dominion 
Naval Forces) Act, 1911, it was provided that where in any 
self-governing Dominion provision has been made ·for the 
application to the naval forces raised by the Dominion of 
the Naval Discipline Act, 1866, as amended by any subse-
quentenactment, that Act as so amended should have effect as 
if references therein to his Majesty's Navy and His Majesty's 
ships included the forces and ships raised and provided by 
the Dominion, subject in the application of the Act to these 
forces and ships to such modifications and adaptations as 
might be made by the law of the Dominion to adapt the Act 
to the circumstances of the Dominion, and in its application 
to forces and ships not provided by the Dominion to any 
modifications and adaptations made by His Majesty in 
Council in order to regulate the relations inter se of the 
different ·forces and ships. But if the forces and ships of 
Dominions were placed at the disposal of the Admiralty, the 
Acts- should apply to them without any modification at all. 
The Act was not to take effect in any Dominion unless pro-
vision was so made by the Dominion, and such provision 
was duly made by New Zealand in its Act of 1913, and by 
the Commonwealth in 1912 by Act No. 21, but in a form in 
both cases which is of doubtful validity, as it makes the 
application of the Act subject to the power of the Governor-
General or Governor in Council to modify it, which is clearly 
not possible, as it is not provided for by the Imperial Act. 
The Dominion of Canada, however, has not legislated on the 
subject. 
1 The views of J. S. Ewart, Kingdom Papers, i. 203, 204, ar~ vitiated by 
his fundamental error in stating that Canadian law follows a Canadian ship. 
It does not do so save as regards merchant shipping matters, under 57 and 
58 Viet. c. 60, s. 735; see Responsible Government, ii. 1200 seq. 
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While the legal position is now clear, and established on 
a constitutional basis, the question of the policy of naval 
defence is still one which is wholly undecided. The attitude 
of Canada may be dismissed in a few words : down to 1909 the 
Dominion declined to consider naval defence as incumbent 
on her resources : the use of Imperial ships was requisitioned 
for the purpose of protecting the fisheries from American 
depredations in the years after the abrogation of the Recipro-
city Treaty of 1854, and again after the termination of the 
Treaty of Washington, and the Imperial Government doubt-
less felt that a certain advantage was derived from this fact 
in that it enabled them to regulate precisely the amount of 
armed action to be taken ~nan international matter of great 
difficulty. Newfoundland also was patrolled by British men-
of-war to secure that the fishery rights of the French an:d the 
American fishermen were not violated by the Newfound-
landers, nor, on the other hand, exceeded by the foreigners. 
In both the Dominion and Newfoundland ships were in time 
provided for fishery protection purposes, but these were not 
vessels of war : similarly, Canada had vessels on the great 
lakes with a light armament, but these again were not to 
be reckoned as naval vessels proper, and their discipline was 
regulated by an Act regarding Government vessels,l not by 
a naval defence Act, though these vessels in their pursuit of 
foreign fishing vessels encroaching on Canadian limits were 
accorded by the Canadian courts the privileges of hot pursuit, 2 
when it was contended that the limited and territorial 
character of Canadian jurisdiction rendered the action of 
the captains outside territorial waters ultra vires· vis-a-vis 
a foreign ship. 
In the case of Australia an intercolonial conference of 
1881 decided that the duty of maintaining the Imperial Navy 
should rest on the Imperial Government, which ought at its 
own cost to · defend Australia by sea. The conference also 
pressed for an increase in the strength of the squadron kept 
on the coast. The Admiralty naturally did not appreciate 
1 Revised Statutes, 1906, c. Ill. 
2 The Ship 'North' v. The King, 37 S.C.R. 385. 
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these views, from -which, it is noteworthy, South Australia 
dissented, and in 1886 commissioned Rear-Admiral Tryon, 
then commanding on the Australian station, to negotiate 
with the Governments on the question. The result of these 
negotiations, which were brought to a close at the Colonial 
Conference of 1887, was the agreement of the Australian 
colonies to contribute £126,000 and New Zealand to con-
tribute £20,000 towards the provision of five fast cruisers 
and two torpedo boats for the protection of floating commerce 
in Australian waters, two vessels to be kept in New Zealand 
waters either from these vessels or from the normal Imperial 
squadron which was to be continued. The agreement was for 
a period of ten years, and in 1897 it was simply renewed; but 
in the following year the Cape of Good Hope made without 
conditions a present of £30,000 a year to the Imperial Navy. 
In 1902 the policy of the Imperial Government was fully 
explained by Lord Selborne in a memorandum laid before 
the Colonial Conference.1 The essence of the memorandum 
was that the Navy existed for offensive purposes, not for 
defence, and that separate local defence navies were a mere 
blunder, fatal if the enemy adopted proper strategy and 
attacked each portion in detail. Moreover, he insisted on 
the absolute necessity of one control. The result of the dis-
cussions, as modified later, was that the Australian contri-
bution now paid by the Commonwealth was increased to 
£200,000 and the New Zealand to £40,000, that it was agreed 
to keep in Australian waters, with power to operate in China 
and East Indian waters, a force of one first-class cruiser, 
three 'second-class- cruisers, and five third-class cruisers, 
two in commission, and three partly manned as drill ships, 
and to establish branches of the Royal Naval Reserve in each 
Dominion, which were only to be called out on the advice of 
the two governments concerned. One vessel and the drill 
ships were to be manned by colonial seamen at special rates 
of pay, commanded by officers of the Royal Navy and of the 
naval reserve, and one drill ship and one other cruiser were 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 1297 and 1597 (Lord Selborne's memorandum). Cf. 
c. 8596. ' 
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normally to be in New Zealand waters. Further ships were 
to be supplied if needed. At the same time the Cape 
gave £20,000 a year more and Natal began a gift of £35,000 
a year without conditions of any kind. Newfoundland gave 
£3,000 a year with a single payment of £1,800 for fitting 
up a ship, for the sake of ·having a royal naval reserve 
of 600 men. 
The next six years witnessed the development in the 
Commonwealth of the desire for an independent navy of 
their own, a desire which nearly led to the rejection of the 
agreement arranged in 1902, which, however, finally became 
law in 1903. The Director of the naval forces of the Common-
wealth put forward a scheme for the local defence of Australia 
by means of cruiser destroyers, torpedo-boat destroyers, and 
.torpedo boats, and as this scheme seemed. to be within the 
means of the Commonwealth; and as it seemed to promise 
the satisfaction of the amour propre of Australia, it was pressed 
by Mr. Deakin on the acceptance of the Admiralty, which on 
the other hand insisted that the real aim of naval policy must 
be attack, that defence tactics were erroneous, and that the 
only result of the local navy policy would be dissipation of 
resources. In 1907, at the Colonial Conference 1 of that year, 
the First Lord of the Admiralty asl{ed for aid in the main-
tenance of the Navy if the Colonies saw their way to give it, 
but he insisted that the unity of the sea and of the Empire 
entailed the unity of naval control, and he acknowledged the 
absolu~e obligation of the United Kingdom to defend the 
oversea Dominions to the best of its ability even if they 
would not help. Australia, through Mr. Deakin, pressed 
the case for a local navy, urging that the disadvantages of 
divided control could be exaggerated, but he made it clear 
that, the defence being local, even in war the control would 
be vested in the Commonwealth Government. Dr. Smartt, for 
the Cape, proposed a motion recognizing simply the duty of 
giving help by a grant of money, or by a local navy, as the case 
might be, but Sir Wilfrid Laurier objected to the recognition 
of any obligation at all. The Admiralty were not anxious 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 3523. 
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to see the agreement of 1902 upset ; they were ready to 
agree to it if desired, but made it clear that in that case they 
would resume full liberty to post their ships as strategy 
required, and not as pleased Australian opinion. Nothing, 
th.erefore, was done, and in 1908 the duel between Mr. Deakin 
and the Admiralty· went on: Mr. Deakin suggested the 
setting up of a local flotilla of destroyers and submersibles, 
and the raising of 1,000 Australian seamen, to which 
should be added two cruisers lent by the Admiralty to 
train the naval militia, and two cruisers maintained by 
the Admiralty, on which 400 of the seamen provided by 
Australia would serve, but he still declined to hand over 
complete control of the flotilla in any event, though he 
believed that the control would normally be transferred by 
the Government.. The Government of New Zealand, how-
ever, made an increase of £60,000 a year in its contribution 
without conditions, and the Cape started a branch of the 
royal naval volunteer reserve, paying the cost from its grant 
to. the Imperial Navy. 
The revelations of the dangerous situation of foreign politics 
and the growth of the German Navy in the speeches of the 
Prime Minister and First Lord on March 16, 1909, led to a 
response from the Dominions.1 _New Zealand offered one or 
two Dreadnoughts. Canada agreed to organize a Canadian 
naval force, recognizing the necessity of the naval supremacy 
of Britain to the security of commerce, the safety of the Empire, 
and the peace of the world. Australia, now u~der Mr. Fisher, 
offered the continuance of the naval agreement to the ·end 
of its due term of ten years and the creation of a naval force 
which would in war automatically fall under the Imperial 
Government, and in peace -when outside Australian waters 
would fall under the command of any senior naval officer. 
This offer did not satisfy the Commonwealth generally. New 
South Wales and Victoria offered to supply Dreadnoughts, 
and a general change of feeling returned a new coalition 
Government to power, pledged to some such policy. The 
result was the opening of a Naval and Military Conference, 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 4948. 
NAVAL DEFENCE 319 
which sat in London from July 28 to August 19, 1909, and 
which decided in favour of the creation of three naval units, 
one in Australian waters, one in China waters, and one in the 
East Indies. Each unit was to consist of a cruiser of the 
Indomitable type, three second-class cruisers, and six de-
stroyers with three submarines. The battle cruiser of the 
China squadron was to be provided by New Zealand, which 
was to continue its payment of £100,000 a year, while Aus• 
tralia was to provide a whole unit, and the Imperial Govern-
ment to provide the rest. Part of the China squadron was 
normally to be in New Zealand waters. Canada was to com-
mence the construction of a local fleet, with cruisers of the 
Bristol class and destroyers. 
The Commonwealth of Australia set at once about the 
carrying out of the programme of defence, arranging to have 
one of the cruisers constructed in Australia from materials sent 
out and placing orders for the other vessels. In 1911 the Im-
perial Conference 1 dealt further with the international ques-
tions arising out of the use of the Dominion fleets in their 
new form, and agreed upon a simple set of rules. Separate 
stations were marked out for the operations of the fleets 
of Canada and the Commonwealth, in which these govern-
ments were to control their own ships entirely. Their ships 
should fly the white ensign at the stern, and the characteris-
tic flag of the Dominion at the jack-staff. Notice should be 
given to the Admiralty when any Dominion ship was to be 
sent out of its station, and if the destination was a foreign 
port the concurrence of the Imperial Government must be 
obtained. When at a foreign port the Commander of a 
Dominion ship was, as regards international matters, to obey 
the instructions of the Impe.rial Go~ernment, and to report his 
proceedings to the Admiralty or the British Commander-in-
chief. If a ship of the Admiralty should meet a Dominion 
ship the senior officer would take command in matters of 
ceremony or .international courtesy, but should have no 
power to control the movements of the other ship, unless 
united action were agreed on, when th,e senior naval officer · 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 57 46, II. 
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would command, but not interfere needlessly .,in internal 
matters on the other ship. The necessary officers were to be 
lent to the Dominions, the commissions 1 of officers were to 
run by their dates when given by any of the Governments, 
and the officers were to be sho,vn in the Navy List. The 
Governments were to keep one another informed of all 
changes in rules of discipline, the Dominions havi11g applied 
the Imperial rules in principle to their forces. 
The Commonwealth obtained, in pursuance of their scheme, 
in 1911, a report from Admiral Sir R. Henderson 2 in which he 
pla11ned the development of a great Commonwealth _fleet to 
consist in 1933 of eight armoured cruisers, ten protected 
cruisers, eighteen destroyers, twelve submarines, three 
depot ships, and one fleet repair ship, at a co-st of £23,290,000 
and an a11nual expenditure in 1933 of £4,794,000, and an 
additional expenditure of £40,000,000 on docks. The per .. 
sonnel for such a fleet would be about 15,000, costing 
£2,226,000 a year, and six naval bases and eleven sub-bases 
·would be required .. 
Canada had obtained by purchase from the British Govern-
ment the vessels Niobe and Rainbow, both of very little 
fighting value, and had allowed the Niobe to be gravely 
damaged by sending it to a dangerous port in order to 
gratify a local supporter of the Governn1ent, while the Rain-
bow had caused legiti1nate surprise by sailing fast enough to 
catch a foreign fishing vessel "\vhich was not at anchor. 
The fall of the Liberal Gover11ment found the contracts for 
new vessels which had been called for u11awarded, and the 
Conservative Government came to the not unnatural con-
·clusion that there would be little but needless expense 
involved in the continuance of the project.3 This was the 
.position when the speech of the First Lord of the Admiralty 
in the House of Commons on July 22, 1912, explained the 
1 A common form of commission was agreed on in principle to be applic· 
able to all the naval forces. 
2 Parl. Pap., Cd. 6091, p. 15. 
3 Canada House of Commons Debates, March 18, 1912; Parl. Pap., Cd. 
6091, pp. 14, 15 . 
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nature of the danger to the Empire involved in the rapid a11d 
unexpected. growth of the German Navy, and the building of 
Dreadnoughts by other powers, including Austria-Hungary 
and Italy. The question of naval defence naturally formed 
part of the matters discussed with the Prime Minister of 
Canada on his visit to England in 1912, and on December 5, 
1912, Mr. Borden laid on the table of the House of Commons 
of Canada a memorandum 1 on naval requirements for Im-
perial defence prepared by the Admiralty at the request of 
Mr. Borden. In this document stress was laid on the fact 
that the Admiralty did not wish to put any pressure on 
Canadian ptlblic opinion or seek to influence the Domi11ion 
Parliament in a decision which solely belonged to Canada, 
and that the Imperial Government were prepared from their 
own resources to supply whatever was needed for Imperial 
defence. It was pointed out that aid now given was not 
a mere question of ships ar1d money, but a testimony to the 
united strength of the Etnpire, and the resolve of the oversea 
Dominions to maintain its integrity. The answer to the 
question of Mr. Borden as to the most effective means of 
help was that it should take the form of the provision of 
a certain number of the largest and strongest ships of war_ 
which science could build or money suppl)r. In view of this 
advice Mr. Borden asked the Parliament to vote a sum of 
thirty-five million dollars for the purpose of constructing 
three battleships or battle cruisers of t.he first strength to be 
placed at the disposal of the Admiralty, but to be re-trans-
'ferred to Car1ada if Canada should decide to set up its own 
Navy. He pointed out that Canada had made no direct con-
tribution to naval defence hitherto, and tl1at the naval expen-
diture of the U11ited Kingdom from 1870 to 1890 on Canada 
was from twenty-five to thirty millions, and the military 
expenditure from 1853 to 1903 about twenty-three millions. 
The proposal was bitterly resisted by the I~iberal Oppo-
sition in the Co1nmons. Sir Wilfrid Laurier urged that the 
proper policy required at least the verdict of the electorate, 
while Mr. Borden referred to his own action in February 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 6513; cf. Cd. 6689. 
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1910 in movi11g a direct contribution of a sum equal to the 
cost of two battleships as showing his views. The situatio11 
was urgent, and a local Navy would be a matter of long 
delay. The ships now given could be recalled when Canada 
desired a local force, subject to reasonable notice. The 
amendment in favour of reference to the people was defeated 
by 122 to seve11ty-five votes, and that of Sir ·\Vilfrid L~urier 
in favour of the creation of two Canadian squadrons by the 
same figures, and the second reading of the Bill was ulti-
mately passed by 114 to eighty-four votes, there being voting 
against the Government by some French-Canadian members. 
The further progress of the measure was systematically 
obstructed, and it was only by dint of passing a closure rule 
that the third reading could be passed. The Senate, ho,v-
ever, in the exercise of its discretion, declined to pass the 
measure by a party vote of fifty-one to t ·wenty-seven votes, 
on the ground that it should be referred to the people. The 
decision was by 110 means altogether expected, as the patrio-
tism of Sir George Ross, the leader of the Senate, was relied 
upon to overcome his objections, on party grounds, to the 
measure. It 'vas rumoured, ho,vever, that the failure to 
reject the Bill would bring about the resignation of Sir 
Vlilfrid I1aurier, and the patriotic members of the Ser1ate felt 
that they could not desert the leader of the party in his day 
of defeat. . Btlt · the episode was deeply to be regretted : 
Sir George Ross was happy enough not to live to see the day 
when the failure of Canada 1night well be thought to have 
encouraged the attacks of Germany; and the Senate of the 
Dominion completed its course of blind partisanship by its 
rejectior1 of a measure which it had not the slightest right to 
refuse, and which had it been the House of Lords in the 
United Kingdo1n it cot1ld not have touched. The irony of 
a constitution which put such power into the hands of a body 
of partisan nominees, most of absolutely no distinctio11 of 
character or intellect, can hardly be excelled.1 
In the meantime the Imperial Government, profiting from 
the Imperial spirit of Sir Robert Borden and from his mani-
1 See Canadian Annual Review, 1912, pp. 48 seq.; 1913, pp. 148 seq. 
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fest · readiness to depart from the particularism 1 of his 
predecessor, had taken a step of the highest importance and 
interest. On December 10, 1912,2 the Secretary of State 
for the Colonies addressed a dispatch to the Governors~_ 
General of Australia, and the Union of South Africa, and 
to the Governors of New Zealand and Newfoundland on the 
subject of the representation of the Dominions on the Com-:-
mittee of Imperial Defence. This dispatch communicated 
the text of resolutions which had been adopted on May 30, 
1911, at a meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence, and 
which were to the effect that one or more representatives 
appointed by the respective Governments of the Dominions 
should be invited to attend meetings of the Committee of 
Imperial Defence, when questions of nava.I and military 
defence affecting the oversea Dominions were under consi.., 
deration, and that the proposal that a Defence Committee 
should be established in each Dominion was accepted in 
principle. It was stated that the Canadian Government 
having changed in the Autumn of 1911, it was necessary to 
put the proposals before Mr. Borden and his colleagues when 
they visited London in 1912, and that Mr. Borden had pro-
visionally accepted the resolutions and had stated that he 
saw no difficulty in a minister of the Dominion Governme11t 
spending some months of every year in London, in order to 
carry out the intention. Mr. Borden had also expressed the 
desire that the Canadian and other Dominions ministers who 
1night be in London as members of the Committee of Imperial 
Defence should receive in confidence knowledge of the 
policy and proceedings of the Imperial Government in foreign 
and other affairs. It had been pointed out to l\'Ir. Borden 
that the Committee of Imperial Defence was a purely 
advisory body and could not become a body deciding on 
policy, 'vhichmust remain the sole prerogative of the Cabinet, 
subject to the support of the House of Commons. But any 
DoininioilS minister reside11t in the United Kingdom would 
1 Still firmly maintained by Sir W. Laurier; see Round Table, 1915, 
pp. 430 seq. 
2 Parl. Pap., Cd. 6560. 
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at all times have free and full access to the Prime Minister 
and the Secretaries of State for Foreign and Colonial Affairs 
for information on all questions of Imperial policy. From 
Mr. Borden's speech in introducing the Ca11adian Naval Bill, 
it appeared that he accepted the proposals, and the same offer 
was open to all the other self-governing Dominions if they 
wished to adopt it, btlt it could be varied in the case of each 
or any Dominion to suit their 'vishes or the special circunl-
stances of their case. 
The position of the Imperial Government was further 
explained by Mr. L. H~rcourt, the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, in a speecl1 which he delivered in his constituency 
on October 25.1 In this speech he pointed out that there was 
on the part of the Canadian G-overnment and people a natural 
and laudable desire for a greater measure of consultation 
and co-operation with. the Imperial Government in the future 
than they had had in the past. This was not intended to, 
and need not, open up those difficult problems of Imperial 
Federation, which, seeming to entail questions of taxation 
and representation, had made that policy for 1nany years a 
dead issue. Speaking for himself he saw no obstacle, and 
certainly no objection, to the (iovernments of all the Do-
minions being given at once a larger share in the executive 
direction of matters of defence, and in personal consultation 
and co-operation with those individual British ministers 
whose duty it was to frame policy in the United Kingdom. 
He 'vould welcome a more continuous representation of the 
ministers of the self-governing Dominions, if they so wished, 
upon the Committee of Imperial Defence, and the Imperial 
Government would be glad if a member or members of those 
Cabinets could be annually in London. The door of fellovv-
ship and friendsl1ip was always open and no formalities of an 
Imperial Conference were required for the continuity of 
Imperial confidence. 
1 In a speech on March 15, 1910, Lord Crewe similarly urged that the 
Dominions should take a greater part and interest in British diplomatic 
affairs and problems, and urged co-operation and common action in these 
matters: Canadian Annual Review, 1910, p. 89. 
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In reply to the dispatch from the Secretary of State the 
Government of the Commonwealth on December 19, 1912, 
suggested a subsidiary conference on Naval Defence to be 
held in January or February 1913 in Australia, Ne'v Zea-
land, South Africa or Vancouver. In answer it 'vas pointed 
out by Mr. Harcourt that it would not be possible to hold 
a general Conference at the places suggested on the date 
named. The other Dominio11 Governments could not attend 
a Conference on such short notice, and it was doubtful 
whether they would wish a general Conference. The Minister 
of Defence of New Zealand was on his "vay to the United 
Kingdom, and i11 May the Minister of Defence of South 
Africa was due for consultation. It was therefore suggested 
that after the general election due in May the Defence 
Minister of the Commonwealth should visit England. To 
this proposal no reply was then made. The views of the 
Government of the Union, as conveyed in a minute of 
January 30, 1913, were that the existing machinery for 
consultation and suggestion, in the shape of the Imperial 
Defence Committee and the Overseas Defence Committee, 
had worlred so smoothly that they doubted ~f it were desir-
able to inaugurate any 11ew departure which might in the 
end prove less satisfactory in practice. In particular they 
doubted whether the idea of a minister of the Union residing 
in I.Jondon for the purpose of constantly representing the 
Union Government on the Imperial Defence Committee was 
practicable. As long as the control of foreign policy 
remained, as under present conditions it must necessarily 
remain, solely 'vith the Imperial Government, and the Im-
perial Government continued, as agreed at the last Imperial 
Confere11ce, to consult the Dominions on all questions of 
foreign policy which affected them individually, they did 
not think it necessary to have a minister in constant atten-
dance at the Imperial Defence Committee. It was always 
open to the Union Government either to seek advice from 
the Imperial Defence Committee i11 writing;,· or in more im-
portant cases to ask for personal consultation between that 
Committee and the representative of the Union Government. 
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In the later case, undoubtedly the more convenient course, 
at any rate as far as the Union was concerned, would 
be that either the Prime Minister, or· 1ninister or ministers 
,~whose departn1ents were more especially concerned, should 
visit London for the purpose of such consultation. The 
Government of Newfoundland saw no difficulty ~n ministers 
. when in London placing themselves in touch with the 
Imperial ·· Defence Committee. The Government 9f New 
0 Zealand stated that thev did not consider it advisable at the 
. ~ 
time for a permanent appointment to be made to represent 
the Dominion in London, but preferred tha.t when accredited 
ministers of t.he Government of the Dominion 'vere in Eng-
land they should be invited to attend the deliberations of the 
Comn1ittee of Imperial Defence, as had been the privilege 
of the Dominion minister of defence during his recent visit 
to the United Kingdom. 
The visit of Colonel Allen on behoalf of the Domi11ion had 
arisen out of the comparative failure of the Imperial Govern-
ment to carry out its share of the agreement of 1909.1 In 
1912 the Government of Mr. Mackenzie agreed to permit 
the retention of the New Zealanrl, constructed at the cost of 
the Dorrtinion, in European waters, on the strength of repre-
sentations by the Imperial Government that it was required 
there. This action was fully concurred in by the Conserva-
tive administration which succeeded Mr. Mackenzie's 
Government, but Colonel Allen was sent to England to 
consider whether some steps could not be taken t9 make 
effective the remainder of the agreement. He found that 
the Imperial Government were faced with such a change of 
naval conditions that the two cruisers of the Bristol class 
which they had intended to send to New Zealand waters 
could not be spared, being required for the China Station, · 
.and the Minister of Defence accordingly suggested that New 
Zealand should begin training her own personnel on a sea-
going ship to be lent by the Admiralty, with the necessary 
crew and officers, that in addition two light cruisers be 
placed in the waters of New Zealand by the Adn1iralty, and 
01 Parl. Pap., Cd. 6863, p. 11. 0 
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. 
that the Dominion should purchase a cruiser of theM elbourne 
type as being specially suited for the defence of con1merce. 
The New Zealand Government, however, decided that more 
than this should be done, and therefore determined to secure 
a cruiser of the Bristol class, 4,000 tons, costing £400,000, 
and to take over from the Admiralty the Philomel, 2,575 
tons, as a training ship. Recruits could easily be obtained 
from both the European and native population, a11d a career 
would be open for them in the ships of the Royal Navy as 
well as in any New Zealand ships. Officers would be sup-
plied by cadets, of who1n two would pass through Osborne 
or Dartmouth every year, and eight through the Roy~al 
Australian Naval College, founded by the Commonwealth 
Government for the training of naval officers, and recog-
nized by the ~~dmiralty. The administration of .any New 
Zealand ships should be entirely under the Dominion in 
peace, but would pass in war automatically to the Admiralty, 
and would be transferable to the Admiralty if risk of war 
were apparent. The Government recognized the essential 
necessity of unity of control of the Fleet in war or in antici-
pation of war, and the necessity of similarity of discipline, 
and they were prepared to face the necessary cost in view of 
the 11ecessity of kee1?i11g naval supremacy in the Pacific. 
The combined action of the United Kingdom and the 
Dominions would result in securing the position. desired. 
The proposals of the Governme11t were accepted by 
Parliament, though only by a majority, as the Opposition 
under Sir J. Ward would have preferred the retention of the 
older policy with its more defined pecu11iary liability. The 
Act, No. 45 of 1913,1 makes provisio11 for the raising by 
voluntary e11listment of a force and for its discipline apply-
ing the Naval Discipl,ine Acts, the King's Regulations and 
Admiralty Instructions to the force subject to the Act, and 
to any modification and adaptations prescribed by regula-
tions under the Act, to the forces raised by New Zealand. 
As in the case of the Commonwealth Act of 1912, the making 
of the application of the Imperial Act of 1911 subject to 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 7057, pp. 79 seq. 
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modification must be deemed as a mistake, and to render it 
not free from doubt whether, i11 point of law, the Act has 
ever been ·applied to the forces at all. It is, however, 
expressly provided that on the declaration. of war between 
Great Britain and any other country or countries, or on the 
outbreak of hostilities, the ships and forces shall pass imme-
diately under . the disposition of the Governme11t of Great 
Britain, and the officers and men shall be subject to all the 
regulations affecting the Ki11g's Navy, for the period of the· 
war, while even without actual \Var the Governor, if he 
thinks it expedient to do so in the interest of Great Britain, 
or is requested by the Government of Great Britain to do so, 
or when 'var is imminent, can by proclamation transfer the 
ships and men to the British Gover11ment for such time as he 
thinks fit. Needless to say, this . power is one not given 
personally to the Governor, for it is to be exercised by pro-
clamation, which implies ministerial responsibility. 
In the meantime, the Government of the Commonwealth 
had suffered defeat at the general election and a new Ministry, 
that of Mr. Cook, had taken its place. On August 16 the 
Government telegraphed that they were considering the 
Naval Defence situation, especially the arrangement arrived 
at by the Imperial Conference in 1909, by which three Fleet · 
units were to be formed to make an Eastern ~F1eet for the 
Empire. The Australian Fleet unit as agreed to \vas nearly 
ready, but it did not appear that the China and East Indies 
units were in course of being provided. The Government 
inquired the intentions of His Majesty's Government in this 
respect : if any new circumstances had arisen to render 
a change of plan desirable, the Government would be glad 
to be informed of them, and, if thought 11ecessary, would 
arrange to be represented at a Conference, should His 
Majesty's Government consider such a course necessary. 
In reply, the Commonwealth Government 'vere informed of 
the vie\vs of the Admiralty as to the possibility of adhering 
to the proposals of 1909, and it was added that if, after con-
sideration of the statement of the Admiralty, the Government 
considered it desirable to confer, as the Governments of 
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other Dominions had done, with His Majesty's Government, 
His Majesty's (}overnment would be glad to welcon1e, at any 
date convenient to them next year, a visit of representatives 
of the Common wealth Govern1nent. To this remark no 
reply was received, but as it appeared from a question and 
answer in the Com1nonwealth Parliament of October 10, 
that the Commonwealth Government thought that such an 
invitation to the Imperial Government to convene a Confer-
ence had been sent, the Secretary of State pointed out in 
a dispatch of November 21, that such an invitation had not 
been received, as it was not contained in the telegram from 
the Government of August 16. In a telegram of February 9, 
1914, it was explained that the telegram of August 16 had 
been intended to be such an invitation. The Imperial 
Government then offered to receive representatives of Aus-
tralia for conference forthwith, and proposed to include 
New Zealand in its scope, but the proposal fell through as 
the Commonwealth Governn1ent could not send a represen-
tative, the session being about to open. 
The correspondence is of some importance, as it shows that 
the attacks made on the Imperial Government for failure to 
summon. a Conference were not justified. The truth was, 
no doubt, that the Commonwealth Government, with a 
n1ajority of the Speaker in the Lo\ver House and a minority 
of twe11ty-nine in the Upper, was not in a position to spare 
a minister, an.d was therefore more anxious to placate its 
opponents by throwing the onus on the United Kingdom. 
It is otherwise impossible to explain 'vhy the Government 
11ever, from August 16 to February 9, reminded the Imperial 
Government of their request, and why, after the receipt of 
the dispatch of November 21 at the end of December, it 
took some six weeks to send a reply of a few words stating 
a fact. The occurrence of more grave events has doubtless 
effaced the memory of this episode, but it is worthy of record 
as a striking example of the use of unfair tactics against the 
Imperial Government, as a device of a party in a difficult 
situation to avoid admittin.g its own defects. 
Just at the moment when the proposal of a Conference 
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between the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and the 
Com1nonwealth was breaking down on the inability of the 
Commonwealth to send a representative, a new and very 
important pronouncement on tl1e relations of the Dominions 
and the Mother Country in matters of naval policy was 
made by the First Lord of the Admiralty in the House of 
Commons on March 17, 1914.1 Mr. Churchill explained that 
the views of the Ad1niralty as to the need for Canada, in 
common 'vith other Dominions of the Crown, taking effective 
part in the defence of the Empire, had been expounded in 
the memorandum of August 1912, and the case there set out 
_had been strengthened by the lapse of time, and constituted 
an absolute justification for prompt Canadia11 action. In 
July 1912, after considering the problem of Naval Defence 
jn the Mediterranean, it had been decided that a British 
battle squadron should be maintai11ed there, with a view 
to protecting the important and long esta·blished British 
interests in the Mediterranean without incurring an~y excep-
tional obligations in any direction. It had been decided, 
therefore, _to place there at the end of 1915 a battle squadron 
based on Malta of eight battleships, including six of the 
_Lord Nelson type. For this purpose it was necessary that 
the three Canadian ships should have been laid down in 
June 1913 and in the place of that it had been necessary to 
accelerate three ships of the British prograuime, by beginning 
them eight or nine months earlier than was originally pro-
.posed. By this acceleration, involving a vote of £437,000, 
it would be possible · to keep the proposed sq-uadron in the 
Mediterranean from the latter part of 1915 to the midule 
of 1916. The Canadian Government could not renew the 
Naval Aid Bill, and so no new ships could be begun in 1914. 
It was therefore necessary to repeat on a smaller scale the 
course followed in the previous year, and to accelerate the 
work on two ships of the 1914 programme, so as to have them 
ready in the third quarter of 1916: it was not necessary to 
increase tl1e rate to three, as in 1913 the programn1e gave an 
excess of one ship, available for the 'vhole world programme 
1 Foreshadowed in part in his similar statement of July 17, 1913. 
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service, and that gain would be repeated in 1915, so that in 
that year, if Canada still delayed, the position in the Mediter-
ranean could be maintained by the acceleration of but one 
ship. There were, however, good prospects that the Cana-
dian deadlock might be relieved by one party or the other, 
or best of all by joint action. The \tvealth and interest of 
Canada rendered it rigl1t that she should make some pro-
vision for her own naval defence, as much as would be 
requiredif she were annexed to the United States or were 
independent, and he did not wonder that Canadians of every 
party felt it beneath the dignity of the Dominion to depend 
entirely on the exertions of the British taxpayer, many of 
\vhom were much poorer than the average Canadian. 
In the Pacific the naval power of the Empire secured 
Australia and New Zealand from all danger from any 
European power, and also at present from Japan. While 
the Japanese alliance lasted, Japan was safe from attack by 
sea by the great fleets of Europe, and i11 no other way could 
. it protect itself in the years immediately to co1ne from the 
dangers of European interference. Moreover, the reasons 
which made Japan contract and renew the alliance would 
gro'v stronger with time, and tl1e growth of European i11terests 
in China, and the development of European navies on a scale 
which Japan could not afford to imitate. The alliance 
req~ired England to maintain in the China sea a force 
superior to any other European power, and thus provided 
against any danger to Japan from a gradual increase of 
European squadrons in the far east. As regards the naval 
agreen1ent of 1909 'vith ... t\ustralia and New Zealand, the 
central principle was that His Majesty's Government sho~ld 
maintain in the Pacific a11d Indian Oceans do11ble the force 
of the Australia11 flotilla. More than that was being done, 
but 11ot in the same form as had been proposed. The pro-
posed battle cruisers 'vere being kept at home, where alone 
they would meet their equals, ar1d on the China and Indian 
stations had been !)laced two battleships and other armoured 
cruisers which were quite sufficient for the work they had to 
do, and which were not merely an equivalent but a~ improve-
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ment upon the mere duplication of the Australian Fleet unit. 
The alliance with Japan had bee11 renewed with the corlcur-
rence of the oversea Don1inions until 1921, and it was not 
expected that after that date Japan would have less need of 
a powerful friend at the other side of the world, whicl1 would 
continue to be the foremost nav ... al power. Apart from the 
good sense and n1od.eration of the Japanese Government, 
and from the mutual benefits rendered, there \Vas a strong 
con.tinuing bo11d of interest on both sides which was a true 
and effective protection for the safety of Australia and New 
Zealand. If the British Fleet were defeated in the North 
Sea, there were no forces to 1)revent territorial expansio11 of 
a European power in the Pacific, and similarly against Japan 
there were no means by which for the next, ten or t\velve 
years Australia and New Zealand could expect to preserve 
themselves si11gle-handed, and their only course would be to 
seek the protection of the United States.1 Fron1 this point 
of view the profound wisdom of the naval policy of New 
Zealand could be appreciated in givi11g the N eu' Zealand 
to strengthen the British Navy at a decisive point. The 
Dominion of New Zealand h.ad thllS provided in the most 
effective \vay alike for her O\Vn and for the common seclirity. 
The situation of the Pacific would be absolutely regulated by 
the decision in European waters; two or three ·Australian or 
New Zealand Dreadnoughts, if brought into line in the 
decisive theatre, might turn the scale and make victory not 
merely certain but coin.plete, but the same vessels in Au~­
tralian waters would be useless the day after the defeat of the 
British Navy in home waters, and their existence would only 
serve to prolong the agony without altering the course of 
events. Their effectiveness would have been destroyed by 
events which had taken place on the other side of the globe, 
just as surely as if they had been sunk in the battle. The 
Admiralty were bound to uphold the broad principles of 
unity in command, but their responsibilities ceased when the 
1 In 1915 in New Zealand feeling against the failure of the United States 
to protest against the violation of Belgium ran strong: Round Table, 
1915, p. 492. 
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facts had been put before the Dominions. It was recognized 
that time \vould be required before the principles of naval 
strategy were applied to their full extent in the Dominions. 
The Dominions wished to have ships under their own control, 
which they could see and touch, and these feelings were facts 
which 'vould govern events. There were at prese11t insuper-
able difficulties in enlisting the active co-operation of the 
Dominior1s in Il:aval defence by means of ships which they 
rarely saw, and which \vere absorbed in the great fleets of 
Britain at the other end of the world. '~rhe Admiralty had 
therefore co-operated to the best of their ability in the de-
velopment of the Australian Fleet unit : they regarded the 
effort which the Commonwealth \Vere making as heroic, a11d 
would leave nothing undone to make it a complete success. 
A sound agreement had been made between the Admiralty 
and the Commonwealth, relating to the use of the Common-
wealth Fleet in war; the importance of creating a naval 
sentiment in the Dominions, and of creating a reserve of 
personnel and local naval establishments was realized, and 
the design of an Imperial squadron had been conceived, 
with the object of combining sound military principles with 
local aspiratio11s. There should be developed severally in 
Canadian, Australian and South African waters a naval estab-
lishment with docks, defences and re1)airing plant, 'vhich 
would enable the Imperial squadron to operate in its theatre 
for a prolonged period. In the seco11d place, local defence 
flotillas should be developed, both destroyers andsubm~arines, 
to defend the bases and establishments, and co-operating 
with the Irr1perial squadro11. In the third place, the Do-
minion should mai11tain local ligl1t cr11isers to co-operate 
with tl1e fleet on its arrival, ·and also to protect commerce in 
·their own waters. In this way 3t true distinctio11 would 
be made bet,veen the services which were essentially local 
.. 
and those necessarily of ger1eral Imperial character. The 
Dominions would be afforded the indi,riduallocal develoiJ-
ment which was necessary to arouse and maintair1 keen naval 
interest and to procure the sacrifices necessary for the main-
tenance and development of that naval power, while b~y 
• 
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sending any capital ships to the Imperial squadron they 
would create a really strong, effecti\Te naval force, not one 
or two ships isolated on particular stations, which could move 
rapidly a11d freely about the \Vorld, bringing aid in sufficient 
strength wherever aid might be needed in time of war. 
The ans,ver of the Commo11wealth Government to Mr. 
Churchill's speech was made ir1 the form of a memorandum 
circulated by the Minister of Defence of ~f\.pril 13, 1914. 
The effect of the document was that alliances \vere uncertain, 
and preparations should be made in good time. rrhe attitude 
of the Admiralty had changed since 1909, when they were 
encouraged to found a fleet unit, charged primarily with 
the protectior1 of British interests in the Pacific, and with 
relieving the Royal Navy of part of its burden of resporlsi-
bility. That aspect had reconciled mar1y supporters of the 
contributio11 policy to support the unit schen1e, and the 11e'v 
proposals destroyed the ideal of a joint Imperial Fleet 
working for common ends and discharging a common Im-
perial responsibility. Australian opinion would neither find 
the men nor money for the dispatch of Australian battle 
cruisers to European waters. But even if the ultimate 
success of such a battle squadron as was suggested was 
admitted, it was clear that the Australian forces, as they 
were, were no more ~han adequate to provide experie11ce for 
the creation of that organization, without \vhich, in time of 
war, a fleet \vould be worse than useless. It was open to 
question whether it was " 7ise in the interests of the Empire 
to rely on tl1e ability of the Admiralty to send to a sphere of 
dar1ger, at least four or five weel{s distant from Europe, 
a powerful fleet to meet a11y emerge11cy that might arise. 
In any case, the Australian scheme provided the esser1tial 
nucleus for such a fleet. Naval bases could only be kept 
efficient by constant use by every type of vessel which was 
likely to require their aid, and without an adequate fleet 
there could be no effective training of officers and men. 
The minister en1phasized the difficulty caused by appare11t 
change of policy on the part ·of the Admiralty, and pressed 
for the convening ef a general Conference i11 1915. 
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The question thus raised is, it is clear, one of the highest 
importance. to the future of the Empire, though it has no 
essential relation to its u11ity. It is perfectly possible to 
hold that the existe11ce of allied fleets 011 the basis of the 
1909 arrangeme11ts would work satisfactorily for the defence 
of the Empire, in so far as it is quite possible that the neces-
sary sin1ilarity of discipline and training and tactics, which is 
essential for reall~y· effective combined action in time of war·, · 
could be obtained by the adoptio11 of similar rules and ·by 
frequent exchanges between the Australian and the British 
Navy. The Australian Navy is at present i11 effect a British 
Navy, nor is it probable that there would be in any time 
which can reasonably be foreseen a fundamental change in 
this regard. But this consideratio11 does not dispose of the 
argument from principles of strategy. It is certain that, if 
any 11aval force is not on strategical grounds needed in any 
place, it is being wasted, and not even Australia can afford to 
waste money,1 eve11 if it felt i11clined to do so, having regard 
to the very severe strain on British fi11ances of the cost of 
the Navy, and this consideration must tell more and more 
effectively in both countries in view of the drain of strength 
in the European War~ The Admiralty should clearly have 
the control of the movements of the capital ships <?f the fleet, 
a11d direct their movements in immediate touch . with the 
principles of foreigr1 politics, as c<?11veyed by the Imperial 
Government to its tech11ical advisers. The argument of . 
Senator Millen that it is not wise to trust the Admiralty to be 
able to send a strong squadron to a threatened point in 
proper time, which is of course a11. allusion .to a sudden attack 
from Japan, is based on a view of foreign politics which is 
fundamentally unsound. The war with Germany arose 
indeed in a very brief period, but from 1909 the danger had 
been realized, and from 1912 it had been recognized to have 
become more serious. It was hoped by the Government and 
by every sober man to avoid war, but the dispositions of 
the Admiralty throughout this period, and the magnificent 
1 Her defence expenditure in 1913-14 was £4,752,735 for a population 
under five millions; cf. Round Table, 1915, p. 451; 1915-16, pp. 168-75. 
I 
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preparation shown at the hour of the emergency of the Em-
pire, prove that the views of the Government of the Common-
wealth as to the probability that a sudden attack could be 
made on Australia, which the British Fleet could not be 
ready to counter, are based on no reasor1able foundation. 
It is perfectly plain that if no precautions at all are ever to be 
taken, if British naval strategy has no relation to diplomacy, 
then the only means of attaining security must be -to scatter 
ships widespread throughout the world, in sufficient numbers 
to meet any attack. It is hardly to be seriously supposed 
that this is possible : certainly it is not possible for Australia 
to accomplish. In the meantime, what useful purpose would 
be served by one battle cruiser against the theoretical strong 
invading force which it is supposed might assail Australia 
when the Admiralty were so unsuspicious of danger as to 
have nothing nearer than four or five weeks' steaming? It is 
certain that if at any time the Japar1ese alliance comes to an 
end,1 there will be grave need for the placing in the Pacific 
of a great battle fleet, though its main habitat would hardly 
be the coasts of the Commonwealth, but in the meantime, 
every sound principle makes it right not to provide against 
a conceivable danger and to ignore a real danger. The 
. -
actual events of the war have been hailed in some quarters 
in the Commor1wealth as a proof of the wisdom of the Com-
monwealth policy.. Nothing could be further from the truth 
than this conception. . The only difference, which the carry-
ing out of the agreement of 1909 in its full shape "\vould 
have made, would have consisted in the presence of two 
fe,ver Dreadnoughts at the heart of the Empire in the days 
of the greatest need of the Empire : as it was the Australia 
was away, where she had no work to do worth her power and 
strength, and had to be brought bacl{ to Britisl1 "\Vaters, and 
the much dreaded Japanese undertool{ much of the impor-
tant "\vorl{ of the protection of the Pacific against the Germ~n 
squadron. The aid of Japan in the movements of ships and 
men in the east has been effectively acl{nowledged by the 
1 On Oct. 15, 1915, Japan adhered to the agreement of England, Russia, 
and France to conclude no separate peace; Parl. Pap., Cd. 8107 . 
• 
NAVAL DEFENCE 337 
First Lord of the Admiralty, and it may be hoped that the 
co-operation in this naval action may serve in some degree 
to mitigate the unreasoning attitude of Australia towards 
the empire of Japan.1 It must be remembered that the 
exaggerated fear of Japan which forbids the calm weighing 
of the position is due to an altogether not linreasonable 
reaction from the foolish complacency with which Australia 
used to regard her isolation. Until the Russo-Japanese 'Var 
it is doubtful if any large number of people in the Commoll-
wealth realized the factors of international politics, and, when 
that war wakened them 'vith a rude shock to the possibilities 
of danger, the reaction urged by the Bul~etin led the popular 
1nind beyond due limits. 
It is also to be borne in mind that the success of the opera-
tions of the Australian fleet in the Pacific 'vas the success, 
not of the direction of the Commonwealth Government, but of · 
the Imperial Admiralty, to whose control the fleet passed at 
once on the outbreak of war, first de facto and then formally 
under transfer by the Commonwealth Government. The 
action of the Commonwealth was wise and inevitable, but 
it shows that there is no ground to use this case as proof of 
the possibility of successful action by separate naval forces. 
The loss of time, which is inevitable in every case of dual 
con.trol, is by itself a most potent argument against any 
division of respo11sibility in war time. The effective action 
of the British forces with the Japanese forces and with each 
other was possible merely because the Admiralty in London 
and the Con1mander-in-chief in the Pacific were sole masters 
of the situation, and could plan and arrange without heeding 
more than was in their opinion desirable the representations 
of the Dominion ministers. 
It is, however, rigl1t to give some weight to Senator Millen's 
arguments from the necessity of the Commonwealth seeing 
its naval forces if it is to be prepared to provide the men and 
money for them. In part the argument is answered by the 
fact that the Con1monwealth would be expected, under the 
1 The 
p. 490. 
1874 
policy of New Zealand has changed ; Round Table, 1915, 
y 
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scheme of the Admiralty, to own not merely great naval 
bases, but also cruisers and minor vessels such as submarines 
and destroyers for local action. This part of the scheme 
would thus give the Commonwealth as much as was ever 
aimed at by Mr. Deakin, and, what is more, give it as the 
Commonwealth's own fleet. Much therefore of the money 
that, on the plan of Sir R. Henderson, which seems still to 
hold the field in the Commonwealth, is to be spent would 
still be spent locally, and that this is an important con-
sideration is of course recognized. The remaining sums 
would be spent as thought fit from time to time in providing 
a11d preferably equipping and maintaining a Dreadnought 
or more, to forn1 part of a squadron for Imperial purposes, 
which would be based, it is suggested, on Gibraltar, but 
would be always ready to move to any part of the world 
where its services were n.eeded, and in time of peace "\Vould 
of course visit the Dominions, in order that the Dominions 
should see tl1eir ships and be encouraged to take an interest 
in the fleet. It is difficult, apart from considerations of the 
expenditure of money in .... t\.t1stralia, to see the difficulty of 
recognizing the fine aspect of a fleet of this kind., which would 
surely be a more effective sign of Imperial strength than odd 
battleships scattered over (he Empire. Nor is it possible 
to understand how the men would suffer : it has always been 
part of every scheme that there should be free interchange 
of men to sec11re full training, and that the Australian men 
and officers . should not be restricted to an Australian career 
only, and it is therefore not easy to see how it can be con-
tended that the attraction to an Australian to join the Navy 
is that he may cruise in an enormous Dreadnought about the 
coast of the Comn1onwealth. The presence of the battle-
cruiser always on the coast is a poor ideal to be represented 
as the aim of Australia, and it is somewhat unhappily similar 
to the spirit which n.early cost the lives of the whole crew of 
the Niobe.1 
On the other hand, it is perfectly fair to hold that 
a Dominion which gives generously is entitled to some 
1 Cf. the view of Sir J. Ward, Round Table, 1915, p. 501. 
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degree of control in the action of what it gives.1 But this· 
action is essentially subject to the control of the Admiralty, · 
and the Admiralty is nothing save the tool of the Imperial 
Government of the day, so that the position reduces itself 
to· the great problem, in what way the Dominions can.obtain 
a share in the direction of the foreign policy of the E-mpire. 
It is hardly, it is probable, realized by those who advocate 
the establishment of separate ·navies that this arrangement 
diminishes, and does not strengthen, the demand for a share 
in the knowledge of Imperial policy. If tl1e position is that 
a Dominion fleet must be obtained as a loan after the out-
break of war, on condition that the Imperial Government 
can satisfy the Government of a Dominion that the war is 
necessary and just, and that naval policy which prompts 
the proposed loan of the ship is prudent, it will be inevitable 
that the Admiralty will make its plans irrespective of the 
Dominion fleet, and that the Imperial Government will in 
a correspo11ding degree be unwilling to trouble to share with 
the Dominion the k11owledge of its foreign policy before 'the 
event happens which causes the need of the Dominion fleet 
to arise. It will be obvious that, confronted with war, it will 
be very difficult for a Dominion to refuse to give the use of 
its fleet, and that therefore its power of control of Imperial 
policy will tend to be less than ever. On the other hand, 
if in some way by a direct contribution of ships, some share: 
of control may be won, the gain will be much greater than· 
could otherwise be attained. 
3. WAR AND PEACE 
It is perfectly clear that i11 international law 2 the \Vhole of 
the Empire is at war if the United Kingdom is at war, and 
that it lies in the hands alone of the Imperial Government 
to declare war and to make peace~ A Dominion Government 
n1ight at~ack another power, and the other power might 
carry on war in consequence, but the beginning of the war 
1 Sir R. Borden's view, Round Table, 1915, p. 427. 
2 Sir W. Laurier, House of Commons Debates, 1910, pp. 2964, 2965; 
Mr. Borden, p. 2982. · 
Y2 
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would be attributable to the Imperial Government only 
if that Government should not disavow the action of the 
Dominion and take steps to offer reparation . . Nor is there 
the slightest reason to believe that this position is not underc 
stood in the most full manner possible by the statesmen in 
every responsible-governed Dominion. It would be impos-
sible to find the evidence of a single remark to this effect 
made by any one of these statesmen, and the views to this 
effect attributed to them from "time to time are based on 
misunderstandings of their language. At a very famous 
stage of the history of Victoria, when anything savouring 
of Imperial control was, under the influence of Sir Gavan 
Duffy, bitterly objected to, a Committee appointed by the· 
Governor on the advice of his Ministry to consider Federal 
Union did definitely suggest that the status of neutral states 
should be sought by the British Government for the sake of 
the colonies, "'-hich should at the same time be given the 
treaty power, and thus be made into fully independent 
Governments, united merely through the personality of the 
ruler of all. The proposal 'vent on to make the extremely 
naive suggestion that the gro,ving tende11cy of the maxims 
of international law to greater humanity would assist the 
British Government in securing this aim, while at the same 
time the position of neutrality would not prevent the colonies 
from coming to the help of the mother country in an emer- . 
gency, but woulcl merely add to the effect of their inter-
vention in her favour as independent powers, ·a conception 
of neutrality of undoubted originality. Tl1e vie,vs of the 
small knot of statesme11 who produced this report had no 
. effect in the colonies of Australia, and the l)roposal for the 
conversion of the status of these colonies was never renewed 
by any responsible statesn1an. Based on similar ignorance 
of international law was the suggestion made by part, not 
the whole, of the Dutch press in South .... 1\frica in 1911, that 
it was possible for the Union to remain 11eutral during a war 
in whicl1 the Imperial power was engaged, a view which was 
contradicted effectively by the ·union Government at the 
time when it was put forward. 
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But it is another question entirely to what extent the 
Dominions are obliged actively to assist the Imperial Govern-
ment and the people of the {Jnited Kingdom when the latter 
begins a "rar, or when it is attacked. In the latter case it 
would seem doubtful whether any Dominion would or could 
stand aloof : it is improbable that it would not be felt to be 
too dangerous to remain indifferent to an onslaught upon 
the centre of the Empire. But the case has not yet arisen in 
any form calling for action by the Dominions, and the ques-
tion of more importance is to what exte11t the self-governing 
Dominions are under obligation to take part ir1 the wars of 
Britain generally. The answer to this question is perfectly 
simple: the Imperial Government and Parliament have 
never claimed that the Don1inions must afford anv active aid 
.., 
in men, money, or ships, in the case of a war \vaged by the 
United Kingdom, while, on the contrary, they ha,ve repeatedly 
acknowledged their obligation to the best of their ability to 
defend the whole of the Dominions of the Crown. There can 
be few more striking examples of this fact thar1 the procedure 
followed in the Boer 'Var and the European War, when it 
was desired to remove the British Imperial forces from 
Canada and South A.frica respectively : no step was taken 
without the full concurrence of the Governments of the 
Dominion and the Union in each case. The basis of this 
attitude is presumably to be sought in the fact that the 
Dominions have no share in the election of the Parliament, 
and thus the appointmer1t of the Government by which are 
determi11ed the questions that lead to peace or war, and, 
having no share, they cannot be held to be bound to under-
tal{e actively burdens which may have been brought about 
by the errors of others, and which in any case expose them 
to grave dangers, or at best ~erious inconveniences through 
commercial difficulties. Similarly the obligation to give aid 
in wars brought, about by Imperial policy follows from the 
fact that the Dominions had no part in the shaping of Im-
perial policy, and that the Imperial Government must mal{e 
good the results of their errors. 
It follows, of course, that if the war were brought about 
' 
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by a cause which ''Tas not due to Imperial policy, but to the 
a-ction of a Dominion, that Dominio11 would be expected to 
share in the burden of the war which it brought about, but 
though on several occasions in the history of Canada since 
responsible government this result has seemed near at 
.hand, owing to the question of the fisheries and the American 
seizures in the Behring Sea, nevertheless, that calamity has 
been avoided, in no sn1all n1easure thanks to the intervention 
of the cool judgement of the Imperial Government. · It is 
:easy for Canadian patriots to attack the policy of the British 
Government, and to deny that the British protection has 
ever been of any value,! but no san.e man will de11y that but 
for the British protection the Dominion of Canada would 
now have been a part of the U11ited States. Such destiny, 
doubtless, is one which cannot be deemed in any way (legrad-
ing, but the British power has preserved for Canada a still 
greater · future as British North America, and it lies with 
Canada herself to make worthy use of the splendid oppor-
tunity afforded her to achieve greatness, without at the 
same time falling into so many grave errors as have the 
States in the manner of their social and economic develop-
ment. On the other hand, if a Domi11ion is attacked, it 
must be expected to defend. itself, thougl1 even in that case 
there is no record of any compulsion to this end imposed by 
the Imperial Government. In'tl1e crisis of the war in South 
Africa, while the Imperial Government made every use of 
th.e colonial forces which offered themselves, a11d while they 
could not, of course, consider as possible the idea of the 
neutrality of the Cape in the war which was put forward by 
Mr. Schreiner's Governn1ent, they did not compel the Cape 
forces to serve, nor did they supersede by Crown (iovernment 
the responsible Ministry at the Cape,2 or still less at Natal, 
which i11deed hampered the effective conduct of the war by 
the stress which the Ministry laid on the effort to protect 
untenable positions for reaso11s other than strategic. * 
. 
1 e. g. J. S. Ewart, Kingdom Papers, ii. 59-146. No one knows better 
than Mr. Ewart that his case is purely ex parte. 
2 Parl. Pap., Cd. 1162; cf. Lucas, South Africa, ii. 155 seq. 
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The most consistent exponent of the· freedom of Canada 
to decide \Vhether to take part in an Imperial war or not 
has always been Sir Wilfrid Laurier. In the case of the 
Boer War he was disinclined to take any steps to afford 
official aid from the Dominion to the mother country, 
doubtless in the main because he feared the effect of such 
participation upon the minds of that most suspicious of 
races and in some ways least warlike of men, the French 
Canadians of his native provi11ce, who throughout his career 
have been his main support in Governme11t. Fortunately 
the Opposition, under Sir Charles Tupper's patriotic lead,1 
gave him the desired assurances of support, the sta11chly 
British- ele1nent in his Cabinet rallied to the support of the 
British cause, and enabled their chief to throw aside his 
fears of the result of the crisis to his party and to send to the 
United Kingdom the aid which it valued. The Conservative. 
Party had already had the credit of such a11 action, for in the 
Egyptian campaigns in the hope of finding or avenging 
Gordon Canadian voyageurs had served with distinction 
and credit. l11 the case of the ·Boer \Var the amount of aid 
sent was quite considerable, and the Canadian arms won 
distinction at Paardeberg, but the amenity of the situations 
was somewhat marred by a vehement quarrel between 
Colonel Sam Hughes, the Minister of Militia, and the General 
Officer commanding in South Africa. 
A formal expression of Sir Wilfrid Laurier's views was made 
at the Imperial Confere11ce of 1911,2 in regard to the proposal 
to enable the Dominions to see the text of proposed Hague 
Conventions when they were negotiated in a preliminary 
manner. He was not enthusiastic regarding the arrange-
• 
ment, and made it clear that his difficulty arose from the 
fact that, if the Domi11ions tendered advice to the Imperial 
Government, they ought to be ready to fight to make good 
the advice if need be, and Canada had not by any means 
come to the conclusion that she would take part in all 
the wars of the United Kingdom. Or, as he said in 
1 Recollections of Sixty Years, p. 311. . 
2 Parl. Pap., Cd. 5745, p. 117 ; cf. Gen. Botha, pp. 131, 132. 
• 
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1910 1 in the Canadian House of Commons: 'If England is 
at war, we are at war and liable to attack. I do not say 
tl1at we shall al,vay·s be attaclred, neither do I say that we 
· would take part in all the wars of England. That is a matter 
that must be determined by circumstances, upon which 
the Canaclian Parliament 'viii have to pronounce and will 
have to decide in its own best judgement.' 2 Or again: 
~Does it follow because "\Ve are exposed to attack that 've 
are going t.o take part in all the wars of the Empire? No. 
We shall talre part if we think proper : we shall certainly 
take part if our territory is attacked.' 
• 
In the case of Sir Robert Borden is to be found the other\ 
side of the attitude of Sir Wilfrid Laurier. 'If Canada', he 
says, ' and any other Dominions of the Empire are to take 
their part as nations of this Empire in the defence of the 
Empire as a whole, shall it be that we, contributing to that 
defence of the whole En1pire, shall have absolutely, as 
citizens of this country, no voice whatever in the Councils of 
the Empire touching the issues of peace and war throughout 
the Empire? I do not think that such would be a tolerable 
condition. I do not think the people of Canada would for 
one moment submit to such a condition.' 3 The same view 
has also been expressed by Mr. Doherty, now Canadian 
Minister of Justice ; speaking in the House of Commons on 
February 24, 1910, he said: 'What I desire to point out is 
that under our constitutior1 there is no obligation on the 
part of Canada legally or constitutionally speaking to 
· contribute to the naval forces of the Empire, and that 
position will continue to exist so long as the United Kingdom 
alone has exclusive control of the foreign affairs of the 
Empire.' The positive side of the line of argument was set 
out by Sir R. Borden on December 5, 1912, in moving for 
leave to introduce the Naval Aid Bill, when he said: 'When 
1 Debates, 1910, p. 2965. 
· 
2 He most eloquently justified the participation of the Dominion in the 
war of 1914 as a matter of duty and righteousness; see Round Table, 1915, 
pp. 430-2 ; and cf. Canada Commons Debates, 1909, pp. 3511, 3512. 
3 Cf. Mr. Doherty's views, House of Commons, 1910, pp. 4137-44 . 
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Great Britain no longer assurr1es sole responsibility for 
defence upon the high seas, she can no longer undertake to 
assume sole responsibility for or sole control of foreign 
policy, which is closely, vitally, constantly, associated with 
defence in which the Dominions participate. It has been 
·declared in the past and even during recent years that 
responsibility for foreign affairs could not be shared by 
Great Britain with the Dominions. In. my humble opinion 
adherence to such a position could have but Qne and that 
a most disastrous result. Duri11g my recent visit to the 
British Islands I ventured on many public occasions to 
propound the principle that the great Dominions, sharing the 
defence of the Empire upon the high seas, must necessarily 
be entitled to share also responsibility for and in the control 
of foreign policy. No declaration that I made was greeted 
more heartily and enthusiastically than this. It is satis-
factory to know that to-day not only His Majesty's ministers, 
but also the leaders of the opposite political party in Great 
Britain, have explicitly accepted this principle and have 
affirmed that the conviction that the mea11s by which it can 
be constitutionally accomplished must be sought, discovered, 
and utilized without delay.' He proceeded in the course 
of his -speech to explain the constitution of the Imperial 
Defence Corr1mittee, its familiarity witlt foreign politics, the 
offer of the Imperial Government to summon to it regularly 
a minister sent by Canada, and the offer to give such a 
minister full information on foreign politics, and urged that 
such an arrangement, though only provisional, would be of 
great advantage to the Dominion. Effect was later given 
to the proposal, as described in the Secretary of State's 
dispatch of December 10, 1912, by the appointment of Sir 
George Perley, an honorary minister in the Canadian 
Cabinet, to act as High Commissioner in London, the office 
having been vacated by the deatl1 of Lord Strathcona, and 
to represent Canada. The appointment was an unprece-
dented one, an_d its existence proved of service in accelerating 
the co-operation of Can_ada and the United Kingdom, which 
marked the opening of the war. 
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The Australasian Dominions have never been tlnder the 
guidance in recen~ years of statesme11 who asserted so firmly 
the doctrine of the facultative grant of aid to the Empire as 
Sir Wilfrid I.Jaurier. The response made at the time of the 
Boer War 'vas .hearty in the extreme, though the perfection 
of accord between the two Governments was marred at the 
close by some minor incide11ts which need not be examined 
in detail. But the Labour Party, which as recently as the 
ge11eral election of 1914 was attacked by very ill-advised 
members of the Opposition as anti-British, has shown a 
singular. eagerness to secure the due organizatio11 of the 
people for naval and military warfare. Mr. Hughes, now 
Prime Minister, and formerly Attorney-General, who, V\'ith 
Mr. ~..,isher, has been the leading spirit in the Labour Govern-
ments, since Mr-. Watson abandoned the joys of leadership 
of the party for the more effective if less showy occupation 
of managing the party from behind the sce11es, was one of the 
protagonists of universal training, and though it was not the 
lot of the Labour Government to introduce the principle 
into practice, still it has shown throughout great friendship 
for the proposal, and its Minister of Defence, Mr. Pearce, has 
been honourably noted for su.ccess ir1 working the details. 
The attitude of Mr. Fisher has been throughout the same: 
the assistance of the Dominions me·ans that they should have 
every· possible opportunity for obtaining foreign information 
and understanding of the issues of foreign politics. New 
Zealand, with its constant loyalty and eagerness for the 
Imperial connex~on, has of late very clearly adopted the 
same attitude : the sharing of the responsibility as 1vell as 
the burden of defer1ce is eagerly ·sought . by some at least 
of the ministers ·of the Coalition. Government by which the 
destinies of the Dominion are now controlled. 
In all these Dominions the outbreak of the war of 1914 
found the most eager response to the need of the moment. 
The Imperial Government had barely had time to warn the 
G-overnments of the critical state of affairs before the war 
became inevitable, but even the few days of suspense marked 
the arrival of most welcome ,assurances of support from the 
WAR AND PEACE 347 
Dominions. When war became inevitable, the action taken 
was decisive; Canada offered a Division, which, by the time 
it was ready, amounted to over 33,100 men, including a 
regi1nent mainly of ex-regulars recruited in the Dominion, 
commanded by the Governor-General's Secretary, Lieut.-
Colonel Farquhar, which was to win the highest distinction 
in battle, and to suffer the most grave losses, including its 
leader. The N ·iobe and RainbouJ, poor substitutes for the 
great addition to the Imperial power offered by Sir R. 
Borden, were transferred to the control of the Admiralty 
and engaged in useful work. A garrison was supplied for 
Bermuda, enabling the British force to leave at a time 'vhen 
every really trained ma11 was invaluable. ~Ioreover, assur-
ances were given that while son1e 8,000 men 'vould be kept 
on garriso11 duty in Ca11ada, 30,000 men would be kept in 
training, so as to allo"''" of successive reinforcements of 10,000 
at a tin1e being sent to the United l{ingdom.1 Australia at 
once promised to send ~ Division and a light horse brigade, 
and shortly added an offer, which was gratefully accepted, 
of an infa11try brigade and a light horse brigade, and under-
tool{ to dispatch further reinforcements from time ·to time : 
by November 1915 92,000 had thus been sent; stro11g opinions 
have also been expressed in the Commonwealth in favour 
even of .compulsory service for the sake of the war, though 
the troops raised as volunteers have been easily secured. 
New Zealand offered at once a body of over 8,000 men 
and constant reinforcements. These troops amounting to 
25,000 b.y November 1915--with the Australians were, i11 
view of the need of protection against Turkey, landed and 
trained in Egypt, whence they \vere tal{en to win fame ar1d, 
in too many cases, death in the Dardanelles. But in addition 
the naval forces of both Dominions were at once placed at 
the disposal of the Crown, and served in the reduction of 
Samoa and of Ger1nan New Guinea 'vith all the other German 
islands.2 Newfoundland not merely contributed her naval 
reserve, but raised an excellent body of volunteers as soldiers. 
1 In December 1915 it was decided to raise 500,000 men. 
2 Japan ook and transferred to Australia the Marshall Islands. 
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The position of the Union of South Africa was more diffi-
cult. The Government agreed readily to the withdrawal of 
the Imperial forces, and these trained troops were of great 
value to the Empire. But they were also invited to under-
talre the responsibility of capturing the wireless telegraph 
apparatus in German South-West Africa,1 which 'vas being 
used to give information to the German cruisers in the 
Pacific and was even suspected to be communicating direct 
with Berlin. The Union Government honourably under-
took the duty, and Parliament, though with hesitation in 
some quarters, accepted the policy. This acceptance was 
unexpected by the group of malcontents who were looking 
for an opportunity to overthrow tl1e Botha Administration, 
and in a brief period the forces which had been gathered for 
the attack in part turned traitor under the leadership of 
Maritz : rebellion broke out in the Orange Free State and 
part of the Transvaal, headed by de Wet and other leaders : 
the ex-Commandant-General of the Forces, \vho had taken 
part in the opening of the campaign and had been giver1 full 
confidence, turned traitor, and neither lVIr. Steyn nor lVIr. 
H~rtzog were willing to lay aside their personal feelings to do 
South Africa the benefit of saving her from rebellion. The 
German forces in the Protectorate were, ho"rever, slow in 
action and their strategy was ineffective : they failed to 
establish any real communication with the rebel forces, while 
on the other hand, after parleying long with the rebels and 
exhibiting the utmost forbearance, General Botha determined 
to strike, and in a short time crushed the movement. DeW et 
was captured when seeking to flee to the Germans, Beyers 
perished in seeking to cross a swollen river in flight, and 
almost all those who had served · with Maritz surrendered 
when they realized that the rebellion had been a fiasco. The 
campaign against German South-West Africa was then 
resumed and carried out with skill and determination against 
an enemy who, for some reason, failed to exhibit that 
desperation in resistance which might have been expected. 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 7873 . 
• 
• 
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The rebellion,1 however, had revealed, the more closely it was 
examined, the existence of a long conspiracy to overthrow 
the British power, a conspiracy in which the aged de la Rey 
had been engaged through · his belief in the vaticinations of 
a prophet, van Rensburg, who failed to foresee, it seems, his 
own fate. Fortunately, as it proved, for de la Rey, an 
accidental shot, fired at the motor-car in which he was riding 
with Beyers, ended his life before he was able to carry out 
his intended treason, and the accident the sentry was on 
guard for a motor containing some bandits who had com-
mitted murders, and fired at the car because it would not 
stop--served in some degree to throw out the plans of the 
conspirators. The action of the Government in view of the 
coming general election and the need of harmony in the land 
was extremely mild : there was constituted a special court 
to try offences, but the power to inflict the death penalty 
was taken away, and the ordinary rank and file of the rebels 
were accorded pardons, or were merely detained until the 
end of the campaign in German South-West Africa.2 l The 
bulk of the troops used to put down the rebellion were Boers, 
as it was felt that it would be both more just and more 
politic thus to use them against their countrymen, but the 
British element supplied the greater number of men for the 
conquest of German South-West Africa. 
The best case that could be made out for the rebels .by 
those who shared their views, but were afraid to put them 
into practice, was that the expedition to German South-West 
Africa was uncalled for, and that it was endangering the 
position of South Africa in the case of a British failure in 
Europe. In point of fact, it turned out that there had been 
for some considerable time a definite propaganda amongst 
the Boers of certain classes to start rebellion in order to 
recover their independence as soon as a favourable oppor-
tunity presented itself. The Government of German South-
West Africa had been consulted and had received the 
approval of the Emperor for the proposal to approve the 
1 See Round Table, 1914-15, pp. 224 seq., 463-86, 875-80; Parl. Pap., 
Cd. 7874. 2 Even de Wet was released after payment of a fine. 
• 
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plan, the Germans guaranteeing the position of the Boers. 
A significant com.mentary on the meaning of the guarantee 
was given by a~map found by the Union forces in the course 
of their victorious progress, which was drawn by a German 
to illustrate the conception 'of the state of South Africa to be 
attained at the end of the war under the terms of peace: 
the Union of South Africa had disappeared, and there was. 
only to be seen a piece of country marked ' Boer reserve ', 
in the same way as here and there throughout the Union 
reserves are marked out for the native races. This was a 
somewhat crude but very expressive symbol of the fate 
which would ·have awaited South Africa, had the British 
power been overthrown. The risk of intervening on the 
British side was of course that the British might be over-
thrown and the Union be then at the mercy of Germany, 
but the fate of the Union if Britain were overthrown without 
her help being afforded to her was equally certain. The 
Germa11 Emperor was not so foolish as voluntarily to leave 
in the hands of a weak republic the best part of the whole of 
South Africa and the finest ports. The criminality of the 
rebels appears the more clearly in that it 'vas certain that, 
if they were able to win some considerable success, the 
whole of South Africa would have been plunged into fratri- . 
cidal war, and that troops from India must have been 
imported to maintain the British control, pending the full 
possibility of reconquest. Unhappily the crime of rebellion 
in South Africa is regarded as venial, and the only satis-
factory episode in the whole affa.ir was the evidence afforded 
of the determinatio11 of the Government of General Botha 
to uphold the sovereignty of the King, and the magna11imity 
of the British population, who not merely spared no effort 
to assist in restoring order, but acquiesced in the decision of 
the Government, for political reasons, to inflict no more than 
·nominal punishment on rebels who had conspired with 
Germany to overthrow. th.e sovereignty to which many of 
them, like de Wet, Maritz, and Beyers, had svvorn allegiance. 
Indeed, perhaps the most deplorable feature of the rebellion 
is the fundamental dishonesty of temperament among mar1y 
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of the Dutch population which it has revealed, and which 
augurs badly for the future of the country.1 
The rebellion, too, suggests another problem of great diffi-
culty. · It is impossible not to raise the qt1estion whether the 
case may"" not arise that a majority in the Parliament and the 
white population of the Union might not desire to set up 
an independent regime, throwii1g off their allegiance to the 
British Crown. If this were the attitude of any other 
Domir1ion, the case would be simple : the desire must be 
conceded on terms to be amicably arranged. But in the case 
of the Union the Imperial Govern1nent has clearly a serious 
duty to the native population, which is not represented in 
• 
the legislature, and to the British section of the population, 
who, for the 1nost part, would certainly desire to retain the 
British sovereignty. Nor, it may be feared, would it be of 
much use to attempt to grant independence on the condition 
of any privileges to be retai11ed for natives or· British .sub-
. jects, for the enforceme11t of such rights would either be 
impossible or lead to war. It would therefore very possibly 
be impracticable to allo'v the country to be independent, and 
this fact must probably govern the situation in the Union 
for many years to come. Moreover, the attitude of the 
Union renders it doubtful whether in the interests of Rho-
desia entrance i11to closer relations 'vith that countrv should 
"' 
not be delayed for a considerable period: possible acquisi-
tions of other outlets may enable Rhodesia to remain outside 
the orbit of tl1e Union altogether, or at least until time has 
succeeded in building up there an effective spirit of unity in 
allegiance to the sovereignty of the Crown. 
Unlike the Boer War, where the enemy were confined to 
a single portion of the "\Vorld, and where any aggressive 
action outside South Africa was not to be seriotlsly expected, 
in this war the wide effect of the outbreak of hostilities 
was evidenced everywhere by special legislation to meet 
the needs of the case. It is important to note that this 
1 The general election of October 1915 gave Gen. Botha 54 votes, the 
Unionists 40, Independents 5, Labour 4, and Nationalists 27, a serious sign 
of the feeling of the Dutch districts. 
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legislation was not Imperial, but Dominion, and State or 
provincial : the existence of a condition of war brought with 
it, of course, the result that the en.emy became in the posi-
tion of alien enemies, but it did not in any \vay abrogate the 
doctrine that the passing of any legislation arising out of the 
state of war was a matter solelv for the con.sideration of 
... 
the Dominio11 Governments and Parliame11ts. Even in n1inor 
details care was taken to secure that the position and auto-
nomy of the Dominio11s should not be affected. injuriously by 
the war. The mere outbreak of war made it an offence to 
trade \vith the enemy, unless with the royal permissio11. 
The prerogative of the Crown to gra11t such permission and 
thereby to relieve the actor of responsibility for breach of 
law is naturally not delegated in time of peace to the 
Governors of Dominions. The first proclamations regarding 
trading with the enem~y, in which matters affecti11g the 
Dominions were dealt \vith, were widely worded, and no 
special rule laid down for the case of the grant of permission 
to trade in the Dominions, but the omission was remedied 
by a Proclamation of October 8, 1914, in which, in the 
operation of the provisions of the Trading Proclamation, for 
Orders in Council made and published on the recommenda-
tion of a Secretary of State was substituted, as regards 
persons resident or carrying on business in the Oversea 
Dominions, a11 Order of the Governor in Council published in 
the official gazette, and tl1e power to grant licences to per-
form certain acts which would otherwise have been illegal 
was conferred on the Governors-General 1 of the Common-
wealth, the Union, and Canada, and on the Governors of 
New Zealand and Newfoundland. The same power was also 
given to the Governors of the colonies n.ot possessing respon-
sible government, but in their case the grant was for reasons 
of convenience, not for constitutional grounds. 
The grant of extra powers taken by the Dominion govern-
ments was generally "vide. Thus in Canada one Act (c. 2) 
1 This was, no doubt, correct ; though internal trade is a State rna tter, 
licences would nearly always involve external trade, a Commonwealth 
matter under s. 51 (i) of the Constitution. 
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ratified all the actions clone on or after August 1, 1914, by 
or under the authority of or ratified by the King-in-Council, 
any minister or officer of the Imperial Government, the 
Governor-in-Council, any minister or officer of the Canadian 
Government, and any other authority or person which would 
have been authorized by the Act or by orders or regulations 
under it had they'" been done after the passing of the Act. 
It was provided that the issue of a proclamation by His 
Majesty or llnder the authority of the Governor-in-Council 
should be co11clusive evidence of the existence of war and 
of its continuanee, and it was declared that war had existed 
since August 4, 1914. The Governor-in-Council was given 
general power to do and. authorize such acts and things, 
and to make from tim~ to time such orders and regulations 
as he might by reason of the existence of war, invasion, or 
insurrection deem necessary or advisable for the securitJ', 
defence, peace, order, or · welfare of Canada, including 
censorship, arrest, detention, exclusion, ar1d deportation, 
control of harbours, ports, and territorial waters of Canada 
and the moveme11ts of vessels, transportation by land, air, 
or water, trading, exportation, importation, production and 
manufacture, appropriation and · control, forfeiture and 
disposure of property, and of the use thereof. In any case 
'vhere property or its use was appropriated by the Crown, 
and com1)ensation was to be made therefor, in default of 
' 
agreement it was to be decided by a judge of the Supreme 
Court of Canada, or a superior court or county court of the 
province in wl1ich the claim arose. Pen.alties for violations 
of orders and. regulations made under the Act could be 
imposed, but not to exceed a fine of 5,000 dollars, or im-
prisonment not exceeding five years, or both fine and 
imprisonment. No person held for deportation under the 
Act or any regulations, or who \vas under arrest or detention 
as an alien enemy or upon suspicion of being such an enemy, 
or for preventing his departure from Canada should be 
released on bail or otherwise discharged withollt the consent 
of the Minister of Justice. The Immigration Act was 
amended by providing that no resident of Canada~ 'vhether 
1874 z / 
• 
• 
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or not he was a Canadian citizen or had Canadia11 domicile 
or not, who left Canada to perfor1n any military or other 
service for a country then at war witl1 His Majesty, or for 
the purpose of aiding and abetting His Majesty's enemies, 
should be permitted to land in Canada or to remain therein 
except with the permission of the minister. Other Acts 
passed at the same session, summoned immediately on the 
outbreak of war, dealt with the conservation of the com-
mercial and industrial interests of the Dominion, authorized 
the modification of the rules regarding the issue of Dominion 
notes, changed the customs-tariff in order to raise a larger 
revenue from imports of certain articles of food and drink, 
.-
and incorporated the Patriotic Fund of Canada to deal 
with cases of need. Another Act appropriated the sum of 
fifty million dollars from the consolidated revenue fund 
towards defraying any expenses to be incurred by or under 
the authority of the Governor-in-Council during the ~Tear 
ending March 31, 1915, for the defence and sectrrity of 
Canada·, the conduct of naval and military operatio11s irt 
or beyond Canada, promoting the continuance of tra(ie, 
i~dustry, and business con1munication, whether by means of 
insurance or indemnity against war risks or otherwise, and 
the carrying out of any other measure deemed 11ecessary or 
advisable by the Governor-in-Council in consequence of the 
existence of a state of war. The Governor-i11-Council was 
also authorized to raise money by loan for making payments 
covered by the authority of the Act. · 
Equally effective steps were tal{en by the Governn1ents 
of the Commonwealth and the States in Australia and by 
the Government of New Zealand.1 lVluch of the legislation 
was devoted to securing the full control of the food supply 
so as to prevent the holding up of stocks and the making 
thereby of undue profits at the expense of the public, while 
steps were also tal{en to secure that the export fron1 Australia 
1 See account in Round Table, 1915, pp. 201 seq.; 1914-15, pp. 240 seq. 
The generosity of the Imperial Government in providing large loans for 
the Dominions and in taking up foreign bills held by Dominion banks 
greatly aided the Dominions. 
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of any articles of food 'vhich were in demand was prevented. 
The State of Queensland, acting with foresight and effective-
ness, passed an Act providing for the acquisitior1 of the whole 
of the 1neat produced in the State with the view to its sale 
to the British Government, a step whicl1 aided considerably 
the victualling of the armies of England a11d France and in 
keeping within fairly reasonable limits the rise in the cost 
of commodities. In the case of New South Wales an Act 
was passed authorizing the acquisition by the Government 
of the wheat supply, the Governn1ent intending to secure 
that there should be no shortage in the State. This decision 
of the Government had the result of disappointing and 
causir1g loss to certain speculators · and dealers in 'Tictoria 
who had relied on obtaining supplies from New South Wales, 
and the result was that the matter was brought before the 
Interstate Commission establisl1ed by the Interstate Com-
mission Act, 1912, in order to obtai11 a declaration that 
the Act was ultra vires the Parliament of New South 
\Vales, as it constituted an interference with freedom of 
intercourse among the states provided by s. 92 of the 
Constitution of the Commonwealth. The Interstate Com-
nlission, on the heari11g of the case, stated a special case for 
the consideration of the High Court as to the extent of its 
jurisdiction to deal with the matter, and at the hearir1g of 
the case, on the suggestion of the Chief Justice, the Common-
wealth of Australia brought an action against the State 
for a declaration of the invalidity of the Act, so that, even 
jf the I11terstate Comn1ission had no jurisdiction, the 
question at issue should be disposed of. 
On March 23, 1915,1 the decision of the High Court was 
delivered, in which they una11imously held that the Act of 
New South Wales was intra vi·res. It was contended for the 
Commonwealth that the law n1ust be invalid because it 
interfered "\vith the right of persons who in New South Wales 
had contracted to sell their wheat to persons in another 
state to carry out the contract, and that thus th.e prohibition 
of the Constitutio11 against the existence of any hindrance 
1 Melbourne Argus, March 24, 1915. 
Z2 
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to free trade "\vas evaded. The Chief Justice pointed out 
that if the contention of the Commonwealth were to be 
supported to its full extent, it would amount to a claim 
that in any Act for the regulation of the expropriation of 
private property there must be an exception for any case 
in which the property was a11 object of state commerce at 
the time of expropriation. · If this were the case, still the 
law .could clearly stand as to other property, the rule being 
that a law must be read as dealing with the subject-matter 
which it could control, and therefore the Act could not be 
ultra vires 011 this grou11d. But he pointed out that the 
effect of the Act was 11ot to limit the powers of an owner to 
export his goods to another state, which the constitution 
forbade, but the effecting of a change of ownership of the 
goods. rrhe state became the Ovvner of all the wheat in the 
state, the owner having merely a compensation claim, and 
the new owner was free to export as he liked. The result 
was that the Act could not be said to violate s. 92 of the 
constitution, even if it were notorious ·that the Government 
of New South Wales acquired the wheat to prevent export. 
Moreover l1e held that the Interstate Commission had no 
authority in tl1e matter, as it had no judicial power proper. 
The Commissio11 was created under the power given by 
s. 101 of the constitution to set up a body provided with such 
powers of adjudication and administration as Parliament 
should deem necessary for the execution and maintenance 
within the Comn1onwealth of the provisions of the con-
stitution relatir1g to trade and commerce and the la"\vs made 
thereunder. In exercising this power in the ... t\.ct of 1912 
Parliament conferred express judicial authority on the 
Commission and made it a court of record and invested it 
with the powers and privileges of the High Court of the 
Commonwealth itself. In support of this action of Parlia-
ment it was argued that the constitution in s. 73 spoke of an 
appeal on points of law lying from the decisions of the 
Commission, and that this showed ·that it was to be a real 
judicial body. The Chief ,Justice overruled this argument, 
on the ground that it clearly was provided by s. 71 of the 
• 
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Constitution that judicial power was to be exercised in the 
Commonwealth by the courts therein expressly provided 
for, and that mode of appointm~nt of the Commission and 
their tenure of office \vas specially provided for in the 
constitution, showing that they did not fall under the 
san1e principles as justices of the Commonwealth. The 
right of _ appeal was given because in the operation of their 
functions the Co1nmission must decide mixed questions of 
law and fact, and it was felt right that they should be subject 
in n1atters of law to the control of the High Court. The 
power of adjudication as given was one of a different kind, 
analogous to the power given in England to bodies like the 
Board of Trade or I~ocal Government Board or other bodies, 
as i11 the case of the Imperial Act, 9 Edw. VII, c. 44, regarding 
housing, town planning, &c. It was never used in British 
statutes for the purpose of conferring jurisdictio11 proper, 
and it could not in the case of the Commonwealth be given 
that sense in the face of the plain distinction betvveen judicial 
and other powers. The view of the Chief Justice was shared 
by Isaacs J., who compared the functions of the Con1mission 
as quasi-jlldicial with those of customs officials or the 
commissioner of pate11ts, and by Powers and Rich JJ. On 
the other hand, Barton J. held that the powers of adjudication 
were equivalent to judicial power, and this view .. was shared 
by Duffy J., but both agreed that the New South Wales Act 
was valid, though Barton J. only on the ground that it vvas 
valid in so far as it does not interfere with s. 92 of the 
constitutio11. 
A further case of interest arose from the operation of 
the War Precautions Act of the Commonwealth. Bv s. 4 
... 
of that Act power was given to the Governor-General to 
make regulations for securing the public safety and the 
defence of the Con1monwealth. Under this Act a regulation 
was 1nade autl1orizing the Minister of Defence, when he had 
reason to believe that a naturalized perso11 was disloyal or 
disaffected, to order him by warrant to be detained in 
military custody until the end of the war. By virtue of 
a warrant under the ha11d of the minister one Franz Wallach, 
• 
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manager of the Australian Metal Company, 'vas detained 
at a n1ilitary camp at Lang,varrin, and obtained a \Vrit of 
habeas corpus on which he was brought before the full court 
of Victoria on August 2, 1915.1 The Minister of Defence 
attended the court and gave evidence on oath tha.t he had 
reason to believe that the prisoner was a person who should 
in the interests of the Commonwealtl1 be i11teri1ed, but he 
declined to explain the nature of his inforn1ation on the 
ground that it would be prejudicial to the interest of the 
Commonwealth to do so, and in this contentio11 he was 
upheld against the Chief Justice by the other two judges. 
On the main question whether the regulation in itself was 
reasonable the court was divided ir1 opinion, but the Chief 
Justice and a'Beckett J. held that it was not. The power 
to suspend the habeas corpus Act rested with Parlian1ent, 
and it was clearly possible for Parliament to authorize the 
step taken if it thought fit, but the regulation in question 
'vas made under no express power to deny a British subject 
the ordinary right of liberty, and it was therefore, as it gave 
no ground for the court examining the cause of the detention, 
too wide and could not be held to be intra vires. A'Beckett ,J. 
concurred in this view : under the regulation far too wide 
a power was given to arrest and detain without examination, 
and though the power was given to the minister it was 
equally open in law for the power to have been given to any 
person if the regulation wa.s intra vires under the Act. 
Cussen J., on tl1e other hand, held that in \Var time and 
under an Act dealing with war precautions the regulatiOn 
could be upheld. As a result the prisoner was discharged, 
only at once. to be rearrested on the strength of a new 
regulation under the Act, providing that if in view of the 
hostile associations of any persons it is in the interest of 
public safety and the defence of the Commonwealth that he 
should be detained in military custody, the minister may order 
his detention, and the decision was reversed on appeal. 2 
In the case of the Union a Public Welfare and Moratorium 
Act, No. I of 1914, conferred on the Governor power to fix 
1 Melbourne Argus, August 3 and 10, 1915. 2 21 A.L.R. 353.~ . 
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prices for commodities, to ascertain the amounts of com-
modities stored, to appropriate commodities for the public 
use, if u11reasonably withheld, on payment of compensation, 
to take possession of premises for the storage of goods, 
to prohibit the publication of false news, and of information 
regarding defence matters. He was also authorizetl to 
proclaim under certain conditions a moratorium, and 
further Acts conferred various financial and other powers, 
besides authorizing the construction of a railway to facilitate 
the attack on Ger1nan South-West Africa. The presence of 
German subjects in the Cape raised at once the same 
difficulties as in the United Kingdom. In ex parte Belli 1 
a German resident at Capetown asked the Cape Provincial 
Division to declare illegal his arrest by the authority of the 
Union Government and his removal by the same authority 
to confinement at Johannesburg. The applicant was 
exempt from military service in Germany and not a reservist. 
He had, prior to his arrest, reported himself to the Capetown 
magistrate. The applicatio11 was rejected by the court. 
While they recog11ized that there was n1odern authority for 
mild treatment of alien enen1ies, they could not deny the 
positive right of the Government to take the action in 
question, as ~t was within their legal right to detain as 
prisoners of war every subject of a hostile power found 
within their territory, and the court had no discretionary 
power to intervene. The same court in September 1914, 
in ex parte Savage artd others,2 decided the rights of alien 
enemies to sue and be sued in the Cape courts in the same 
sense as that of the decision of the English Court of Appeal.3 
It \vas laid dow11 that the character of an alien enemy is 
determined by residence in a hostile country, and that in 
accordance with the rules of English common law this pre-
scribes a prohibition of intercourse between such alien 
enemie~ and persons resident in the Cape, and the court 
held t.hat, unless special legislation was passed in accordance 
1 [1910] C.P.D. 742. 2 [1914] C.P.D. 827_- . 
3 Porter v. Freudenberg, Kreglinger v. S. Samuel & Rosenfeld, in re 
Merten' s Patents [ 1915] 1 K.B. 857. 
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with the Hague Conference of 1907, forbidding interference · 
with legal proceedings, the common law rule ir1volved 
a prohibition for an alien enemy to use a11y s ·outh African 
court of justice. The same rule did not interfere with 
suing alien enen1ies i11 a civil action, as there was nothing 
against public policy in this, and it resulted that an alien 
e11emy could be sued in the courts of the colony. It 'vas 
also held that as the method of substituted service did not 
prevail in the courts of the Cape, and as edictal citation 
would be an in1perfect 1neans of giving notice, recourse could 
be had to the method of seizure of property ad j''ltndandam 
i~urisdictio1tern or simply to service of the summons on the 
local branch of the firrr1 in question, whose head office was 
at Berlin but whicl1 had brar1ches in the Cape. 
It is quite inevitable that after being so deeply affected 
by the war as the Dominions have been, and after mal{ing 
such ready sacrifices for the cause of Empire, they should 
seek the assurance that they shall most fully be consulted 
with regard to the termi11ation of hostilities. For a time 
a somewhat determined movement was made in favour of 
the holding in May or June 1915 of an Imperial Conference 
to discuss affairs/ but the proposition, though apparently 
seriously intended and supported by the wishes · of the 
Commonwealth Government, could hardly be taken as 
practicable. The Canadian Ciovernment., by mea11s of their 
minister statio11ed in Londo11, had the fullest and most 
intimate relations with the Imperial Government, and 
a conference 'vould l1ave had no attractions for them in 
any way. The Prime Minister of the Union of South 
Africa was busy in devising an attack on the German forces 
in South Africa, and was also for the earlier part of the war 
deeply engaged in contending against a dangerous rebellion, 
and after its suppression was very busily involved in an 
election campaig11. In the Dominion of New Zealand 
a .curious political position arose in December 1914, for the 
opposition, as a result of the general election, found itself in 
1 See The Times, May 22, 1915; Round Table, 1915, pp. 325 seq. The 
latter is a reasoned statement of great interest. 
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almost an equality with the Government, the issue depending, 
as usual in such cases, on the decision of one or two doubtful 
seats. The position therefore left no possibility for the dis-
patch of a minister to the United Kingdom until, after a lo11g 
series of tactics, it was agreed to fou11d a coalition govern-
ment and to send a united representation to any Imperial 
Conference held in the future, a decision the wisdom of 
which "\vas obvious, since the two parties in the Legislature 
have clearly come to almost the same numbers and degree 
of popular favour. In the Commonwealth. alone could 
ministeTs have been spared to visit the United Kingdom, 
and the holding of a Conference with these ministers was of 
course open had they cared to come, but naturally enough 
they preferred a full Conference. · .... L\..ccordingly the meeting 
of the Imperial Conference due for 1915 was postponed by 
agreement until a more convenient season, but a most clear 
intimation was given that the tern1s of peace as affecting 
. ' 
the Dominions would be discussed with the Dominions 
before the peace was concluded. 
In the military operations which were undertaken by the 
Dominions against the German Protectorates in Samoa, in 
New Guinea, and in · South Africa the Governments con-
cerned acted entirely on the understanding that any con-
quests which were made by their troops were made in the 
name of the Empire, and that the question of annexation 
or other action in regard to the conquests must wait until 
the conclusion of the war. The territory thus tal{en was 
therefore not annexed to the Crown, as often loosely stated : 
the territory was merely occupied, and is now being adminis-
tered by the Dominion Governments on behalf of the Cro,vn 
pending the final allocation in time of peace. The con-
ventiorls which were made "\vith the German forces occupying 
the islands were nothing but military conventio11s, though 
the fullest use of the freedom of a commander was made 
by General Botha in settling the terms on which German 
South-West Africa was to be yielded to the Britisl1 arms. 
It is, however, very certain that neither New Zealand, nor 
the Commonwealth of Australia, nor the Union, "\vill be 
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. 
willing to relinquish the territory which they now hold. 
New Zealand bitterly resented in 1899 the conclusion of the 
Samoa Conve11tion,1 though that Convention was really 
forced from the Imperial Government by reason of the 
pressure exerted by the German Gover~ment at the moment 
when the British reverses in the Boer War had begun to 
look serious. At that psychological mo1nent the pressure 
of public opinion in Germany, which had been fairly calm, 
becan1e, in tl1e view of the German Governn1ent, so serious 
that son1ething had to be done to assuage it, a11d tl1e action 
taken was in the form of asking for the cessio11 of the British 
share of the islands. Luckily the British Government, by 
remaining firm, succeeded in obtaining the- cession of all 
German claims 011 Tonga and the giving up of the Solomon 
Ishinds, but obvious considerations of this ki11d do not 
apJleal very forcib-ly to persons not familiar with foreign 
politics, and at a great distance fron1 Europe. The feeling, 
however, that Great Britain was negligent of the interests 
of New Zealand in that matter, though it cannot be too 
often said that it was perfectly unfounded. and that British 
diplomacy in this afiair showed itself at great advantage, 
is one which it is not to be expected that an:y considerations 
will eradicate, and the demand of New Zealand for tl1at 
island will be firmly pressed at any conference or discussion. 
Similarly Australia remembers that Queensland tried in 
vain to annex what is now Germa11 New Gui11ea, and may 
be trusted to .demand that the full possession of the territory 
will be secured to it, not indeecl because of any intrinsic 
value, of which it probably has very little, to judge fron1 the 
case of British New Guinea, which will not progress despite 
much effort and some mor1ey, but because it is most und.esir-
able to have in foreign hands any part of an island which 
is really an integral part of the continent. In the ease of 
South Africa General Botha has already declared that the 
... 
German territory is required for the Unior1. It is said to 
have in it not merely great wealth in diamonds, which is 
adrrtitted, but considerable ranges of land suitable for 
1 See Parl. Pap., Cd. 7, 38, 39, 98. 
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settlement, and the great need of the Union Government is 
such land. Moreover, quite just emphasis .has been laid by 
General Botha on the conduct of Germany in its treatment 
of t.he Hereros as a source of un.rest and discontent among 
the native races of South Africa. Nor in fact can it be good 
for a country to have as next neighbour a country which 
extern1inates a nation with as little humanity as sho,vn by 
Germany to a helpless if not very attractive native race. 
Moreover, the actual presence on South African soil of 
a power wl1ich has intrigued against the Govern.ment of 
South Africa is really an intolerable grievance, 'vhich the 
Union cannot be expected to acquiesce in unless it is 
essential. 
It is obvious that there is abundant room for difficulty 
in the granting of their desires to the Dominions unless the 
war has a perfectly favourable ending, and in that case 
there is the danger of the desire .to mitigate the harshness 
of the terms given interfering 'vith the demands of the 
Dominions. It is right to recognize the danger, for the 
absurd view has actually been expressed that, as a matter 
of good'\\ill, in the case of success in the war ma11~y· colonies, 
including German South-West Africa, should be returned 
to Germany. If the Imperial Government has the power 
to retain German South-West Africa and does not do so, 
it will be clear that the sacrifice of the Don1inions has 
bee11 wasted and that the Empire is merely a na1ne, but 
the contingency of an.y such folly on the part of the In1perial 
Govern1ner1t should not be accepted as a possibility. The 
more serious position n1ay be that some sacrifices have to 
be made to ensure peace, and that the Dominions may be 
involved in the sacrifices. The mere possibility of this is 
adequate reason. to render the prosecutio~ of the war by 
the Government the more effective and resolute. 
A mere consideration of the actual position of the war, 
the great efforts which must still be made before there can 
be any hope of peace, shows how idle were the proposals .to 
have an early meeti11g of the Imperial Conference, based 
on the idea which the DomiiJ.ions, not l)erhaps unnaturally, 
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entertained, since many people in the United Kingdom 
sufferecl from the same delusion, that there was a chance of 
an early peace. It is still premature to discuss the actual 
mode of arranging peace when no peace is in sight. It is, 
however, quite a different thing to discuss. the steps which 
should be taken in settling the outli11es of the conditions of 
peace to be sought, and that could be done by a conference 
if the time and circumstances of the Dominions permitted 
a full attendance of ministers. It may, however, be 
observed, that the appointment of the ex-Labour Prime 
Minister to be High Commissioner of the Commonwealth in 
London affords a simple and effective means, if desired, 
for keeping the I.~abour Government in touch with the 
Imperial Government and with foreign affairs. It is true 
that the High Commissioner remains a civil servant of 
a special kind, but that does not alter the fact that he n1ust 
be in complete Sj7mpathy with the Labour Government of 
\vhich he has so long been the leader i11 Parliament, and 
that owing to the caucus system he is not in the same 
position towards his ministerial superiors as the ordinary 
High Commissioner to the Governn1ent by which he is 
appointed. The Labour system of rule gives to the private 
individual a con.siderable amount of importance as com-
pared with ministers, for it reduces their rank by sub-
ordinati11g their position to the control of the Labour Party 
in Parliament, and behir1d that the Labour Party in. the 
country, and thus while · the position is experimental it is 
not impossible that in this way the needs of consultation 
might be met effectively and conveniently. That if possible 
a full Conference should be held is obvious, but mlist depend 
on . the wishes and needs of the Dominions as a whole : 
Australia and New Zeala11d have far more need for confer-
ences than the nearer Dominions. 
The position of the Dominions in any actual Peace Con-
ference which might be held to settle terms of peace is 
a more difficult question. If a formal meeting similar to 
those which marked the end of the great wars of the begin-
ning of the nineteenth century 'vere held, it might be possible 
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to have the Dominions represented by advisers of the British 
plenipotentiaries, or as n1embers of the British delegation 
acting on the rule that the final decision would rest 'vith the 
Imperial Government. It might also be possible that they 
should act as plenipotentiaries to represent the King on 
behalf of the Dominions, as has been done in the case of 
two commercial conferences, and l1as been suggested above 1 
as a suitable procedure for Hague Conferences. But it may 
be doubted if, in case of the peace necessary to effect a settle-
ment after a war in which there are the wishes of so n1any 
allies to consider and so many conflicting aims to be recon-
ciled, it would not be better to allow the Don1inions merely 
to be representee! in an advisory capacity. 
It must ·of course be remembered that the common idea 
that ir1 this war the Dominions are coming to aid the Empire 
merely out of chivalry and loyalty is not an accurate 
representation of facts. It is most true that this is the 
feeling animating many of those 'vho have offered thein-
selves for service, but it would be idle to deny that the war 
is essentially one as much for the freedom ancl the power of 
self-government of the Don1inio11s as it is for the freedom 
of the United Kingdom. We may indeed go further and 
assert that the Dominions are in rather more danger, with 
the exception of Canada, which would be protected by the 
United States in accordance with the Canni11g doctrine 2 as 
enunciated by Monroe in her own vital interests,3 than the 
United Kingdom herself, which is too strong to be finally 
ruled even by a victorious Germany. But Australia and New 
Zealand, and still more South Africa, would have :ho chance 
of resisting appropriation by a victorious Germany, and 
it is idle to deny that the obtaining of such possessions 
would exactly meet the German view of their future in the 
world. There has been evidence alre~dy in the Common-
t Part I, chap. xiv. · 
2 See J. S. Ewart, Kingdom Papers, ii. 169-92, who usefully reminds his 
fellow Canadians of the true source of the policy. 
3 This would be humiliating to Canada, as pointed out by Sir W. Laurier; 
Round Table, 1915, p. 431, and by Sir R. Borden, ibid. p. 432. 
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wealth 1 of the insidious control which has been effected of 
the whole metal industry, a control which the Commonwealth 
Government has set itself successfully to defeat for good,2 
and the university circles of New Zealand have given 
a signal example of their lack of common-sense by their 
determined resistance to the wise decision of the Govern-
ment and the Parliament that an unnaturalized German 
professor should not be allowed to continue the instruction 
of youth. 
1 Note should be made of the clear recognition of the Bulletin (e. g. 
Aug. 12, 1915) of the real stake of Australia in the war. 
2 See Round Table, 1915-16, pp. 175-80. The necessary co-operation of 
the Imperial Government is to be obtained by Mr. Hughes during his 
visit of March 1916 to London . 
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CHAPTER XVI 
APPEALS TO THE PRIVY COUNCIL 
THERE still exists at the present day a very wide right 
of appeal to the Crown-in-Council from the courts of the 
oversea Dominions possessing responsible government, and 
it is perhaps not always realized that the right to appeal is 
not one which can be taken away at pleasure by the Legis-
latures of the Dominions. Apart altogether from the 
question of the exercise of the right of the Cro\vn to withhold 
assent from a Bill fettering the right of the Judicial Com-
mittee of the Privy Council to grant leave to appeal from the 
decision of a Dominion court, in almost every case such an 
attempt at legislation would be ultra vires, and would 
therefore not in la'v hamper the exercise of the discretion 
of the Judicial• Committee · in p.erforming their function of 
considering such appeals. Moreover it must always be 
borne in mind that the Judicial Committee · is a judicial 
body, and that, though it is not impervious to considerations 
of a quasi-political nature as to the mode in which it should 
exercise its right to grant special leave to appeal, neverthe-
less it is bound to deal with any such application in a judicial 
spirit and to decide it in a judicial manner. It would not 
be possible to lay down for that body any rule that the 
dislike of a Dominion to the hearing of appeals should be 
a ground for not hearing those appeals which were actually 
brought to its notice. 
The right of the Crown to grant special leave to appeal 
rests on the royal prerogative in the first instance, but the 
prerogative can be· barred by local legislation in most cases, 
and it may be held that it could effectively be barred in the 
case of this prerogative also. There is, however, a certain 
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difficulty in the matter which cannot be wholly ignored. 
The prerogative is exercised in the United Kingdom, and 
not in the Dominion, and it may be argued that the effect 
of a local Act being limited in territorial effect would not 
bar the possibility of the grant by the Crown of special 
leave, and that, if on the hearing of the appeal the judgement 
were reversed, the effects of such a reversal would follow 
automatically in law, if not in practice. On the other hand 
the question is really academic, for, if the actual effects 
·were not permitted to follow in the Dominion, if the courts 
there were instructed by local law that their decisions were 
to -be treated by them as final, the reversal of a decision on 
appeal would matter nothing, and, what is more important, 
the Judicial Committee would not ·deal with judgements 
which would not be affected by their decisions. In any case, 
however, the power to prevent the operation of the preroga-
tive is taken away from nearly all Dominion Legislatures 
by the provisions of an Act, 7 and 8 Viet. c. 69, which was 
passed, not for this purpose but merely because it had been 
found doubtful whether the Crown had power to hear cases 
brought on appeal, not from the last appellate jurisdiction 
in a colony, but from an inferior court. It may at first 
sight seem strange that there should have been any desire 
to hear appeals direct from the inferior courts, but the 
explanation is that in several colonies the final court of 
appeal in the colony itself was the Governor-in-Council, 
not a judicial body in any very satisfactory sense, and not. 
one which was likely by its deliberations to add much of 
value to what was said in the highest inferior court. Indeed 
this anomalous system remained alive in theory in Western 
Australia until 1911,1 when the last remnant of it was 
abolished as the result of the discovery that apparently the 
Governor-in-Council was a c~urt of appeal in divorce cases, 
-a duty which that body had not the slightest desire to 
perform. The Act, however, while permitting appeals to 
be brought direct from any inferior court, incidentally 
abolished all restrictions on the right to bring appeals 
1 Act No. 4 of 1911 ; Parl. Pap.; Cd. 6091, p. 53. 
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from the final court in any colony by including that court 
in its wording. 
Curiously enough the effect of the Act in question was 
long overlooked : it is otherwise inexplicable that there 
should have arisen any dispute regarding the Act creating 
the Supreme Court of Canada, when the Imperial Govern-
ment in 1875 clearly intimated that the Act must not touch 
the prerogative right to grant special leave to appeal, or it 
could not expect to obtain the royal approval. The same 
question arose further regarding the right of the Privy 
Council to grant special leave to appeal in the case of 
criminal cases in Canada. The matter was brought to 
a head by the discovery that the Privy Council in a suitable 
case would grant such leave, as in the case of the trial of 
Louis Riel 1 for his part in the North-West rebellion of 1885. 
The Canadian Government decided that the prerogative 
must be barred, and after one failure secured the placing on 
the statute book of a law, which was held by them to have 
attained this end. The Act, however, is not a triumphant 
example of the barring of the prerogative, but a striking 
example of the fact that the Act of 1844 seems to have been 
as little read by the lawyers of ·the Crown in Canada as by 
those of the United Kingdom. In the case of New Zealand 
an Act dealing with divorce passed in the year 1912 sought 
to restrict the right of appeal to the Privy Council in a minor 
matter : the point at issue was infinitesimal, but it was at 
once recognized that the Act was ultra vires the Parliament 
of New Zealand and by Act No. 69 of 1913 the peccant 
paragraph was emended.2 
It is not of course to be supposed that the Judicial Com-
mittee are indifferent to the views of the Dominion Govern-
ments in the matter of what appeals are proper. Of their 
own motion they have insisted on declining in normal 
circumstances to hear appeals in criminal cases and have 
refused to become a court of criminal review, though they 
have always held themselves at liberty in. any very extra-
ordinary case to grant leave to appeal. The trial of Riel 
1 Riel v. Reg., 10 App. Cas. 67 5. 2 Parl. Pap., Cd. 7 507, p. 4 7. 
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was clearly such a case : not only was the matter one of the 
utrr1ost political interest in the Dominio11, ·where the people 
of Quebec were eager to save a man whom most of Canada 
regarded as no better than a murderer and who was in fact 
a good deal of a madman, but the questions raised as to his 
trial were serious questions of constitutional la·w, dealing 
with the problem how far it was possible for the Legislature 
to repeal the old statutes in force in the territory before it 
'vas placed under the legislative power of the Dominion of 
Canada. It is not likely that any such case will ever again 
arise in Canada, but, if it did arise, it is not certain that the 
Judicial Committee would feel bound to refuse to decide it : 
it is not even impossible that it might be desirable and 
desired that the Judicial Committee should so decide it, 
for Canada has very high respect for the advantages of 
a tribunal w·hich is above any suspicion of being swayed 
by party p.olitics in the Dominion. 011 the other hand, 
the Judicial Committee on 1\Iay 7, 1914, declined to admit 
an appeal from the Supreme Court of Canada in Oa.rey v. 
Roots, which was a case arising out of co11tract to purchase 
land: the matter was disputed and there was very con-
siderable conflict in the courts below, the decision of the 
Supreme Court reversing a decision of the Supreme Court of 
Alberta in its appellate jurisdiction, a fact which was 
urged as a reason for l1aving the matter finally disposed of 
by the highest tribunal. I:q this sort of case appeals have 
not rarely been allowed in the past, but the Lord Chancellor 
announced that in his view the practice of the court had 
been unduly lax, especially as the Supreme Court Act of 
·the Don1inion evidently deprecated any appeal at · all being 
·brought to the Privy Council. The ·view is one which is 
naturally felt stro~gly by the Supreme Court of the Dominion 
itself, and there is this amount of justification for the objec-
tion to the hearing of such appeals on other than constitu-
tional questions, in that the plaintiff or defendant, as the 
cage may be, who is defeated below can carry the case direct 
to the Privy Council from the appellate division of any 
province, so that if he chooses to go to the Supreme Court 
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he should accept the decision as final. In a case where the 
appeal to the Supreme Court is brought by the party who 
is victorious in that court the case for a decision by the 
Privy Council is stronger, as obviously the other party had 
no option of action accorded to him at all. 
As in Canada, in the Commonwealth there is the same 
possibility of elaborate appeals arising from the fact that 
an appeal lies from every Supreme Court in a State to the 
Privy Council or alternatively to the Commonwealth High 
Court, and that from the latter an appeal lies by special 
leave to the Judicial Committee. The case of the Common-
wealth is, however, differentiated greatly from that of 
Canada by the arrangement made to preserve for the 
Commonwealth the decision of the interpretation of its own 
Constitution, a decision based on the American models which 
it was the glory of the fathers of federation to follow with 
more affection than wisdom, as the stormy history of the 
interpretation of the Constitution has shown. The Con-
stitution as finally accepted by the Imperial Government 
allowed the High Court of the Commonwealth to be the 
fi11al judge in any case brought before it where the constitu-
tional rights of the States inter se or of the Commonwealth 
and the States were concerned. It was recognized at the 
time that, as the State courts would deal with these questions 
in matters coming before them and as the appeal from the 
State courts still lay to the Privy Council, there might 
arise the possibility of the two tribunals giving different 
judgements on the same point, that of the High Court 
being final unless it should be pleased to grant permission 
to appeal "from its own decision. But it was argued that as 
normally the Privy Council was the higher court, the High 
Court would bow to its views. The result proved the 
supposition to be quite unfounded. The High Court not 
merely held 1 that the salary of a federal officer could not be 
taxed by a state since that would allow a state by taxation 
to interfere with a Commonwealth instrumentality, which 
the courts of the United States held to be wrong, but when 
1 Deakin v. Webb, 1 C.L.R. 585; Keith, J ourn. Soc. Oomp. Leg. ix. 269-80. 
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the Privy Council 1 ruled in precisely the same issue brought 
on appeal from Victoria in precisely the opposite sense, 
they persisted in their view and declined either to accept 
the view of the Privy Council or to allow an appeal from 
their judgement to that body. The situation was ludicrous, 
and the knot had to be cut. The Parliament legislated 2 
to allow the States to tax federal officers at a rate not 
exceeding that imposed on other inl1abitants of the States, 
and it also 3 enacted that no constitutional case affecting 
the powers of the Commonwealth or the States i~nter se 
should be determined by a State supreme court, but must 
be removed to the High Court itself for determination. 
The Act was intra vires as the power had been given to the 
Parliament to deal with federal jurisdiction, and it effected 
its aim. The High Court proceeded to interpret the con-
stitution of the Commonwealth with such effect that the 
most wholesale attempts at amendment have been made 
by the Labour Party to rescue the Commonwealth as they 
hold from the legalism which has deadened its life and is 
destroying it. On the other hand the High Court on the 
occasion when it has allowed the Privy Council to deal 
with its judgements has not fared altogether very satis-
factorily at its hands, and the irony of fate is that while the 
High Court of the Commonwealth has on the whole dis-
tinguished itself by the upholding of the rights of the 
States and not of the Commonwealth whereas the tendency 
of the Supreme Court of Canada has rather leaned to the 
other side, the Privy Council, with 'vhose decision it quarrelled 
in the early l1istory of the COlirt on the ground that it was 
too favourable to the States, has gone in its latest judgement 
muchfurtherthan the Commonwealth High Court, by holding . 
that the Royal Oom~missions .. 4ct, 1912, of the Commonwealth, 
on which action against the Colonial Sugar Refining Company 
was based, was r1ot merely not applicable in that special case, 
but was in itself ultra vires as containing matter which was 
quite· beyond the authority of the Contmonwealth. 
1 lf ebb v. Outtrim, [1907] A. C. 81. 
2 Act No. 7 of 1907. a Act No. 8 of 1907. 
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In the ordinary jurisdiction of the High Court of the 
Common,vealth on appeal from the Supreme Courts of the 
States, the judgements of the Commonwealth have not 
received al,vays very respectful handling from the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council : in one case which arose 
out of the interpretation of a law of New South Wales and 
affected the question of the degree of privilege 'vhich was 
allowed to a society which for gain carried on the work of 
giving information about the financial status of private 
persons, the result of the reversal of the decision of the 
High Court in favour of such societies possessing privilege 
by reason of interest was that the New South Wales Govern-
ment introduced an amendment into their law 1 of libel 
which would have resulted in undoing for New South Wales 
the interpretation of the law as laid do"rn by the Jltdicial 
· Committee. ~I:'he result, however, was 11ot what was 
proposed : the Bill was so considerably amended before it 
became law that it could not be said to have accomplished 
its purpose in any degree. Nor, to do the then Prime 
Minister of the State justice, did he suggest that the view 
of the Privy Council was bad law: he merely thought that 
the law as it resulted exposed to too serious risl{s of heavy 
penalties firms who were performing a 11seful work in 
a country where credit is of much importance, and he 
considered that, if they did their 'vork honestly and in 
a competent manner, they should be privileged in respect of 
a mis-statement as to a man's position n1ade in good faith, 
without negligence and without malice. 
In the case of the Union of South Africa far greater 
inroads in theory have been made on the roya.I prerogative 
than in any other Dominion. The Sottth Africa Act, 1909, 
replaced the old procedure under which appeals came to 
the Privy Council from a considerable number of colonial 
courts, three in the Cape, two in the Transvaal, two in 
Natal, and one in the Orange River Colony, by the establish-
ment of a new regime tlnder which one Supreme Court for the 
Union was constituted, to which in its appellate division 
1 Act No. 22 of 1909; Parl. Pap., Cd. 5135, p. 15. 
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all tl1e appeals which formerly 'vent to the Privy Council 
as well as others might co1ne. From the divisions of the 
Supreme Collrt no appeal was henceforth to lie to the 
Privy Coun.cil, but from the appellate division only might 
an appeal be brought by special leave to the Judicial Com-
mittee. It was also intimated that the occasions on which 
appeals could be allowed were expected to be very rare 
indeed, as it was desired that the appellate division should 
in effect be the final appeal court for South Africa.1 It 
must, however, be remen1bered that the state of affairs in 
the Union is son1ewhat ur1usual the law in force there is 
Roman-Dutch law, a11d the lawyers of the Union are familiar 
with the peculiar variety of that law which applies to the 
Union: the Judicial Committee -of the Privy Council has 
no such familiarity with that special law, and therefore it is 
not unnatural that parties in cases. are not specially anxious 
to take their cases avvay from the domestic forum. More-
over, the bringing of appeals is especially a matter for 
wealthy firms and companies, and these are not in South 
Africa constantly engaged in litigatio11 arising out of con-
stitutional points as in ·Canada. The Parliament of the 
Union is, subject to the control of the Imperial Parlian1ent, 
in effect a sovereign body, and cases of con.stitutior1al law 
of real importance will always, it may safely be said, be 
comparatively rare. 
Efforts have of late years, especially since the beginning 
of the century, been made to arrange improvements in the 
Privy Council which will make the position of the court 
less open to attack on co11st.itutional grounds. It is idle 
to suppose that the anomaly of a court which sits in England 
and which is not in any very obvious way in touch w:ith 
Imperial issues can be regarded universally with satisfaction, 
and there has always been a certain current of opinion 
in the Dominions in favour of the restriction of the right of 
appeal. The Constitutions of the Commonwealth and the 
Union both permit legislation by Parliament to restrict 
1 The expectation has been fully realized; appeals have almost dis· 
appeared from the Court in its Union jurisdiction. 
• 
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the right of appeal, but the legislation for this end mu·st be 
reserved for the signification of the royal pleasure, and no 
responsible Government has gone so far as to introduce 
a Bill to this end. Nor have the Dominions yet put forward 
a demand for the restriction of appeals, and indeed there 
is a fair amount of evidence that the statesmen of the 
Dominions have not yet reached the stage of holding that 
it is a matter of importance or even perhaps really desirable 
that the appeal should be taken a\vay. The possibility of 
occasional ebullitions of feeling is always present : New 
Zeala11d some years ago was bitterly moved by a judgement 
which was, it held, based 011 the totally wrong-headed view 
that the New Zealand Government had been trying to 
neglect native interests, and from this time dates the strong 
antipathy of Sir Robert Stout, the Chief Justice, to the 
Privy Council. The disputes between the Privy Council 
and the High Court of the Commonwealth created strong 
feeling both for the Privy Council and against it : the 
States thought that it was upholding their rights and the 
judgeme11ts of · St3ite courts : the Commonwealth feared 
that its influence would be thrown on the side of the States. 
In Canada of late years it has rendered some constitutional 
judgements of great value from the point of view of calming 
popular feeling : its decision 1 that the House of Commons 
of Canada had no power to enact a general Marriage Act 
providing for the universal conditions of recognition of 
validity of marriages, in face of the fact that under the 
constitution the provinces have the exclusive right to 
legislate regarding solemnization of marriage, put an end 
to an inconvenient and troublesome agitation based on the 
fact that the N e temere decree was supposed to have legal 
validity in Canada, as was suggested by the decision of one 
judge in a Quebec case of a marriage of two Catholics by 
a Protestant. On the other hand, feeling in Quebec in 
1913 was somewhat strongly moved by the decision of the 
Privy Council in the case of Cotton v. Rex.2 The matter 
was one of succession duties : all the provinces of the 
t [1912] A.C. 880. 2 [1914] A.C. 176. 
J 
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Dominion are anxious to get as much revenue as they 
can in this way, and they therefore seek by every device 
whatever to secure that revenue by evasions of the rule 
which limits them to taxation of property actually in the 
province. The Privy Council in that case did not, however, 
as in an earlier case,l discuss the matter on the subject of 
. the nature of taxation within the province, but instead 
they dealt with the matter as of indirect and direct taxation. 
The Provincial Legislatures are limited strictly to direct 
taxation and are not allowed to levy indirect taxes, so that 
the problem was whether the taxation in this case was 
direct. The scheme of the Act in the opinion of the court 
was that it levied a duty on all movable property wherever 
situated of a man who died domiciled in the province, and 
required that every executor, administrator, trustee, uni-
versal legatee or notary before whom a will had been 
executed should furnish within a certain time a schedule 
of the estate. The collector of revenue then intimated the 
amount of duty payable which the declarant had to pay 
within thirty days. The collector could thus recover the 
money from the declarant, who would in most cases be 
merely the notary, who in his turn \vould have to recover the 
money from the estate or, more correctly, the people con-
cerned in it. Now, if an ordinary case were taken of 
movable property in New York dealt with by the will 
of a person domiciled in the province, the legatee could 
obtain the sum outstanding under the law of New York 
without showing that he had paid. duty in Quebec, and the 
case would clearly arise of the declarant in Quebec being 
a person who was not expected to pay the duties in respect 
of this legacy at all, but to recover them from some other 
person. This could not be direct taxation within the 
meaning of the words in the British North America Act, 
which clearly contemplated as direct taxation only what 
was held by Mill to be such taxation. The Privy Council 
therefore held the whole scheme of succession · duties in 
Quebec invalid. 
1 Woodruff v. Attorney-General for Ontario, [1908] A.C. 508. 
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The Act \Vas obviously a rather unpleasant blow to the 
Government of Quebec, which was p11t in the position of 
losing all its revenues from the duties and of having a crop 
of actions for the refund of duties already paid. The Legis-
lature therefore hurriedly set to work in January 1914 to 
enact measures to establish the tax as a direct tax, and one 
of these measures was directly aimed at the Judicial Com--
mittee. It recited that the judgement rested in large 
measure on conditions which were non-existe11t, the alleged 
obligation of the notary to pay the duties, as under art. 1380 
of the Revised Statutes, 1909, the notary was expressly 
exempted from the class of persons who n1ust make the 
declaration, and therefore be liable to r)ay the duties, and it 
asserted that the Acts regarding succession duty all agreed 
in not taxing the person making the declaration, but did tax 
immediately and without benefit of recourse the beneficiaries 
under the Acts. It proceeded, however, to spoil tl1e effect 
of its assertion that the case was decided on the ground of an 
error, which was obviously not the case, though the remark 
regarding the notary was an error, by admitting that the 
rule by which a declaration 'vas made by one person only 
and he became liable to pay the whole duty on the estate to 
the collector, was introduced by an Act, 58 Viet. c. 16, s. 2, 
which was passed merely to obviate the trouble under the 
old rule, by which every person had to send in an inventory, 
though each was only liable to pay on his share of the estate. 
Moreover, it argued, even if one person could be called upon 
to pay the whole amount, which was not the intention of the 
Acts, though it n1igl1t be possible und.er their terms, still he 
did 11ot pay in the expectation of indemnifying hin1self, but 
he merely paid as representative of the other heirs out of the 
common estate. It further stated that, as those who paid 
succession duty before the introduction of the_ new procedure 
were not entitled to recover back the dt1ties paid, clearly it 
would be unfair to these persons if persons who had paid 
subsequently could recover the duties paid, and it accord-
ingly provided that the intention of the _Acts was and had 
been, that every person to whom property or any interest 
... 
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t.l1erein was transmitted owing to death should pay to the 
Government, directly and without having a recourse against 
any other person, a tax calculated on the value of the pro-
perty as transmitted, and that there should be no right of 
action against the Government for the recovery of any money 
heretofore or hereafter paid to, it in respect of succession 
duties for the reason only that the taxes were not direct 
taxes. The Act was not to apply, however, to pending or 
decided cases. It is clear that the enactment validating 
what had been done is of doubtful validity, since what is not 
a direct tax cannot be made a direct tax by any effort of the 
Provincial Legislature, and a provisio11 forbidding an action 
has no validity if it deals with an action for an illegal act of 
the province, since it shares in the illegality of the action 
under the Constitution, but the enactment presumably 
secured the position as to future tax-payers. On the other 
hand, the passi1ig of such an Act was a clear breach of the 
courtesy due to the Final Court of Appeal, for even had the 
Act been correct i11 point of fact and the decision of the court 
much influenced by the fact of the notary paying which 
was not the case the terms of the preamble are unwise. 
It remains, however, curious that the error should have been 
committed : the case was argued as always by expensive 
Canadian counsel, who must have been guilty, one 'V011ld 
think, of some error in their presentation of the case. 
Apart, however, from ebullitions of feeling of this kind, it is 
clear that the permanent acceptance by the Dominions of 
a court in Lon.don is impossible, tlnless that court can be so 
e11larged as to give the Dominions some just feeling that it is 
an Imperial court. The arguments which can be adduced 
for the retention of the appeal to a purely colonial court, as 
the Privy Council may rightly be said to be, as colonial 
appeals occupy its attention far more than anythi11g else, 
and as its_ judgements are not binding on the British courts, 
are not of sufficient importance to induce the Dominions to 
acce:r_:>t it permanently. It is true that the court is of some 
value as dealing in a uniform way with the prerogative of 
the Crown which is, generally speaking, identical in all the 
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Do1ninions, but this is subject to local legislation and 
therefore is often to be interpreted, not on the broad 
basis of the ordinary law, but on the special basis of local 
Acts. It is also true that it is a body which in cases of strong 
political excitement in a Dominion may be relied on to be 
caln1, and give an unbiased judgement. There is, too, a 
special propriety in entrusti11g to it such cases as the boun-
dary dispute between South Australia and Victoria, which it 
disposed of very satisfactorily, for the settling of such dis-
putes is part of its historic functions, b11t for this purpose it 
must be remembered that it, ·need not have been invoked in 
its judicial attitude JJroper : the power of the Crown to make 
special references could have been used as in the case of the 
disputes over the Ontario and Quebec boundary in 1878, 
and Ontario and Manitoba in 1884, and the pending refer~ 
ence in the case of the Newfoundland and Canada boundary. 
The English common law, however, is so far from alive in 
most parts of the Empire where it is now in part embodied 
in stat11tes, in part changed by legislation, that the function 
of the Privy Council in maintaining uniformity of law is not 
to be taken very seriously. -· 
But there would be some real temptation to the Dominions 
to take part in the reconstruction of the Judicial Committee 
if they could be given the assurance that the body would be 
concerned with appeals from England, Scotla11d, and Ireland, 
as well as with appeals from the Colonies, and that the mem-
bership of Dominion judges would be really welcomed. _The 
two things must go together in the long run, and the id.eal 
of the Dominions, so far as they do not prefer to have the 
abolition of the appeal in toto, is that expressed by the 
Commonwealth Government in 1901, at the Conference 1 held 
in that year in view of the passing of the Commonwealth of 
Australia Constitution Act, in 'vhich for the first time the 
prerogative was seriously affected by the exclusion of consti-
tutional cases in certain i11stances from its purview. It was 
then suggested that there should be constituted an Imperial 
Court of Final Appeal, including Dominion representatives, 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 846. 
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one for Canada, one for Australia, and one for South 
Africa being suggested, which would exercise the whole 
jurisdiction of the House of Lords on appeal, and of the 
Judicial Committee, on Colonial and Indian appeals. The 
court was also to include an Indian judge, and was to sit in 
two divisions, on one of which could be a Colonial judge and 
on the other one India11 and one Colonial. For special cases 
the two divisions would sit together, and the expert opinion 
of the judge most familiar with the subject-matter of any 
case would be utilized by the Lord Chancellor as the ground 
for assigning one case to any division. The proposal, how-
ever, was not then generally acceptable to the Colonies, and 
nothing further was done for the moment. 
Of the two ideals of the Commonwealth view in 1901, the 
first, that there should be one court only of appeal for the 
whole Empire, has been left in practically the same position 
as in 1901. The latter, the question of the addition of 
Colonial judges, has bee11 dealt with piecemeal, and on the 
whole rather unsatisfactorily. ~rhe first step was taken in 
1895, when by the Judicial Committee Amendment Act, 1895, 
it was rendered possible to add to the Privy Council not more 
than five persons being Privy Councillors who "\vere also, or 
had been, Judges of the Supreme Court of the Dominion of 
Canada, or of any of the superior courts of the provinces, or 
Judges of the Supreme Courts of the Australasian Colonies, 
and the two South African Colonies, or other Colonies named 
by the King in Council. The number of five was only 
gradually made up : the Chief ,Justices of Canada, of the 
Cape, and of South Australia were appointed in 1897, and later, 
in 1904 and 1901, were added Sir H. E. Taschereau, the new 
Chief Justice of Canada, and SirS. Griffith, the Chief Justice 
of Queensland. The places of the two older Canadian judges 
were taken by the appointment of Sir C. Fitzpatrick, Chief 
Justice of Canada from 1906, and of Sir E. Barton, of the 
Higl1 Court of Australia. But there was no provision in the 
Act for the payment of the judges, and as a result, though 
they might sit occasionally, that could only be on rare visits, 
when judges came to the United Kingdo1n on other business 
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at their own expense or at the expense of the Government 
which they represented. In 1907 the discussion at the 
Conference 1 led to no definite result, except that it was 
agreed that it would be a good thing to re-codify the rules 
regarding appeals from the Dominio11s, provinces and states, 
and to make the conditio11S n1ore even. Not only was this 
done, but a useful step was tal{en by giving the courts in 
the provinces, the states, New Zealand and Newfoundland, 
the power wherever they thought fit to allow an appeal to 
the Judicial Committee. The old rule applied 011ly to 
appeals in certain defined cases, and if the cases did not fall 
within the exact wording of the rules, the appellant had to 
ask special leave for his appeal, an(l though in point of fact 
this could be obtained reasonably easily, and occasionally 
the application could be treated as the trial of the case, still 
the possibility of waste of time and effort, not to mention 
money, was always present. But in more serious matters 
nothing was done of importance. An Act of 1908 provided 
that a judge of a Colonial court fron1 which ar1 appeal was 
being heard, or a judge of a court to which an appeal 
would lie from that court, might if available be summoned 
as an assessor at the hearing of the appeal. Moreover, it 
added the High Court of Australia and the Supreme Court 
of Newfoundland to the lists of courts whose judges, if Privy 
Councillors, might be rnembers of the Judicial Committee, 
and added to the South African Colonies the two new 
Colonies of the Transvaal a11d the Orange River Colony. 
The first clause remained a dead letter, and the second 
merely· had the effect of qualifying Sir Edward Barton as 
a Privy Councillor to fill the first vacancy in the number of 
five judges which occurred. 
The discussion at the Imperial Conference of 1911 2 was 
in effect little more satisfactory. The Dominion Govern-
ments were not united in desiring anything : Canada had to 
think of the provinces, and Sir Wilfrid Laurier wished to 
leave things alone: New Zealand was anxious to have 
a New Zealand judge to hear cases on appeal from that 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 3523. 2 Ibid., Cd. 5745. 
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Dominion, as matters affecting native land were of great 
importance ~o the Dominion, and the Dominion was anxious 
that no mistakes should be made in dealing with such 
questions. The Union of South Africa did not wish any 
appeals to co.me save in the most infrequent cases, and had 
no interest in any change of the court. Australia had lost 
some of its enthusiasm for any action, and had apparently 
an insufficient knowledge of the position, due to the absence 
of a lawyer on the delegation and the usual imperfect pre-
paration of the subject which marks all Imperial Conferences. 
The only result was that the Conference agreed that a change 
should be made in the rule under which, as being in theory 
an advisory body, the Judicial Committee delivers but one 
judgement without indication of dissent. In the place of 
this rule it was unanimously agreed that it was right that 
the judges who dissented should be allowed to express their 
reason for their dissent, though the Lord Chancellor depre-
cated the proposal as being in his opinion un,vise and tending 
to diminish the respect felt for the judgements given. 
Despite the unanimity of the resolution it was never carried 
into effect : on second thoughts the new Government of 
Canada disliked the idea, and the other Govern;ments on 
second thoughts nearly all concurred in thinking that the 
new Government of Canada was quite right. The other 
change made was one which was merely based on Imperial 
needs : it was desired by the Impe.rial Government to secure 
the addition of two Lords of Appeal, and it was thought that 
the putting forward of the proposal under the guise of a 
resolution of the Imperial Conference would bring the House 
of Commons, which was then in a mood for economy, to 
accept the idea gladly. Therefore the proposal was made 
that two new judges should be added, to be used both in the 
. 
Privy Council and the House of Lords : the Conference, 
which had not proposed the idea and which clearly did not 
care a straw for it, acquiesced in a matter which they made 
it plain did not really concern them, and the Government 
presented the proposal to the House of Commons and com-
pelled its acceptance on the strength of the Conference reso-
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lution, it being clear that hardly any of the members who 
discussed the Bill in the Commons or the Lords had looked 
at the Conference Debates on the point at issue. At the 
same time it was agreed that the anomaly of fixing the num-
ber of representatives of the Dominions on the Committee 
under which New Zealand could not be represented should 
be removed, and that the number who might be appointed 
should be raised to seven, while to avoid difficulties arising 
from the comparative amount of representation of the 
Dominions the King in Council should be empowered to 
arrange which Privy Councillors who were qualified should 
sit so as to secure due representation of the Dominions. 
Accordingly, an Imperial Act, 3 and 4 Geo. V, c. 21, provides 
for the addition of two Lords of Appeal to the four already 
appointed under the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1876, the 
raising to seven of the number of Privy Councillors who, if 
Colonial judges shall be members of the Committee, the sub- · 
stitution of the Union for the four South African Colonies, 
and the grant of power to the King in Council to regulate 
the manner in which eligible Privy Councillors shall in future 
be given places. The only result of the Act as far as the 
Dominions were concerned was the appointment of Sir 
Joshua Williams to represent the Dominion of New Zealand. 
A new departure was, however, made in his case: not only 
did the Government take the appointment seriously, but 
they actually sent the judge home to sit on· cases, and on 
his death decided to replace him by Sir R. Stout. 
The opportunity ·had been afforded by the passing of the 
Act to take a real step towards the creation of a genuine 
Imperial Court, a step too of a simple kind, which would not 
have fettered the discretion of the Government if it had 
proved that the step was not a wise one. It would have been 
an easy and a gracious act to give one of the new appoint-
ments to the most distinguished of Dominion judges, Sir 
Samuel Griffith, whose long career as statesman and a judge 
had won him the respect of the whole of the Commonwealth, 
and recognition even in the United Kingdom. By his 
appointment to act both in the House of Lords and in the 
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Privy Council, which would have meant the giving him an 
adequate salary from Imperial funds in the first instance, 
though doubtless that point could have been arranged with 
the Commonwealth if it were preferred that part of his pay 
should be derived from the Commonwealth, the beginning ~ 
of a true Imperial Court would have been provided, and in 
his case the doubtless sometimes just remark that Colonial 
judges need not be, and often are not, of the same calibre as 
British judges of the highest orders of rank, could not be 
said to be applicable. Unfortunately, the indifference which 
characterizes statesmen of both parties to questions of Im-
perial sentiment, and the unwillingness of the Commonwealth 
to press forward a claim that they had constitutionally 1 no 
right to make, prevented advantage being taken of the 
opportunity. 
The responsibility for the failure to take this step must 
rest with the Liberal Administration, which is the more 
remarkable in that the Lord Chancellor at the time, Lord 
Haldane, had .for years been noteworthy for his advocacy 
of an Imperial Court, and it might have been expected 
that in accordance with that opinion he would have eagerly 
welcomed the opportunity afforded to him to carry out the 
policy of his pre-ministerial days. Curiously enough, after 
the chance was over, presiding at a series of Rhodes's lectures 
delivered in University College, London, he drew attention, 
in connexion with the question of the reform of the House of 
Lords, to which the Government of which he was a member 
was pledged, to the fact that the reform when carried out 
would make a new Supreme Court of Appeal for the United 
Kingdom necessary. On his visit to Canada he had been 
struck with the feeling among those most competent to give 
an authoritative opinion, that if any change took place with 
regard to the Final Court of Appeal they did not wish to have 
a court outside the Dominions. The opinion of Canada set 
value on an appeal to the King in Council: there was no 
desire to alter it, and if any change in judicial arrangements 
1 Perhaps, too, the personal friction between the Government and the 
Chief Justice had its share in this result. 
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was necessary, it was hoped that the foundation and principle 
of that appeal and the form of the court would not be 
varied. The san1e view would also probably be taken by 
all the self-governing Dominions, and it meant that they 
regarded the King in his Privy Council as something not 
outside themselves. He suggested that the true line of 
future development would be that all appeals, whether from 
the Oversea Dominions or from the United Kingdom itself, 
should lie to the King in Council, as was proposed in the 
case of Irish appeals under the Government of Ireland Bill. 
The Judicial Committee had already been strengthened by 
adding two more judges : it might be with increased respon-
sibilities that an Act could be passed enabling it to sit in 
more divisions than one, and enlarging its membership. As 
the King was not a local but an Imperial institution, as the 
King was present in each of his Dominions a11d represented 
by his ministers, and as the Imperial Privy Council was an 
Imperial body existing for, and drawing members from, all 
parts of the Dominions, and containing on its Judicial Com-
mittee chief justices and judges from all points of the Empire, 
they had .at once a court that did not offend against the 
canons which the self-governing Dominions wished to set 
up, namely that their Supreme Court of Appeal should not 
be outside themselves. If the Judicial Committee could sit 
in more than one division, a solution would be found of 
difficulties which had taxed more than one statesman. 
Supposing they had a boundary case in Canada, as had been 
the case some time ago, it would then be easy to send mem-
bers of the Judicial Committee from London to sit in Canada 
and determine the question. They might, for example, 
invoke the assistance of the Chief Justice of Australia, who 
had been sitting in the Judicial Committee hearing appeals 
from various parts of the Empire, and indeed the Chief 
Justice of South Africa had been sitting to hear Scottish 
appeals in the House of Lords. The instrument available 
in their hands should be developed by transferring all appeals 
whatever to the King in Council, and by dividing the Judicial 
Committee into divisions which would sit in the several parts 
1874 B b 
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of the Empire from time to time, thus ·helping largely 
towards the solution of the question of Imperial unification. 
This solution would be in precise accordance with the existing 
principles of the constitution of the Empire. 
The proposal thus adumbrated has not yet received any 
• 
endorsement or, on the other hand, dissent from the respon-
sible Governments of the Empire. It has been less discussed 
than its importance merits. There are obvious advantages 
in a procedure by which appeals could be tried, say in 
Canada or Australia, without the expense of the present 
procedure of bringing the counsel employed to London, but 
it is right to note that the present system owes some Of its 
popularity with counsel in the various parts of the Empire 
precisely to the fact that it gives them opportunities for 
visiting England, and, while this consideration may be dis-
missed as not very material, this would be to ignore the 
importance of contact between the people of the Dominions 
and those of the mother country, especially in the case of the 
educated classes of the Dominions, who lose much by being 
isolated from the main current of the affairs of the world. 
On the other hand must be set the fact that the visit of a 
distinguished body of judges to a Dominion would probably 
be an event of much intellectual profit to the Dominion, 
and that it would inevitably be of advantage for Imperial 
unification. But it must be quite clearly realized that the 
scheme must be one in which Dominion judges play their 
due part in looking after English, Scottish, and Irish cases. 
If the Parliament of Ireland should legislate in such a way 
as to call into activity the ": powers of the Privy Council in 
interpreting the range of its authority, there must be no 
hesitation to employ colonial judges as part of the court to 
hear the case: there must be no attempt to delude the public 
with words which seem to mean that the House of Lords and 
the Judicial Committee are parts of one Imperial Court of 
Appeal, whereas in point of fact they are in no sense of the 
word such parts, since, while the judges of the one may sit in 
the other, the judges of the other cannot sit in the House of 
Lords, unless on the rare occasion when one like Lord de 
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Villiers happens to be a peer and a persona grata. Of 
course with the project of the disappearance of the House of 
Lords as a judicial tribunal would disappear any ground for 
a distinction between the different aspects of the Judicial 
Committee, and the Dominions could have their proper 
place. 
With the giving of such a place it might be possible to 
expect the Dominions to pay their judges. It would pro-
bably be enough to give the Dominions each the right to 
appoint one, and the two greatest of them the right to appoint 
two, making seven as at present, while, if the Newfoundland 
choice were to become ineffective at any time by the inclusion 
of Newfoundland in the Dominion, then Canada could have 
three, the numbers of course being varied as occasion might 
require from time to time. The cost of paying these judges, 
once they were real workers, would naturally fall on the 
Dominions, with the exception of the case of Newfoundland, 
in which the salary might be defrayed by the Imperial 
Government, but that is a matter of wholly infinitesimal 
importance. On the other hand, if all the appeals of the 
United Kingdom were to go to the court, it would be neces-
sary .to reconsider the question of the final appellate courts 
in the Dominions, with the aim of diminishing, if possible, their 
numbers by removing the existing highest Courts of Appeal. 
In the case of Canada and the Commonwealth, already many 
of the provincial and the State appeals never go near the 
Supreme Court of Canada and the High Court of Australia : 
it might be a matter for consideration how far these courts 
could not be relieved of their merely appellate jurisdiction, 
and confined instead to the work of federal jurisdiction 
proper. Similarly the appellate side of the Supreme Courts 
of New Zealand and the Union might be dispensed with if 
there were available for a definite period in each year a court 
of the King in Council sitting in the Union of South Africa 
or the Dominion. The objection that some delay might 
result will not be regarded as very serious, when it is remem-
bered that the power to deal with urgent matters can easily 
be exercised by some court below, and that appeals which go 
Bb2 
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to the highest tribunal are always lengthy. There would on 
the other side have to be set the fact that there would be 
no possibility of further appeal, and that the cost of appeals 
would be greatly lessened. But the ingrained conservatism 
of lawyers renders such a change very far from probable. 
Moreover, such a procedure would have the advantage of 
creating a body which might be set to deal with those dis-
putes between the Imperial Government and a Dominion 
Government and Dominion Governments inter se, which 
must arise as long as there are human beings in existence 
and conflicting interests to consider. There would be no 
need to treat such a body as suitable for dealing with purely 
political questions which must be reserved for some other 
body, but they could well be entrusted with the settlement 
of other forms of legal dispute, such as form the subject-
matter of the ordinary treaty of arbitration. To such a 
tribunal could well have been referred the question of the 
position of the deportees from South Africa in the beginning 
of 1914, had the question not been amicably arranged before 
the necessity arose of pressing the matter to any kind of 
decision. 
A body of the nature contemplated would of course be 
well able to undertake all the miscellaneo11S duties of the 
Privy Council, special references on such questions as the 
Canada-La brad or boundary, the removal of colonial judges 
in the case of the Crown Colonies, appeals in prize matters, 
in ecclesiastical law, and a number of minor powers under 
such Acts as the Patent Acts, the Endowed Schools Acts, 
and so forth. 
By Act 5 and 6 Geo. V, c. 92, provision has been made 
to enable the Judicial Committee to sit in more than one 
division, primarily to facilitate the disposal of prize appeals, 
but the step is of possible future importance. 
• 
D. THE AMENDMENT OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 
CHAPTER XVII 
DOMINION PARLIAMENTS AND THE 
CONSTITUTIONS 
THE paramount position of the Imperial Parliament results 
in a fundamental distinction between tl1e Imperial Constitu-
tion and that of any self-governing Dominion. The Im-
perial Parliament cannot bind itself : it can fetter itself as 
much as it pleases, but it can cut its fetters asun.der at 
pleasure. It may provide that no Act shall be passed to alter 
an Act which it has passed save by a two-thirds majority of 
both Houses, but the next Parliament may by simple majority 
repeal tl1e offending Act, and it is in vain that the effort to 
bind itself had been made. But in the case of a Dominion 
the position is not so simple. Any rule wl1atever which has 
been laid down by any legislative authority with regard to 
the mode of modifying the constitution is a fetter on the 
freedom of the Dominion Parliament which it cannot break 
save in the way appointed by the Act imposing the fetter. 
If a Domini.on Parliament enact to-morrow that any Act 
which it passes must be passed by a two-thirds majority to 
take effect as an alteration of the constitution, then this 
condition becomes one which, so long as the Act in question 
stan.ds, cannot be undone by tl1e Parliament save in the 
prescribed manner, that is to say, if the Act has been careful 
to make it clear that this provision itself is to be protected 
in this way. In Queensla11d indeed, in 1908, it was found 
possible to evade a difficulty that no alteration of the con-
stitution of the legislative Council could be made except by 
a two-thirds majority in the Council by repealing the proviso 
in the Constitution Act of 1867, which made this necessary, 
as the proviso itself was not covered by the requirement, 
• 
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but the really effective met~od of requiring that the majority 
should apply also to any alteration of the law affecting the 
principle would secure the effectiveness of the rule. -'rhe 
limit thllS put on the powers of D<?minion Parliaments is at 
first sight rather curious, but it follows inevitably from the 
express provision in the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865,1 
that the power of constitutional alteration there accorded 
to every representative legislature shall be exercised i11 such 
ma11ner and form as may from time to time be required by 
any .~..l\.ct of Parliament, Letters Patent, Order in Council, or 
Colonial I.Jaw,' for the time bei11g in force in the said Colonv. 
u 
The actual limitations which apply to the Dominions and 
States are extre1nely various. At the one end of the scale 
stands Canada, and at the other the Commonwealth of 
Austr.alia ; the other Dominions occupy an intermediate 
positio11. The constitution of Canada was the result of the 
agree1nent of fo.ur colonies, and the fact that the federal pact 
was in effect a treaty has never for a moment been forgotten 
by any of the parties to that pact, and was indeed explicitly 
recognized in 1907 by the Dominion Government, and by the 
Imperial Government, when the British North America Act 
was amended as regards the payments made to the pro-
vinces.2 The amendment was only carried ou_t when it \Vas 
ascertained that all the provinces were in full agreement 
that it should be made, and that the only difficulty was that 
British Columbia was a11xious to get more than it was given, 
but preferred to have something rather than nothing. The 
occasion is of interest for another cause : the Parliament of 
the Dominion, natllrally enough from its own point of view, 
but from the point of view of the Imperial Parliament i11 an 
unconstitutional manner, wished the Act to declare that the 
settlement of payme11ts by the Dominion to the provinces 
co11tained in the Act was to be final and unalterable. Such 
a declaration could not have been placed in an Act without 
an absurdity, since the Imperial Parliament cannot bind 
and ought not to purport to bind a successor, and the 
difficulty of meeting the wishes of the Dominion and of 
1 28 and 29 Viet. c. 63. 2 7 Edw. VII, c. 11. 
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avoiding an unconstitutionality, while at the same time 
meeting the objection of British Columbia to any action by 
the Imperial Gover11ment, which could be interpreted as an 
indication that that Government was not prepared to allow 
its chance of obtai11ing better terms any weight, was relieved 
by reciting in the Act the resolution of the Canadian House 
of Commons, in which the agreement of the provinces was 
expressed and in which the Dominion view of the final and 
unalterable character of the settlement was set out. In 
point of fact the new Dominion Government recognized that 
the province had a grievance, and set up an arbitral tribunal 
to decide the question \Vhat additional sum ought in fairness 
to be allowed to the province. 
Hence it follows that in all fundamentals the constitution 
of Canada cannot be changed by the Dominion Parliament. 
In many matters, of course, the constitution can be altered : 
but these are minor matters, not matters of the first order 
of importance. Even the mode of increasing the number of 
members of Parliament is determined on a population basis, 
a fact explicable of course by . the federal principle. The 
most serious thing is, of course, the position of the two 
Houses : they stand in such a relation that the certai11ty of 
friction whenever there is a change of Government is pro-
duced, and such friction has always been produced. The 
system of life nomination. is a thoroughly bad one in any 
country where the nominations are made solely on political 
grounds, and, while it was recorded that Sir John Macdonald 
only once gave a Senatorship to a political opponent, it was 
denied of Sir Wilfrid Laurier that he ever was guilty of that 
indiscretion. The Senate accordingly in the long regime of 
the Conservatives from 1878 to 1896 became a mere Conser-
vative stronghold, and it mortally offended Sir Wilfrid 
Laurier by refusing to accept his proposed railway to the 
Yukon, a fact to which he 'vas wont to trace the loss of the 
Alaska boundary arbitration, but at any rate, after the 
Liberal regime from 1896 to 1911 the Senate proved itself 
at least as obstructive to the new Government as its prede-
cessor had been to the Liberals. The position was obviously 
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difficult : the only power of overriding the views of the 
Senate was that provided by s. 26 of the British North 
America.L4ct, 1867, which merely allowed the addition, by the 
authority of the Crown only, of three or six Senators, and as 
the Imperial Government laid down in December 1873, when 
the use of this power was applied for by Mr. Mackenzie, when 
he came into office on the defeat of the first Ministry of Sir 
John Macdonald in that year, the power was only intended 
to be used for the settlement of some serious deadlock, when 
the numbers on each side were equal. The addition of six 
members in the early years of the Borden Ministry would 
have been quite useless save to add to the debating power 
of the Government. In 1912 the Senate, under the direction 
of Sir R. Cartwright, who had, even under the Liberal 
Government, been anxious to make it a more active body, 
threw out three Bills: they amended a Bill to set up a tariff 
commission in such a way that the Government had to drop 
it, they insisted that subsidies for road-making in the pro-
vinces should be on a proportional basis, and they would 
not give a subsidy to the Temiskaming-Ontario railway on 
the ground that the railway had been built and was working 
at a profit, and needed no subsidy. The more obvious 
reason for the refusal was that Ontario was the centre of 
the Conservative authority and therefore unpopular with the 
Senate. A further attempt to interfere with a Bill granting 
a subsidy to the British Columbia sectio11 of the Canadian 
Northern Railway was a failure through the error of the 
member in charge of the Opposition in thinking that the Bill 
could be amended, which, as the matter was a money Bill, 
the Speaker of the Senate ruled "\vas impossible. A subsidy 
of 100,000 dollars a year to Prince Edward Island was 
opposed, but there was a split in the Liberal camp, and the 
Bill was passed by 15 to 12 votes. 
In 1913 1 matters were not better between the two Houses. 
The most important action, of course, was that of the 
Senate in rejecting by 51 votes to 27 the Naval Aid Bill, 
providing for the grant of 35,000,000 dollars for the construc-
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 7507, p. 51; Canadian Annual Review, 1913, pp.441,442. 
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tion of ships for the British Navy, to which reference has 
been made above. But the Se11ate also declined to approve 
proposals made for the grant of assistance in road-making 
to the provinces, unless the strict syste1n of proportional 
payments per head of population was adhered to, and unless 
the Government dropped the clause in the Bill authorizing 
the expenditure of the proposed subsidy moneys by the 
Minister of Railways and Canals in a man11er agreed upon 
with the Provincial Legislatures and Governments. They 
further ruled out as inadmissible proposals which were made 
by the Government to authorize the Minister of Railways, 
with the consent of the Governor in Council, to construct 
lines of railway not exceeding 200 miles in length, and to 
purchase lines not exceeding twenty-five miles i11 length, 
unless the cor1tract of purchase or other docun1ent was laid 
before the Parliament for approval, an arrangement which 
the Government contended would deprive the Bill of all 
possible value to them. Nevertheless, in 1914 the Govern-
ment managed to carr~r out most of its proposals, and the 
decision to arrange a satisfactory settlement of tl1e question 
of redistribution with the co-oper.ation of the Opposition 
was widely approved. Under the redistribution as settled 
the numbers of the House of Commons were re-arranged 
as follows: Ontario, 82 ; Quebec, 65; Nova Scotia, 16; 
New Brunswick, 11 ; Manitoba, 15; British Columbia, 13 ; 
Prince Edward Island, 3; Alberta, 12; Saskatchewan, 16; 
and the Yukon, 1. The marked changes 'vere of course 
in the western provinces, where the census had shown the 
great growth of population: Ontario lost four members, the 
unit being adjusted b~y· the sixty-five allotted to Quebec, and 
being based strictly on the number of voters; Nova Scotia 
and New Brunswick two apiece, Prince Edward Island one, 
while Alberta and Manitoba won five each, and the other two 
provinces six each. The growth in the population of the west 
rendered it necessary and desirable to increase the number 
of their representatives in the Senate, but there arose a 
serious amount of friction over the question whether the 
increases proposed to be made in the number of the Senate 
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. by assigning six Senators each to the provinces of Alberta, 
Saskatchewan, British Columbia, and Manitoba, should be 
postponed, in effect, until after the coming into operation of 
the new representation of the Lower House at the general 
election. The Government objected strongly to this proposal, 
on the broad ground tl1at the question of increasing the 
Senate had nothing· whatever to do wit,h the que~tion of the 
Lo,ver House, and that it was based on the simple considera-
tion of the numbers of the population, which had increased 
si11ce the last census in such a vvay as to leave the proportions 
anomalous, seeing that the great provinces of Saskatchewan 
and Alberta had, like Manitoba, but four members apiece, 
and British Columbia but three, which was quite out of pro-
portion with the populations of the provinces, as contrasted 
with the provinces of the east. The Opposition, however, 
remained firn1, alleging, "\vith of course much truth, that the· 
aim of the Government clearly was to provide themselves 
as soon as possible with a majority in the Senate, which the 
i11crease of the numbers of members, plus the rapid process of 
death in an assembly where most of the members are not 
young at appointment, would soon bring about. Eventually 
the Government decided to give way on this point, and the 
necessary Imperial legislation was ·procured for effecting the 
additions.1 
The necessity of invoking the aid of the Imperial Parliament 
induced the Canadian Government to clear up obscurities 
in its position in respect of the Senate. The British North 
. 
America Act, 1867, provided for a Senate of :seventy-two 
members, representing in equal numbers the three divisions 
of Canada, Ontario, Quebec, and the maritime provinces of 
Nova Scotia and New Bruns,vick. It was also provided that, 
if Prince Edward Island should come into the Union, it 
should be included in the third division, the two provinces 
losing two each of their Senators, which would fall to Prince 
Edward Island, and this took place in 1873. If Newfound-
land were to be added, then it would have four Senators of its 
own, and not be included in any one of the three divisions. 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 7897; 5 and 6 Geo. V, c. 45. 
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The importance of these divisions lay in the fact that if the 
Crown were to approve the addition of three or six Senators, 
in order to decide some deadlock, one or two, as the case 
might be, were to be taken from one of the three divisions 
of the Dominion. The anomaly of the position of Ne,v-
foundland in this case would have been negligible, but the 
position became more difficult when the grant of powers to 
the Dominion in 1871 1 and in 1886 2 to set up new provinces 
and to give them representation in Parliament, and to assign 
representation in Parliament to parts of Canada not included 
in any province, enabled Canada to create new Senators. 
In virtue of the power thus given by the Act of 1871, Canada 
set up the province of Ma11itoba in 1870,3 with a maximum 
of four Senators, and those of Alberta and Saskatchewan in 
1905,4 with a maximum of six Senators, the number to be 
subject to increase to that· figure after the decennial census 
of 1911. The number in the case of Manitoba was also made 
a maximum of six when new territory was added by the 
Dominion Act of 1912.5 It was therefore possible for the 
Parliament of Canada to increase to six members each the 
representation of these provinces in the Dominion Parlia-
ment, without recourse to the Imperial Parliament. But, 
on the other hand, the terms of union of British Columbia 
allowed only for the appointment of three Senators, and, as 
these terms could not be altered by Canada, the aid of the 
Imperial Parliament had to be invoked if the number were 
to be raised to six. Further, the same aid was needed to 
divide the Senators into a fourth group, consisting of Mani-
toba, British Columbia, Saskatchewan, and Alberta, each 
with six Senators. The creation of this group 11ecessitated 
the alteration of the number of Senators who could be 
summoned by direction of the Crown to four or eight, one or 
two from each of the four divisio11s of the Dominion. At the 
same time the number of Ser1ators which "\vould be allotted 
to Newfoundland if she entered the Union was i11creased to 
1 34 and 35 Viet. c. 28. 2 49 and 50 Viet. c. 35. 
3 30 Viet. c. 3. 4 4 and 5 Edw. VII, cc. 3 and 42. 
5 c. 32 ; Parl. Pap., Cd. 6863, p. 18. 
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six, and a long cherished wish of Prince Edward Island was 
granted, by enacting that no province should be represented in 
the House of Commons by fewer members than the number 
of her Senators, thus preserving from annihilation the repre-
sentation of the province in that House by four members. 
It is not very easy to see how the position of dependence 
on the Imperial Parliament in the case of the Dominion is to 
be altered. It would be different if there were any sign of 
the provinces being willir1g that the Dominion should be en-
trusted with gi--eater powers in this regard, but the provinces 
treat the matter with much emphasis and are not in the 
slightest degree likely to consent to any change which would 
place their legislative power in any further degree in the 
hands of the Dominion. The constitution of the Dominion 
must therefore remain in statu quo until the provinces and 
the Dominion can agree on some system under which altera-
tions can be made independently of the Imperial authority. 
In the case of the Commonwealth, not merely the constitu-
tion of the Commonwealth itself, but also that of the States 
in their relation to the Commonwealth, is subject to altera-
tion, for the power to alter the constitution is expressly 
conferred by the constitution, and can be exercised by an 
absolute majority vote in the two Houses, followed by sub ... 
mission to the electors in the Commonwealth : any change 
must be approved by a majority of the electors and a ma-
jority of States, and, if it affects the position of the provisions 
of the constitution relating to any State, or diminishes its 
number of Senators or its minimum representation in the 
House of Representatives, it must also be approved by the 
majority of the electors in that State. If the two Houses 
disagree on a proposed amendment, then, after either has 
passed it twice 'vith an interval of three months in the same 
or subsequent sessio11s, the Governor-General may submit 
the matter to the electors;though in the one case in which the 
exercise of the power has been sought it has not been ac-
corded. The power is by no means free from doubt: the con-
stitutions of the States are expressly continued in operation 
subject to the constitution, until altered by the State in 
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accordance with its constitution, and this at first seen1s to 
give the States an independent position. But the power of 
alteration extends to the whole constitution, and there 
seems no reason to doubt that the Commonwealth constitu-
tion niight be so amended that the State constitutions 
disappeared in their present form: it has already been 
proposed in the Commonwealth Parliament to legislate so as 
to create a unitary in place of a true federal Government ; 
the proposal has the strong support of the Bulletin, and mt1st 
therefore be regarded as one of the ideals which the Common-
wealth Labour Party "\viii endeavour to carry out. In the 
' 
meantime the great questio11 is that of the_ giving to the 
Commonwealth of wider powers on all subjects of trade and 
commerce, and, though the concession of these powers will 
certainly not leave the State Parlian1ents bereft of all 
authority, it will deprive them of the important part of the 
work which they do, and diminish effectively their value as 
legislative bodies. 
The States themselves are under few restrictio11s as to 
constitutional changes. The Act of 1907, which was passed 
to sweep away an intolerable muddle in the matter of the 
reservation of Bills, which threw no credit on the drafters of 
the constitutions of the Australian colonies, pro,rides merely 
for reservation of Bills affecting the constitution of the 
Legislature, and even this phrase is made less serious than it 
might seem, on the ground that it i~ defined not to co,rer cases 
of fixing the qualifications of the electors or of the members 
of elective Houses, the nun1bers of elective members, the 
districts for which they are to be returned, and the numbers 
for each district. There are also a few minor restrictions 1 
under colonial Acts, but in the main the States can freely 
enough amend their own constitutions. The matter, however, 
does not end there : the constitutions are in some ways not 
exactly ideal or convenient to work, and the mere statement 
that a constitution can in law be amended has no value, if 
in fact the relations of the two Houses are now fixed in such 
a way that change is almostimpossible. It is not desirable 
1 Parl. Pap., H. C. 131, 1893; Responsible Government, i. 432-6. 
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that any country shot1ld have a constitution which cannot be 
I 
altered constitutionally, and in four cases in the States there 
is always present the possibility of a deadlock. 
l11 the case of Queensland and New South Wales the 
difficulty which arises is one which can always · be solved, 
and accordingly Imperial intervention is not required. The 
right of rejecting and altering legislation, enjoyed by the 
Upper House in New South Wales, is subject to the fact 
that the House can be swamped, and would no doubt be 
swamped if it were found that it persistently refused to· 
accept Bills sent up by a Ministry possessing the control of 
the electorate. In the unquiet period which intervened 
between 1911 and 1913, the Upper House was never co11fronted 
by a really strong Government : the Labour Ministry held 
office by the skin of its teeth, and was often apparently on 
the point of collapse: a minister of importance, Mr. Beeby, 
resigned on December 9, 1912,1 and another of the scanty 
majority was absent on a mission in the United States. The 
treatment of Bills by the Upper House was not unreason-
able: they accepted an Income Tax Bill which was not a 
model of legislation: they rejected very properly the ridicu-
lous proposal that death sentences should be relegated for 
consideration to a Council of Judges, as a mere effort to 
evade the moral responsibility which must rest with an 
executive Government. They also rejected a proposal that 
all persons in receipt of poor relief should be at once en-
franchised. A Gas Bill, which as introduced might perhaps 
be described as predatory, they altered into a fair and 
reasonable shape, following British precedents of regulating 
the cost of gas to the consumer on the one hand and the rate 
of profit on the other. In 1913,2 however, it had to come 
more directly into conflict with the Lower House : that body 
was the scene of some proposed legislation which was perhaps 
not very seriously intended as a contribution to anything 
but the programme of the party for the general election. 
At any rate, the Council threw out a Fair Rents Bill to fix 
rents of certain houses in Sydney on the ground that it would 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 6863, p. 109. 2 Parl. Pap., Cd. 7507, p. 61. 
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do much more harm than good, and that it was economically 
quite unsound; a Bill to allow railway servants to appeal 
from decisions of the railway commissioner, which was a 
certain means of ruining discipline ; a Bill to provide all 
public servants with superannuation allowances, a measure 
the finance of which was clearly sketchy; a11d a Bill to provide 
for an eight hours' day in the chief industries. But the 
Council had the excuse that the Government had a poor hold 
of the Assembly: its Vaccination Bill, introduced because of 
the fear of smallpox, was rejected on a non-party vote, when 
it was found that it would be otherwise defeated on a party 
vote; and a Bill for an underground railway in Sydney s-hared 
the same fate. The Government, moreover, did not venture 
to press for the ratification of the proposed agreement for 
the construction of railway lines by an English firm of con-
tractors, on the basis of the State paying the cost, and the 
contractors having a commission, but advancing through 
an ingenious scheme the necessary funds. The result of the 
election in that year, however, was decisive in favour of 
the Labour Party: they won forty-nine seats to thirty-nine 
· of the Opposition, with two independents, the victory being 
in the main secured on the se.cond ballots, which went nearly 
all against the Liberals : the Independent Party, which had 
promised well, came to disastrous defeat. The Upper House 
at once recognized the changed position by accepting several 
items of legislation in a modified form, which the Govern-
ment presented. It was expressly explained in the Upper 
House that, if the people should see fit to approve the pro-
jects of the Government, the Upper House held no brief to 
alter these proposals in matters of first-class importance. 
The Upper House, however, retains .quite a valuable power 
over the construction of public works under the Public Works 
Act.1 That Act lays down the principle that no public work 
which is to cost over £20,000 -shall be commenced without 
the adoption of · the procedure of referring it on the motion 
1 The same principle has been followed in the Commonwealth by Act 
No. 20 of 1913; Parl. Pap., . Cd. 7507, pp. 34, 35. The limit there is 
£25,000 . 
• 
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of a minister in the Assembly to a Committee, consisting 
of three members of the Upper and four of the Lower House. 
On the report of this Committee the Assembly decides 
whether the matter should be proceeded with, and, if it passes 
a resolve to that effect, a statutory duty is imposed upon the 
minister to bring in a separate Bill to carry out the proposed 
work, and of course such a Bill may be rejected by the 
Council without the inconvenience of rejecting a general 
Appropriation Act. In 1911 an atte:tp.pt to insert an appro-
priation in an ordinary Bill appropriating moneys was 
defeated by the distinct ruling of the Speaker that the Act 
of 1900 could not in this way be 10verridden. 
In the case of Queensland the nominee Upper House is 
now placed in a de~nite relation to the Lower House by the 
provision for the reference to the people at a referendum of 
a measure which on being twice sent up by the Lower House 
the Legislative Council will not pass. This provision in the 
law has definitely, it may be taken, destroyed the right to 
swamp the House in normal circumstances, though it might 
be that in a case of great urgency, when there could be 
no referendu·m from considerations of time, this course of 
harmonizing the views of the two Houses might be used. In 
the years since 1908 up to 1914 there was no serious possi-
bility of disagreement between the two Houses, as the 
Government of Mr. Kidston, after carrying the legislation of 
1908, was much altered in composition .and views by the 
making of an alliance with the Opposition and the breaking 
up of the agreement with Labour, by which the change in 
the constitution had been effected. Even so, however, in 
1911 the Upper House dealt somewhat severely with a 
Licensing Bill, by insisting that the majority to authorize 
the closing of licensed houses under the local option system 
should be three-fifths, that Sunday closing should be limited, 
and that increased compensation should be paid to licence 
holders who Sliffered from the effect of the Act. The 
Government on some of the points could not give way, and 
it took steps to put the referendum into operation,! but in 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 6091, p. 71. 
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the session of 1912 the matter was disposed · of by mutual 
accommodation. The position, however, is seriously altered 
by the defeat of the Government of Mr. Denham, who 
succeeded Mr. Kidston in the leadership of the joint party 
on the retirement of the latter from political life in conse-
quence of domestic bereavement, and who definitely adopted 
a more conservative line of action than his predecessor, at 
th~ election in 1915. The Government had won much 
distinction by its firm handling of the great strike at Brisbane 
at the beginning of 1912, but the victory then achieved was 
frittered away by means of a somewhat amorphous policy, 
and the Labour victory of the Commonwealth helped to give 
Labour in the State a chance of reasserting its position, 
and, although there exists a simple means of deciding any · 
ordinary dispute between the Houses, the Lower House has 
declared in favour of abolishing the Council. 
In the other four States, with their elective Upper Houses, 
Victoria has twice in the past been the scene of grave dis-
putes between the two Houses, but it is doubtful whether 
the risk of friction is so great now as it then was. The Upper 
House is not very extreme in its views : the men composing 
it are in the main reasonable in political outlook, and treat 
the questions submitted to them in a moderate and, indeed, 
committee spirit. In 1911 1 there was an example of the 
usual relations between the two Houses : the Upper House 
so altered a Wages Boards Bill as to render it unacceptable 
to the Lower House, and a Bill for cold storage they altered 
by reducing from £84,000 to £9,000 the appropriation 
which it was proposed to make. Under the constitutional 
powers of the Upper House this reduction could only be put 
as a suggestion, but the lack of distinction between a sug-
gestion and an alteration was seen when the Upper House 
persisted in its suggestion, and thus compelled the Lower 
House to lay aside the Bill, since obviously it had ceased to 
be the same measure at all ; indeed, the Upper House would 
not even agree to allow the £9,000 it was willing to spend to 
be spent in the way proposed by the Lower House. Th~ 
1874 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 6091, p. 70. 
oc 
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Government was annoyed, and, as a general election followed 
shortly, they declared that it was part of their policy to 
secure the passing of legislation to facilitate a decision in the 
case of disagreements between the two Houses : it is doubtful 
whether the proposal was meant very seriously, as the Upper 
House was not in the slightest degree likely to pass any such 
Bill, but in point of fact, when the Government succeeded in 
being returned to power at the general election, the Upper 
House accepted their victory as a sign that they should 
agree to the Cold Storage Bill, which accordingly received 
their concurrence without substantial amendment, and 
became law. But the future is not without elements of 
doubt : Victoria has never had a real Labour Government : 
one Labour Ministry only has ever held office, and that 
nominally for a few days as a mere incident in a competition 
in December 1913, between two opposing factions in the 
Government. If the Lower House should become in time 
Labour, then the Upper House which, like all the Upper 
Houses of Australia that are elective, is based on a property 
qualification in the electors, which is higher than that for 
the Lower House where adult suffrage prevails, has a long 
record of successful resistance of the Lower House behind it, 
and trouble might easily result. For this there is no obvious 
means of solution unless by the action of the people and 
Parliament of the Commonwealth, in the form of a change 
of the Commonwealth Constitution, which would be a very 
difficult and hardly proper mode of effecting a settlement, 
or the interven~ion of the Imperial Parliament, which, as it 
alone has the power in the case of deadlocks to break the 
deadlock, would have to intervene if a really good case were 
made out. Even in 1914 the Upper House delayed for 
a whole month the passing of a very important Bill for the 
· ·control of prices, a fact which was believed to have told 
against the Liberals at the federal election of that year.1 
In the neighbouring Stat~ of South Australia, in the 
course of 1911,2 very serious difficulties arose between the 
two Houses, for which the intervention of the Imperial 
1 Round Table, 1915, p. ,681. 2 Parl. Pap., Cd. 6091, pp. 70, 71. 
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Government seemed to the Labour Government to be the 
only remedy. The Labour Government, which took office 
in 1910, introduced a measure to bring about the solution of 
differences between the two Houses on the basis that if the 
Lower House passed a measure three times, a general election 
intervening between the second and third times of passing, 
each passing being in a separate session, then, if the Council 
rejected the Bill, the Bill might be presented to the Governor 
for the royal assent. The Bill was passed through the Lower 
House by the necessary majorities of 21 to 15 and 21 to 
10, on its second and third readings, as required by the 
constitution, under which absolute majorities are needed for 
the passing of legislation altering the constitution, but the 
Upper House rejected it on the second reading. But the 
Upper House went further: at the end of the year it threw 
out the Appropriation Bill on the ground that it contained 
items for the establishment of Government brick and timber 
works, which were to supply these commodities for the use 
of the public at large and not merely for governmental 
purposes. The result of this action on the part of the Upper 
House was to determine the Government of the State to make 
an appeal to the Imperial Government. What they asked 
in their appeal of November 2, 1911, was that the Imperial 
Government should provide the safety- valve that was 
necessary to settle a deadlock which there was no constitu· 
tional means of overcoming, by intimating that the con-
stitution would be amended by Imperial Act, if the Council 
did not accept in principle such a measure as had been sub-
mitted and had been rejected. They pointed out that the 
intention of the constitution had been always to be a demo-
cratic one, that the original proposal in 1853 to have a 
nominee Upper House was rejected precisely on the ground 
that it would be undemocratic, and instead a system of 
elective Houses with different constituencies had been 
adopted: that the result of this differentiation, aided _by; 
female suffrage, had been to strengthen the position of prp ... 
perty owners: that in the United Kingdom the Crown 
afforded a means to reconcile the will of the pepple and ~h~ 
CC2 
404 IMPERIAL UNITY AND THE DOMINIONS 
action of Parliament by insisting on submission to the 
popular will by the Upper House, but that in South Australia 
no such power existed. A dissolution would merely mean 
the retllrn of the Council by its electors to retain its old 
position. The Government also pointed out that of the 
~electors only 33 per cent. of those on the Assembly rolls were 
electors for the Council, while even of this number only 13 
were able to return half the members of the Council. In the 
previous year the Upper House had already rejected a land 
tax measure and a Bill for adult suffrage for the Upper House. 
Their position, however, was weakened in 1911 by the fact 
that they had found themselves unable, through the defec-
tion of one of their supporters, to press their franchise mea~ 
sures upon the House. Moreover, the Legislative Council 
argued in the matter of the rejection of the Appropriation 
Bill that the compact of 1857 between the two Houses on 
the question of Money Bills was expressly made on the 
understanding that the Appropriation Bill was not to con-
tain provisions for new and unusual heads of expenditure, 
but that such heads were to be made the subject of separate 
proposals. There could be no doubt that in this point the 
Council had a complete case : the compact of 1857 was 
passed precisely because the constitution contained no 
provision regarding the powers of the two Houses as to 
Money Bills, and therefore some arrangement had to be made 
if any work was to be done. The Government in return 
argued that the agreement of 1857 was unconstitutional; 
that the agreement between the two Houses was a departure 
from the spirit of the constitution, which was meant to 
follow that of the United Kingdom; · and that therefore the 
power of the Upper House to deal with Money Bills should 
be held to be non-existent. The argument was clearly bad: 
apart from the fact that it was idle to argue in 1911 against 
an agreement which had prevailed, more or less continuously 
observed, since 1857, it is certain that the relations between 
a nominee body and an elective body and two elective bodies 
could not be regarded as analogous to each other. The real 
strength of the argument of the Government, so far as it 
DOMINION PARLIAMENTS AND CONSTITUTIONS 405 
existed, would have been in the fact that the Upper House 
was defying the will of the people, and the small and uncer-
tain majority of the Government in the Lower House made 
that position impossible to uphold. The refusal of the 
Imperial Government to intervene, on the ground that inter-
vention was only possible if all constitutional remedies had 
been exhausted, and only then on a request of a large ma-
jority, and if essential to enable the work of the State to be 
carried on, was clearly and plainly inevitable. The Labour 
Government evidently recognized that this was the case : 
they at once advised a dissolution of Parliament with a view 
to strengthening their hands in the struggle, and the Upper 
House readily passed a Supply Bill for £800,000, to let affairs 
be carried on. The election of January 1912 was disastrous 
to the Government, and Mr. Peake took office with a majority 
of 24 votes to 16. 
The new Govern;ment then secured the passing of the 
Appropriation Bill, but deleted the offending items. They 
further took occasion to place on record, in a memorandum 
of April 24, their ·disapproval of the action of their prede· 
cessors in invoking the intervention of the Imperial Govern-
ment, and they pointed to the defeat of the Government as 
an indication that the action taken by them in this matter 
had not been approved by the people of the State. They 
themselves, however, attempted to regulate by legislation 
. 
the relations as to Money Bills of the two Houses, and, after 
introducing a Bill confined to this alone in 1912, they in 1913 
laid before the House of Assembly an elaborate Constitution 
Amendment Bill which not merely dealt with the relations of 
the two Houses as to Money Bills, but also the constitution 
of Parliament, the franchise for both Houses, and the settle-
ment of deadlocks generally. 
The deadlock provisions were based on those in the 
Commonwealth constitution : they proposed that if a Bill 
were twice rejected by the Upper House, after being passed 
twice with an interval of three months in the same or 
successive sessions of Parliament, the Governor might 
dissolve both Houses, and, if this were done and the Upper 
• 
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House persisted in its attitude, then the matter should be 
settled by a joint session of the two Houses. It was felt 
necessary to follow the model of having a dissolution before 
_ a joint ·session. Even, however, in this form the Upper 
House declined to accept any deadlock provisions, but they 
accepted the rest of the Bill with various amendments. 
By it the numbers of the Council were raised from eighteen 
to twenty, elected for five constituencies, four members in 
each, and the number of the Assembly from forty to forty-
six, with eight three-member and eleven two-member con-
stituencies. The franchise for the Upper Chamber was 
considerably extended, rather in theory than in reality, 
by the alteration of the occupation franchise, so as to 
include any inhabitant occupier as owner or tenant of any 
dwelling-house, and not merely one of £17 value yearly, 
with, however, no vote for joint occupation. As · regards 
Money Bills, the Act repealed s. 1 of the Constitution Act, 
No. 2 of 1855-6, which provided that all Bills for appro-
priating any part of the revenue of the province or for 
imposing or altering or repealing any rate, tax, duty, or 
impost, should originate in the House of Assembly, and 
substituted the following provisions : A Money Bill or 
money clause in a Bill shall originate only in the House of 
Assembly, and the Legislative Council may not amend any 
money clause. The Council may, however, return to the 
House of Assembly any Bill containing a money clause, 
with a suggestion to omit or amend such clause, or to 
insert additional money clauses, or may send to the assembly 
a Bill containing suggested money clauses which must 
then be printed in erased type, and shall not be deemed 
to form part of the Bill, requesting by message that the 
suggestion be given effect to, and in every case the Assembly 
may comply with the suggestion with or without modifica-
tions, but the power of the Council applies to the money 
clauses contained in an Appropriation Bill only when such 
clauses contain some provisions appropriating revenue or 
other public money for some purpose other than a pre-
viously authorized purpose or dealing with some matter 
• 
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other than the appropriation of revenue or other public 
money. A Bill for appropriating revenue or other public 
money for any previously authorized purpose shall not 
contain any provision appropriating revenue or other public 
money for any purpose other than a previously authorized 
purpose. No infringement or non-observance of any of 
these provisions shall be held to affect the validity of any 
Act assented to by the Governor, and, except as provided 
as regards Money Bills, the Legislative Council shall have 
equal power with the House of Ass~mbly in respect of all 
Bills. A Money Bill is defined to mean a Bill for appro-
priating revenue or other public money or for dealing with 
taxation or for raising or guaranteeing any loan, or for the 
repayment of any loan, and a money clause means a clause 
of a Bill which appropriates revenue or public money or 
deals with taxation or provides for raising or guaranteeing 
any loan, or for the repayment of any loan. ....t\. previously 
authorized purpose means a purpose-which has been pre-
viously authorized by Act of Parliament or by resolution 
passed by both Houses of Parliament, or a purpose for 
which · any provision has been made in . the votes of the 
Committee of Supply whereon ~n Appropriation Bill pre-
viously passed was founded. No Bill or clause of a Bill 
shall be taken to appropriate revenue or public money, or 
to deal with taxation by reason only that it contains 
provisions for the imposition or appropriation of fines or 
other pecuniary penalties, or for the demand or payment 
or appropriation of fees for licences, or for services under 
the proposed Act. Any revenue, money, taxation, or loans 
raised by local authorities are not within the scope of the 
Act.1 · 
The Peake Government, however, was defeated in the 
election of 1915, and the Labour Government which came 
into power brought forward after the election in the first 
session of the Parliament in July 1915 proposals to undo 
the position of the Houses. The Governor's speech announced 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 7 507, pp. 39-41. There is a Committee on Railways 
as in New South Wales on Public Works under Act No. 1089, 
.. 
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measures for the restoration to the House of Assembly of 
control over Money Bills, which they declared had been 
taken away from the people by the late Govern.ment in the 
Act of 1913. The measure was to be accompanied by 
a complementary measure for adult suffrage for the Legis-
lative Council, the amendment of the electoral code, and 
the adoption of effective voting, with a rearrangement of 
the electoral districts, the constituencies having been in 
the opinion of the Government gerrymandered by the late 
Government in the Act of 1913. The speech also announced 
the change of the incidence of taxation by increasing the 
tax on unimproved land values, with reduction of income 
tax and the charges for conveyance of the produce of the 
primary producers. There is, of course, no prospect of the 
settlement of all these issues without much friction, and the 
possibility of Labour appeal to the Imperial Parliament 
must always be present so long as the Upper House is elected 
on a property franchise of any kind which differentiates 
the electorate quite considerably from the electorate by 
adult franchise for the Lower House. 
\The position in Tasmania is closely analogous to that in 
the case of South Australia. There, however, the Upper 
House is absolutely independent of the Lower in every 
respect, and no compact even regulates the relationships 
of the two bodies. On the other hand, the position of the 
Government in the Lower House is rendered ludicrously 
weak by the system of proportional voting 1 acting on the 
small number of members arranged in six-member con-
stituencies. Hence the prospect of any serious conflict is 
minimized, since the Lower House realizes that, if it is able 
merely to carry a measure by one vote, it can hardly insist 
that the Upper House must hold that the wisdom of the 
Lower House is superior to its own, and a .majority of ten 
or twelve against in a House of twenty-four members is very 
possibly a proof of better views than a majority of one or 
two in a House of thirty members. Hence even in the 
1 On this topic see Parl. Pap., Cd. 7 507, pp. 67-69, which summarizes 
a Tasmanian report. 
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emergency legislation of the war in 1914, the Upper House 
rejected certain measures as to control of prices and of 
foodstuffs sent up by the Lower House,! and it normally 
exerts as great an influence on legislation as the Lower 
House ; it freely rejects and alters Bills every year, and 
alters Money Bills or rejects proposals of expenditure as it 
thinks fit. 
In Western Australia the position is different : the power 
of the Lower House is constantly checked by the Upper, 
but the Upper is not so strong as in Tasmania, for the 
Lower House can show real .majorities, at present over-
whelmingly Labour in complexion and determined in 
character. The election of October 1911 gave Labour 
a majority of twenty in a House of fifty, and it carried 
much legislation, the Upper House declaring emphatically 
that it had no party character, and would consider all 
proposals submitted merely on that basis. It rejected, 
however, a proposal to set up a Public Works Committee 
on the model of that existing in New South Wales, and it 
further declined to accept the proposal of the Government 
regarding arbitration. In 1912 2 there was more friction 
between the two Houses. The Upper House rejected Bills 
for the setting up of State hotels, as it disapproved of muni-
cipal trading, for amending the land laws by the substitution 
of the principle of leasehold in every case for that of free-
hold, for setting up a Public Works Committee, for authoriz-
ing a railway from Norseman to Esperance, and a Land 
and Income Tax Bill. The State Hotel Bill was intended 
to control the liquor traffic, and it was pointed out by the 
Premier that at the local polls held under the existing Act 
the great majority of the voters in every licensing district, 
with few exceptions, had voted in favour of the holding 
of new licences by the State : under the Bill the Govern-
ment would have had power to set up a State hotel in 
every licensing district. The majority in the Legislative 
Council, in rejecting the Bill, expressed readiness t<? consider 
it if restricted to defined cases, and a further Bill in this 
1 Round Table, 1915, p. 678. 2 Parl. Pap., Cd. 6863, p. 111. 
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sense was accepted by the Council. In the support of the 
Land Bill reference was made to the evil result of freehold 
in the United Kingdom, where the absolute ownership of 
more than half the land was enjoyed by 2,500 persons, 
while experience in Victoria with freehold showed that, 
despite the large alienation of land from the Crown, the 
land cultivation had not increased for many years. It was 
the desire to set up a community of tenant farmers, cultivat-
ing land under the State. All acquired rights were to remain 
in force, and all contracts carried out. A lease of land in 
perpetuity, with a rental at 2 per cent. of the assessed 
unimproved value, was to take the place of freehold. In 
reply, the Council argued that the principle of leasehold 
had been abandoned in 1912 in New Zealand,1 and that 
France, Denmark, Norway, Belgium, Switzerland, and 
Ireland showed the advantages of freehold. The same year 
showed some feeling between the two Houses arising out 
of an incident in the action of the Government. In 1911-12 
the Parliament had agreed to give a sum of £250,000 as 
an advance to the Treasurer to meet expenditure which 
from time to time might not be provided for, and the 
Government used some of the money for the purpose of · 
purchasing steamers to provide a Government service to 
the northern portion of the State. This interference with 
private enterprise annoyed greatly the members of the 
Upper House, who had .mostly large business or agricul-
tural interests, and who did not wish any interference with 
private concerns. When Parliament met in 1912, the 
Upper House recorded its disapproval of the expenditure 
of the money by the Government, and criticized adversely 
a portion of the Governor's speech which seemed to claim 
that the Lower House could by mere resolution legitimize 
expenditure incurred by the Government. The Government, 
however, made it clear that they made no such clai~, as 
was asserted, for the Lower House. But they insisted that 
they could use at their discretion the sums placed at their 
disposal by the Act of the preceding session. The Governor'S 
1 Cf. Round Table, 1915, pp. 692, 693. 
• 
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position in the matter was called into question, but it was 
vindicated on the ground that he had acted in accordance 
with the advice of his law officers and of the Ministry, and 
indeed it seems clear that his action was strictly legal, and 
that the error of the Upper House was in agreeing to the 
grant in the previous session without imposing conditions. 
In 1913 1 there was again friction in the two Houses. The 
Government proposed an initiative and Referendum Bill, 
which would have enabled the people to claim the sub-
mission to the electors of any measure passed by the Houses; 
and to demand the legislation of any measure desired by 
the electorate. This was rejected by the Upper House on 
eighteen votes to six. The Council also rejected the land 
and income tax proposals, and Bills for the setting up of 
a Public Works Committee, for the amendment of the 
Factories Act, and the construction of a railway from 
Esperance northwards. The position is in fact somewhat 
difficult, for the possibility of effectively coercing the Upper 
House does not exist, and its franchise has not yet been 
extended to cover all householders, as in South Australia: 
even if it were, there would still be no certainty of its being 
in harmony with the Lower House at any future date. 
In the case . of New Zealand the Legislative Council, 
originally composed of nominees for life, was modified in 
constitution in 1891 by the introduction of the limitation 
of the tenure of office by new appointees to seven years. 
The appointments made by the Liberal administrations, 
which held office for twenty years consecutively, were 
political in origin, and therefore after the very beginning 
" 
of the Liberal Government, when the refusal of the Governor, 
Lord Glasgow, to add members to the number desired by 
Mr. Ballance to the Upper House was overridden by the 
Secretary of State,2 the Houses had been in general harmony, 
the Upper House merely delaying the passing of measures 
which it distrusted, though in some cases it did so for 
considerable periods. This state of affairs came to an end 
by reason of the defeat of the Liberal Government in 1912, 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 7 507, pp. 62, 63. 2 Parl. Pap., H.C. 198, 1893. 
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and the position became at once difficult. Even in the 
times of the Liberal Government there were many sugges-
tions of alteration of the constitution, and in his last 
policy speech the former Prime Minister, Sir J. Ward, had 
suggested that the proper way to deal with the matter was 
to make the Upper House elective, the members being 
chosen by the Provincial Councils, which he also proposed 
to set up in order to deal with local affairs and relieve the 
Parliament of excessive centralization of business. In the 
session of 1912 1 the new Government brought forward 
a proposal to make the Upper House elective, consisting 
of forty members, elected by the North and South Islands 
.in equal numbers by proportional 2 voting on the system 
advocated for the Imperial Parliament by Lord Courtney. 
The members were to hold office for six years, one-half 
retiring every three years : the franchise for both Houses 
was to be the same. While according the Bill, which was 
as a matter of courtesy introduced in the ·House affected, 
a second reading, and thus affirming the principle of election, 
the Upper House resolved by twenty votes to thirteen 
that, the principle having been affirmed, it was not desirable 
to proceed further with the measure in the session then in 
progress, in order that the country might have the chance of 
considering the steps to be taken to give effect to this prin-
ciple. The Government then proceeded in the Lower House 
by resolution to affirm the principles of their Bill, and asked 
the Council to pass a Bill to restrict to three years the 
tenure of office of the next appointees to the Council. It 
was explained that, as sixteen of the mem hers would retire 
in 1914, it was desired to be able to fill their places with 
men whose appointments would terminate within the life 
of a single Parliament. But the Council would not proceed 
with the Bill. In the session of 1913 3 accordingly the 
Government again introduced the Bill with alterations. 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 6863, pp. 117, 118. 
2 The system of second ballots was repealed for the Lower House by Act 
.No. 36 of 1913. 
a Parl. Pap., Cd. 7507, pp. 69, 70. 
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In place of two great divisions there were to be four, two 
in each island: the members to be elected were now to 
be eleven for each of the north divisions and nine for each 
of the south, thus avoiding the unfairness of the original 
proposals. The mode of choice was to be the Tasmanian 
system of proportional representation, and the idea of 
a periodic retirement of half the members was ·to cease, 
the members holding office for five years from election, and 
then until the next dissolution of Parliament. The electors 
were to be the same as those of the Lower House. In the 
first place, however, as there were still some members who 
were entitled to remain members for life, or a portion of 
seven years, the elections would be confined to seven members 
for each of the North Island divisions, and five for each 
of the South, an unfair majority for the North, but unavoid-
able, since for proportional representation to work there 
must cbe an uneven number of members to be returned . . 
Further, the relations of the two Houses were to be set up 
on a new model in place of the mere constitutional under-
standings of the past : the proposal made was a mixture 
of the procedure under the Irish Parliament Act and the 
Commonwealth Constitution Act. The Council was to have 
no power to initiate appropriation or taxation Bills : it 
could not amend any Bill imposing taxation or appropriat-
ing money for the ordinary annual services, nor amend any 
proposed law . so as to increase a charge on the people. 
But in the case of any law which it could not amend it 
could request an alteration by the other House. A Money 
Bill which was to be defined in the manner of the Govern-
ment of Ireland Act, when certified as such by the Speaker, 
must be passed by the Upper . House within a month after 
it had been sent up, or it could be presented to the Governor 
for his assent. In the case of disagreement on any other 
kind of Bill, if passed twice by the Lower House in sub-
sequent sessions, and rejected by the Upper, the Governor 
might convene a sitting of the two Houses, and, if the Bill 
were affirmed by a majority vote of the members sitting 
together, the Bill should be presented for the royal assent, 
• 
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and if not the Governor could dissolve both Houses simul-
taneously. 
For its part the Council set up a committee to consider 
the matter. The Committee came to the conclusion that the 
position of the Council should be in all matters that of the 
House of Lords as it stood before the passing of the Pa1·-
liament Act, and that the Council should insist on its right 
to deal with Bills exactly to the same extent as the House 
of Lords used to do. They accepted as correct the view 
that the Upper House should yield to the Lower House, 
when it was seen that the views of that House represented 
• the deliberate opinion of the nation. They also agreed 
that the principle of nomination should be abandoned .in 
favour of election, and they then defeated by five votes 
to three the proposal that the Government plan of direct 
election by the same electorate as that of the Lower House 
should be resorted to. By six votes to two they rejected 
the proposal of one member that, as vacancies occurred, 
three-quarters of the Council should be elective and one-
quarter nominee, and decided that the constitution of the 
Council should be limited to forty members, and that as each 
vacancy occurred the place should be filled by election by 
the members of the two Houses sitting together and voting 
by ballot. They further recommended that the tenure of 
office should be seven years, that the proposals of the 
Government regarding the powers of the two Houses should 
be accepted, and should be modified by the addition of the 
provision that, if after a dissolution of both Houses the Bill 
was again passed by the Lower House and rejected by the 
Upper, it could be presented to the Governor for his assent. 
They also made provision for the summoning by nomina-
tion of two Maori members to the Council, and of one 
member of the executive Council. 
The difference of opinion between the two Houses was 
too complete to allow of reconciliation, but the possibility 
of any very decisive conflict was diminished -by the con-
tingency of the outbreak of the war, and the result was 
that the p:roposals of the Government became law as Act . 
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No. 59 of 1914. The ensuing election, followed as it 
was by a series of election petitions and negotiations for 
a coalition, rendered the country indifferent to the ques-
tion of the reform of the Upper House. But the position 
of that body must some day be definitively solved, and the 
problem is one of difficulty : it was, it may be added, doubted 
whether it was possible for the Parliament without the aid 
of the Imperial Parliament to effect the whole of the changes 
contained in the measure proposed either by the Govern-
ment or the Committee of the Legislative Council. The 
doubt, however, seems to be somewhat mistaken: it is 
true that in certain respects the power of the Parlia,ment 
of New Zealand to alter the Constitution Act of 1852 was 
expressly limited when express authority of alteration was 
given by the Imperial Parliament in the Act 20 & 21 Viet. 
c. 53, but this was prior to the passing of the Colonial Laws 
Validity Act, 1865, and the general power of constitutional 
change there given seems sufficient to cover any of the 
changes which in either of the Bills was proposed to be 
effected. 
The Union of South Africa differs essentially from Canada, 
and resembles Newfoundland .and New Zealand in being 
in effect a .unitary colony, and the power of constitutional 
alteration possessed by the Parliament is therefore of the 
most extensive kind. The only restrictions on the altera-
tion of the Constitution are that none of the provisions for 
whose operation a definite time is fixed, as in the case of 
the appointment of Senators, shall be changed in that 
. 
period, and that the provisions of the repeal clause 152 
itself, of clauses 33 and 34 providing for the number of 
members in the Lower House and their mode of increase, 
of clause 35 relating to the franchise with its special pro-
vision to safeguard the native franchise in the Cape, and 
of clause 137 providing for the equality of language within 
the Union, as regards English and Dutch, shall not be 
repealed unless the Bill be passed by a two-thirds majority 
of the total number of members of the two Houses of the 
Union sitting together in joint session. There exists also 
I 
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the restriction that any Bill which alters the constitutio11 
or powers of Provincial Councils as provided in the Act 
or that changes the provisions of the fourth chapter of the 
constitution regarding the Lower House shall be reserved, 
while any Bill altering the ·provision to this effect con-
tained in s. 64 of the Act must itself be reserved. But 
these few technical points seem of very little cons(/quence, 
and the Union of South Africa may be said without doubt 
to have within itself the full power of its own control. It 
must always be remembered that the provincial Councils 
cannot pass any law which contravenes any law of the 
Union, and that the Unio11 Parliament can pass any law 
it likes and override the legislation of a Provincial 
Council. 
I11 the case of Newfoundland and the provinces of Ca11ada, 
the power of constitutional alteration is possessed in the 
widest degree. The provinces are, unlike the Dominio11, free 
to change their constitutions at will save as regards the 
position of the Lieutenant-Governor, who is the bond of 
executive authority between the Dominion and the pro-
vince, and who, therefore, in that aspect could not be 
made subject to change by the province. But the control 
of such constitutional change is exercised by the strong 
power of the Dominion Government, and therefore such 
alteration cannot be dangerous to the federation in any 
way. Newfoundland is subject only to the control of the 
Imperial Government, but it is difficult to conceive any 
way in which the desire to alter the constitution could arise. 
The Upper House, which is nominee, is however not directly 
under the control of the Government of the day, for unlike 
· the case of New South Wales, Queensland, and New Zealand, 
the number of members who can be appointed by the 
Governor on the advice of ministers cannot rise above 
fifteen, so that, if any further members are needed, it is 
necessary to n1ake the appointments by the issue of warra11ts 
by the King. This at once places the Governn1ent in the 
position that it has to satisfy the Imperial Government 
of the need for extra members to allow of the smooth 
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working of G·overnment before tl1e number of the Upper 
House can be altered. The number has fron1 time to time 
bee11 increased : in 1904 it 'vas brought up to eighteen in 
order to secure the passage of any necessary legislation 
regardi11g the new arrangements with the French Govern-
ment as to the fisheries, and in 1908 a further increase 
by three members was rendered desirable by the change 
of Ministry, which put the new Government of Sir E. Morris 
in the position of having a solid majority against them 
in the Upper House of some thirteen to five. The Upper 
House has, however, shown a sensible spirit of compromise, 
and, though it every now and then amends a Bill or throws 
one out, it does not do so in such a way as to cause needless 
offence or ill feeling. , 
In the provinces of Canada difficulties with Upper Houses. 
can exist in but two cases. In the case of Nova Scotia the 
Upper House, which is in effect limited in number through 
the absence of any legal means of increasi11g the number, 
at one time was somewhat independent in its attitude 
towards the Lower House, which n1ade an energetic effort 
to abolish it. But the Upper House has managed to retain . 
its existen.ce by dint of the process of consenting of late 
years to most of the measures of the Lower House, except 
any suggestion of its own abolition. In Quebec, where the 
Upper House is also limited in number, there has been no 
serious friction, and the House may well continue its exis-
tence undisturbed. But in either case, if serious deadlocks 
arose, they could be solved only by the intervention of the 
Imperial Government, since there is no power in the Dominion 
to alter the Cor1stitutions, and there is no reserve authority, 
such as that possessed by the Governor in the Australian 
States and New Zealand and the Crown in Newfoundland, 
to intervene and compose differences by the addition of 
members to the Upper House in either case. 
1874 nd 
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PART II. POSSIBILITIES OF UNION 
CHAPTER I 
IlVIPERIAL FEDERATION 
• 
1. CANADA, THE CoMMON"\VEALTH, AND THE UNION 
THE essential characteristic of any federal system springs 
from the fact that a federation must be a compromise: 
it is a form of government which preserves multiplicity in 
unity, which admits that union is strength, but which 
insists that individuality must not be swamped. A federa-
tion may claim to be an organism, in that it should exhibit 
the most complete unity in diversity, each part being an 
indispensable member in the whole, but at the same time 
deriving its real effectiveness from its conjunction with other 
parts to form that whole. But in any case of a real as 
contrasted with an ideal organism experience shows that 
there are defects, and while in an organism not composed 
of conscious individuals capable of expression the failures of 
adjustment show themselves only in the in1perfect indivi-
duality and success in maintaining itself of the organism, 
in the case of a federation the imperfection of adjustment 
expresses itself in friction among the organs of government. 
While therefore in theory a federation should be the most 
. effective form of government inasmuch as the whole 
should be enormously strengthened by the i11dividual 
character of the parts, in point of fact it is, so far as it yet 
appeared in the world, a mucl1 weaker form of government 
than it should in theory be. This loss of strength is due 
to the dissipation of effort caused by the disputes between 
the central and the local authorities, and not less by the 
fact that both central and local authorities in their executive 
and their legislative action are subject to the control of the 
federal courts, which may adopt a point of view satisfactory 
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neither to the federation nor to the states. In a unitary 
state the executive and the legislative powers stand in the 
closest connexion, and this connexion is also to be seen in 
most federations, but the judicial power in a federation 
stands apart from the other two powers in a very marked 
degree. In a unitary state the laws of the legislature are 
carried out by the executive, and their proper performance 
can be enforced through the courts, which are bound by 
then1. In a federation the judiciary ceases to be a means 
of enforcing the will of the legislature and nothing more : 
its function includes the duty of scrutinizing the action of 
the legislature and the control of the legislature when it 
exceeds its due powers. The executive thus ceases to have 
the unquestioned duty of obedience to the legislature : 
it is entitled and indeed it is bound to ask w-hether the 
legislature is acting within the sphere of authority assigned 
to it or whether it is going beyond its bour1ds, and seeking 
to lead the executive into paths of error. Now it follows 
essentially from these considerations that unless the authority 
of the Parliament can be precisely defined in such a way as 
to leave no doubt as toits powers, there must be waste of 
power. The time occupied in considering problems of 
ultra vires must divert attention from greater issues, and the 
burden of reform must often be imperfectly borne from 
doubt as to the legal means of executing the reforms 
aimed at. 
The same position in the central government and legis~ 
lature is repeated in the case of the local governments and 
legislatures. They cannot vvell be certain of their rights 
and authority, either inter se or towards the federation, and 
the spirit of local autonomy is naturally felt most strongly 
in the minds of the executive officers, the legislators, and the 
judiciary of a province. The Government and Parliament 
will, experience shows, nearly always be more anti-federal 
than the constituents by whom the legislature is elected and 
the officers indirectly appointed. 
These theoretical considerations receive, it n1ust be 
a_dmitted, very marked illustratio11 in the case of the two 
D d2 
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federations within the British Empire. In both cases 
federalism seemed destined to come without undue delay : 
in both cases the particularism of the units prevented the 
change of government being made until the force of circum-
stances n1ade choice practically unavoidable. In the case 
of Canada federation was achieved thirty-three years before 
it came ~o pass in the Commonwealth, and it would be wl1olly 
idle to deny that the cause of the earlier fruition of the 
movement in the Dominion was essentially the danger which 
menaced Canada from the south, and which was so real that 
it was the essential ground why Ca11ada was denied the 
title of Kingdom which Sir John Macdonald and his fellow 
leaders of federation would gladly have seen assigned to her. 
It was felt that the chance of the weak provinces of Canada 
maintaining themselves against the attractions of the 
United States, to annexation, for which there had been 
a strong movement in 1847, was much less than the pro-
bability of the resistance of a united Dominion conscious 
of future possibilities of greatness. In point of fact, even 
then the carrying out of federation was almost hampered 
by an accident. Prince Edward Island, which had at first 
consented to come in, decided at last to stand out ; and 
Nova Scotia, after declaring for union, was completely 
carried over to the opposite opinion for a time by the 
eloquence of Howe. Had it not been for the cleverness 
shown by Sir C. Tupper as leader of the Government at the 
time in Nova Scotia and the eagerness of the Imperial 
Government to secure union/ the attempt would have been 
practically a complete failure, since New Brunswick could not 
with Canada have made a union worth bringing about. 
Similarly it was in large measure due to the influence of the 
Imperial Government that the newly created Canada was 
allowed to secure the Hudson Bay Company's territory 
and the North-West, and that British Columbia was induced 
to join the union, thus giving the Dominion the assurance 
of a brilliant future when the first difficulties of growth had 
been successfully overcome. 
1 Recollections of Sixty Years, pp. 69-73. 
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In the ease of the Commonwealth the extraordinary 
difficulty of inducing six colonies with a fairly homogeneous 
population and, on the whole, similar conditions to federate 
without external pressure was exhibited. It is certain that 
in -this ease also something towards federation was con-
tributed by reasons of defence. The feeling was gradually 
growing for years, especially after 1885, in the Common-
wealth that further unity for defence purposes was necessary, 
and the obvious exposure of the Commonwealth to attaclr 
from any great power i11 the Pacific was realized by a number 
of statesmen. But the feeling was not strong : the move-
nlent for unity which began at the very outset of the history 
of the country was extraordinarily slow in developing, and 
it is plain that its development in the long run was feeble 
in the extreme, for the form of the Commonwealth Con-
stitution shows the many compromises necessary to secure 
the consent of the States to union; ar1d the State of New 
South W ~les at the last moment "rould not agree to union 
unless it were given certain concessio11s, · including the 
undertaking that the federal capital should be situated 
within its territory at such a distance as not to rival Sydney. 
The result of the different circumstances of the two cases 
is obvious in the whole aspect -of the Constitutions. The 
essential difference is seen at once in the attitude to the 
two federations as regards external affairs. In the case of 
Canada no doubt has ever existed that the Federal Goveril-
ment alone is concerned with the external affairs of that 
Dominion, in so far as a non-Sovereign State can have such 
affairs. This fact reveals itself very obviously in the case 
of treaties :· it is not possible for Canada to become a party 
to any treaty through the King's adherence in respect of 
the Dominion, save on the condition that the whole of 
Canada is bound by the treaty : that is to say, the provinces 
have not enough individuality as units of Empire for His 
Majesty to undertake obligations in respect of some one 
of them by itself. For the same reason the full power is 
granted to the Parliament of the Dominion to legislate to 
carry out the treaty obligations of Canada. This power 
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applies not merely to obligations contracted before the unio11 
of the provinces, but also to obligations contracted there-
after: the most striking case 1 of this is the legislation passed 
by Canada under the Boundary Waters Treaty with the United 
States of January 11, 1909, and the Protocol of May 5, 1910, 
modifying the treaty in one respect. By s. 2 of the Act, 
chap. 28 of the Statutes of 1911, provision is made that the 
laws of Canada and of the provinces are amended and 
altered so as to permit the performance of the obligations 
undertaken by the Crown in the treaty and so as to in1pose 
the various rights, duties, and disabilities which are intended 
to be conferred by the treaty. Any interference with, or 
. diversion· from their natural channels of, waters in Canada 
which in their natural channel should flow across the inter-
national boundary or into boundary waters, which results 
in any injury on the United States side of the boundary, 
shall give the parties injured the same legal remedies as if 
the injury took place in_ Canada. Jurisdiction is given in 
any such case to the Exchequer Court of Canada. Power 
is also given to the International Joint Commission con-
templated by the treaty to compel by application to a judge 
of the superior court in the province in "rhich the sitting 
of the Commission is held the attendance of witnesses and 
to take evidence on oath, and provision is made for 
appropriation for the salary and the expenses of the Com-
mission so far as they fall to be paid by the Dominion of 
Canada. It will be noted that the Act deliberately deals 
with provincial law as it thinks fit, and it does so without 
the consent of the provinces being obtained. There is no 
case of legislation like this in the Commonwealth as yet. 
Moreover, though the External Affairs Departme11t of 
Australia is older in origin than the corresponding depart-
ment in the Dominion of Canada, the latter since 1912, under 
the Prin1e Minister,2 has far more reality and impor~ance, 
mainl3r, of course, because of the fact that the proxin1ity 
of the United States renders it necessary to maintain 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 6091, p. 19; Journ. Soc. Oomp. Leg. xvi. 5-12. 
2 See c. 22 of 1912, replacing c. 13 of 1909; Parl. Pap., Cd. 6863, p. 16. 
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a constant stream of negotiatio11s with that country, so that 
the British Ambassador, who is the intermediary, is always 
kept busy in dealing with the external affairs of Canada 
through the G·overnor-General--or sometimes less formally 
direct with ministers or the Under-Secretary of Canada, 
and the States Department of the United States. 
In the Con1monvvealth the power to legislate as to external 
affairs was given to . the Commonwealth by the Constitutior1, 
and an Externa-l .£.\ffairs Department early appeared on the 
scene. But the position of the Commonwealth in the 
matter of external affairs was early a11d energetically 
challenged by the G-overnment of the State of South Aus-
t.ralia.1 The Dutch Government made a representation to 
the British Government that the authorities in South 
Australia had failed to arrest the crew of the shiJ) V ondel 
as they were required to do u11der the terms of the Anglo-
Dutch Treaty of 1856. The Imperial Government com-
municated the complaint to the Commonwealth, asking 
that Government to obtain a report on the alleged failure 
of duty from the State Government. The State, however, 
energetically declined to report otherwise than direct and 
at the direct request of the Imperial Government. It based 
its view on the provisions of the Constitution of the Common-
wealth : the authority to which application in any matter 
should be made must be the authority which was entrusted 
with the legislative authority, and therefore the executive 
authority, by the Constitution; and, eve11 vvhen the Common-
wealth had power to act, still tlle action must be not merel~y 
one which the Con1monwealth could take under the Con-
stitution, but action which it had empowered itself to 
perform by legislating on the topic. Thus there remained 
to the States all those matters in which the legislative 
power did not rest with the Commonwealth, and until 
legislation was passed by the Commonwealth all those 
powers which the Commonwealth COlild exercise but had 
not exercised, and the Com1nonwealth could deal 011ly with 
the departments transferred to her control by virtue of the 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 1587. 
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Constitution Act, e. g. customs; or matters on which it had 
legislated. But this division of authority in_ external 
affairs according to the legislative authority 'vas not accepted 
by the Imperial Government or the Government of the 
Commonwealth, which insisted that the federation of 
Australia was not merely tl1e creation of a _seventh govern .. 
ment beside the others, but of a new government, which for 
some purposes and for all external purposes must be rega"'ded 
as above all the States. The responsibility for answering 
questions raised by foreign governments rested with the 
Imperial Government, which in its turn was entitled to 
ask tl1e Co1nmon.wealth Government for an explanation, 
which that Government could ask from the State Govern .. 
ment. r~ro deal direct in such a: case with the State 
Government would completely fail to fulfil the essential 
purpose of the Commonwealtl1 Constitution, the creation as 
an external unit of one Australia. The State Government 
remained unconvinced, and the positio11 is still unsatis-
factory : if a Stiate Government makes any representation 
which deals with external affairs, the Imperial Government 
will not deal with it until the Commonwealth Gover11ment 
have expressed their views, and they send all complaints 
to the Commonwealth, but the Commonwealth has no 
control over the States, and, if they refused to reply, could 
not make them reply. Nor, of course, has the Secretary 
of State in his actior1 any legal authority to rest upon save 
his own. opinio11 : indeed it may be doubted if the current 
of jt1dicial opinion _in the Common,vea.lth is not directly 
against his action, for the High Court of the Commonwealth 
has expressly used the term Sovereign States of the States 
of the Commonwealth, meaning by this to I)lace them on 
the same footing of authority as the Commonwealth itself, 
from which it does not follow that the external affairs 
power excludes in any way the direct relation of the States 
to the real sovereign po,ver, the United Kingdom. The 
real reason in favour of the course of action adopted is 
not a legal one at all, but is one of common sense. The 
Commonwealth Government has. the military and naval 
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power in tl1e Commonwealth: it has the customs power, 
and it must therefore be vitally interested in all matters 
of foreign relations and should be allowed to express its 
opinion i11 regard to them freely, and this can best be 
secured by making it the channel of correspondence. Even, 
however, this principle cannot be carried . out rigidly : the 
legislation of the States is 11ot subject to the control of the 
Commonwealth Government, and if clauses in that legisla-
tion offend, as was the case with a Queensland Act in 1911, 
the Imperial Government must forgo the pleasure of in-
sisting on the correct mode of procedure and deal directly 
with the State Government, or it may be feared the State 
Government would not meet the views of the Imperial 
Government. Where the proper procedure of recognizing 
the position of the State in such a case is observed, as was 
the case with the Act in question, no difficulty in securing 
the preservation of treaty rights is found. Thus while the 
Queensland Act, No. 31 of 1911, wa-s passed providing that 
no land could be leased to aliens unless the alien could pass 
a dictation test, it was expressly provided, jn deference to 
representations made by the Im:perial Government and re-
ceived after the Bill had passed both Houses of Parliament, 
that nothing contained in the Act should prejudice the 
rights of any of the subjects of a foreign power between which 
and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland 
there was subsisting or should in future subsist any treaty 
of commerce whereby reciprocal civil rights of the subjects 
of such treaty powers were reserved, granted or declared, 
and to which treaty the State of Queensland had acceded 
or should thereafter accede. Similar legislation was shortly 1 
afterwards passed by New South Wales to .amend the error 
in the Land Act 2 of that State by which certain disabilities 
in respect of land-holding were placed. on all aliens who were 
not naturalized within a certain time, contrary to the 
provisions of the Treaty of 1883 with Italy and the Treaty 
of 1859 with Russia. 
In the case of treaties the self-dependence of the States 
1 Act No. 53 of 1912; 7 of 1913. 2 Act No.6 of 1912. 
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is emphasized in two ways. While it is now clearly the 
established practice, as it ought to be, that accession cannot 
be expressed to any treaty witho11t the desire of the Common-
wealth Government, whatever the "\Vishes of the States, it is 
not possible for the Commonwealth to accede to any treaty 
until it has secured the concurre11ce of the States an.d the 
promise or passing of the necessary legislation, if the subject-
matter of the treaty falls within the sphere of the States in 
whole or part. In the second place, there is no theoretical 
objection to the l(ing acceding to a treaty i11 respect of part 
only of the Commonwealth, though the policy of such 
action might be doubtful. The first point is the result of 
the fact that the Commonwealth power to deal 'vith external 
affairs is of quite unknown extent, and there is no legal 
authority for the view that it confers on the Commonwealth 
Parliament the same power to enforce treaty obligations 
which is given in exr,ress terms by the British North Ame~rica 
Act to the Dominion in Canada. If, therefore, the Conlmon-
wealth asked that accession be expressed to a treaty affecting 
matters of domestic importance, as for instance the necessary 
changes required in the la\V of the States to preveJlt the sale 
or manufacture of white phosphorus in matches if the 
internatio11al convention to suppress the use of this abomina-
tion is to be carried out, and if the States declined to legislate, 
the po~ition of the Commo11wealth would be hopeless. 
Similarly when the Opium Convention was accepted by the 
Commonwealth, it first of all ascertained that all the States 
concurred in tl1e proposal. But the anomaly that the 
Commonwealth could ask that accession be declared for 
one State alone is remarkable and sho\VS how feeble th~ 
unity of the Common,vealth is. 
The same looseness of structure is to be seen in the pro-
-cedure regarding the recognition of consular officers, on 
which there has been correspondence at various times and 
which has been discussed at · the Premiers' Conference of 
1914. The position is obvious that, if external affairs are 
to be taken au pied de lettre, the whole business of consuls 
should be handed over to the Commonwealth, and that all 
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requests from the Imperial Government for the recognition 
of consuls, provisionally or definitively, if there is no objec-
tion, should be addressed to the Commonwealth Government 
alone. It "rould rest, as in Canada, with the Commonwealth 
Government to consult 'vith the State Government and to 
answer the inquiry on its own authority after hearing the 
views of that Government. The State Governments, how- · 
ever, at an early period in the history of the question 
brought any attempt thus to deal with them to an untimely 
end, by adopting the policy of simply taking no notice of 
any consul unless he had been approved by them. The 
result was, of course, that the consul, whose duties bring 
him into constant contact with the State authorities, would 
have found that the comfort of being recognized by the 
Commonwealth would have been somewhat void; and the 
Imperial Government, with good sense, resorted to the plan 
of asking both Commonwealth and State if they saw any 
objection to the appoint:ment, the Commonwealth from_ the 
point of view of the relations of the proposed official with 
the Commonwealth authorities, and the State from the 
point of view of his communications with the State authori-
ties. The importance of this procedure must be recognized 
when it is remembered that the consul is often a resident 
Australian citizen and that it is not desirable that men of 
any but excellent character should be appointed to these 
posts. In the case of a consul de carriere, the highest 
luminary in the consular firmament, no inquiry is needed, 
as an exequatur can ~e issued at once for him, and the 
Commonwealth and State Governments are merely informed 
of the re·cognition accorded by the King. There remains, 
of course, possible trouble in regard to the fact that the 
views of the two governments might disagree, but in that 
case it is to be hoped that in the interests of common sense 
the report would be treated as unfavourable. It would 
be absurd for the State to recognize a man whom the 
Commonwealth disliked and not less absurd to adopt the 
reverse course. 
Apart, however, from external affairs in the fuller sense 
• 
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of the word, there is a complete distincti~n between the 
Dominion and the Com·monwealth in the relation of the 
local governments to the I,mperial Government. The pro-
vinces of Canada are so subordinated in this regard. to the 
Government of the Dominion that they are not at liberty 
to address correspondence to the Imperial · Government on 
any topic, and the ])ominion Government .uses its discre-
tion as to whether it will forward any correspondence it is 
asked to send on, and that discretion is often in the negative, 
even if the matter is one on which the province is very 
anxious to enlighten the Imperial Government, though it is 
perhaps fair to say that the failures to forward papers may 
be in some cases merely due to the propensity of all Canadians 
and provincial governments to lose all their papers. On 
the other hand, the Governors of the States correspond 
directly with ·the - Imperial Government on all matters 
falling within the sphere of the States authority and often 
on matters outside that sphere, though in such cases they 
are required to send copies of their correspondence to the 
Governor-General for his information, and if the correspon-
dence is public for communication if necessary to ministers. 
The Secretary of State, on his part, replies direct to all 
communications from the States unless they deal with 
federal matters, in which case he would normally reply 
through the Commonwealth; but in some cases, as we have 
seen, and notably in the case of consular correspondence, 
he does not adopt this plan, since it lies in the power of the 
States to refuse to act if he overlooks what they deem their 
rights in this matter, and he has no legal authority to 
support his view. The result of the quasi-independer.t 
position of the Governors regarding the Commonwealth 
and the Governor-General is inevitably to create friction 
between the Governors and the Governor-General. This is 
especially the case with the Governor of Victoria, who by 
residing in the town in which de facto the Governor-General 
has his abode p_ending the building of the federal capital 
at Canberra, vies with the Governor-General and cannot 
but . be felt by the latter to diminish in some degree the 
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prestige of his position as the representative of the Crown. 
It would be contrary to human nature if the two viceregal 
personages were to be naturally on really good terms, and 
that they are so can hardly be asserted, though the degree 
of obvious lack of cordiality varies considerably with the 
personality of the men concerned. Of late years it is 
certain that in Victoria, since the appointment of Sir T. 
Gibson Carmichael to be Governor of the State, a real effort 
has been made by the Governor to ease the position, but 
it is inevitable that there should be difficulty, and the 
transfer of the Governor-General's residence to Canberra 
should be a fortunate period for the Governor of Victoria. 
On the other hand, it is doubtful if the Governor-General 
will really like banishment from the sea and Melbourne to 
the obscurity of a bush town. 
The extent to which friction in these matters can be 
carried is revealed in a very curious manner by the famous 
dispute over the position of Government House, New 
South Wales, which was a cause celebre, and on which the-
amount of learning spent was prodigious. The old Govern-
ment House of New South Wales, a very fine building, was 
at the time of federation placed at the disposal of the 
Commonwealth Government rent free by the State of 
New South Wales, because it desired that the Governor-
General, whose residence was during the session of Parlia-
ment to be at Melbourne, the seat of Parliament under 
the Constitution pending the building of a federal capital, 
should make Sydney his head~quarters in the recess. This 
arrangeme11t "\vas renewed in 1906 for a further period of 
five years~ and when the agreement 'vas about to expire, 
the Commonwealth Government suggested that it be 
renewed for one year. The Nevv So11th Wales Government, 
which was not on good terms with the Commonwealth 
Government, thought that, if the agreement were extended, 
which it did not wish to a.gree to, but might do as a matter 
of courtesy to the Governor-General, it should receive rent 
for the house. But the Commonwealth discovered that it 
would be unconstitutional to pay rent, since while it had 
430 IMPERIAL UNITY AND THE DOMINIONS 
an obligation to provide a residence for the Governor-
General during the session of Parliament, and to provide 
him with temporary accommodation in the various other 
States than Victoria during the recess, it had not any 
right to pay a State a rent for a Government House. The 
argument was a silly one, but the Commonwealth was as 
angry with New South Wales as the State with the Common-
.. 
wealth and the Governor-General had to · suffer. On October 7, 
• 
1912, accordingly the last visit of Lord Denman took place, 
and the State Government then took charge of the house 
and began to turn the stables into a conservatoriurn of 
music, a proceeding which produced a good deal of amuse-
ment. The loyal citizens of Sydney, however, losing all 
sense of humour, after attacking the Govern.ment in vain 
in the Legislature, where its action was upheld by thirty-
three votes to twenty-nine in the Lower House, brought 
an action against the Government for the purpose of obtain-
ing an injunction against their using the house for any 
purpose other than a residence for the King's representative. 
The action was unique, for it was brought by the Attorney-
General, on behalf of the members of the public concerned, 
against the King, and thus the Crown in effect sued the 
Crown; but the court decided that this was a very legitimate 
form of procedure, and pointed out that in the Common-
wealth the Commonwealth and the States were constantly 
able _ to sue one another, a fact which was obviously not 
very much to the point. But the court found that the 
case of the Attorney-General was made out and that the 
Government House was vested in the King, dedicated to 
the purpose of serving as a residence for the Governor or 
representative of the Sovereign in New South Wales, and 
that the concurrence of the Imperial Government must be 
required before there could be any change in the position of 
the house, and that, as there was no hint that the Governor 
had ever approved the action, the matter having been 
dealt with by ministerial action alone, there was no possi-
bility of the approval of the Imperial Government to the 
change ever having been given. The court therefore 
,\ 
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granted an injunction against the proposed transmutation 
of the stables to purposes of music. The Government of 
New South Wales thereupon proceeded to appeal to the 
High Court of the Commonwealth, where the case was 
elaborately considered, and the decision of the court below 
reversed in 1913 on the reasonable ground that that court 
was wrong in holding that the house had remained the 
property of the Crown in its Imperial aspect, li.ke the military 
reserves. On the contrary, the land and house had really 
passed under the terms of the Constitution Act of 1855, 
accompanied by the Act of that year relinquishing hold 
of the land in Australia to the control of the local govern-
ment, and further, even if this were in doubt, by an Order 
in Council, made in order to surrender the reserved military 
lands to the Government of New South Wales in exchange 
for certain work for naval purposes done by New South 
Wales, the whole claims of the Imperial Crown to property 
in New South Wales had been handed over, so that the 
action of the Government of New South Wales had been 
in due order. This decision was upheld on appeal in 1915 
to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, with the 
result that the Government House was left in the posses-
sion of the State Government and available for restitution 
to its rightful occupier, the Governor of the State of New 
South Wales, Sir Gerald Strickland. 
In the case of Canada, on the other hand, the Lieutenant-
Governor of a province is not appointed by the King but 
by the Governor-General of the Dominion, acting with the 
ad·vice of the Privy Council of Canada, and he is liable to 
be removed by the same authority, subject only to the 
rule that the cause must be stated to the Parliament of 
the Dominion. The power is not a dead letter, as the famous 
cases 1 of M. Luc Letellier in Quebec in 1879 and of 
Mr. Mcinnes in British Columbia in 1900 have shown. 
The first case was that · of Lieutenant-Governor of the 
Liberal Party dismissed by a Conservative Government as 
a result of his alleged improper dismissal of a Conservative 
1 Responsible Government, i. 226 seq. 
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Provincial Ministry : the second, of a Liberal by a Liberal 
Ministry, because he had set about to endeavour to turn 
the province into a good Liberal province and had dis-
missed a couple of ministries as a preliminary to this result, 
and had kept another Ministry in office for months without 
a parliamentary majority. But it is not to be imagined 
that the duties of a Lieutenant-Governor are normally 
supposed to be of this energetic type : he is usually 
a gentleman retired from political life, of mature years, 
anxious for a quiet life, and devoted, if to any form of 
activity, to encouraging charities: a good example of the best 
kind . of Lieutenant-Governor is given by the history of the 
· latter years of the life of Sir Oliver Mowat, when in retirement 
from the issues of his earlier years he governed Ontario to the 
satisfaction of every party and faction in the province.1 
While the actual amount of control over the Executive 
Gover11ments of the provinces exercised by the Govern-
ments of Canada through the Lieutenant-G-overnor cannot 
be said to be extensive, save iQ ~o· far as all direct com-
munication with the Imperial Government is cut off, the 
control of the legisla~iori of the province by the Dominion 
Government is effective and direct, whereas in the case of 
the Commonwealth the Central Government has no control 
whatever over the legislation of the States, which may 
legislate on any topic they please, subject only to the 
royal veto and the control of the courts. The Dominion 
Government can disallovv any provincial Act within a year 
after its receipt by the Governor-General from the Lieutenant-
Governor, and this power has been exercised on very many 
occasions. In the early years of responsible government 
it is not too much to say that it was deliberately used as 
means for er1forcing the interpretation of tl1e Dominion 
Constitution 'vhich appealed to Sir J. Macdonald, and this 
was a very restrictive one. In later years this degree of 
control has been relaxed. For this there are several reasons : 
in the first place many of the imaginary limitations of the 
power of legislation laid down by the early opinions of 
1 See Biggar's Life of Sir Oliver Mowat. 
CANADA, COMMONWEALTH, AND UNION 433 
Canadian Ministers of Justice, with whom lies in the first 
place the duty of reporting on the propriety of leaving 
provincial laws in operation, have disappeared under the 
efforts of the courts to interpret the co11stitution and to 
make clear the powers of the provinces. In the second 
place, the growth of the provinces has increased the sobriety 
of their legislation on the one hand and on the other ren-
dered the Dominion Gov~ernment chary of raising serious 
points of contro·versy with them. In the third place, the 
Dominion Government has gradually con1e to feel that it 
is not well for it to sit in moral censure 011 the acts of pro-
vincial governments, but that it should leave the operation 
of the laws passed by the provinces to be dealt with by 
the courts. This view 'vas laid down by the Liberal Govern-
ment in the year 1909, in the Cobalt Lake case, where it 
was contended that the Government of Ontario had inter-
vened by legislation to deprive certain persons of the right 
which they enjoyed to establish certain claims to mining 
areas. The case on the facts adduced seemed to be a bad 
one of governn1ental action to prevent the men in question 
profiting by their diligence, but the .Minister of Justice 
considered that the law, being constitutional, should not be 
interfered with by the Dominion Government. In 1911 
the Conservative Government was invited to disallow an 
Act passed by the Alberta Legislature, c. 9 of 1910. This 
measure confiscated the moneys at the Royal]?ank, which 
had been provided by certain investors in England on the 
strengtl1 of a scheme for the building of a railway by the 
Alberta and Great Waterways Railway Company, under 
which the bonds issued by the railway company in return 
for the money invested were guaranteed by the Government, 
and the money was to be paid out as the building of the 
railway progressed. The legislature mitigated in some 
degree the effect of the Act by passing another Act (c. 11) 
in which it "\vas provided that any person holding himself 
to have suffered injury by the passing of c. 9 might within 
six months file a claim, which was to be reported on to the 
next session of the Legislature by the Lieutenant-Governor 
1874 E e 
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in Council, but it did not ad1nit the validity of any such 
claim. On the other hand, the guarantee of the bonds 
was repeated in the Act, c. 9. The reasons alleged for 
disallowance were partly constitutional, on the ground that 
the Act interfered with the law of banking, and that it 
affected to deal with rights not i11side the province, and 
partly moral, that confiscatory acts \Vere undesirable. 
T.he Government after examining the case in detail decided 
that, "\vhile they would not absolutely rule out the possi-
bility of the disallowance of a provincial Act or1 the ground 
that it was unjust, they could not hold that the Act in 
question was so obviously unfair as to render disallowance 
necessary, especially as the Act, c. 11, seemed to indicate 
a desire on the part of the legislature to do _ justice, and 
the Premier had stated in the legislature, with the assent 
of both political parties, that the Government would do 
what was fair. Any question of constitutionality could 
best be dealt with by the courts, which in point of fact 
decided that the Act was invalid.1 
'I,he most characteristic cases of recent control of legisla-
tion are the series of disallowances of Acts of British 
Columbia aimed at the exclusion of Asiatics, especially 
Japanese, from the province, and their restriction in 
regard to kinds of employment when they were there. 
The position of the Dominion Government has always 
been in this regard strictly imperial: they have consistently 
disallowed such Acts, and have sought to find means of 
limiting migration by virtue of their own power. The 
courts have also helped them by declaring that the legisla-
tion of the Dominion, passed in virtue of the power to 
regulate treaty matters and imn1igration, overrides sin1ilar 
legislation on the part of the province, in so far as it con-
flicts with the Dominion legislation.2 Of late tl1e British 
Columbia Government, as a result of the advent of the 
Co11servative administration in the Dominion, have ceased 
J 1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 6091, pp. 66, 67. The Provincial legislation later on in 
1913 repealed their legislation; Canadian Annual Review, pp. 645-50. 
2 In re N a kane and Okazake, 13 B.C. 370. 
' 
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passing the objectionable Acts in such numbers. The use 
also of the intimation of disallowance in the case of the 
Saskatche,van Act, regarding the employment of women 
by orientals in 1912, secured the due amendment. of that 
Act by confining its effect to Chinan1en. On the other 
hand the Dominion have not felt obliged to prevent the 
exclusion of naturalized Asiatics from the provincial fran-
chise, a power recognized as constitutional by the Privy 
Council, in the case of Oun~ningha1n v. Tomey Homrna,1 
in which it was held that the power to legislate as to aliens, 
given to the Don1inion exclusively by s. 91 (25) of the 
British North America Act, 1867, did not mean that no 
nower to legislate was to be possessed by the provincial 
_&... 
legislatures which differentiated against aliens or naturalized 
people, the power of the Dominion being apparently the 
povver to confer the status of naturalization and to deal 
in some especial way with aliens, as in the Acts regarding 
alien immigration. The- decision being later than must 
leave doubtful the mear1i11g of an earlier decision in Unior;~ 
Colliery Co. v. Bryden,2 in which it was laid do,vn that it 
was not within the power of the legislature to exclude 
Chinese from any employment about mines, as the legisla-
tion w·as aimed at preventing them earning their living 
and therefore residing in the province, and was not a real 
exercise of mining legislation at all. The other matter in 
which the power of disallowance has been exercised "\vithin 
recent years is in ar1 effort to con1pel provincial companies 
to restrict within closer limits the powers given to these 
companies. The provinces, in exercise of the right claimed 
by them to incorporate companies with po,ver to carry on 
business outside the provinces, incorporate companies with 
objects covering business in all Canada, and in the last 
years of the Liberal adn1inistration the Minister for Justice 
carried on a disallowance crusade in support of his vie,vs 
as to the powers of the provincial legislatures in this regard.3 
1 [1903] A.C. 151. 2 [1899] A.C. 580. 
3 e. g. Order in Council of May 31, 1911, disallowing Quebec Act, c. 82 
of 1910, an Act to amend the Charter of the General Trust. 
Ee2 
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The action taken was not intended to be in any way pro-
vocative, but it was based on the view that if these companies 
acted ultra vires they might bring loss on their share holders. 
The whole question has since then been referred to the 
Supreme Court of Canada 1 and to the Privy Council, but 
even the Judicial Committee is hardly likely to decide 
all the possible niceties. The truth is that the provinces 
are anxious to extend their powers so as to make no real 
difference between a Don1inion and a provincial company, 
but they have so far been defeated in that the Judicial 
Con1mittee have clecided in 'I'he flohn Deere Plow Go. v. 
Wharton 2 that the powers of a provincial legislature do not 
extend to passing legislation which would in effect deny 
the right of a Dominion company incorporated under the 
trade and commerce po·wer, s. 91 (2) of the British North 
America Act, to carry on business within the province, 
without submitting to registration Under a scheme framed 
to make a Don1inion company ill effect a provincial com-
pan y in all rna tters. 
The 'visdom of tl1e attitude of tl1e ·Dominion Government 
in restricting in the closest possible way the power to 
disallow- 3 has led it away from n1any difficulties and dangers, 
and it is doubtful if the power of disallowance has ever 
been of Very great value save as an extreme remedy against 
the action of British Colurr1bia. In the case of the States 
of Australia the disallowance of any Act by the Imperial 
Government on . the request of the Commonwealth, o:f 
proprio motu, because it was unconstitutional, has never 
been attempted: it is clear, as was long ago pointed out by 
the Chief Justice of the Commonwealth,4 when it was sug-
gested that this would be a suitable mode of preventing 
1 48 S.C.R. 331. Cf. the Privy Council decisions in Bonanza Creek 
Gold Mining Co. v. The King, and Attorney-General for Canada v. 
Attorney-General for Alberta, Times, Feb. 25, 1916. 
2 [1915] A.C. 330. 
a An Ontario Act of 1911 regarding chartered accountants, disallowed 
because of its ignoring the position of British chartered accountants as 
entitled to use that designation in Ontario, was re-enacted in 1912 in the 
same form. 4 4 C.L.R. 1087, at 1126. 
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differences rising between the States and the Commonwealth, 
that the proposal would impose unbearable burdens on 
those who sought to decide what was and what was not 
constitutional, and that it would be most objectionable if 
these problems were not left to the decision of the courts 
in due course. The only way, therefore, of restraining the 
legislation of the States is by means of the judgements 
of the courts of the Commonwealth, or rather since the 
legislation of 1907 by the High Court, since that court 
alone has full federal jurisdiction in cases involving the 
consideration of the powers of the Commonwealth and the 
states inter se. 
The action of the courts, however, while negatively 
doubtless of value, is as a positive factor singularly un-
important. Nothing can better illustrate this fact than the 
famous dispute which raged for years between British 
Columbia and the Government of the Dominion of Canada 
regarding the building of the transcontinental railway. 
The terms of union laid it down that the railway was to 
be built, but the question of carrying out the terms was 
one which could not effectively be brought before any 
court, and for years the indignation in the west was very 
high : Lord Carnarvon's interventions arranged a set of 
terms as a compromise, which after a good deal of difficulty 
and delay were at last carried into effect by the Conservative 
Ministry largely owing to the initiative of Sir Charles 
Tupper.1 There have been many disputes between the 
provinces and the Government at Ottawa since that date, 
but many of them, such as the demand of Alberta, Sas-
katch~wan, and Manitoba for the control of their public 
lands, which in the main are reserved under the direct 
administration of the Dominion as being responsible for 
immigration, are of minor importance, and have not led 
to serious difficulty. More importance no dot1bt attaches 
to the disputes with British Columbia on her Japanese 
immigration restriction policy, and the G<?vernment found 
it necessary to appoint a commission in 1902 to examine 
1 Recollections of Sixty Years, pp. 134 seq. 
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that question in full detail, and to seek to find some solution 
for the problem. The most famous of the later difficulties 
between province and Dominion was that arising out of 
the religious teaching in the schools of Manitoba. The 
difficulty arose out of s. 93 of the British North Amer·ica 
Act, as applied to the province by the Canadian Act estab-
lishing the province.- The education system of the province 
which had at one time made a certain provision for Roman 
Catholic teaching, by allowing each denomination to do its 
own teaching, was altered into a defined system with 
rates, and the Catholic minority complained that they had 
to pay rates which were not applied for the maintenance 
of Catholic teaching, the Government having decided not to 
have any specific denominational teaching in the schools. 
It was decided by the Privy Council 1 that the Manitoba 
legislation did not prejudicially affect any right or privilege 
existing at the time of union, as at that time the only right 
or privilege enjoyed was that of paying for their own 
schools, but the satisfaction of Manitoba was later removed 
by the same body holding that the legislation of 1890 on 
which the difficulty arose did affect the position of the 
Roman Catholics in the province, and that under the third 
subsection of s. 93, the Governor-General in Council had 
a right to decide in what manner the local legislation should 
be modified to meet the situation.2 The local legislature 
was not, of course, in the slightest degree prepared to yield 
and the Conservative Government, to its undoing, failed 
in the session of 1895 to deal with the matter. In 1896, as 
the Parliament was due to expire by efflux of time, the 
Opposition prevented the legislation to remedy the state 
of affairs in Manitoba, as authorized by the British North 
America Act, which the Government brought forward, from 
being passed, and the result was that the Goverr1ment had 
to go to the country without having passed the legislation 
requisite. This fact was used by the Liberal Opposition to 
take away the confidence of Quebec, and on the other hand 
1 City of Winnipeg v. Barrett, [1892] A.C. 445. 
2 Brophy v. Attorney-General for Manitoba, [1895] A. C. 202. 
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there were many who objected to the coercion of a province 
in favour of Roman Catholics, and thus Ontario felt dis-
trust in the Government which not unnaturally fell from 
office, because on the one hand they had tr~ed to coerce 
a province to give too good terms to Catholics, and because 
on the other they had failed to relieve the needs of good 
Catholics. The new Government managed to bring about 
a compromise, but its permanency is again threatened. 
Somewhat parallel to these cases of the ineffectiveness of 
legal judgements of the courts for enforcing obligations in 
a positive sense is the case of the action of the Government 
of the Com1nonwealth of Australia in the great strike at 
Brisbane in the beginning of 1912.1 The origin of the strike 
was a dispute between the manager of the Brisbane tramway 
and the employees as to the right of members of trade unions 
to wear a trade union badge. The result was a strike, but, 
as non-unionists came in considerable numbers to replace 
the unioni~ts, they called on the Trades Council to bring out 
other unionists in a sympathetic strike: this was done, forty-
three unions being brought out, despite the fact that they had 
no dispute with their employers, while many were working 
on industrial agreements approved by Wages Boards and 
legally binding on masters and men alike. The men stopped 
all traffic in Brisbane for tv1o days. As it seemed impossible 
to keep order with the small force of police available, the 
Government of the Commonwealth was asked under s. 119 
of the Constitution to send military aid to protect the State 
against domestic violence. It was replied by the Common-
wealth Government that the state of matters in Brisbane 
did not render such assistance necessary. The help was 
therefore not sent, and the State had, in the absence of any 
military force, to put down the rioting with civilian special 
constables. The State argued that the Constitution clearly 
placed an absolute duty upon the Commonwealth Govern- . 
ment, and that the States would never have agreed to give 
up their militia on federation had not the right to the use 
of the Commonwealth forces been assured to them.. It was 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 6091, p. 71. 
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proposed during the federal conventions to restrict the right, 
but the proposed restrictions had been negatived. The real 
reason, of course, for the attitude of the Commonwealth 
Government was political : in the first place, the then Prime 
Minister, Mr. Fisher, who was a Queenslander, was a Labour 
member, and he showed his practical sympathy with the 
strikers in his usual indiscreet fashion by subscribing towards 
their distress funds. In the second place, the Labour Party 
had just learned from the Conference of the Labour Party 
at Hobart that the use of the armed forces of the Crown 
against strikers would be gravely condemned, and they were 
compelled therefore to violate the Constitution rather than 
offend the Labour Party, which had gone so far as to demand 
that the use of the forces against strikers should be made 
illegal, a step which the Government did not take, presum-
ably because it would have been flying too openly in the face 
of the Constitution. The State Government talked of bring-
ing an action against the Commonwealth Government for 
breach of their duty under the Constitution, but unhappily 
for the student of the Constitution nothing came of the pro-
posal. The case was a bad ~ne; public opinion in Australia 
refused to approve the strike: the Labour Party indeed were 
severely defeated at the general election which was then 
sprung on the State by the Government, and for three years 
was out of any possibility of gaining power.1 
A good deal of disappointment was also for a long period 
expressed in Western Australia at the delay which ensued 
after federation in carrying out the agreement to make the 
transcontinental railway, on the faith of which Western 
Australia consented to enter the federation. Here again, 
as in the case of British Columbia, it was found impossible 
to bring the matter in any shape before the courts, and, 
fortunately for the Commonwealth, the visit to it of Lord 
Kitchener resulted in the realization that on military grounds 
the long delayed railway must be built, though all the Con-
ferences which have taken place since 1911 have still left 
1 In the general election of 1915 they defeated the Government and came 
into power. 
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the Government unable to decide the exact mode of convert-
ing the railway gauges of the Commonwealth to the one 
gauge which military considerations render absolutely 
imperative. 
From the negative point of view the courts are, of course, 
extremely powerful. But in the case of Canada and the 
Commonwealth there is the fundamental distinction that 
the constitution_ of Canada has been interpreted by the Privy 
Council, that of the Commonwealth almost entirely by the 
High Court under the provisions in the constitution under 
which the appeal to the Judicial Committee is made depen-
dent on the consent of the High Court, a body which early 
in its history laid it down 1 that it was its duty not to allow 
appeals to go outside the Commonwealth. The principles of 
interpretation of the Constitution have therefore differed 
fundamentally. In all probability the application of the 
different principles has had far more effect than the formal 
differences in the distribution of legislative power in the two 
cases. In that of Canada reaction from the error in the 
United States which led to the war of secession resulted in 
the assignment to the Dominion of all residuary power, and 
to the grant to the provinces of only specified powers, but the 
effect of this rule is considerably modified by the wide 
character of the provincial authority in its defined powers. 
In the case of the Commonwealth the powers of the States 
in certain matters were definitely taken away, and in most 
matters left unchanged, but in many matters the Common-
wealth was given paramount power of legislation. The 
necessity of conflict was fully recognized by the time wl1en 
the Commonwealth was created : in. the case of Canada it 
was assumed ·that the divisions were exclusive save in the 
specific subject~ of immigration and agriculture, where the 
two jurisdictio11s might clash, in which case the federal law 
was to prevail. 
In the case of Ca11ada the general powers of the Parlia-
ment have been lit-tle resorted to, and the enun1eration of 
pow,.ers ins. 91 of the British North America ... 4ct, though it is 
1 Deakin v. Webb, 1 C.L.R. 585; Flint v. TV ebb, 4 C.L.R. 1178. 
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expressly said not to be intended to restrict the generality 
of the Dominion power to legislate for the peace, order, and 
good government of Canada, in large measure covers the 
field of its actual legislative activity, just as the enumerated 
topics of the Commonwealth power cover the whole field of 
its activity. The powers in the case of Canada include the 
necessary powers of a civil government, namely the co11trol 
of the property of the Dominj.on, the raising of taxation, 
the borrowing of money, the control of the public debt, and 
the provision of a civil service. The questions of Military 
and Naval defence are entrusted to the Federation, as are 
the postal department and the census and statistics. In 
regard to trade, besides a general authority to regulate trade 
and commerce, the Federation is entrusted with the regu-
lation of weights and measures_, currency and coinage, and 
paper money, banking, including savings banks, bills of 
exchange and promissory 11otes, interest, legal tender, 
bankruptc~y and insolvency, an.d industrial property in the 
shape of patents of invention a11d discovery and copyr~ght. 
Commur1icatio11S are placed under its control in the shape of 
ferries or lines of steamers from a11y province to a country 
abroad, railways, canals, telegraphs, &c., serving as mear1s 
of commu11ication between one province and another, and 
any other public works which are declared before or after 
their production, even if entirely within a province, to be for 
the general advantage of Canada, or of t1vo or more provinces, 
by Parliament. Navigation and shipping, beacons, buoys, 
lightships and lighthouses, quarantine and marine hospitals, 
and sea-coast and inland fisheries are also assigned to the 
Federation. The crimir1allaw with criminal procedure, and 
the provision of penitentiaries, and in civil law, marriage and 
divorce, together with aliens and naturalization, complete 
the record of exclusive powers.1 It has also paramount 
powers as to immigration and agriculture.2 
On the other hand,3 the provinces have exclusive co11trol 
of all matters of merely local or private nature in the pro-
vince, and of property and civil rights in the province, of 
1 30 and 31 Viet. c. 3, s. 91. 2 Ibid., s. 95. 3 Ibid., s. 92. 
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local works and undertakings where not · assigned to the 
Dominion by reason of their affecting the whole of Canada 
or two provinces, and of municipal institutions. It has also 
the full power to provide for the administration of justice, 
including the establishment of both civil and criminal courts, 
and civil procedure : it can provide prisons and reforma-
tories, and impose fine or imprisonment for breaches of its 
laws. Like the Dominion, a province can manage its pro-
perty,! raise taxation, which can, however, only be direct or 
take the form of shop, saloon, tavern, auctioneer or other 
licences for the purpose of raising a revenue for provincial, 
local or municipal purposes, borrow money and provide for 
a civil service. Moreover, three odd powers are give~, the 
control of the solemnization of marriage, the incorpora-
tion of companies with provincial objects, and the establish-
ment of hospitals and other institutions other than marine 
hospitals. 
In one matter the provinces have more power than the 
Dominion for they are, unlike the Dominion, essentially 
constituent bodies, free to alter everything in their con-
stitution save the office of Lieutenant-Governor, and this 
the Dominion Parliament seems unable to touch, though the 
point is not free fro:m obscurity.2 In the case of education 
the power of the ,Dominion to legislate is merely remedial, 
and it has never been exercised: in immigration and agri-
culture both legislatures have the power to legislate, but the 
Dominion Acts prevail. The meaning is clearly that the 
provinces can pass laws as they have passed laws to facilitate 
bringing in settler.s on special terms, and to promote agri-
culture, and similar Acts of the Dominion are in force ; 
usually they do not clash : if they do, the Dominion Act 
prevails. 
In the case of the Commonwealth,3 the enumerated powers 
1 The act divides property between the Dominion and the provinces. 
2 This seems to follow from 30 and 31 Viet. c. 3, s. 91 (29), the right to deal 
with this office, but this would conflict with the general inability of the 
Dominion to change its constitution. 
3 63 and 64 Viet. c. 12, Const. s. 51. 
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are in great measure the same as those exercised by the 
Dominion : thus naval and military defence, the postal 
department, and census and statistics, are assigned to th~ 
Commonwealth. Foreign and inter-state trade and com-
merce are also accorded, and generally currency, coinage, 
legal tender, banl{ing, other than state banl{ing, so far as it is 
intra-state, bills of exchange and pro!llissory notes, bank-
ruptcy and insolvency, patents and trade marks, and copy-
right. Insurance other than intra-state state insurance is 
added, but this is one of the recognized exercises of the general 
authority of the Canadian Parliament. The Commonwealth 
can tax, but must not discriminate between states or parts 
thereof, and grant bounties on production or export which 
must be uniform : it can borrow money. Its powers extend 
to navigation, lighthouses, lightships, beacons and buoys, 
and to quarantine, but it has only power over fisheries in 
Australian waters beyond territorial limits, an extra-
territorial power of legislation, not granted to Canada. 
Astronomical and meteorological observations are assigned 
to the Commonwealth and exercised by Canada. It also 
controls naturalization and ~liens, marriage and divorce, and 
the people of any race not aboriginal in a State for which 
special legislation is deemed desirable. Immigration and 
emigration and the influx of criminals are powers also 
exercised by Canada. The ·powers as to external affairs and 
relations of Australia with the islands of the Pacific corre-
spond only vaguely to the treaty execution power of Canada.1 
· Two powers which have been the subjects of much doubt 
are the control of foreign corporations and trading and 
financial corporations, formed within the limits of the 
Commonwealth, and co11ciliation and arbitration for the 
prevention and settlement of in.dustrial disputes extending 
beyond the limits of one State. Other powers are those for 
the recognition of civil and crimi11al process issued by the 
States throughout the Comn1onwealth, and the recognition 
of the Ia,vs, public acts and judicial proceedings of the 
States. The Common,vealth _may, with the co11sent of 
1 30 and 31 Viet. c. 3, s. 132. 
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a State, acquire a railway i11 it or build and extend such 
rail":ays, as it has do11e in the case of the railway between 
South and V\Testern Australia. It has, moreover, the right 
to control transport on any railway for naval and military-
purposes. It has further the odd power of dealing with old 
age and invalid pensions, given to it for financial reasons, 
and it may legislate on any subject if power is delegated by 
the State Parliaments. . 
These powers are none of them expressed to be exclusive. 
But the Parliament is given elsewhere 1 exclusive powers in 
regard to the transferred departments, namely customs and 
excise, and such of the following, postal, military and naval, 
lighthouses, &c., and quarantine as might be taken over by 
the Commonvvealth, the seat of government, and the amend-
ment of the Common,vealth Constitutio11, with the assent 
of the people. 
In the case of the States, the powers possessed by them on 
r 
federation remained vested in them,2 subject to the loss of 
power to legislate on the n1atters affecting the transferred 
departments, and to certain other regulations. Thus they 
are forbidden to maintain naval or military forces except 
with the consent of the Parliament of the Commonwealth, 
or to tax Comm.onwealth property, while the Common,vealth 
may not tax State property.3 They may not coin n1oney or 
make anythi11g but gold legal tender : 4 they can impose 
inspection taxes, the proceeds to be paid to the Colnmon.-
'vealth on i1nports and exports, but these taxes may be 
annulled by the Commonwealth Parliament if it so desires. 5 
The powers of the State are also limited in various ways, as 
by the requireme11t that, after the coming into existence of 
the Commonwealtl1, a citizen resident in any one State of the 
Commonwealth shall not be subject to any disabilities on 
another State, which would not be equally applicable to him 
if he were reside11t in that State,6 -and that there must be 
freedom of inter-state commerce.7 Moreover, a state must 
1 63 and 64 Viet. c. 12, Const. s. 52. 2 Ibid., ss. 106, 107. 
3 Ibid., s. 114. 4 Ibid., s. 115. 5 Ibid., s. 112. 
6 Ibid., s. 117. 7 Ibid., s. 92. 
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make provision to receive in its prisons persons who are 
accused or convicted of offe11ces against the laws of the 
Commonwealth, and the Commonwealth is empowered to 
make laws on this question.1 The Commonwealth,-on the 
other hand, may not legislate as to religion, or give prefer-
ence to any State or part thereof, or obstruct the right of 
a State to use rivers for irrigation or conservation.1 
In the interpretation of the two Constitutions the essential 
difference of treatment has been based on the fact that the 
Privy Council have-treated the Constitution of the Dominion 
as an ordinary Imperial Act, subject to the normal rules of 
construction, and therefore intended to be given the fullest 
effect in each clause that is contained in the Act. If such 
an interpretation should result in producing inadmissible 
results the Committee has felt that the error can be altered 
by Parliament, but in point of fact the interpretation which 
they have adopted has not yet led to the appearance of any 
insoluble anomaly. On the other hand, the High Court of 
the Commonwealth has treated the Constitution as a docu-
ment which cannot be altered save by the very cumbrous 
process of the referendum, and they have applied to it the 
principles which have been adopted in the interpretation of 
the Constitution of the United States. It must, indeed, 
be admitted, that this mode of interpretation no doubt ex-
presses well enough the interpretation which the founders 
of federation desired to place on their Constitution, for they 
were admirers of the Constitution of the United States, and 
lived too remote from the civil war and from the experience 
of the actual working of the Constitution of the States to 
realize its grave imperfections. Moreover, they probably 
ignored the fact that the Constitution could be easily 
amended if it were really desired by any real majority of the 
people to amend it, and that the process in the United States 
is far more difficult, not merely by reason of the inevitable 
complication resulting from the large number of states, but 
still more from the high majority of states required for 
a constitutional amendment. Nor in the case of a Constitu-
1 63 and 64 Viet. c. 12, Const. s. 120. 2 Ibid., ss. 116, 99, and 100. 
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tion conferred by Act of Parliament can the possibility of an 
amendment by the same power be ignored, though the 
Cornmonwealth High Court doubtless holds the view that 
further Imperial interference with the Constitution must 
not be invoked.1 
The fundamental difference of the results which can be 
arrived at from the adoption of these two points of view can 
be seen from the case of the taxation by the local Govern-
ments and Parliaments of the salaries of federal officers. 
In the view of the Judicial Committee the matter was simple 
enough: it was merely necessary to look at the express 
words of the Commonwealth Constitution. There was an 
express declaration that the powers of the States remained 
inherent in them unless they were expressly given to the 
Commonwealth : the power to tax remained unaltered, and 
it must extend to the taxation of the salary of Common-
wealth officials.2 But the High Court tool{ precisely the 
opposite view. In the early days of the history of the United 
States, when the feeling between the States and the Central 
Government ran high, the question was raised whether the 
State of Maryland 3 was entitled to levy a tax on the salary 
of a federal officer. Now in these times there was no doubt 
the obvious possibility that, in order to annoy the Federation 
and intimidate its officers, the State might tax the salaries 
of the latter so highly that the officers would be hampered 
in the execution of their duties. There being no obvious way 
of restraining the activities of the States in this regard save 
by a Judicial decision, the Supreme Court of the United 
States produced the doctrine of the immunity of instru-
mentalities, which asserts that the instruments necessary for 
the carrying out of the functions of federation may not be 
subjected to control by the local Governments: or more 
simply, that a State cannot tax the salary of a Federal 
1 Mr. Hughes suggested recourse to the Imperial Parliament in 1914 to 
recall the late Parliament of the Commonwealth; Round Table, 1914-15, 
p. 211. 
2 Webb v. OuUrim, [1907] A.C. 81. 
3 McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316. 
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officer, for instance, by making him give a stamped receipt 
for his income,1 or charging him income tax along with other 
citizens.2 Nor would the High Court yield in its view of the 
law, even to the opinion of the Privy Council, while the 
Government, in order to support the Court, rescinded by 
legislation the prohibition on taxation of official salaries, but 
by another Act removed from the Privy Council the chance 
of deciding on any of these questions between the States and 
the Commonwealth, save by the permission of the High 
Court. There was an obvious flaw in the action of the 
Government and Parliament, .but one denied by the High 
Court : 3 if the result of the immunity of i~strumentalities 
were part of the constitution, it could not be removed, it 
must follow, by legislation by the Commonwealth Parlia-
ment. To complete the story, it must be added that the 
Supreme Court of Canada,4 when the question which had 
formerly been decided in Canada in the same sense as in 
Australia, under the influence of the decisions of the Supreme 
Court of the United States, came before it, followed the 
reasoning of the Judicial Committee in the Commonwealth 
case, and declared the taxation to be perfectly legal. 
Some of the problems which the Judicial Committee have 
had to face in the case of the Dominion, could hardly arise 
in the Commo11wealth : thus the long contested point in the 
Dominion as to whether the Lieutenant-Governors of the 
Provinces could in any way be said to represent the Crown, 
which was definitely settled in the case of Liquidators of the 
Maritime Bank of C1anada v. Receiver-General of N f:!W Bruns-
wick 5 in favour of their being such representatives for pro-
vincial purposes, so that the Crown right of priority of 
payment over other creditors enured to the Provincial 
Government, could not arise in the Commonwealth, where the 
States clearly remain directly connected with the Crown 
and not, as in Canada, shut off from immediate access to it. 
1 D' Emden v. Pedder, 1 C.L.R. 91. 
2 Deakin v. Webb, 1 C.L.R. 585 . . 
3 Chaplin v. Commissioner of Taxes for South Australia, 12 C.L.R. 375. 
4 Abbott v. City of St. John, 40 S.C.R. 597. 5 [1892] A.C. 437. 
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The presence of the words exclusive in the powers enume-
rated in the British North America Act, ss. 91 and 92, as 
belonging to .the Federation and to the provinces respec-
tively, furnished the chief basis for the argument disposed of 
in Smiles v. Belford,! that the Parliament of the United 
Kingdom had purported to divest itself of any legislative 
power in Canada, and had authorized therefore the Parlia-
ment of the Dominion to repeal Imperial Acts applying to 
Canada, to which Canadian legislation would otherwise be 
repugnant : the vague power given to the Commonwealth 
Parliament, to exercise with the consent of the State Parlia-
ments any power which, prior to Federation, could only be 
exercised by the Imperial Parliament or the Federal Cou11cil 
of Australasia, remains uninterpreted by the High Court. 
The maxim that any of the legislatures of the Federations 
can delegate powers, as they are not subject to the rule dele-
gatus non potest delegare, established in the case of Hodge 
v. The Quee1~,2 is definitely accepted by the Commonwealth 
for its Parliament.3 
But in other matters the Privy Council has followed a 
different path from the High Court. It has acted on the 
principle of reconciliation of the conflicting provisions of the 
constitution, by endeavouring to give them all a reasonable 
sense, and to allow the fullest measure of validity to the Acts 
of both the central and the local legislatures, overriding the 
local legislatures or the central legislature only when it is 
impossible to avoid doing so. On the other hand, the High 
Court has, on the American model, developed the doctrine 
that many of the powers apparently assigned to the Common-
wealth are only to be exercised in such a way that they shall 
not encroach upon the reserved powers of the States, and 
everything is reserved which is not expressly given to the 
Commonwealth, or which is not definitely ancillary to the 
execution of the powers of the Commonwealth. In some 
degree the distinction may be held to be based on the fact 
that the residual power of legislation, in the case of the 
1 23 Gr. 590; 1 O.A.R. 436. 2 9 App . . Cas. 117. 
a Baxter v. Ah Way, 8 C.L.R. 626. 
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Commonwealth, belongs to the States, but it is doubtful if 
this affords by any means an adequate explanation of the 
distinction of treatment. 
Thus the Privy Council have laid down that in respect of 
its power of dealing with such subject as bankruptcy, copy-
right, and patents the Federation may deal with matters of 
property and civil rights in the provinces, though in one 
sense these are exclusive powers of the provincial legislature. 
Thus the Dominion may regulate the conditions affecting 
warehouse receipts, taken as security by banks, under its 
power to regulate banking,1 though the legislation is incon-
sistent with an Ontario law regarding the form of such 
receipts. The trade and commerce power of the Dominion, 
on the other hand, does not exclude the power of the pro-
vinces to regulate the trading of insurance companies within 
the province, intended to secure the adoption of standard 
forms of policy for fire insurance business. Though the 
Dominion has power to deal with bankruptcy, and in the 
exercise of that power might deal with voluntary assign-
ments for the benefit of creditors, unless and until it has 
done so, it was decided in Attorney-General of Ontario v. 
Attorney-General of Canada,2 it is open for the Ontario Legis-
lature to enact a law on the subject of such assignments as 
a 1natter affecting property and civil rights in the province. 
Both the Dominion and the provinces n1ay seek to regulate 
the liquor trade, the Dominion under its residual power, and 
so far as it is impossible to reconcile the provisions of the 
two sets of legislation the Dominion Act must prevail, but 
not otherwise is the local legislation invalid, as has been 
settled in Russell v. The Queen,3 and Attorney-Generral for 
Ontario v. Attorney-General for the Dominion.4 In the case 
of conflict in the laws of the two powers, then if part of one 
law is valid and part invalid, the valid part can be enforced 
if it is separable from the invalid part, so that its enforcement 
would not make the elimination something quite different 
from what was intended. The Privy Council held in the 
1 Tennant v. Union Bank of Canada, [1894] A.C. 31. 
2 [1894] A.C. 189. 3 7 App. Cas. 829. 4 [1896] A.C. 348. 
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case of the older Dominion Liquor Licence Acts 1 of 1883-4, 
which sought to deal with the liquor trade in a way generally 
beyond the power of the Dominion, that the clauses regard-
ing adulteration of drink might have been upheld had they 
been separable, but that as they stood the whole Act must 
fall to the ground. In its liquor legislation, however, the 
Dominion, as it can act only· under its residual power, is 
restricted to legislation to the peace, order, and good govern-
ment of Canada : thus, while in the case of its specific 
powers, it has been decided in Quirt v. The Queen 2 that the 
Dominion may pass an Act under its power regarding bank-
, 
ruptcy for the winding up of the bank of one province only, 
or otherwise legislate ·for a portion of the Dominion as it 
thinks fit, in the case of the residual power it would be 
difficult as a rule to uphold legislation for one province only, 
unless the circumstances were such as made legislation there 
necessary for peace, order, and good government in a 
special sense. 3 
The doctrine of the immunity of instrumentalities was 
raised on behalf of the Dominion in the case of Bank of 
Toronto v. Lambe, 4 where it was argued that, if the provinces 
were able to impose any taxation which they liked on banks 
incorporated by the Dominion, they could in effect prevent 
the exercise of the Dominion power to incorporate banks. 
The Privy Council overruled this argument, and with it the 
doctrine of the immunity of instrumentalities. So also 
provincial Acts may require brewers and distillers, though 
duly licensed by the Dominion, to take out and pay for 
provincial licences also. What applies to Canada also 
applies in the Privy Council view to the Commonwealth, but 
the High Court has always held the contrary view. 
The Privy Council has also refused to accept the view that 
the Dominion cannot legislate because it interferes with the 
powers of the provinces. Thus it was contended, in the 
1 4 Cartwright, 342, n. 2 19 S.C.R .. 510. 
3 Attorney-General for Ontario v. Attorney-Generalfor the Dominion, [1896] 
A.C. 348. 
4 12 App. Cas. 575. 
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course of the discussions 1 on the legislative authority of the 
Dominions and the provinces in the matter of liquor, that 
the Dominion legislation was invalid as it, though merely 
passed under its residual power, would interfere with the 
power of the province which was exclusive to raise revenue 
by means of taxation in the form of saloon licences. This 
view was rejected by the Privy Council : the power to raise 
money in this way was exclusive, but, unless the Dominion 
attempted to exercise a forbidden power, it was not possible 
to restrict the exercise of its actual powers on the ground 
that the sphere of operations of the provincial legislatures 
would thus be diminished or otherwise adversely affected. 
But the principle affecting the use of the residual power is 
that it ought to be restricted in its operation to matters 
which are Canadian in interest and importance, and that it 
should not deal, except incidentally and unavoidably, as in 
the case of the· liquor questions, with any of the exclusive 
powers given to the provinces, since otherwise the exclusive 
authority of the provinces would disappear. An instance of 
the distinction, which would make a matter Dominion as 
opposed to provincial, is that suggested by the Privy Coun-
cil : the sale of revolvers to young persons in a province 
might well be forbidden by the province : the arms traffic 
as a whole might require for international purposes Dominion 
control. 
A complicated series of questions arising out of the differ-
ence of the authority of the Dominion under its enumerated 
powers and its residual power, and the vagueness of the 
power as to trade and commerce, concerns itself with the 
position of companies. It is clear law that a company for 
Dominion purposes can be incorporated by the Dominion 
Parliament, and that its status as a company cannot be 
denied by the courts of the provinces or affected by the 
legislation of the provinces.2 But its power to act in defiance 
1 Russell v. Reg., 7 App. Cas. 829, at pp. 837-9. 
2 The John Deere Plow Go. v. Wharton, [1915] A. C. 330. If the power to 
incorporate falls under the trade and commerce power it is clear that that 
power does not extend to regulating in all its details the action of a company, 
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of provincial laws depends on whether the powers it has are 
under the enumerated authorities or under the residual 
power, and this involves the decision whether trade and 
commerce covers company legislation, and, if so, to what 
extent it goes. If it did in its whole ambit, then all com-
panies incorporated by Canada would seem to be above all 
provincial law, but it is clear that the Judicial Committee 
do not favour this view of trade and commerce and indeed 
give it no very definite sense, save as certainly including 
commercial regulation for treaty purposes or something 
similar. Hence, while a telephone company 1 authorized by 
the Dominion Government to make telephones cannot be 
hampered by a law of the province that the consent of the 
municipality is necessary before it can exercise its powers of 
erectir)-g telephones in its limits, while the Dominion Par-
liament for the purposes of Dominion railway may dispose 
even of provincial Crown la,nds,2 and a provincial legislature 
cannot give a company an exclusive right to operate in the 
province to the exclusion of a Dominion company,3 in 
matters not inconsistent with the ·Dominion legislation the 
province retains its powers, and can compel the Canadian 
Pacific Railway Co. to clean a ditch alongside the railway 
line,4 but not to fence the line.5 If the company is only 
created under the residual power it is practically subject in all 
respects to the provincial law, provided that that law does 
not deny its status as a company or seek to compel it to 
become a provincial company, and that is the case even if 
the company restricts operations to one province alone. 
but merely as to its incorporation and status. The view of the court in 
Citizen Insurance Co. v. Parsons, 7 App. Cas. 97, at pp. 116-17, gave incor-
poration as a general power. The later judgement seems to tend to the 
other view, but to arrive at the same result. , 
1 City of Toronto v. Bell Telephone Co., [1905] A. C. 52. • 
2 Attorney-General of British Columbia v. Canadian Pacific Railway Oo., 
[1906] A. C. 204. 
3 La Compagnie hydraulique de Saint-Franrois v. Continental Heat and 
Light Co., [1909] A.C. 194. 
4 C.P.R. Co. v. Corporation of Notre-Dame de Bonsecours, [1899] A.C. 367. 
5 Madden v. Nelson and Fort Sheppard Railway, [1899] A. C. 626 . 
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On the other hand, the powers of the provinces to enact 
legislation regarding companies and the validity of the 
Insurance Act of Canada of 1910, which seeks generally to 
regulate insurance in the Dominion other than mere intra-
state insurance, has been the subject of the most elaborate 
and unconcluded debate.1 The question arose whether the 
provincial purposes for which the province can alone incor-
porate companies must mean mere business in the province, 
or whether a company incorporated ·had the right to avail 
itself of the comity of other provinces and foreign countries, 
and to make contracts inside or outside the province in 
respect of business in the provinces or foreign countries. 
Moreover, the question also arose whether the objects and 
functions of a provincial company could be increased by 
the legislation of-the Dominion or o~her provinces, so that it 
could carry on business outside the province, or was this 
. entirely outside the meaning of the Imperial Act ? The 
Supreme Court, on being asked to advise under the power of 
the Government to obtain advisory judgements, which 
though questioned on the ground that it was invalid and 
ultra vires has been upheld by the Privy Council,2 gave con-
flicting opinions. 
The question of railway legislation has also raised diffi-
culties : the Dominion in its Railway Act claimed the power 
to impose Dominion legislation on the subject of through 
traffic on provincial railways, which had never come other-
wise under the legislative control of the ·Dominion Parlia-
ment. The claim was,' however, rejected by the Privy 
Council,3 who denied that the proposal could be upheld 
whether under the residual power or the trade and commerce 
power of the Parliament, or on the ground that it was neces-
sarily incidental to the power to control Dominion railways. 
There was available in the case of a recalcitrant provincial 
railway the power of the provincial legislature to cause it to 
meet the views of the Federal railway and the Dominion 
Government, and in the worst case the Dominion could 
1 See Journ. Soc. Oon~p. Leg. ~iv. 357-68. 2 [1912] A.C. 571. 
3 City of Montreal v. Montreal Street Railway, [1912] A.C. 333 . 
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subject the provincial railway to Federal control by declaring 
it to be a work for the advantage of Canada. 
The fishery rights of the provinces have been a subject of 
consideration, and it is now clear law 1 that in the open sea 
the sole power to regulate the right of public fishery within 
the limits of Canadian jurisdiction is vested in the Dominion 
Parliament under its power to legislate as to the fisheries: 
the same rule applies to the estuaries and tidal portions of 
rivers . . Further, the sole right of regulating the modes of 
fishery belongs everywhere to the Dominion. On the other 
hand, the Dominion has no proprietary right in the fisheries 
in non-tidal waters at all, unless, as in the case of the railway 
belt in British Columbia, the lands have been transferred to 
the Dominion by the province in virtue of some arrange-
ment. Otherwise the sole right to regulate the fishery, 
whether by the grant of leases or licences, as a matter of mere 
property, rests with the province in its right to regulate civil 
rights in the province, whether the property right rests with 
the province or is in the hands of private owners. 
The marriage question is notorious because of the great 
amount of excitement which it produced in the Dominion. 
. ' 
It was held by the court of Quebec in one case that the 
effect of the document l{nown as the N e temere decree was 
to render invalid a marriage contracted between two 
Catholics by a Protestant minister othervvise than in accord-
ance with the rule that such marriages must be contracted 
before the priest of the parish of the contractors of the 
marriage.2 The decision was, it seems, bad law,3 but in the 
meantime, before it was so declared to be, an agitation 
• •J 
arose in the Dominion Parliament with a view to the enact-
ment of a law \vhich was intended to have the effect that 
if a marriage were solemnized before persons having a limited 
authority to solemnize marriages under the provincial law 
1 Attorney-General for the Dominion v. Attorneys-General for the Provinces, 
[1898] A.C. 700; Attorney-General for British Columbia v. Attorney-General 
for Canada, [1912] A.C. 153. 
2 See J. S. Ewart, Kingdom Papers, i. 121-32. 
3 Q.R.J. 41 C.S. 249. 
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the marriage would be valid in all cases that is, if a priest 
having authority only to marry certain persons on grounds 
of religious faith should marry others, still the marriage 
would stand good. The government referred the Bill for 
an advisory judgement to the Supreme Court ; it was held 
to be ultra vires, a decision approved by the Judicial 
Committee, which adopted the view that the power to 
regulate the solemnization of marriage given by the con-
stitution to the province exclusively was a power under 
which the forms of celebration could be regulated · by the 
provinces, and such regulation was not open to be 
overridden by the legislation of the Dominion.1 It should, 
ho·wever, be noted that the po·wer given to the province is 
restricted to the province : it is not· in tl1e power of the 
province to regulate the provisions to be observed by people 
who go outside the province to be married elsewhere: 
if any further legislation is required on this subject, which no\v 
is regulated by the rules of private international law under 
the aegis of the Judicial Committee, it would seem to fall 
under the Dominion power of legislation as to marriage. 
The Dominion power to regulate divorce is a dead letter, 
as the French Canadian population would not acquiesce 
in its use, so that each divorce has to be performed by Act 
of Parliament save in the provinces of New Brunswick, 
Nova Scotia, and British Columbia, where divorces still 
can be given under the Acts as they stood before federation, 
but where no change of law is no'v possible by local legis-
lation. In Prince Edward Island the pow·er to grant 
divorce has been disused for a century. 
The restriction of the legislative authority of the pro-
vinces to direct taxation has led to the strict limitation of 
the rights of the provinces to raise succession duties, with the 
result that the law is completely confused. The provinces, 
however, instead of accepting loyally the restrictions on 
their powers of taxation and agreeing on some definition 
which would provide that they did not transgress into 
fields of taxation open to other provinces or to the Dominion, 
1 [1912] A.C. 880. 
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spend their energies in spreading as widely as possible the 
net of their taxing Acts. Thus the Ontario Legislature, in 
its taxation of insurance compar1ies' premiums, as amended 
in 1914, demands- a tax based on the amount of gross pre-
miums received in respect of business transacted in Ontario, 
and includes as such premit1ms any premiums paid in the 
province, and premiums paid any,vhere in respect of persons 
or property in tl1e province at the time of payment. It is 
clear that in this, as in the Succession Duty Acts, double 
taxation is a constant incidence of the peculiar method of 
procedure.1 
The question of the position of the Indians and their 
land claims has elicited the decision that the legislative 
power of the Dominions in respect to Indians leaves the 
property in the lands occupied by them in the hands of the 
province, so that if the Indian claims are satisfied the 
beneficial ow11ership of the land reverts free of a11y control 
or claim by the Dominion to the province : 2 indeed so 1nuch 
is that so that the Dorr1inion canr1ot claim the sums expended 
011 the removal of the Indians' claims tlnless a specific 
agreement to pay has been entered into : there is no known 
principle of law which allows the Dominion to set out that 
such payments were in effect paid by it as an agent for the 
province.3 The nature of the title of the Indian is held 
never to have been, since the British occupation of Canada 
and the royal proclamation of 1763 which promised the 
Indians that their lands would be reserved to them, more 
than a usufructuary use and claim on the consideration 
of the Crown, whence it has been deduced that in law the 
annuities arranged to be paid to the Ojibeway Indians 
under the Cession Treaty of 1850 by 'vhich they resigned 
their claims to considerable areas of land in the Lake 
Huron and Lake Superior districts is merely a contractual 
right and not a real burden in the form of a trust or interest 
on the lands, in the sense that the revenues should be 
1 Of. Sir J. Aikins, Journ. Soc. Comp. Leg. ;xv. 279. 
2 St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber Go. v. The Queen, 14 App. Cas. 46. 
3 Dominion of Canada v. Province of Ontario, [1910] A. C. 637. 
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. 
applied to the payment or augmentation of the annuities.1 
It has also been held that escheats 2 and precious minerals 3 
are included in the property of the provinces, being royalties 
which with lands, mines, minerals, belong under s. 109 to . 
the provinces. The possession of these lands, &c., is not, 
however, given by the arrangements for the erection of new 
provinces, and the Acts enforcing these terms, to the new 
provinces of Manitoba, Alberta, and Saskatchewan, whence 
has arisen the steady agitation of these provinces to have 
the lands conceded to their care. In British Columbia, 
while the lands as a whole are retained by the province, 
large grants have been made to the Dominion for public 
purposes in connexion with the building of the trans-
continental railway, and the exact powers of the province 
and Dominion over these lands and the water rights 
affecting them have been dealt with by the courts.4 
The administration of justice enables the provinces to 
impose, it would seem, duties on Dominion officers, 5 and 
it is clear that the Dominion can impose the duty of dealing 
with contested elections for the Federal Parliament on the 
provincial courts.6 The control of the crilninal law is 
federal, and the passing of a Lord's Day Observance Act is 
therefore ultra vires a province,' but the provinces have 
power to create and do create a quasi criminal law by 
· imposing fines and imprisonment for breaches of their enact-
ments, and it is no answer to s·uch fines and imprisonment 
that the act is also a crime under the Canadian law. 
The powers of the provinces in regard to municipalities 
1 
·Attorney-General for Canada v. Attorney-Generr;tl for Ontario, [1897] 
A.C. 199. 
2 Attorney-General of Ontario v. Mercer, 8 App. Cas. 767. 
3 Attorney-General of British Columbia v. Attorney-General of Canada, 
14 App. Cas. 295. 
4 The matter has been adjusted by the Dominion conceding power by 
law to the province (1912, c. 47). 
5 In re County Oowrts of British Columbia, 21 S.C.R. 446. . 
6 Valin v. Langlois, 5 App. Cas. 115. 
7 Attorney-General for Ontario v. Attorney-General for the Dominion, 
[1896] A.C. 348, at pp. 363, 364. 
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depend entireJvr on the constitution and have no relation 
to the powers of municipalities before the union. The 
power is to establish civic bodies and to confer on them such 
portions of authority as can be given under the enumerated 
powers of the provinces. The right to tax possessed by 
the municipalities is based on the provincial powers which 
are delegated to it, for it is fixed law that a province 
can tax one part of the province and not another as it 
sees fit.1 
It is doubtless curious that with the establishment of 
a federal constitution there should have bee11 no provision 
for a local court inserted in the constitution other than the 
mere power of Parliament to establish a court. The power 
to establish a court has been argued to be the only power 
which the Parliament should have · in this matter, and this 
was one of the grounds of objection to the practice of 
asking the Supreme Court for advisory judgements i11 matters 
of law regarding the constitutional powers of the Dominion 
and the provinces. Such an opinion would not bind the 
court itself in a concrete case and was not therefore a judicial 
opinion at all. The Supreme Court 2 and the Privy Council,3 
however, both agreed that the power, which had certain 
analogies in the British constitution, could not be said to 
be non-judicial, though it should be used most carefully, 
and though it was perhaps necessary in some cases for t .he 
judges to explain to the G·overnment that the questions 
could not be answered. In point of fact, however, most 
important questions have more or less satisfactorily been 
thus dealt with by the court and on appeal by the Privy 
Council, and it is far from likely that any decision on such 
hypothetical cases 1-vould be varied in a real case. Moreover, 
in any real case it is nearly in1possible to arrive at the real 
elements of the problem, since the courts must often decide 
on minor issues, and it seems as if the new procedure, which 
has become extremely frequent of late, will be permanent : 
the references on the fishery and the marriage laws have, as 
1 Dow v. Black, 6 P.C. 272. 2 43 S.C.R. 536. 
3 [1912] A.C. 571. 
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decided, given much satisfaction, and the tangle of company 
legislation seems to need some clearing up in this way. 
The practice of bringing all constitutional questions on 
appeal from the Supreme Court to the Privy Council in 
one sense certainly weakens the authority of the Supreme 
Court. At the same time it exempts it from the very trying 
position of the High Court of the Commonwealth, which sits 
in the midst of the governments whose position its judge-
ments affect. It would be idle to deny that there have 
been signs of dissatisfaction with that court. The original 
body consisted of three justices set up by the Act of 1903, 
which provided for the number of the court, though the 
main outline of its powers was laid down in the constitution, 
contrary to the Canadian practice. In 1905 two more 
justices were added, and conflict of opinion arose between 
the two new men, who represented the modern school of 
Australian thought with a labour leaning, and the three 
older justices who were fathers of federation and admirers 
of the constitution of the United States. The result was 
that in a series of cases the judgements of Sir S. Griffith, 
Sir E. Barton, and Mr. O'Connor were opposed by the judge-
ments of Messrs. Isaacs and Higgins, the former insisting 
on the doctrines of the immunity of instrumentalities and 
the reserved powers of the States, the latter preferring to 
read the Commonwealth powers in the normal manner 
applicable to Imperial Acts as authorizing the Common-
wealth to legislate, independently of considerations of the 
powers of the States, in the matters prescribed. Ultimately 
in 1912 the Labour Government, which was very indignant 
with the Chief Justice, legislated to add two new justices 
to the court, and to provide that no constitutional decision 
should be valid unless a majority of all the justices, i.e. four, 
concurred in the judgement. The Act was severely criticized 
as an effort 1 to alter the rulings of the court by the intro-
1 Its validity was also called in qt1estion on the ground that Parliament 
could not legislate as to majorities necessary or rules as to how, in case of 
equality, the decision was to go, but these objections seem to have been 
ineffective. · 
' 
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duction of new men, and the appointment of one of the new 
judges, Mr. Piddington, was so badly received that he 
resigned office, being succeeded by Mr. Rich. A further 
change in the court has been caused by the death of Mr. 
O'Connor, who was succeeded by Mr. Gavan Duffy, the 
bearer of a well-known name in Australia. The other judge 
appointed under the new Act was the Commonwealth 
solicitor, Mr. Powers. Whatever the expectation of the 
Government as to the effect of the change, and it is idle to 
suppose that the Government did not wish an alteration of 
view in the court, the result has not been in any marked 
way to modify the opinion of the court on any topics pre-
sented to it. Perhaps too much faith was placed by the · 
Government in passing the measure on the dicta of the two 
judges appointed in 1905, that they felt themselves at 
liberty to disregard in future majority decisions of the High 
Court if they thought them wrong, which was interpreted 
in some quarters to be an indication that they would, if they 
were supported by colleagues, reverse older rulings. The 
adoption of such a policy would have been a blunder : 
the proper way to upset the decisions of the High Court is 
clearly merely by constitutional alteration. 
The view of the Commonwealth Constitution taken by the 
High Court emphasizes the independent position of the 
states as retaining in all matters not occupied effectively 
by the Commonwealth their sovereignty : it has even been 
doubted if the Commonwealth has power to enact a law 
regarding fugitive offenders or extradition. This question 
raises the difficult point to what extent the Commonwealth 
is a central legislature within the meaning of the Interpretation 
Act, 1889, so as to exercise, in reference to the States, the 
powers given by Imperial Acts to such legislatures as opposed 
to local legislatures. The answer must clearly be that the 
Commonwealth Parliament is not a central legislature in 
any matter in which it has no legislative power : therefore 
the Governor of a State is still the Vice-Admiral of the · 
Commonwealth 1 and not the Governor-General, a fact 
1 53 and 54 Viet. c. 27, s. 10. 
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admitted by the Commonwealth Governn1ent at the begin-
ning of the war, when the State ·Governors as well as the 
Governor-General issued proclamations of the outbreak of 
war so as to bring into operation the working of the prize 
courts in the States as required under the Prize Court Act.1 
The State Governor again is not subject to mandamus 
under any Commonwealth Act ;2 since that would be a 
violation of State sovereignty. But the Commonwealth is 
not a mere agent of the States for · any purpose: 3 even if 
the States have a share in the customs revenue, and the 
surplus over Commonwealth requirements is to be paid 
to the States, the Commonwealth Parliament alone must 
decide what is the expenditure which it will incur. Nor 
is the Commonwealth Parliament in the slightest way 
fettered in deputing to the Governor-General in Council 
powers of subordinate legislative authority. 
The powers of the Parliament in the opinion of the court 
depend in the first place on the meaning of the terms used 
in conferring them, and on this ground they have considered 
very carefully the power of dealing "\tvith immigration, and 
have decided that a person who is definitely connected 
with Australia in some way, such as birth therein or fixed 
abode, cannot be treated as an immigrant,4 though mere 
artificial domicile under the law that an infant, who has 
never been in Australia, has the domicile of his father is not 
a good reason to permit his immigration~ They have also 
held that a workers' trade-mark which is a mark to show 
that the article was manufactured under trade union 
conditions is not a subject of Commonwealth power at all, 
as no such trade-mark is included in the meaning of the 
terms of the constitution giving the power.5 But in addition, 
even if the power is given by the mere words it cannot be 
1 57 and 58 Viet. c. 39, s. 2 (2). 
2 The King v. Governor-General of South Australia, 4 C.L.R. 1497. 
3 State of New South Wales v. The Commonwealth, 7 C.L.R. 179. This 
replies to suc-h assertions as that in Parl. Pap., Cd. 3340, p. 24. 
4 Potter v. Minahan, 7 C.L.R. 277. 
5 Attorney-General for New South Wales v. Brewery Employes' Union of 
New South Wales, 6 C.L.R. 469. 
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supported if it offends the doctrines of the immunity of 
instrumentalities or the reserved powers of the States. 
The immunity of instrumentalities was first, as we have 
seen, applied by the High Court to the simple case of a 
receipt stamp for a federal salary, which was denied validity; 
it was also applied to the salaries of the fede·ral officers, 
commencing a dispute which only ended in 1907 ; it was 
also cited as preventing the municipality of Sydney levying 
taxation on the property of the Commonwealth.1 But if 
used against the States it soon appeared that it could be 
used for them : it was relied upon by the High Court to 
forbid the application of the Commonwealth legislation to 
railway servants who were employed by a State Govern-
ment.2 But they declined to extend this doctrine to 
protect the State in importing barbed wire for the use of 
farmers,3 or even from it to draw the less unnatural conclu-
sion that the State was entitled to import duty free the rails 
needed on the Government railways of the State.4 
The doctrine of reserved powers was first asserted by the 
High Court in _Peterswald v. Bartley,5 where the power of 
, the States to impose licence duties on the manufacturers of 
beer was expressly asserted, and the general doctrine 
enunciated that the constitution contained no provisions 
for enabling the Co;mmonwealth Parliament to interfere 
with the private or internal affairs of the States or to 
restrict the power of the States to regulate the carrying on 
of any business or trade within their boundaries, or even, 
if they think fit, to prohibit them altogether. Otherwise the 
effect of the constitution would be t ·o deprive the States 
of the power to regulate their internal affairs in connexion 
with nearly all trades and businesses carried on in the 
States. To construe the constitution thus was to run 
.. 
1 Municipal Council of Sydney v. The Commonwealth, 1 C.L.R. 208. 
2 Railway Servants' Case, 4 C.L.R. 488. 
3 The King v. Sutton, 5 C.L.R. 789. 
4 Attorney-General of New South Wales v. Collector of Customs of New 
South Wales, 5 C.L.R. 818. 
5 l C.L.R. 497. 
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• 
' 
464 IMPERIAL UNITY AND THE DOMINIONS 
counter to its whole spirit. The same doctrine· was applied 
by the three first justices of the court in the famous case of 
the excise on agricultural machinery,1 in which the Common-
wealth Parliament, in an effort to carry out by its powers 
the new protection, i.e. a protective policy in which the 
workers should have their assured share of the increased 
price produced by protection, laid it down by Act No. 16 
of 1906 that an excise duty should be paid on agricultural 
instruments, provided that it would not be levied if certain 
conditions of the remuneration of labour were complied 
with. They held that in substance this was not a valid 
exercise of the power of imposing excise duties, but an 
attempt to regulate the conditions of labour in the States 
which was ultra vires : the new justices disagreed, holding 
that, as long as the power was given to tax, the motive was 
immaterial. The same divergence of opinion marked the 
discussion of the question of the validity of Part VII of the 
Commonwealth Trade Marks Act, 1905,2 which provided 
for the marking of goods by a mark indicating that the 
goods had been made under union conditions. The majority 
of the court dismissed the idea that such a mark was a trade 
mark at all, and they held that, treating the matter solely 
as an exercise of the commerce and trade power, the sections 
of the Act in question were void as an attempt to regulate 
the trade of the States quf!' internal, which was expressly 
forbidden, since the power of the Commonwealth was 
restricted to inter-state and foreign trade. · The same prin-
ciple was again applied to limit the power of the Common-
wealth as to corporations,3 the majority of the court deciding 
that the power to deal with them was confined to prohibiting 
their engaging in trade or to imposing conditions on their 
being permitted to do so, but not to imposing rules on them 
affecting their conduct of operations if they were allowed 
1 The King v. Barger, 6 C.L.R. 41. 
2 Attorney-General for New South Wales v. Brewery Employes' Union 
of New South Wales, 6 C.L.R. 469. 
3 Huddart Parker and Company Proprietary Limited v. Moorehead, 
8 C.L.R. 330. 
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to engage in trade: it was not open to subject them to 
special laws as regards monopolies or conditions of wages or 
anything else of the kind, all these being powers of the 
States alone. 
The same principle has been used to limit very severely 
the value of the power of the Commonwealth to legislate 
for conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and 
settlement of industrial disputes extending beyond the 
limits of one State. The High Court decided 1 that the 
power thus given did not allow the court to prescribe in .. 
the settlement of any dispute the payment of wages which 
were at variance with the wages fixed by Wages Boards in 
States acting under statutory authority to fix minimum 
rates, though they allowed the court to override awards of 
State arbitration courts and industrial agre~ments which 
were legal and effective under State law. They, however, 
qualified seriously the effect of this rule by allowing the 
court to give a higher rate of wages than the minimu.m fixed 
by a State Wages Board, on the ground that as the parties 
could agree to fix a rate higher than the minimum the 
court had equal power in this regard.2 But they definitely 
declined,3 and in this all the justices for once agreed, to 
admit that the court could ~.mpose a common rule regulating 
any trade as to which it had intervened to settle or prevent 
a dispute. The court pointed out that the giving of this 
power was not necessary as part of a scheme of. arbitration 
or conciliation : it dealt with cases where no dispute had 
arisen or even threatened, and it was in effect legislation 
by the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration; no such 
power of legislation had been conferred on the Common-
wealth Parliament itself, and it could not indirectly do · 
what it had no direct power to do, even if the lack of this 
power were likely, as pointed out by Higgins J., to render 
1 The Woodworkers' Case, 8 C.L.R. 465. 
2 Australian Boot Trade Employes Federation v. Whybrow and Go., 
10 C.L.R. 266. 
3 Australian 
11 C.L.R. 311. 
1874 
Boot Trade Employes Federation v. Whybrow and Go., 
Gg 
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the powers of the Court of Conciliation of which he .was 
President somewhat inadequate. Further difficulty has 
arisen from the fact that the question what is a dispute 
extending beyond the limits of a State raises so many 
nice points of law as to render any discussion or decision 
very difficult. It is not wonderful therefore that efforts 
to exclude the High Court from interfering by prohibition 
with the powers of the Court of Conciliation were made by 
the Parlia;ment of the Commonwealth, but the effort was a 
failure, the court being prepared to hold, apart from specific 
provisions of the constitution and of the Judiciary Act, 
that the nature of federal jurisdiction gave the High Court 
the right to control by prohibition any improper exercise 
of it.1 
The doctrine also was applied in 1910 to the case of 
merchant shipping, when it was decided that the Common-
wealth power was confined to inter-state shipping and to 
foreign shipping, and not to intra-state shipping at all.2 
A Seamen's Compensation Act was therefore held ultra vires 
because it did not make the necessary distinction, and the 
whole Act had to fall with the invalid part, since it was 
impossible to hold that Parliament would have consented 
to distinguish the two classes of cases. 
More serious, however, than even these instances was 
the decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 
in the matter of the Royal Commissions Act, 1912. The 
question arose out of the desire of the Commonwealth 
Government to ascertain the real position in trade of that 
great monopoly, the Colonial Sugar Refining Company of 
New South Wales, which carries on business in Fiji and 
New Zealand. In order to obtain the information desired 
after some trouble with the Company in 1911, the Common-
wealth by Act No. 4 of 1912 gave extensive powers to Royal 
Commissions to compel the appearance of witnesses and 
the production of documents. After the passing of the 
Act the Royal Commission summoned the manager of the 
Company, requiring him to attend and to produce certain 
1 II C.L.R. I. 2 SS. Kalibia v. Wilson, II C.L.R. 689. 
CANADA, COMMONWEALTH, AND UNION 467 
books and documents. He replied 1 by bringing an action 
for a declaration of the invalidity of the Royal Commissions 
Act, and an injunction to restrain the Commission from 
proceeding on the summons, or alternatively, if the court 
should decide that the Act was not invalid, a declaration 
that the manager was not bound to answer questions nor 
to produce books or documents relating to matters as to 
which the Federal Parliament had no legislative powers, 
or which were not relevant to the subject-matter of the 
Royal Commission on the sugar industry. Stress was 
laid by the plaintiff on the famous decision on the validity 
of Form IV in the case of Dyson v. The Attorney-General.1 
The case was heard by four justices, and the validity of 
the Act was upheld. The Chief Justice said that the power 
must be deemed to refer to matters falling within the 
ambit of federal power, and · that therefore the Act itself 
could not be held to be invalid, but he considered that 
many questions to be asked were not relevant to the powers 
of the Commonwealth, which did not extend to inter-
ference with the internal or domestic management of the 
affairs of corporations trading under State laws. Nor was 
an inquisition into the operations of the Company outside 
the Commonwealth within the ambit of federal power, save 
in so far as it related to the conditions of carrying on the 
sugar industry in the abstract. He considered therefore 
that the Commissioners should be r~strained from requiring 
the manager to answer any questions or produce any 
documents which were relevant only to the internal manage• 
ment of the affairs of the Company, the operations of the 
Company outside the Commonwealth except in so far as 
they related to the conditions of carrying on the sugar 
industry irrespective of the persons by whom it was carried 
on, matters relating to the value of particular parts of the 
property of the Company, except such parts as were actually 
used in the production and manufacture of sugar in the 
Commonwealth, and details of salaries paid to officers of 
the plaintiff Company, except in so far as they were relevant 
1 18 Argus L.R. 429. 2 [1911] 1 K.B. 410; [1912] 1 Ch. 158. 
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to the actual cost of such manufacture and production. 
The opinion of the Chief Justice was shared by Barton J., 
but Isaacs J. and Higgins J. in varying degrees dissented. 
I11 view of this dissent the High Court· certified that the case 
was one which might properly go to the Judicial Committee. 
The result of that journey was startling.1 The Judicial 
Committee examined the basis of the constitution of the 
Commonwealth, and laid much stress on the fact that the 
Canadian constitution was based on a very different prin-
ciple from that of the Commonwealth constitution, in that 
it transferred the residual power to the Dominion, whereas 
the tenth amendment of the American constitution expressly 
reserved that power to the States of · the Union. The 
Co'mmonwealth constitution therefore gave the Common-
wealth o:qly such powers as were transferred, as was plain 
from the express words of ss. ·51 and 107 of that constitu-
tion. Now the power of imposing restrictions on the liberty 
of the subject by causing him to answer inquiries was one 
which did not appear to have been transferred to the 
Commonwealth: that Parliament had power to deal with 
various subjects, and in connexion with tl1em it might 
impose obligations to give information, but the Royal 
Commissions Act dealt quite generally, and gave the coercive 
powers it mentioned to all statutory or common law com-
missions, nor indeed had specific Acts been passed giving 
the directions to give information for which inquiries might 
have been directed. The inquiries might be urged, as by 
Higgins J., to be relevant to the possibility of altering the 
constitution either under s. 128 of the constitution or to 
the exercise of the vague power ins. 51 (xxxviii) empower-
ing the Parliament to exercise, with the concurrence of the 
States concerned, any power which at the time of the estab-
lishment of the constitution could only be exercised by the 
Imperial Parliament. But, until the constitutio!l had been 
altered, it was impossible for the Commonwealth to justify 
its legislation imposing the duty to answer such inquiries, 
1 Attorney-General for the Commonwealth v. Colonial Sugar Refining Co; 
[1914] A.C. 237. Printed in the Commonwealth Parl Pap., 1914 !No. 25. 
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which was a power not given, and therefore not exercisable. 
Nor could the Act be supported as incidental to the exercise 
of powers actually existing by statute or common law. 
No such powers had been actually set in operation, and the 
Royal Commissions Act must be held to be invalid, without 
an alteration of · the constitution, though the Committee 
had hesitated to give this decision in view of the contrary 
opinion of the Chief Justice and Sir E. Barton. 
As against this crushing demolition of the Royal Com-
missions Act there can only be set the fact that the High 
Court of the Commonwealth declined to apply the doctrine 
of reserved powers to the Land Tax Act, 1910, of the Com-
monwealth.1 . It was pressed on the court that the Act was 
really meant for the purpose of breaking up large estates, . 
and was not a taxing Act at all, but the court had no diffi~· 
culty in distinguishing between the fact that an Act was 
really intended for one purpose and merely nominally 
carrying out a power, and the pr,obable effect of a genuine 
taxation Act. The boundary line in any individual case 
may, of course, be slight, but the general soundness of the 
distinction seems beyond cavil. 
Another point of much dispute has been the prohibition 
of the imposition of taxation by the State on Common-
wealth property or vice versa.2 The difficulty came to a 
head in the case of the importation of steel rails for the use 
of the New South Wales Government railways, when the 
New South Wales Government took the law into its own 
hands and took the goods a.way from the custody of the 
federal authorities, refusing to pay duties. The High Court 
decided that the duties were levied not on property but 
on the importation, but this seems rather a forced view, 
and it is perhaps safer to say that property in the section 
of the constitution in question was not intended to refer 
to imported goods at the time of importation. 
The question of non-discrimination between residents of 
1 Osborne v. The Commonwealth, 12 C.L.R. 322. 
2 Attorney-General of New South Wales v. Collector of Customs of New 
South Wales, 5 C.L.R. 818. 
• 
470 IMPERIAL UNITY AND THE DOMINIONS 
different parts of the Commonwealth is not an easy one. 
The ruling has, however, been laid down that an Act based 
on domicile does not offend against the prohibition of 
differential treatment, so that it is not a contravention of 
the rule if a State raises succession duties in a different 
way in the case of succession of domiciled persons and 
other cases.1 On the other hand, it was held that the section 
had no application unless a person residing in one State 
seeks to enforce rights in another : it could not apply to 
the case of a man who was resident in the State which 
legislated.2 
More generally important is a decision under s. 92, which 
provides for freedom of intercourse and trade among the 
States. The question was discussed at some length in 
a case, The King v. Smithers, ex parte Benson,3 which was 
decided at the end of 1912. The point at issue was 
whether the provisions of a New South Wales Act to prevent 
the influx of criminals were valid, inasmuch as they pro-
hibited the entrance into the State of any person sentenced 
in another State for a · crime, the punish,ment of which was 
death or imprisonment for a year or upwards. The case 
was brought on a writ nisi for certiorari to remove the 
conviction of one Benson in New South Wales into the 
High Court. All four justices who heard the case agreed 
that the conviction was bad. The Chief Justice did not 
rest his view on either s. 92 or on s. 117, but on the general 
principle, which arose from the mere nature of federation. 
This principle proved that the power of police was limited 
to cases of necessity for self-defence, which did not exist 
in such a case, and Barton J. concurred. Isaacs and 
Higgins JJ. rested their agreement with the view that the 
conviction was bad expressly on s. 92, which they held as 
a warning to both the Commonwealth and the States that 
there were to be no boundaries for intercourse or trade. 
S. 92 has also been invoked in Fox v. Robbins 4 to show 
1 Davies and Jones v. State of Western Australia, 2 C.L.R. 29. 
2 Lee Fay v. Vincent, 7 C.L.R. 389. 
3 16 C.L.R. 99. 4 8 C.L.R. 115. 
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that it is impossible for a statute to impose higher duties 
for -licences to sell the wine produced in another State 
than the sum charged for a licence to sell local wine only, 
an interesting decision since otherwise a State might by 
licences, which it can legally impose, practically give a prefer .. 
ence to its own products over those of another State, a result 
clearly opposed to the principles affecting a federal con-
stitution. On the other hand, in 1915, an effort to n1ake 
the principle apply to prevent a State Government exercis-. 
ing its sovereign power of expropriation of goods was 
defeated by the judgement of the High Court,l which also 
by a majority of four judges to two pronounced the judicial 
power conferred on the Interstate Commission by the 
Commonwealth Act constituting it to be ultra vires as an 
attempt to confer judicial authority in a quarter beyond 
the High Court. 
It is by no means unnatural in view of these many restric-
tions on the Commonwealth powers that successive Common-
wealth Governments should have aimed at the securing 
of greater powers for the Commonwealth Parliament. It 
is the obvious result of the creation of any political body 
that it should seek to enlarge in every way the ambit of its 
authority, and the Government and the people of the 
Commonwealth seem to have steadily been approaching 
nearer the period when the constitution will have to be 
largely altered in important respects. The first formal 
effort to change the powers of the Commonwealth was 
made by Parliament in 1910,2 when two proposed laws 
were duly passed, and referred to the people, but failed in 
1911 3 to obtain acceptance in five out of the six States, 
though the Government still enjoyed popularity in the 
country. The extraordinary position then arose that, though 
the Government's proposals were emphatically rejected, the 
Government were not affected politically in any direct 
manner by the result of the voting. In 1912 the proposals 
1 Melbourne Argus, March 24, 1915; above Part I, chap. xv, § 3. 
2 Parl. Pap., Cd. 5582, pp. 29, 30, 42. 
a Parl. Pap., Cd. 6091, p. 68. 
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were again passed by Parliament, but this time as six laws, 
which have been summarized above.1 In this case also 
the referendum was held simultaneously with the federal 
elections, and the result was curious.2 The Commonwealth 
Governme11t were defeated by one vote in the Lower House, 
but three States, South and Western Australia and Queens-
land, approved the referenda, and the majorities against 
them were nowhere at all very serious. The determination 
of the Governme;nt to proceed with them in the session of 
1915, after their return to power, was only to be expected, 
and the appeals made to prevent the spread of party feeling 
by pressing these proposals were sqmewhat belated,3 as 
the Government in its over-confidence had pressed on the 
general election, when it might have avoided the result 
by agreement with the Opposition, which had offered frank 
and full co-operation. However, it must be remembered 
from the point of view of the Government that they had 
asked in 1914 for their referenda again to be submitted to 
the people at the time of the general election, and that 
this request had been refused. To expect them therefore 
to forgo the chance of success in the repetition of the 
referenda could hardly be expected. Moreover, an additional 
reason for having a referendum was afforded by the proposal 
to change the law of Parliament to secure the concomitance 
of the election for Senators and the Lower House in 1918. 
This cannot be done under the existing constitutional powers 
of the Commonwealth, and had therefore to be sanctioned or 
denied by the people, unless the alternative of an Imperial 
Act were faced, and it is the desire of all parties in the 
Commonwealth as a rule to avoid such an application. 
The most attractive counter-proposal which has been 
made in the matter is undoubtedly one which was put 
forward by Mr. Holman as a solution of the difficulty. 
He was anxious to see that the Commonwealth secured 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 6863, pp. 108, 109 ; above, Part I, chap. v. 
2 Parl, Pap., Cd. 7507, p. 60. 
3 Round Table, 1914-15, pp. 209 seq. For the other side see 
P. M. Glvnn, Federal Constitution. 
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for the purpose of conciliation and arbitration definite 
wider powers, while the States would retain the general 
control of their internal affairs. He recognized that the 
confusion arising from the existing state of things, seven 
different systems, all acting at the same time, was disastrous, 
and, as it appeared to him useless to ask the Commonwealth 
to restrict its powers either by Act or by constitutional 
change, he thought it would be wisest to transfer to the 
Commonwealth all the power to deal with trade disputes 
by conciliation and arbitration, abolishing seven conflict-
ing sets of rules, and securing at the same time in all proba-
bility more smooth working. If the matter were in Com-
monwea1th hands it would still work by local, if federal, 
· courts, and these courts would be just as likely to consider 
local conditions carefully as any existing courts, while as 
they were federal courts there would be less temptation 
on the part of the Commonwealth Court to interfere vvith 
its local branches. Such a solution, however, would clearly 
not go far enough for the Labour Party at large, and, :whereas 
in 1911 the referenda of the day were frankly opposed by 
many Labour men in New South Wales, in 1913 the recal-
citrants had come in the main into line, a fact which explains 
in part the much more favourable appearance of the voting 
for the referenda, though that was in part due to the fact 
that the referenda coincided with a general election. 
. A fairly comprehensive scheme of arrangement was also 
suggested by Mr. Holman at the conference of State Premiers 
held in - 1912,1 •hen it was proposed to resolve that the 
several Parliaments should pass laws transferring to the 
Commonwealth legislative power with regard to labour 
and employment so far as necessary to enable the Common-
wealth to prevent and settle industrial disputes extending 
beyond the limits of any one State, and to provide that 
·certain conditions of employment considered suitable by 
an authority constituted under the law of the Co1nmon-
1 For ~Ir. Holman's proposals see Parl. Pap., Cd. 6091, p. 73; the above 
represents the degree of agreement arrived at, but New South Wales and 
Western Australia dissented from the proposals as inadequ!lte . 
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wealth should be a common rule of the industry, and should 
override the local rules pro tanto. The Commonwealth was 
also to have power over monopolies and combinations if 
extending beyond a single State, and declared to be in 
restraint of trade or commerce to the detriment of the 
public by the High Court, so that the Commonwealth 
might acquire the business on just terms or carry it on, 
or acquire property used in connexion with the business, 
the subject of the combination or monopoly. Further, in 
order to prevent unfair competition, it was proposed to set 
up a procedure under which the Commonwealth Court of 
Conciliation and Arbitration would have power to lay down 
regulations as to conditions of employment in any trade, 
if complaint were made by . a State court, on the motion 
of a State industrial tribunal, that an industry in that 
State was suffering from unfair competition as a result of 
the industrial laws of another State. 
These proposals are interesting, not because of their 
completeness, but because they show that the feeling that 
the provisions of the constitution are not by any means 
satisfactory is generally recognized in the Commonwealth. 
The Commonwealth Government, in the arguments of 
1912 in Parliament over the passing of the Bills for the 
referenda, laid stress on the fact that the law of Australia 
was inadequate to deal with monopolies or combines, as had 
been proved in the failure of the proceedings in the case 
against the steamer owners and the coalowners who made 
an agreement to raise the price of coal to the detriment of 
consumers,! by the proceedings in the case of the Colonial 
Sugar Refining Company, which made the people of Australia 
pay £7 7s. 2d. more for their sugar than they charged the 
people of New Zealand, and paid 10 per cent. annually, 
and by the experience of the Government in trying to buy 
steel rails for the transcontinental railway, thanks to the 
opposition of the steel trust. The Opposition argued, in 
reply, that the same result could be attained by co-opera-
tion of the States and the Commonwealth, and that it was 
1 The coal vend case; Commonwealth Parl. Pap., 1914, No. 22 • 
. 
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desirable not to seek uniformity o:vermuch, but to encourage 
individuality by allowing each State to preserve a vigorous 
personality instead of reducing the position of the States 
to a nominal power alone. 
The Opposition also pointed out that there were several 
matters in which change of constitution seemed more 
necessary than in regard to the legislative authority of the 
Parliament, including especially the position of the Senate. 
That body, which was appointed to be in theory the repre-
sentative of the interests of the States as against the Lower 
House based on population, can hardly be said to have 
shown much activity in this regard, though here and there 
on an odd point, such as the building of a quarantine station 
in Tasmania, the local Senators secure by their unity the 
rejection of a proposal. Normally, however, the result of 
the system of election of the Senators has been to throw 
the power into the hands of the best organized party the 
Labour Party. Each State forms one electorate for the 
election of the three Senators whose office falls vacant 
every three years, the term of a Senator's office being six 
years. There is no preferential voting, and, as a State is 
an enormous area, an individual cannot possibly canvass 
it in any way. Therefore, the party which has its can-
didates and its electors best in hand has the great advantage 
of being able to send its three candidates out to the different 
parts of the State, and thus to cover the ground more or 
less effectively. A party with less excellent organization 
falls short in this important point. 
The inaccuracy of the present system as a means of 
representing the parties of the country can"' be best seen 
by the figures of the election of 1913 : the result for the 
Lower House, single member constituencies without pre-
ferential voting, was that thirty-eight members of the 
Opposition were elected, and thirty-seven of the Govern-
ment.1 The proportional figures on gross numbers would 
perhaps have been thirty-nine to thirty-six in favour of 
·the Government : at any rate, the Government was fairly 
, 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 7507, p. 59; Keith, Journ. Soc. Oomp. Leg. xiii. 526-41. 
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well matched in every way witl1 the Opposition., and lost 
a good many votes because of the referenda, which were 
voted on at the same time and defeated. On the other 
hand, while · the referenda agreed with the actual result 
of a small success to the Opposition by giving the party 
against an advantage of about ·25,000 on a vote of nearly two 
millions, the Senate saw the return of eleven Government 
;members to seven Opposition. By good organization the 
Opposition won all the seats in New South Wales and 
Tasmania, and one in Victoria, but none elsewhere. Clearly 
New South Wales should have returned one Labour member 
at least, if the representation of the State were to represent 
in any way the people: the same thing applies to Tasmania, 
while on the other hand Victoria, which would but for the 
intervention of an independent candidate have sent three 
Opposition candidates back, gave but one to the Opposition. 
In all the other three cases the Opposition should have 
had one member apiece, and the result should have been 
nine to nine. The position is, however, even worse than it 
seems, for at the election of 1910 the whole eighteen places 
of Senators were secured by Labour, while undoubtedly on 
any reasonable syst~m of voting the Opposition should have 
had at least six seats, so that in a House of thirty-six on the 
two election results they would have numbered fifteen 
votes, in place of a negligible seven. In the general election 
of 1914, out of thirty-six places contested they won but 
five, one by an accident, though they had about 48 per 
cent. of the voting strength.1 It is certain, therefore, that 
the present plan is open to the criticism that it tends to 
the undue swelling of majorities, and that it makes . the 
decision of an election depend on electoral organization 
and wire-pulling to an exaggerated degree. But the chance 
of any change is scarcely to be called worthy of considera-
tion. The Lower House could, indeed, if it felt able, force 
the reference to the people of a change in the mode of select-
ing Senators, but the difficulty of carrying in the teeth of 
· 
1 In the Lower House the Labour Party, with 52 per cent. of the votes, 
won under 57 per cent. of the representation. 
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Labour a measure which would attack them in their favourite 
stronghold can hardly be exaggerated. 
Curiously enough, by the side of the regular organization 
of the Commonwealth there has grown up a new feature 
of the life of Australia, the holding of periodic conferences 
among the Premiers and other ministers of the States in 
which problems affecting the States are discussed with the 
Commonwealth ministers or among the State Premiers, 
according to the nature of the subject-matter of the dis-
cussion. The flourishing character of these conferences is 
rather interesting, since at first sight at least it seems odd 
that it should be found desirable or necessary to continue 
meetings which before federation were the only effective 
means of co-operation between the States, but which after 
federation might seem to have sunk into unimportance. 
But this result has not been attained, by reason jn part of 
the independent position still occupied by the States, and 
by reason also of the fact that the Commonwealth and the 
States are placed by the agitation for the referenda in 
a position which is sometimes almost one of antagonism. 
The States, moreover, in the early days of the Common-
wealth especially, were desirous of discussing among them-
selves many of the financial questions affecting them and 
the Commonwealth, such as the long-vexed problem of 
how to settle the finance of the Commonwealth and States, 
which finally was disposed of by the adoption of the payment 
of twenty-five shillings per cap,ita, in place of the old and 
inconvenient three-quarters of the net customs and excise 
revenue, thus compelling the Commonwealth to raise three 
times more money than any sum required by her for 
expenditure from this source. On few of these occasions 
has much important business been done, but that of March 
1914 was noteworthy for its tone of hearty friendship 
between Commonwealth and States, a fact due to the 
presence in office of the brief-lived Liberal Government 
of Mr. Cook. The nature of the work done at these con-
ferences is indicated by the discussions which then took 
place: the problem of the use of the waters of the Murray 
• 
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River was to be solved by an elaborate scheme ben3fiting 
South Australia, Victoria, and New South Wales alike; 
the Commonwealth rendering the plan of constructing 
a huge system of weirs and locks practicable by bearing 
half the cost, while Australia would win half a million 
irrigated acres. It was also agreed to settle one of the 
chief disputes between the states and the Commonwealth 
by giving up the separate post office banking business 
transacted by the Commonwealth Savings Bank,! and allow-
ing the States to enjoy this popular mode of securing 
money cheaply, while in return the States were to transfer 
their banking accounts to the Commonwealth Bank, and 
thus give it the strength which it required. But while 
these two projects, .neither of which has matured, were 
instances of the possibility of co-operation, the conference 
left the old question of the position of the conversion of 
the railway gauge in practically the old impasse, by merely 
agreeing that the Interstate Commission should be asked 
to consider the possibilities of conversion : the error made 
through colonial jealousy in the early years of the founda-
tion of Australia has left Victoria and South Australia 
with 5' 3" gauge lines, and New South Wales with 4' 8~", 
while the Commonwealth has commenced its east to west 
line to join Kalgoorlie with Port Augusta, on the New 
South Wales gauge. The necessity of a uniform gauge for 
military defence would seem to be obvious; the funds -to 
carry it out are lacking. 
But though, like many other forms of conference, the 
conferences of State Premiers are not necessarily very 
fruitful 2 in results, and though sometimes the discussions 
seem to lead to no end, the value of the conferences is not 
to be underestimated, and the formal conference of May 
1915 at Sydney, when Mr. Fisher attended to represent 
the Commonwealth, and every State was represented, shows 
that the change of Government in the Commonwealth 
1 Cf. Mr. Fisher's proposals in 1912; Parl. Pap., Cd. 6091, p. 72. 
2 A Conference in August 1914 to agree on a policy as to food prices and 
conservation was not very effective; see Round Table, 1915, pp. 677 seq. 
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means no serious change of co-operation between the 
States and the Commonwealth. It is characteristic that 
the relations of the States and the Commonwealth do not 
by any means necessarily become closer through the simi-
larity of political faith between the parties in the Common-
vvealth and the States. The Labour Ministry of New South 
Wales in particular has shown signs of sharing the general 
dislike of seeing the engrossment of all authority by the 
Commonwealth, and it is only through the pressure of the 
Labour organization outside Parliament, under the leader-
ship of Mr. Watson, the first Labour Premier of the Common-
wealth, that the State Labour Party has been more or less 
effectively brought into line. 
The advantages of encouraging co-operation with the 
States have recently revealed themselves in an unexpected 
manner. The result of the general election of September 
1914, which was rashly provoked by the Government, was 
their complete and effective overthrow by the loss of four 
seats in the case of New South Wales and two in the case 
of Victoria, and the new Government were therefore under 
a clear duty to proceed with their policy, provided it 
was not inconsistent with the action requisite for the 
purpose of ending the war, so far as that lay in the power 
of the Commonwealth. The Opposition tendered to the 
Government the fullest measure of co-operation in all 
matters pertaining to the war, and even went beyond the 
Government in urging, with the Bulletin, that compulsion 
should be employed if necessary to secure adequate men 
for the aid of the mother country ; this view was also 
adopted by the Labour Government of South Australia 
which had come into office in 1915 as the result of the defeat 
of the Ministry of Mr. Peake at the general election of that 
year. The Government, on the other hand, were extremely 
anxious to carry out anything necessary in the interests of 
the Empire, but they thought that they were clearly entitled 
to proceed also with the . six referenda which had been 
rejected on May 31, 1913, but which they claimed \vould 
confer on the Commonwealth powers which it was absolutely 
• 
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essential that it should possess in time of war, _ and they 
proposed to add a seventh so that at the next general 
election for the Lower House the election should correspond 
with that of the Senators whose places would then be 
vacated. The position, therefore, threatened to degenerate 
into a case in which the Commonwealth would be distracted 
with a referendum just at the time when its whole energies 
should be concentrated on the successful carrying on of the 
preparations for war, and the feeling throughout the country 
was strongly against disunion, though the Labour Party 
observed that this could be avoided by the simple expedient 
of the Opposition conceding the principle that the referenda 
should be accepted, in which case the actual voting would 
cause no friction or difficulty. Fortunately at almost the 
last moment it was found possible amicably to arrange 
the issue by the agreement of the States-which, however, 
has not been approved by the Parliaments in five of them 
-to pass legislation conferring on the Commonwealth 
Parliament for the period of the war and for the term 
of one year thereafter the powers considered essential 
by the Commonwealth, though not the full powers which 
the Commonwealth wished to have, but rather those which 
were advocated in 1912 by the Premier of New South Wales. 
From both the federations the Union differs essentially 
because it is really, as its name proclaims it, a union. There 
seemed to be at first sight no place in the British Dominions 
where every circumstance made more for mere federation. 
Natal was a very British colony with an enormous native 
population in a barbaric condition and a British Indian 
population outnumbering the white population: the Cape 
was an old-established British-Dutch colony with a native 
franchise and a record of staid and sober government : 
the two Dutch republics, then British colonies, had never 
been able to agree in their independent existence to form 
a unity, and certainly had so developed on different lines 
that the idea of any close association seemed out of the 
question. Nor were the colonies in the slightest degree 
affected by mutual affection: the people of each had a very 
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modified opinion of the n1erits of those of the other Colonies, 
and very special idiosyncrasies, though in each Colony, 
but least in Natal, there was a certain similarity in the type 
of the ignorant farming Boer. On the other hand, the most 
active and pushing men ·Of the Dutch race were to be 
found in the Transvaal, while the most ignorant were also 
there in the out-of-the-way parts, and the Orange Free 
State contained the most conservative of the Dutch. 
The causes which compelled union in place of a real 
federation were economic pure and simple. The movement 
to federation became possible with responsible government, 
and not only did it become possible but it became necessary. 
As long as the Imperial Government controlled the fate of 
the Transvaal, the Colony could not take any step which 
was disagreeable to its neighbours, but its hands were 
u:p.tied at once when it was given liberty to guide its own 
course, and General Botha showed at _ an early date the 
decision of his Government to carry the day in South 
Africa. The Cape would naturally have expected to be the 
leading party in any discussion, but the Cape was economic-
ally unable to rival the Transvaal. If the Transvaal could 
not be satisfied, it could cease to let the Cape or Natal have 
any of its goods traffic, and the long lines of railway, built 
at great cost to convey the produce of the Rand to the 
coast and to carry back in return food stuffs and mining 
machinery and material, would lose the best part of the 
traffic, and the economic ruin of the Colonies was as good 
as certain. Moreover, the miners of the Transvaal were 
clamouring for cheaper imports and objecting to the pro-
tective policy of the Cape, which was binding on the Trans-
vaal while it was still bound by the Customs Union, and the 
Transvaal Government had only to threaten to refuse any 
renewal of that agreement to show the coast Colonies their 
danger, in view of the tempting nearness of Delagoa Bay 
and the fact that the Government of Mozambique and the 
Transvaal were on terms of marked intimacy. 
But, while the aim of the Transvaal was bent on the closer 
union of all South Africa, it was for long the view that 
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there should merely be a federation, and it was argued 
conclusively in favour of this view that the essential differ-
ences between the Colonies were exactly those which caused 
federation and not union to be inevitable. The Colonies 
had common interests, but differed greatly, and therefore 
should be allowed to be unhampered in individual growth, 
subject to the existence of a union_ to represent all South 
Africa and to deal with questions of common interest. 
It had been pointed out by Lord Selborne in the memor-
andum 1 as ·to the position of South African affairs which he 
wrote at the request of the Government of the Transvaal, 
that the union of the Colonies of South Africa would greatly 
promote independence of the Imperial authority, which was 
quite impossible as long as the different Colonies disagreed 
among themselves and one or other appealed to the Imperial 
Government to use its influence in respect of the polioy 
of another Colony. But when the attempt to frame a 
constitution was made, the federal solution was felt to be 
impossible, so many and important were the things on 
which united action was required, and so comparatively 
few those matters on which the provinces could engage in 
separate action. This was due in large measure to the 
nature of the country. To take an obvious instance, cattle 
disease and other agricultural troubles could not be allowed 
to be dealt with on four different systems without grave 
danger to the different Colonies, and therefore agriculture 
must be capable of being controlled by the central govern-
ment. The railways must be run on one principle and 
through traffic facilitated, and so the railways, which in 
Australia are state controlled and in Canada are largely 
privately owned under Dominion control, but in South 
Africa are nearly all state owned, had to be managed by 
one central body. Needless to say, customs and defence 
must be national, with the post office and statistics, naviga-
tion and all that pertains thereto. Moreover, there must be 
a uniform native policy : that had been decided from the 
beginning of things as essential in any federal scheme, for 
t. Parl. Pap., Cd. 3564. 
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the Native Affairs Commission of 1903-5, on which were 
representatives of all the Colonies as well as of Rhodesia 
and Basutoland, had reported in a sense which showed that 
the management of such affairs was far too chaotic and 
confused by reason of the different policies of the four 
Colonies.1 · 
There remained, therefore, nothing but union as a prac-
ticable course, and the decision to set up provincial councils 
and provincial administrations was only in the first place 
an effort to meet the natural difficulty which would have 
arisen, had th~ apparatus of government at once been 
removed from the four capitals to one only, and had no 
places been left for local politicians. · In the second place, 
it is certain that local government is important in the case 
of South Africa, and it is appreciated, and therefore the 
setting up of the councils was an effort to encourage an 
active spirit of local interest in affairs. But the essential 
features of the whole constitution are that it is a unitary 
one and not a federation in any real degree. 
This fact is sufficiently sho,vn by the powers of the federal 
Parliament which are quite inconsistent with those of the · 
Union Parliament. The latter has the power to abolish 
the provinces and to alter their constitution as it thinks fit, 
subject only to the nominal requirement of reservation of 
any Bill so abolishing the Provincial Councils ·or abridging 
their powers. In the second place, the laws of the provinces 
have validity even when within the ambit of their powers, 
only so far ~s they do not conflict with a law of the Union, 
and the Parliament of the Union has unfettered power to 
legislate on every topic which the Provincial Council can 
deal with, though it may be granted that the Union Parlia-
ment should as a matter of courtesy refrain from gratui-
tously occupying the field left to the provinces. But that 
field is again subject to many limitations, part of which are 
in the hands of the Government of the Union. A provincial 
council may legislate as to roads, ponts, outspans, and 
bridges, but not as to bridges connecting two provinces, 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 2399. 
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as to markets and pounds, fish and game preservation, 
hospitals and charitable institutions, municipal councils, 
divisional councilf? and other similar local institutions, 
elementary education for a period of five years and there-
after until Parliament otherwise decides, and direct taxation 
within the province for the purpose of raising a revenue 
for provincial purposes. Bt1t to raise money it must 
conform with directions la.id down by Parliament and 
obtain the sanction of the Governor-General in Council ; 
agriculture is in its province only so far as Parliament 
thinks fit : local works and undertaltings are subject to it 
only if not ports and railways, and any work may be 
declared a national work by Parliament and constructed 
by its authority by agreement with the Provincial Council 
or otherwise. The Council may also deal with any n1atters 
which the Governor-General in Council considers of merely 
local or private nature and with any subjects sent to it by 
Parliament. It can also impose fi11e or imprisonment for 
a breach of laws made within the ambit of its power.1 
· Moreover, when the Provincial Council has passed a Bill, 
it must receive the assent of the Governor-General in 
Council, and this assent is only given if the Union Govern-
ment· think that it ought to be given, acting on its own 
discretion.2 -The short period since the origin of the 9-overn-
ment of the Union shows that there is not the slightest 
prospect of any undue readiness to yield to provincial 
wishes in these matters . 
~ Further, the control of the executive government of the 
province is largely in the hands of the Union Government. 
The executive administration of provincial affairs in matters 
over which the province has legislative power is entrusted 
to an executive committee consisting of four persons, 
whether members of the Council or non-members, elected 
by its members by ~eans of the transferable vote on the 
principle of proportional representation, and they are joined 
_with rthe Administrator of the province, a Union officer, 
~ho has a vote in their deliberations and also a ·casting vote. 
1 9 Edw. VII, c. 9, s. 85. 2 Ibid., s. 90 . 
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Further, his importance is increased by the fact that he can 
act for the Union Government in matters not within the 
power of the Council, if authorized to do so, and in so acting 
is not bound to consult the committee at all. The members 
of the committee need not even be members of the Provincial 
Council, and they hold their offices from general election to 
general election independently of the views of the Council, 
so that there is no responsible government in the manage-
ment of the affairs of the province, though there is of 
course some approach to it in that the members are elective, 
and are not permanent. Moreover, the further control of 
the Administrator is secured in that he must recommend 
any appropriation of money for governmental purposes, 
and all !flOnies can only be issued on his warrant, after such 
appropriation,! and the accounts of the province are audited 
by an Auditor-General, appointed by the Governor-General 
in Council and removable by the same authority . 
.A_t first the whole expenditure of the provinces was 
subject to the approval of the Governor-General, and the 
revenue was paid by the Government from appropriations 
made by Parliament, the only fixed amount being that for 
education, other than higher education, when the sum paid 
was based on the appropriations of the colonial Parliaments 
for that purpose in 1908. By Act No. 10 of 1913 2 the 
financial relations of the provinces to the Union are regulated 
up to April 1, 1917, in accordance with the consideration 
given to the question by a commission appointed by the 
Union under the terms of the Act of Union. The province 
is given a subsidy . from the Union, certain re"\Tenues are 
transferred to it, and others are assigned, and it is empowered 
to raise additional revenues in certain ways. The subsidy 
is to be half the normal expenditure of the province, inclu~­
ing in that sum expenditure by divisional councils, school 
boards, and native councils out of sums r~ised locally, but, 
if in any year after March 31, 1914, the normal expenditure 
exceeds that of the year before by more than 7 ~ per cent., 
1 E;xcept in special cases under s. 17 of Act No. 10 of 1913. 
2 Parl. Pap., Cd. 7507, pp. 85-90. 
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only a third of the excess will be allowed in providing for t:':le 
expenditure for the next year. The expenditure of the 
province is to be classed as normal and non-recurrent, the 
former including all expenditure on administration generally, 
the cost of carrying out the matters entrusted to the 
province where it does not fall under the head capital 
expenditure, interest and sinking fund payments in respect 
of advances made to meet capital expenditure, and the cost 
of construction and maintenance of roads, unless the cost 
of construction but not of maintenance is allowed by the 
Treasury to be treated as capital expenditure. Capital 
expenditure covers expenditure on the erection or improve-
ment of any building, bridge, or any permanent work or 
undertaking, provided that the expenditure on a building 
must exceed £500, and that on a bridge or other work 
£1,500. The provinces of Natal and the Orange Free State 
receive also additional subsidies of £100,000 a year. The 
subsidies are to be estimated by the Administrator an~ to 
be paid in the financial year to which they apply, but 
readjustments are to be made subsequently. The subsidies 
may be readjusted if the province ceases to be expected to 
deal with any matter at present entrusted to it. For 
capital expenditure, loans are to be made by Parliament at 
interest not over 5 per cent. to be repaid by equal half-
yearly instalments within forty years. 
The province receives also the revenues derived from 
certain fees, dues, and licences including hospital fees, 
education fees in respect of elementary education, totalizator 
fees, auction dues, game licences, certain dog licences, trade 
]icences, and other miscellaneous receipts. The Councils 
may legislate as to the raising or management of such 
revenues and may amend the laws of the Union in 
regard to these matters. But a Provincial Council cannot 
make an ordinance relating to licences to trade so as to 
take away any right existing at the commencement of 
the Act to appeal to a court of law against a refusal 
to renew any licences, this provision being intended to 
preserve the appeal given to British-Indians against 
( 
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refusals of the Natal municipal bodies to renew existing 
licences.1 · 
Provision is also made for the enlargement of the authority 
of the provinces : if the matter is one which falls under the 
heads specified in the second schedule to the Act, the Governor .. 
General may with the concurrence of the executive com-
mittee determine whether the additional matter shall be so 
entrusted, while on any other matter an Act of Parliament 
shall be necessary. When any power is allotted, the 
Provincial Council may make ordinances in respect of the 
transferred matters. The matters scheduled include the 
destruction of noxious weeds and vermin; the registration 
and control of dogs outside municipal areas; the experi-
mental cultivation of sugar, tea, and vines save as these 
matters concern the administration of the laws relative to 
diseases of plants ; the making of grants to agricultural 
and kindred societies not being registered under any law; 
the administration of libraries, museums, art galleries, 
herbaria and botanic gardens, excepting the governmental 
libraries at Capetown and Pretoria; the control of places 
reserved out of crown lands by the Union Government as 
public resorts or as of historical or scientific interest ; the 
administration of cemeteries and casual wards; the distri-
bution of poor relief ; the regulation of opening and closing 
of shops a~d regulation of hours of shop assistants ; the 
administration of the Labour Colonies Act, 1909, of the Cape of 
Good Hope; the establishment and administration of town-
ships ; the licensing and control of vehicles and of other 
means of conveyance using roads under provincial control ; 
the regulation of horse-racing and betting and of totalizators. 
In addition to · the transferred revenues certain revenues 
of the Union are after collection to be paid to the provinces, 
namely those derived under the laws affecting transfers of 
or successions to immovable property, revenues under laws 
regarding licences for the sale or supply of intoxicating 
1 See above, pp. 206, 213. The power of a Province to discriminate 
on colour grounds is denied ; Williams v. Johannesburg Municipality, 
[1915] T.P.D. 106. 
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liquor, and in the case of the Transvaal the revenue froiil 
licences for the employment of natives. These matters shall 
remain under the sole legislative control of the Union. 
In the case of Natal a special grant is to be made equal to 
the amounts derived by the municipal and local authorities 
from trading and liquor licences. The powers of Provincial 
Councils as to licences are further limited to a considerable 
extent by forbidding the receipt of revenue or the making 
of ordinances in respect of licences for commercial travellers, 
companies or banks, or insurance and friendly associations, 
newspapers, gold dealers, brokers and cutters of precious 
stones, for prospecting for metals, manufacturing cigarettes, 
dealing in arms, ammunition or explosives, engagement or 
recruitment of natives, or the ownership or use of boilers; 
nor may any province exact licence fees which may be 
exacted by any municipal or local authority. 
The Act gives also to the Administrator authority to allow 
the expenditure of money in cases of emergency despite the 
fact that no appropriation has been made, if postponement 
would mean serious injury. The total sum so to be author-
ized shall not exceed £25,000, and the expenditure must be 
submitted at the next ensuing Council at latest, to the 
Provincial Council for appropriation. 
The expectation with which the provinces 'vere set up 
has hardly been in the full . degree carrie<\ out, as it was 
probably thought that they would not be marked by party 
feeling to any great extent. The Transvaal, ·however, has 
proved that the expectation is not exactly justified. The 
deportation of the workers at the beginning of 1914 roused 
much bitterness of feeling and the Provincial Council became 
the scene of strife. The Council determined to enter upon 
a course of resistance to the control of the Union Govern-
ment, by setting up select committees in place of the executive 
committee of the province as entitled to the powers of an 
executive under responsible government, and claiming to 
be entitled to fuller powers and to complete freedom in the 
use of the powers which they enjoyed. This would have 
meant the reduction of the Administrator, both in his 
CANADA~ COMMONWEALTH, AND UNION 489 
capacity as head of the administration and in his capacity 
as the servant of the Government of the Union, to the 
position of an ordinary Governor or a Lieutenant-Governor 
in a Canadian province who ,normally acts on the advice of 
ministers; and the Union Government could not be expected . 
in an~y way to agree -to a change in the existing relations 
of the two authorities, even had it been in the legal power 
of the province to do so, as it was clearly not.1 Nor will the 
Union assent to .the desire of the Provincial Council that all 
taxation should be based on land values, though it has allowed 
the Council to establish various rules for itself on other points. 
One of the difficulties in the way of the Union which 
caused some trouble was the language question: in the 
Cape there was , limited equality of the Dutch and the 
English languages confined to the use of them both in 
Parliament, but in Natal there was no such equality at all, 
and the provisions of the constitutions of the Transvaal 
and the Orange River Colony gave Dutch privileges, but 
not full equality. It was, however, decided that the grant 
of full equality should be accorded, on the ground that 
only thus could the Union be satisfactorily brought about. 
It is not easy to accept the view that this concession 
was desirable: it was absurd in a place like Natal to flood 
the country with useless duplicates in Dutch which nobody 
wanted to read, and even in the Cape the practice of printing 
matter in Dutch had by a commonsense Ministry, whether 
British or Boer, been restricted to documents which were of 
some real interest to the Dutch-speaking race. The result 
of union was not merely to confirm an existing rule : it was 
definitely to give Dutch a far higher place than it had 
hitherto occupied, and nothing but the agreement of the 
South African parties would have rendered the concession 
a reasonable one. The best excuse for the policy is that the 
future of English in the Union is assured, since Dutch will 
never be a language of any literary or political or com-
mercial importance in the world and the speakers of Dutch 
must perforce learn English. But this is not the_ideal of the 
1 See Round Table, 1915, pp. 573, 739, 740. 
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Dutch at all, and the first few years of union were rendered 
difficult by the determined efforts of Mr. Hertzog, whose 
loyalty to the Empire was found singularly wanting in 
1914-15, to force a bilingual system of education upon the 
schools throughout the Union. This was brought about 
by a device 1 in which, in return for the Orange Free State 
modifying its compulsory Dutch teaching, the other pro-
vinces went further in admitting the teaching of Dutch 
than had been done before. The system as finally agreed 
upon in effect aims at bilingualism, but does not make it, 
' 
as formerly in the Free State, compulsory. Up to the 
fourth standard the child shall be taught in. its ;home lan-
guage, but the parent may insist on the pupil being gradually 
accustomed to be taught also through the medium of the 
other language. After the fourth standard both languages 
are to be used unless the parent prefers one only, and in 
either case there must be provision for efficient teaching in 
separate classes, if the pupils are numerous enough. More-
over, the other language of the two shall always be taught 
in all schools, unless the parent of the pupil objects. The 
teachers in future will be expected to pass the highest 
examination in both languages when seeking a certificate : 
the medium of examination is to be chosen by the teacher, 
and he must pass one language on the higher standard 
and one at least on the lower. But no English-speaking 
or Dutch-speaking teacher in office when the laws in the 
various provinces came into force was to be penalized, if 
otherwise · competent for his duties, by reason of lack of 
knowledge of the other language. 
In Australia the language question has never appeared 
in a practical form, though here and there may be found 
villages of German parents who have little knowledge of 
English. In Canada, on the other hand, French in Quebec 
naturally maintains its position, and it is by law given equal 
rights in the Parliaments of the Dominion and of Quebec, 
and in the law courts of the Dominion and of Quebec.2 
1 See Parl. Pap., Cd. 6091, pp. 81, 86, 87. 
2 30 and 31 Viet. c. 3, s. 133. 
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But in Ontario also 1 there has been of late an increasing 
effort on the part of the French-speaking section of the 
people to insist on the practical recognition of the French 
tongue, though it has no legal rights whatever., The 
examination of the educational system of the province 
undertaken by the Government resulted in the realization 
of the fact that in many schools in the French-speaking 
districts of the province the use of English was systemati-
cally regarded as undesirable and no teaching was taking 
place in it, or if it was being taught it was taught in such 
a way as to be of no real value to the pupils. The action 
of the teachers was clearly to be reprehended : the educa-
tion system of Ontario is based on instruction through 
English, with an exception in case of German and French 
communities where, the home language not being English, 
the use of English as a medium would at first be absurd, 
but it is intended that the use of English should be gradually 
increased, as should obviously be the case in a British 
Dominion. The Government as the result of the investiga- · 
tion carried out by its commissioner decided that the use of 
French or German as a medium of instruction and means 
of communication should not be continued beyond a child's 
second year of school life, that the instruction of children 
in English should begin immediately after the entry of · 
a child upon school life, and that additional inspection to 
secure this result should be provided, while government 
grants would be confined to schools which had competent. 
English teachers on their staffs. It is characteristic of the 
feeling created by these subjects that the decision of the 
Ontario Government was a source of bitter complaint in 
Quebec and denounced as a deliberate attack on the French 
element of the population. 
The example of Quebec undoubtedly proves that the 
grant of official encouragement to a foreign language in a 
British possession has grave disadvantages from the point 
of view of unity. It is undeniable that until the European 
War it would have been quite impossible to predict that the 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 6091, pp. 65, 66; Round Table, 1915, pp. 661-9 . 
• 
• 
492 IMPERIAL UNITY AND THE DOMINIONS 
French-Canadians in any substantial n~mbers would shew 
themselves eager to take part in the wars of the Empire, and 
of course, e-ven now, when they are fighting with and for 
France, their response has not been comparable to that of 
the British. The bond of language is a strong one for pur-
poses of separation, and it is idle to deny that a very large 
proportion of the French in Quebec neither know nor wish 
to know any other tongue. · Real fellow feeling in other 
matters is thus impossible, as is indicated by the fact that 
· the division between the Irish Catholics and the French 
Catholics in Canada is extremely marked. The case is of 
course far worse with the masses of Galicians, Ruthenians, or 
other similar peoples rwhom the foolish immigration policy 
of the Dominion of Canada has allowed to be settled on its 
western lands. These communities are often determined 
not to be educated: they ignore the ordinary laws of society, 
and their presence in Canada will steadily make for the 
introduction there of all the evils of the system of the older 
civilization in over-crowding, lack of independence of the 
workers, and so forth. 
In the case of the Union alone is there any prospect, or 
indeed possibility, of further addition of territory on an 
important scale : that Newfoundland should ultimately 
become part of Canada is suggested by geographical con-
ditions, and was foreshadowed in the British .North America 
Act, 1867. But while the other changes foreseen by that 
Act have been fulfilled, and all the continent of North 
America so far as it is British is now under the Dominion of 
Canada, and the greater part of it assigned by the new 
legislation of 1912 1 to the existing provinces, leaving to the 
Dominion under her direct control only the far north, the 
Island of Newfoundland has remained steadily outside the 
circle. The temptations to enter the Union would of course 
have to be mainly financial, and the difficulty is that the 
Government of the Dominion has not yet been able to see its 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 6863, pp. 17, 18; Acts, cc. 40 (Ontario); 45 (Quebec); 
32 (Manitoba). The Dominion reserves full control of Indian affairs and 
lands, and in Manitoba of public lands also . 
• 
CANADA, CQMMONWEALTH, AND UNION 493 
way to give terms which could be ·accepted by the Colony. 
Moreover, prior to 1904 the existence of the French rights in 
Newfoundland, and the controversies which they excited, 
led to the reluctance of the Dominion to take upon itself 
the troubles which would result from having those thorny 
questions on hand. Nor, until 1910, was the difficulty with 
the United States disposed of more or less completely. 
But, while intrigues for the bringing of the Colony into the 
fold are a regular a;;musement of the statesmen of the Do-
minion and the Colony alike, there is no immediate prospect 
that the fishermen and the merchants will be convinced that 
a change of political status would benefit them financially, 
unless the Dominion is prepared to pay dearly for the 
privilege of including the Colony. The power of appointing 
Senators from .the Newfoundland Ministry of the day and 
other means of providing remuneration fqr these ministers 
might easily result in the readiness of a Ministry to see the 
change accomplished. Indeed ministers have always been 
accused, probably with a good deal of truth, of having the 
possibility of federation before them at all times, but the , 
terms of the Dominion must be improved a good deal before 
they can .be accepted, or in the alternative the Colony must 
suffer such a set-back as will induce the people to accept 
much less than they want. The change, however, if and when 
accomplished, would be of minor consequence from the point 
of view of the Empire. It is inconceivable that connexion 
with the ·Dominion would make the Newfoundlanders less 
loyal, though it is true that they would lose in status, and 
also perhaps in other ways not material, from ceasing to be 
autonomous, and becoming subject to the wirepullers at 
Ottawa. Moreover, they are far from Ottawa, and it is 
quite possible that development would merely be retarded 
by union, for the eyes of Canada are set, and will for some 
time be set, on the west and on the prairie provinces. 
The further question arises in the case of Australia, 
whether New Zealand and the Commonwealth might not be 
united to form one powerful Dominion of Australasia. The 
proposal, however, seems one which can hardly be accepted 
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by New Zealand without great loss in many respects. The 
Dominion is large enough in area and in potential population 
to become a powerful country if not a great one, and her 
interest and wants are in many small ways very different 
from those of the Commonwealth. The Central Government 
of the united dominion must lie in Australia, and the power 
of such a central government effectively to exercise authority 
over New Zealand without much friction seems very doubtful. 
But the failure of every effort from ·1890 onwards to solve 
the problem of including the Dominion in the federation is 
a distinct proof of the difficulty of carrying federation effec-
tively beyond certain limits. 
In the case of the Union the possibility of attaining 
Rhodesia is one of the aims of the Union Government, and 
Rhodesia was allowed to participate in the constitution-
making of the Union. But Rhodesia has shown itself 
unwilling to merge its future in that of the Union. The 
position of the country is greatly complicated by the presence 
of the governing and other powers of the British South Africa 
Company, by which, under the terms of its charter of 
October 29, 1889, the administration of the country is 
carried on, subject to certain changes made by subsequent 
legislation. From ·1903 onwards there has been the growing 
desire of the settlers to secure the freer development of the 
country apart from the management of the Company, which, 
having commercial as well as administrative functions to 
fulfil, is regarded by them as incompetent to manage the 
two successfully~ The Company, on their part, while pre-
pared to concede in principle that the administrative power 
of the Company should be brought to an end, have contended 
that their rights in the lands of the country and their claims 
to be repaid thereby if not otherwise, for all their expendi-
ture on the conquest and administration of the country, in 
so far as these sums have not been repaid by administrative 
revenue, should be secured to them : the nature of the sums 
·can be judged fro·m the proposals in 1903-4, which would 
have given the settlers control in exchange for the acceptance 
of liability for a debt of about £7,500,000, of which only a 
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third would be represented by sums to be spent on develop-
ment, the rest being dead-weight debt. This proposal could 
not be accepted as the country could not bear such a burden, 
and the Imperial Government refused to assist, and in 1905 
vetoed the proposal to raise a loan of £250,000 for advances 
to farmers on the security of the administrative revenue . 
. In 1907 the Company adopted the policy of making a dis-
tinction between the commercial and administrative aspect 
of their business transactions, but without any approval 
from the Imperial Government, while there was steadily 
growing in the country a determination to question the title 
of the Company to the control of the land, on the ground that 
the control of the land was vested in the Company merely 
as an administrative body, and that it had no proprietary 
right to the land, so that, if it were deprived of its adhlinis-
trative powers, the proprietary claims it asserted would dis-
appear, and the new administration would have complete 
control over all land not lawfully alienated or leased. The 
Company in its turn relied on its conquest of the land plus 
its concessions from Lobengula, and its occupation to give 
it a proprietary title. In 1908 and 1909 efforts ·were made 
to induce the Imperial Government to settle this dispute, 
but the Secretary of State declined to intervene, seeing that 
an effective settlement was only possible if both parties 
agreed, and the Company declined to agree. But the Im--
perial Government insisted in 1911 1 on the issue of an Order 
in Council to carry out the promise of a wider representation 
of the people of the country by the abolition of the nominee 
majority in the part elective Legislative Council set up by the 
Order in Council of 1903, and by the new Order the Legisla-
ture was made to consist of five nominee to seven elective 
members in place of equal numbers of each. In 1912 
a movement of some strength apparently developed itself 
in favour of ultimate union with the Union, but in 19132 the 
Company made a new statement of policy modifying in the 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 7264. 
2 lbid9, Cd. 7645, pp. 31-7. For the proposed e;xpenditure for 1913-14 
see Cd. 7708. 
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direction of greater freedom their position of 1907. They 
agreed to increase the Legislature to eight no'minee with 
twelve elective members, to carry out more completely the 
separation of administrative and co,mmercial revenue, by 
taking care that the commercial depart.ment paid its obliga-
tions to the administration in cash and on the same terms as 
the ordinary public, to transfer all administrative buildings 
to the administration without extra cost, and to surrender 
some additional sources of revenue to the administration. 
They announced their intention to favour responsible govern-
ment if that were desired, in which case no claim would be 
made for the initial expenditure of the Company on the 
acquisition and defence of the country, which the Company 
would put down as the cost of its winning control over its 
assets in land and mines. They moreover expressed readi-
ness to ~rrange . for loans for capital expenditure desired for 
administrative purposes, and agreed that after October 29, 
1914, they would not, if the charter came to an end in respect 
of their administrative privileges, claim under the terms of 
clause ·aa of the charter the value of public wotks carried out 
since October 29, 1914, if on the whole period the adminis-
tration had paid its way and, if it had not, the amount 
claimed would only be the actual value or the deficit in the 
total cost of administration as compared with administra-
tive revenue, whichever should be the less. Partly as a 
result of this, and partly as the result of the growing feeling 
of distrust of the Union in consequence of Mr. Hertzog's 
anti-British propaganda, the electors at the elections for the 
reformed Council to which five new elected members were 
.. 
to be added, refused to return any candidate suspected of 
leanings towards the merger of Rhodesia in the Union, and 
the Legislative Council thereupon asked 1 that the existing 
form of company government should be continued for the 
time being, a proposal rendered necessary by the fact that 
the Crown under the charter had the power to alter the 
administrative position at twenty-five years from its grant, 
and thereafter at ten~year intervals, but that there should be 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 7645, pp. 10, 11. 
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made arrangements to allow of the introduction of respon-
sible government when the country was fit for such govern-
ment. It was further asked that the audit of the accounts 
of the Company should be placed in the hands of an auditor 
who should not be an ordinary servant of the Company, 
that loans on the security of the Company's administrative 
revenue should be allowed, and that any member of the 
Council should be permitted to propose appropriations after 
provision had been made for civil service, police, and the 
maintenance of law and order. The Imperial Government, 
in consultation with the Company, arranged that there should 
be issued a supplemental charter,! providing that, if the 
Legislature should resolve by a majority that responsible 
government should be introduced, this could be done if the 
Imperial Government thought fit, but that otherwise the 
charter should not be changed as regards the general prin-
ciples of administration. They also agreed to the appoint-
ment of the Auditor or Auditor-General being made, like 
those of the judges, one to which the approval of the Secre-
tary of State was necessary, the same approval being requisite 
for dismissal. The proposal to allow any member of the 
Legislature to propose appropriation was rejected, on the 
ground that the responsibility for expenditure must still rest 
with the Company, which under the Order in Council of 1911 
retains the control of all initiative of expenditure and taxa-
tion, and without whose consent no legislation affecting 
their rights can be passed. But the Imperial Government 
approved of a modified system of raising loans : it rejected 
the simple expedient of the issue of bonds charged on the 
administrative revenue, proposed by the Company, but 
agreed that the Company should advance monies to the 
administration for the purpose of carrying out works which 
could not be defrayed from ordinary revenues, the sums to 
be repaid from such revenue as rapidly as possible, say in 
twelve years, on the understanding that, if the administra-
tion of the Company terminated, the Company would have 
no right to the repayment of the sums outstanding, but would. 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 7970. The charter is dated March 13, 1915. 
1874 I i 
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have a right to the cost of the works executed, in so far as 
they had not been defrayed from the balance, if any, between 
administrative revenue and expenditure, an ingenious device 
for securing due economy by both the administration and 
the Co.mpany. , 
The land _ question, which had been of course keenly 
debated for the whole period, was for the moment disposed 
of by being referred to .the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council for its consideration and determination under the 
provisions of the Judicial Committee Act, 1833. T'he Com-
mittee decided to hear the various interests involved, includ-
ing that of the natives who might have a claim to the land, 
by counsel, and the Company und·ertook to place their case 
on record for discussion. 
2. THE PossiBILITY OF IMPERIAL FEDERATION. 
The summary of the chief points in the federations already 
existing in the Empire will bear out the view that the 
creation of federal government is not merely a matter of 
great difficulty, but that the working of such a government 
adds very considerably to the complication of existence, and 
from one point of view retards progress _by absorbing in the 
legal difficulties which arise much intellect and Inuch effort. 
In Canada, for instance, there is considerable need for legis-
lation as to the pollution of waters of various kinds, but the 
carrying of such legislation is hampered by the admitted fact 
that it is· very doubtful if the legislative authority to pass 
such legislation is vested in the Dominion Parliament at all, 
and the theory that clranges of law can well be effected by 
the parallel action of a number of legislatures is one which 
would not be entertained very readily by any person who 
has observed the great difficulty experienced in the United 
States, or in any other federation, in securing any real 
similarity of legislation by different legislatures. There is 
the highest authority for saying that the provinces of Canada 
consistently differ in detail in their legislation on every 
conceivable topic, and these divergencies are very trouble-
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some in business transactions : each province has its own 
ideas as to company law and of insurance, and if the Do-
minion had not been the sole authority in matters of patents, 
trade-marks, and copyrights, it would doubtless have its own 
laws in respect of these points also. To ask one legislature 
to follow the precedent of another and to expect it to do so 
faithfully is futile : it is an essential part of human nature 
to seek to improve on whatever is put before one, and the 
tendency to do so is always felt by legislatu~s : slight im-
provements are made on the model, involving other changes 
and spoiling the uniformity, even if the principles of the 
legislation are adopted. 
lVIoreover, there is always present in a federation beside 
the constant questions of ultra vires, the hampering of the 
Government, and the weakening of the Legislature and the 
Executive, the possibility of quite serious disputes bet.ween 
the federation and its me.mbers. These disputes are ren-
dered free from real danger to the Empire when they occur 
merely in one area : in the Dominion or the Commonwealth 
the mere physical proximity renders the seriousness of dis-
agreement infinitely less than the dangers which would be 
incurred in the case of disagreement between members of 
a federation which are separated by the sea. It is more 
difficult in a single area with facilities for close intercourse 
between the members of the several political divisions for 
those feelings of hostility to spring up which make a dispute 
between the members of federation a real danger to the 
federation. The danger to Canada from the attitude of 
British Columbia in the seventies lay precisely in the fact 
that the Province was not united by railway with the rest 
of the Dominion, and that it felt that, if the agreement to 
unite it were not carried out, it would cease in fact, and there-· 
fore should cease in law to be part of what was in effect 
a foreign State. Similarly, had the failure of the Common-
wealth to carry out the making of the railway between South 
Australia and Western Australia been indefinitely prolonged, 
there might have grown up a dangerous feeling of discontent-
ment in the west : even as it is, there is clear trace of a growth 
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of different national sentiment in the west, and it is well that 
the railway will not be long unfinished : the mere needs of 
defence are in the long run not more important than the 
fact that national unity in the Con1monwealth can never be 
complete without real possibilities of . free intercourse. It 
is the same cause which makes the people of Newfoundland 
in many respects essentially distinct from those of Canada : 
they are not in immediate contact with the Dominion, and 
their outlook is not identical with that of the Dominion. 
Similarly the great and probably fatal objection to . unity 
between New Zealand and Australia lies in the fact of the 
distance between them which would render the government 
of the Dominion by a Federal Government, with its abode 
somewhere in Australia, obnoxious. 
These are very obvious considerations, and they struck 
powerfully home to the members of the movement for Im-
perial federation who, in the period from 1880 on, sought to 
secure some measure of Imperial unity by means of federa-
tion. The problem in one aspect was at that time more 
promising, in that the Australian colonies were still quite 
separate, and it was not therefore a question of dealing with 
so strongly formed a national unit as the Commonwealth of 
Australia. Moreover, at that time the dependence of t:he 
colonies on the protection of the Mother Country was more 
obvious and undeniable: the first assistance of any serious 
kind, and then only valuable as a token of sentiment, was 
given in the Sudan expeditions of 1884-5 by Canada and 
New South Wales, and the policy of naval development had 
neither been conceived by the colonies nor favoured by the 
Imperial Government. An offer to give a colony a share in 
the control of the Empire meant therefore more then than it 
would now, when in Australia there is a national Govern-
ment 'vith very wide authority. But the Imperial Govern-
ment in summoning the first Colonial Conference of 1887, 
which was an assemblage of notables and not a political body 
proper, th~ representation including every part of the 
Empire, and not merely representatives of Governments in 
po\\rer in the self-governing colonies, as in 1897 and 1902, 
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through the Secretary of State for the Colonies, expressly 
ruled out the question of federation as ~ matter for serious 
consideration. In 1891 the efforts of the movement elicited 
from Lord Salisbury 1 the express assertion that the orga-
nizers should frame a definite scheme, a challenge which they 
could not meet, and the movement for the time died away. 
Interest in some degree transferred itself to the preparatory 
matter of the federation of the Commonwealth, and at the 
Conferences of 1897, 1902, and 1907, the idea of federation 
was not mooted : indeed, the first two Conferences showed 
contentment in the main with the existing arrangements of 
the Empire. 
It was therefore all the more striking when Sir Joseph 
Ward, the Prime Minister of the Dominion of New Zealand, 
at the. Imperial Conference of 1911 2 introduced the subject 
of the possibility of the creation of federation for the Empire. 
The reception of his proposal was rendered difficult and 
unsatisfactory because of a defect for which he must be held 
to have been responsible. The resolution which was put 
forward by New Zealand for consumption by the Conferen~e 
was not the one which he actually submitted, and indeed 
differed from it as fundamentally as any two proposals on 
one subject could well do. The original proposal was that 
there should be an Imperial Council of State with represen .. 
tatives from all the constituent parts of the Empire, whether 
self-governing or not, in theory and in practice advisory to 
the Imperial Government on all questions affecting the 
interest of the Oversea Dominions. The proposal had 
resemblance to the views expressed by Mr. Chamberlain in 
1897 and 1902, and was in the main line of development of 
Imperial ideals, but that resolution was never discussed at 
the Conference, as in place of it Sir Joseph Ward set out 
a new plan, one for an Imperial Parliament of Defence, by 
which he meant naval defence only, as alone being common 
to all parts of the Empire. He proposed that it should 
be a. genuine Parliament elected in such manner as each 
1 Sir C. Tupper, Recollections of Sixty Years, pp. 251, 257. 
2 Parl. Pap., Cd. 5745. 
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Dominion thought fit, as regards the members representing 
that Dominio11 in the Parliament. The basis of represen- . 
• 
tation was to be one member for 200,000 of population, 
which, on the then population of the Dominions and the 
mother country, would give the latter 220 members, Canada 
.37, Australia 25, New Zealand 6, South Africa 7, and New-
foundland 2, or just under 300 members. These would con-
stitute the Lower House, and there would be an Upper House 
or Senate, of twelve members, two chosen by each of the 
members of the federation to represent them. The execu-
tive power corresponding to the legislative power of the 
Parliament would be vested in a body of fifteen, of whom not 
more than one should be a Senator. The legislative powers 
of the Parliament would extend to naval defence and to 
treaties, and questions of war and peace, treaties mainly in 
their relation to such naval defence. The Parliament would 
have no power to deal with taxation, but it would be entitled 
to be provided with funds for the first ten years of its exis-
tence by the Dominions, and the Imperial Parliament would 
have a right to decide the amounts to be contributed to the 
expenditure to be incurred, on the basis that the Dominions 
were to pay per capita for defence purposes only half of what 
the people of the United Kingdom paid per capita, but were 
to contribute equally on that basis for other purposes. The 
mode of payment after the first ten years would be left to 
be decided by the Dominions themselves. As a supplement 
to the scheme the proposal put forward the suggestion that 
the Dominions should raise ten shillings a head for naval 
defence, giving a revenue of £6,500,000, sufficient to build 
three Dreadnoughts annually, or preferably to pay the 
interest on, and provide money to replace the ships purchased 
by, -a loan to be raised to the amount of £50,000,000, with 
which twenty-five Dreadnoughts could be constructed, and 
these vessels would be available for the defence of the oversea 
Dominions, in effect being a far better mode of protection 
than the local fleets <?Ontemplated by Australia and Canada, 
The scheme he also recommended as being likely to give the 
Dominions a real knowledge of, and voice in, Imperial policy, 
POSSIBILITY OF IMPERIAL FEDERATION 503 
without at the same time taking away the control of that 
policy from the United Kingdom. 
The criticism of the proposals of Sir J. Ward was as 
unsatisfactory as criticism on an unexpected scheme always 
is : much of it consisted in verbal points impeding the 
progress of the speaker in his effort to explain his scheme, 
though in part this was due to his own complete change of 
front in advocating a Parliament after proposing a Council. 
Moreover, he did not improve his case by his somewhat 'vild 
naval schemes, whic4 he had probably assimilated from 
a proposal current in some political and commercial circles, 
that a loan of a hundred millions should be raised to purchase 
Dreadnoughts, oblivious of the question of providing men 
for these ships. His financial calculations were also chal-
lenged by Mr. Fisher, whose criticisms were obviously due 
to an imperfect power of calculation which did not recognize 
that the revenues proposed to be raised would have easily 
sufficed to pay interest on the loan and sinking fund, and 
provide for the replacement of the vessels at the end of the 
period of fifteen years assumed by the proposer to be the life 
of a Dreadnought. But the most irritating feature of the 
whole discussion was the fact that the members present did 
not seem to recognize that they were being asked to enter 
into federation, and that the proposal carried with it certain 
consequences. It is perfectly clear that the proposal meant 
that the foreign policy of the Empire would be entrusted to 
the executive, subject to the control of the new Parliament : 
the suggestion that Sir J. Ward meant to give the negotiation 
of treaties and so forth to a Parliament was absurd, and still 
more absurd the idea that the proposal was that this new 
body should leave to the British Government the manage-
ment of treaty negotiations and foreign relations, and step 
in to decide if there should be war or peace. The proposal 
was clearly intended to create a federation 'vhich should, for 
the sake of preserving as far as possible intact the autonomy 
of the Dominions, be confined to what was essential~y 
Imperial, the navy and foreign affairs in their connexion 
with peace and war : doubtless this carried with it the 
• 
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general control of foreign affairs, as it would be impossible 
to divorce one side from the other, and also therefore the · · 
diplomatic service. But the scheme went no further, had 
it been set out in detail, than to propose a legislature and 
executive entrusted with power to deal with naval defence 
and foreign relations. It would have been satisfied from the 
executive side by placing the Navy and the Admiralty under 
the federal executive, ~nd by placing the Foreign Office and 
the Diplomatic Service under the same authority. The 
consular service might also have been transferred to it, but 
that step would hardly have been necessary or even desirable. 
When this is realized, it will be seen at once that the 
criticism of Mr. Asquith upon the proposal was in the main 
an attack on a proposal which had not been put forward. 
'It would impair,' he said,l 'if not altogether destroy the 
authority of the Government of the {Jnited Kingdom in the 
conduct of foreign policy, the conclusion of treaties, the 
declaration or the maintenance of peace and the declaration 
of war, and indeed, all those relations with foreign powers, 
necessarily of the most delicate character, which are now in 
the hands of the Imperial Government, subject to its respon-
sibility to the Imperial Parliament. That auth<;>rity cannot 
be shared, and the co-existence side by side with the Cabinet 
of the United Kingdom of this proposed body it does not 
matter what name you call it for the moment clothed with 
the functions and the jurisdiction which Sir Joseph Ward 
-proposed to invest it with, would in our judgement be abso-
lutely fatal to our present system of responsible Government.' 
The criticism is of course quite just, but it is a criticism 
of an imaginary proposal. The proposal of Sir J. Ward was 
intended to destroy the Imperial Parliament : he made that 
perfectly clear, for he expressed the view that it - really 
meant that the Imperial Parliament must be replaced by 
a system of local Parliaments in the United Kingdom, beside 
which there would be no place for an Imperial Parliament 
other than his own proposed creation, the powers of which 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 5745, p. 71. The defence in Round Table, 1915, p. 334 
ignores the fact that this was a reply to a proposal of federation . 
• 
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might in time be increased. Similarly the objections 
unanimously urged by the representatives of Canada and 
Australia with much lack of courtesy, and by that of South 
Africa with much courtesy, ignored the aspect of Sir J. 
Ward's scheme, which meant that the Imperial Parliament, 
as at present constituted, would cease to exist, and a new, 
really Imperial body take its place, with powers of a very 
limited order. The substitution · of the new for the old 
Parliament would, in fact, have freed the Dominions from 
any control whatever except the control for foreign affairs 
and defence at sea, which would be given to the new Parlia-
ment. It would, on the one hand, have federated the 
Empire for defence and foreign affairs, but at the same time 
it would have freed the Dominions from the, at present, 
theoretically complete and in practice not negligible, supre-
macy of the Imperial Parliament. The representative of 
Newfoundland, though he differed in theory from Sir J. 
Ward, was less remote from him in spirit than he believed, 
for he suggested that some representation in the Imperial 
Parliament ·might be desirable, as a matter of interest. 
But though the discussion was a bad one, and not really 
based on the true nature of the scheme, it is not to be 
thought for a moment that the proposal, if better expounded 
and less deliberately misunderstood by its critics, would 
have stood any better chance of a favourable reception. 
The obvious fact was that federation of this sort would 
deprive the Imperial Parliament of its present supremacy, 
and in 1911 the Imperial Government were not prepared 
to limit that supremacy. The Imperial Parliament would 
have sunk to be a mere Parliament for the United Kingdom 
and the Crown Colonies : it is a sign of the imperfection 
of the thinking out of the scheme that it did not indicate 
what Parliament was to deal with the parts of the Empire 
other than self-governing : clearly, as they did not fall 
under the control of the new Parliament, the old Imperial 
Parliament, even if there were set up separate Parliaments 
for Scotland and Ireland, must have been needed for some 
purposes, perhaps for supreme authority over the British 
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Islands, and the non-responsibly governed parts of the 
Empire.1 But the · new Parliament would have been pre .. 
dominantly a British Parliament, inasmuch as the British 
representatives would have outweighed all the others, and 
while in the case of foreign affairs the power exercised to 
control these matters would have been· new, and the 
Dominions would have been admitted to a power which 
they never possessed before, on the other hand it would 
be at the expens.e of submitting themselves to the will of 
the majority in the Imperial Parliament in the matter of 
defence expenditure for the Navy and of the control of 
naval policy. Now the strategical principle of the founda-
tion of local navies is absurdly wrong, as can be seen on 
any consideration of the matter, but that does not alter 
.the other factors which affect the question, and; while the 
·obvious advantages of a single Imperial Navy would have 
been asserted by the Imperial Parliament,2 the . Dominions 
would have felt the indignity of being deprived of the right 
to have their local navies as they decided to do in 1909. 
In short, the essential features necessary to make a federa-
tion acceptable were absent in the discussion of 1911. 
The theoretic power of the present Imperial Parliament 
does not press hardly enough on the Dominions to make 
them resent it seriously, and they enjoy under it a degree 
of autonomy, which in a federation they could never have, 
while the gain from federation would be very slight, since 
the inequality of the several parts of the Empire would 
result in the preponderance of the United Kingdom on 
such a Parliament to a11 extent which would make the 
appearance of Dominion power illusory. For the appearance 
of controlling the policy of the Empire it would be folly, 
the Dominions thought, to sacrifice their power over their 
own fleets : the Imperial Government for its part felt that 
for the sake of acquiring the power of carrying out a naval 
1 Hence in the suggestion in the Round Table, 1915, p. 624, the Crown 
Colonies would fall under the Federal Parliament. 
2 ~ So Sir J. Ward) but not Sir W. Laurier in 1911 or now (Round Table, 
1915, p. 433). 
-
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policy on one basis, it would pay much too dearly in sacrific-
ing its control of Imperial affairs generally and foreign 
policy in particular. No Government indeed will willingly 
sacrifice anything of its powers but for a very striking good 
to be gained, and the position in 1911 presented neither the 
Dominions nor the mother country with any such good. 
Moreover, it must be admitted that even in foreign 
affairs the new arrangement would have tended, while it 
appeared to give the Dominions a higher position, to lower 
their actual powers. In all cases of commercial treaties 
the negotiations would under the new system have had to 
be carried on by the executive Government of the Empire, 
and in their hands it can hardly be supposed that the same 
regard to Dominion wishes would have been paid, as is now 
paid by the Imperial Government. For instance, the com-
pact made in 1911 by Canadian ministers with the United 
States Government was in all probability an unwise one 
in the interest of the Empire,l and, if constitutionally the 
negotiation and the approval of it had rested with an 
Imperial Executive, it is idle to suppose that the matter 
would not have been subject to careful consideration, in 
which the wishes of the representatives of the United 
Kingdon1 must have prevailed. Doubtless such a view 
was very present to Sir Wilfrid Laurier, whose visit to the 
Imperial Conference had only been arranged with great 
difficulty by means of a truce for a short period in his great 
fight with the Opposition to carry his proposed fiscal arrange-
ments into effect : doubtless, too, the same consideration 
occurred to the Governments of the other Dominions. The 
position is yet more complicated when it is remembered 
· that foreign policy and commercial tariffs are often closely 
related. Germany for years imposed disabilities on Canada, 
and Canada retaliated, without the relations between 
Germany and the United Kingdom being seriously affected : 
such a position would hardly be possible if an Imperial 
Executive dealing with all the foreign affairs of the Empire 
were set up. It is not that separate arrangements for 
1 Cf. Can':ldian Annual Review, 1911, pp. 57 seq . 
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different parts of the Empire could not be 'n1ade as eaSily 
as of old, but that the tendency would be for an Imperial 
Executive in the full sense to hold its views superior to any 
opinions of the .local Governments. 
Nevertheless, the rejection of the idea that the Imperial 
Government, as now c.onstituted as the Government of the 
United Kingdom, can share with any other authority its 
responsibility for foreign affairs is a doctrine which, as 
pointed out by Sir Robert Borden, . in his speech in the 
House of Commons of Canada in moving the introduction 
of the Naval Aid Bill on December 5,- 1912, could have 
but one disastrous end, if persisted in when once, the Imperial 
Government ceased to be able without Do.minion assist-
ance effectively to protect the Empire. There are, indeed, 
only two alternatives available for the future of the ~mpire: 
either the doctrine that the Imperial ·Government cannot 
share responsibility can be persisted in, which must mean 
that the Dominions shall become independent for purposes 
of international law o£ the Imperial Government; as they 
cannot remain indefinitely in the hUmiliating position of 
dependencies without share in · foreign policy, or in the 
alternative some means of associating.-them in the control 
of the Empire must be found, which shall fall short of 
federation. That at the preSent time is out of the question, 
in view · o.f the fact that federation would mean to the 
Dominions a subjection of their individuality with no real 
control conceded ill return, . while .for the United Kingdom 
it would mean · loss of unquestioned authority ·for an 
inadequate return. It is perfectly true that in one sense 
of the word there can be no sharing of responsibility by the 
Imperial Government, in so far as the ministers can be 
responsible in point of effective practice only to the power 
which -makes them ministers and unmakes them, the House 
of Commons, as representing the people of the United 
Kingdom. ·But this fact in no way prevents them in effect, 
if they think fit, sharing in quite a considerable measure 
the burden . of their responsibility for the defence of the 
Empire and the conduct of its foreign policy with states-
• 
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men from the self-governing Dominions. The people of the 
. United Kingdom already recognize and will recognize in 
increasing measure the fact that the Dominions are vitally 
interested in questions of this policy, which has led them 
to be involved in a war of the first rank. They will be 
prepared for a time to accept a position in which ministers, 
while responsible to them alone, can yet plead that their 
action must be regarded, not merely from the narrower 
British point of view, and can .quote the approval of the 
Dominions as a part of their justification. In this sense, 
prior to federation, it may be possible to secure the Dominions 
a larger share in the control of the defence and foreign 
policy of the Empire. No such arrangement can be more 
than a preliminary stage, either on the one hand to federa-
tion or on the other to independence and perhaps alliance, 
nor is it well to be under any misapprehension on so funda-
mental a point as this. But in politics it is necessary to 
progress in the way and at the speed which is most practic• 
able. The effect of the war may be to cause the desire of 
federation to develop in the oversea Dominions: it may 
produce the view that in the United Kingdom there should 
be a division between those who conduct domestic affairs, 
and those who busy themselves with foreign policy. It is 
perfectly true that foreign policy has been seriously hampered 
by the fact that the Government has never been able to 
devote to it the due amount of attention, and that domestic 
policies have prevented the people from understanding the 
dangers of the attitude of Germany in anything like a full 
degree. But it is certain that the divorce of the control of 
externalaffairs from the control of internal affairs is a thing 
which will be but slowly accomplished in any case, be it in 
the United Kingdom or the Dominions, and it is therefore 
necessary not lightly because of theoretical considerations 
to maintain that · there is no choice between the non-
participation of the Dominions in the control of defence 
and foreign policy and the accomplishment of a federation. 
This, if it is held to be Mr. Asquith's attitude in 1911, can 
hardly have been his attitude in later years. 
• 
CHAPTER II 
THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE DOMINIONS 
THE natural solution for the position of the Dominions, 
suggested by the ~esult of the Conference of 1911, is that 
each Dominion should proceed to attain complete inde-
pendence as a unit of international law, and that the 
Empire should be reconstituted on the basis that on the 
one hand should stand the United Kingdom in political 
control of the Crown Colonies and of India, and on the 
other hand the self-governing Dominions, each as an 
independent State. Or at least, if the suggestion seems 
rather absurd when put in this wider aspect, the great 
self-governing Dominion of Canada should declare its 
position to be that of an independent State, leaving it 
for Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa to follow 
suit either at once or in due course. It is not suggested 
that this independence need be separation: the Dominion 
might still under its new status remain a kingdom closely 
allied with the United Kingdom in sentiment and under 
the same monarch, but nevertheless as an independent 
unit in international law, and therefore internationally not 
responsible for or involved in the blunders of British foreign 
policy. The proposal has a faint resemblance to that made 
by certain politicians of Victoria in 1870, but it differs 
from the lucubration of Sir Gavan Duffy and his friends 
in its greater clearness of outline and understanding · of 
international politics: it is not suggested that the Dominions 
should seek to be neutralized, still less that if they were 
neutralized they would be at liberty to afford aid to the 
.mother country with the greater effectiveness arising from 
their position as independent States. The Dominions are 
to stand on their own feet as nations, prepared to accept 
• 
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the duties as well as to avail themselves of the rights of 
· the status of States of international law. 
The case for the independence of the Dominions and 
primarily of Canada deserves careful consideration, because 
it has been set out in full detail and with many and varied 
arguments by a Canadian, Mr. J. S. Ewart,! who has for 
some years conducted to the best of his ability a movement 
destined, as he hopes, to carry out his scheme in a complete 
form. He recognizes that as a practical policy, and perhaps 
also on theoretic grounds, it is not desirable to set out any 
scheme which would result in the dissolution of any link 
of union between the United Kingdom and the Dominions 
and leave the later independent States divorced wholly 
from the United Kingdom. This view is clearly sound, 
as a matter of political possibility. The idea that the 
Dominions might desire and achieve independence, and 
that the Imperial Government might well be content that 
it should be freed from them, has disappeared into com-
parative oblivion with the growth of the Dominions and 
the obvious interest which they display in their connexion 
with their native land. Professor Goldwin Smith adhered 
to the last to his view that the natural destiny of Canada 
was union with the United States, but he lived to see the 
D~minion growing more and more self-reliant and less and 
less inclined to do anything which might hasten her steps 
in a direction which she did not desire. The Labour 
Party in the Commonwealth has been accused of lack of 
interest in the mother country and of republicanism : these 
accusations made at the general election in 1914 were 
repudiated by those attacked, and the people of the Common-
wealth showed their disbelief in them by returning the 
suspected party to power, where it spent all its exertions 
to accomplish its declared desire to afford the Empire all 
its possible aid. It would be idle to doubt the attachment 
of the people of New Zealand and of Newfoundland to the 
mother country : the inhabitants of the Dominion may be 
willing to believe with the Chief Justice that they have 
1 In The Kingdom of Canada and The Kingdom Papers. 
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before them a glorious future, but they do not share his 
dislike of the Imperial Government, nor have they taken 
very seriously his efforts as judge to assert the sovereign 
powers of the legislature of New Zealand: in Newfoundland 
the attachment to the United Kingdom is remarkable in 
its intensity. In the Union of South Africa, alone in all 
the Dominions, can there be seen any trace of a desire' for 
rep,ublican freedom, and the ghastly bad faith which that 
desire has involved on its authors, and their share in the 
rebellion which they so wrongfully brought about, may be 
held to have discredited republican leanings in the Union 
for the time being at least.1 
This fact, however, of the clear desire on the part of the 
Dominions, as shown by their remarkable support of the 
United Kingdom in a war which they had no chance of 
preventing, imposes a serious burden on the statesman who 
wishes to press for the formal transformation of the relations 
of the United Kingdom and the Dominions, for it compels 
him to show that it would be compatible with the constitu-
tion of the United Kingdom that the Dominions, while 
becoming units of international law, should remain under 
the same King as the United Kingdom. The fact is not at 
all obvious, and the proof requires great care. It rests,2 
putting aside the case of the Ionian Islands, which canJ:?.Ot 
be taken as a serious parallel to even the smallest of the 
Dominions, on the fact that from 1714 to 1837 the Imperial 
Crown of the Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland was 
worn by the ruler of Hanover, and that from 1603 to 1707 
the union between the two Crowns of Scotland and England 
was personal. During that period the sovereignties remained 
quite distinct, the countries had separate flags and coinages, 
the Parliaments were independent, and imposed various 
restrictions on the trade between the countries, and finally 
the two Parliaments enacted laws which but for union 
1 The return of 27 Nationalists at the election of October 1915 is a sign 
that, despite the loyalty of the Union, there is a republican spirit. 
2 Ewart, Kingdom Papers, i. 178 seq. Cf. Ward, Great Britain and 
Hanover. 
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would have resulted in the separation of the thrones on the 
death of the reigning Queen. The same procedure was in 
force when the Crowns of Hanover and Great Britain were 
united : the two Governments were absolutely distinct, 
the Hanoverian being purely despotic, the English par-
liamentary ; the flags were distinct, and the terms on which 
the King of Great Britain held his throne expressly denied 
the obligation of that country to engage in any sort of war 
in respect of his other possessions, unless with the consent 
of Parliament. It is sometimes forgotten that, so long as 
the Hanoverian Crown was united with that of Great 
Britain, the royal prerogative of declaring war was fettered 
by this express restriction. Moreover, it is certainly the 
case that the distinction of the two kingdoms was recog-
nized throughout the period in international law. As 
Elector of Hanover, George I took part in the war between 
Prussia, Denmark, and Russia on the one side, and Sweden 
on the other, and for his assistance in this regard was 
given the occupation of certain Swedish territory : the 
British Fleet made some demonstrations in the Baltic, but 
this was alleged to be due to the need to protect British 
merchant vessels, and in point of fact the friendly relations 
of the Swedish and British Crowns were never interrupted. 
Similarly, the efforts of Peter to obtain subsidies from his 
ally, George, were met with the reply that as King of 
England he was not at ,war with Sweden but would perform 
his obligations as Elector of Hanover, and the good offices 
of England were used as a means of bringing about peace 
between Hanover and Sweden. The same distinction was 
observed consistently later on: the two kingdoms remained 
distinct, and the actions of the Governments of the two 
varied from time to time in no small degree. But the 
, possession of Hanover was never regarded with unmixed 
satisfaction by British statesmen, and its loss by the opera-
tion of the Salic law on the accession of Queen Victoria was 
regarded by public opinion as an unmixed blessing. 
It must, however, be noted before accepting the complete 
parallelism which it is suggested might be drawn between 
1874 K k . 
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the case of the Kingdom of Canada and a Kingdom of 
Hanover, that the position of the Kingdom of Hanover 
was not quite as satisfactory from the point of view of 
independence as might be expected from its theoretic 
position. In the later days of its existence the power of 
Britain so overshadowed that of Hanover, that at the 
great European conferences, such as those which decided 
the fate of Europe in 1815, the King of Hanover played no 
part at all. He was ignored as much as the other numerous 
petty princes of German States, even when they remained 
sovereign, were ignored by Prussia, Austria, and Great 
Britain. The illustration is important because it indicates 
that the parallel between the position desired for Canada 
as a kingdom and Hanover is not complete. Hanover 
could be ignored because its King was a despot, who had 
behind him the power of his British Kingdom, but it is 
precisely at such conferences as the great Conferences of 
The Hague, that the Dominion as a Kingdom would desire 
to be represented, and at such conferences history shows 
that Hanover was not represented, and did not have a voice. 
Similarly, history shows that Great Britain and Hanover 
could make treaties with each other, but the terms of these 
treaties remind us that Hanover was politically the King, 
not an independent power. · 
This indeed is the precise spot in which the argument 
from Hanover breaks hopelessly into pieces. It was well 
enough in the early days of international law and responsible 
government, when the personal rule of the King was 
a matter of importance, to permit the two kingdoms to stand 
together as independent units, and to allow the King to 
be in one an independent sovereign ruling despotically, and 
in the other to be a King falling more and more under the 
control of ministers, though it must be remembered that 
down to nearly the end of the eighteenth century the 
power of the King was enormous, thanks to his control of 
patronage. Would it be now possible for the same King 
to be sovereign of two Governments which in foreign 
affairs acted contrary to the views of each other? It is 
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difficult to think that this would be possible : the per-
sonality of the King having vanished as an element in the 
function, you are faced with the Governments of the coun-
tries, and that these Governments would be content to 
have the same monarch if they were opposed in foreign 
policy is m9st i;mprobable. Moreover, a practical difficulty 
of great importance exists : if there were to be two sovereign-
ties, and still more if several, the question must arise 
whether the King was to retain power to appoint a Viceroy 
or whether the office was to be hereditary in some member 
of the royal family. In the former case the dependence of 
the one kingdom in status would be obvious, while in the 
other the position of the Viceroy would be extremely 
difficult, if the policy of the two Governments was to diverge 
seriously. The union of Hanover and Great Britain was 
rendered easy enough because the first King was fond of 
visiting Hanover and leaving his minister to rule England 
in his place, while, when he was in England, Hanover was 
governed by his directions, but since George III, the United 
Kingdom would, it may safely be said, not tolerate that 
the sovereign should for any substantial length of time be 
absent from the Kingdom. 
It may be feared therefore that any real attempt to alter 
the constitution of the Empire on the model of Hanover 
would involve serious risk of the breaking up of the Empire 
into totally independent States, without even a personal 
relationship in the case of the monarch.1 Or in the alter-
native an attempt at such a relationship might in the long 
run lead to a closer union, as in the case of England and 
Scotland. It is nevertheless possible that the status might 
be created and last some time, and it is therefore desirable 
to consider the arguments adduced in favour of the 
position. 
1 If the monarch remained the same by English law, all his subjects 
would be to one another not aliens; Isaacson v. Durant, in re Stepney 
Election Petition, 17 Q.B.D. 54. No doubt this could be altered by legisla-
tion. On the separation of the Crowns, Hanoverians became aliens, just 
as on annexation Boers became British. 
Kk2 
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In the first place it is asserted 1 that the assumption of 
independence by Canada would be an assertion of fact, since 
in fact it is independent and since this fact is accepted by 
British statesmen. This state1nent is, however, a serious 
over-statement and can hardly have been carefully thought 
out. It is true that distinguish~d British statesmen have 
made a number of statements which seem in agreement 
with Mr. Ewart's assertion. Mr. Coomberlain, out of office, 
has called the Dominions ' states which have voluntarily 
accepted one crown and one flag, and which in all else are 
absolutely independent of one another'., and has talked of 
them as 'sister states equals of the United Kingdom in 
everything except population and wealth \ Lord Curzon 
has spoken of the Dominion Governments as ' partners as 
free as ourselves and with aspirations not less ai_nple and 
keen'. Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman at the Colonial Con-
ference of 1907 called freedom and independence the essence 
of the Imperial connexion, Mr. Lyttelton talked of practical 
equality of stattls, and Mr. Balfour of formal equality, and 
so forth. These assertions may be strengthened by the 
words of Mr. Asquith that the United Kingdom and the 
Dominions are' each master in t4eir own household, a prin-
ciple which is the life blood of empire, articulus stantis aut 
cadentis imperii '. 
It is needless to say that neither these assertions nor the 
more guarded conception of Sir F. Pollock, that the Domin-
ions are 'separate kingdoms having the -same king as the 
parent group, but choosing to abrogate that part of their 
full autonomy which relates to foreign affairs ', have any 
close relation to facts. Despite Mr. Asquith's w:ords, the 
Conference over which he presided declined to allow New 
Zealand to pass into law her Bill to suppress the use of 
lascar crews in her trade, or to add to the powers of Canada-, 
or Australia or South Africa to deal with merchant shipping, 
and the Commonwealth Government had to concede the 
position as to its legislative power asserted by the Imperial 
1 Ewart, K ingd01n Papers, ii. 203, 204. It is useless to cite these flowers 
of rhetoric as serious argument. 
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Government and advise the Governor-General to reserve 
the Navigation Bill on the pain of finding it waste paper, 
when it was challenged in the courts, from which they 
could not prevent an appeal lying to the Imperial Privy 
Council, without obtaining the sanction of the Imperial 
Government. In 1915 and 1916 Canada had to come to 
the Imperial Parliament in order· to secure the amendment 
of its constitution in matters of great moment. Granted 
that the Imperial control is exercised with consideration and 
restraint, can it be pretended that the Dominions are 
independent nations, when the Imperial Government can 
in 1914 suggest to the Union of South Africa that in its 
Indemnity Bill it should avoid seeming to claim the power 
to legalize the continuation of martial law under statute? 
Or are independent nations subject to have an Act of 1819 
invoked in 1907 to override their duly enacted laws because 
their views of policy do not suit those of the Imperial 
Government ? That in many of these matters more liberty 
should be accorded to the Dominions is perfectly proper 
to argue, as has been seen above, but the fact of indepen-
dence is far from being yet attained. 
The matter is still more striking when the question of 
treaties is raised. Mr. Ewart claims that Canada has made 
her own treaties, but the claim cannot be made out for 
a moment. Canada has concluded several agreements, 
but internationally they are waste paper, and neither the 
Dominion Government which concluded them nor any 
foreign power thought otherwise. The essence of a treaty 
is that it is definite in duration, or, if indefinite, that it is 
permanent. The agreements made by Canada with Germany 
and Italy were agreements of no defined duration, which 
merely resulted in action by both parties in the way of 
legislation, while that with the United States ended in 
a refusal of the Canadian Parliament to legislate. Had it 
been a treaty it would have imposed an obligation to 
secure legislation : as it was, it resulted merely in an agree-
ment between statesm~n to try to obtain concurrent 
legislation in the two countries. The department of external 
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affairs of Canada has no power to negotiate with any foreign 
country whatever, and the negotiators of the agreement 
of 1911 went formally to the British ambassador in order 
to be placed in touch with the United States GDvernment. 
The negotiations with the German and Italian consuls 
imposed no obligation on either side: the Government 
agreed to ask the Governor-General to sign an Order in 
Council bringing to an end the surtax on German goods if 
the German Government would also cease imposing special 
taxation on Canadian goods, but it was expressly declared 
that the arrangement was merely temporary, with a view to 
a treaty being negotiated, and similarly in the case of Italy. 
Mr. Ewart, however, lays stress on the fact that Article 10 
of the Boundary Waters Treaty1 with the United States 
provides that 'any ·question or matters of difference arising 
between the high contracting parties involving the rights, 
obligations, or interests of the United States or of the 
Dominion of Canada either in relation to each other or 
to their respective inhabitants may be referred for decision 
to the International Joint Commission by the consent of 
the two parties, it being understood that on the part of 
the United States any such action will be by and with the 
advice of the Senate, and on the part of His Majesty's 
Government, with the consent of the Governor-General in 
Council'. This agreement is relied upon by Mr. Ewart as 
showing that the power to discuss any subject with the 
United States has been formally given to Canada in place 
of procedure through the Governor-General, the Colonial 
Office, the Foreign Office, and the British ambassador 
before reaching the United States Government. The idea 
is, of course, absurd : the reference is expressly stated in 
the treaty to be one made by the high ,contracting parties, 
i.e. the Imperial Government, or strictly the ~ng on the 
advice of his Imperial ministers ; in respect of Canada 
being vitally interested, the King will act on the advice of 
his ministers with the consent of the Canadian Government, 
1 Cf. Round Table, 1915, pp. 851-5. The omission there to cite the end 
of the clause may be misleading. 
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if he thinks fit to agree with their advice. The point of 
the words is obvious : it is to ensure that the reference of 
any subject to the Commission is made with the consent 
of Canada just as, in the arbitration and the pecuniary 
claims treaties, the assent of the Dominions in cases where 
they are specially interested is set off against the right of 
the Government of the United States to obtain the assent 
of the Senate. In such a case the procedure has neces-
sarily to be most formal, and the assent of t~e Imperial 
Government must be expressly obtained. But in normal 
cases minor matters between Canada and the United States 
are, and have been for many years, disposed of by direct 
communication between the Governor-General of the 
Dominion and the British ambassador at Washington, 
while the Imperial Government is informed of anything 
of importance by one or both of these officers, and so can 
intervene. 
The second reason adduced by Mr. Ewart is that in 
defence matters the declaration of independence would be 
of the greatest advantage, since it would remove Canada 
from the danger of being involved in British wars, while 
it would be wholly unwise to lean upon British assistance 
if there should arise need for it : nay nothing in British 
history gives any assurance that the only use of an emer-
gency made by the British Government would not be to 
cement her friendship with a foreign state at the expense 
of Canada. On the other hand, it is intolerable that, while 
Great Britain can rely on Japan in certain circumstances 
or on France, she could not rely in any event on active 
aid from Canada. In the case of independence there would 
have to be a definite arrangement, which would be better 
for both. 
Now the position of Canada in regard to war obligations 
is undoubtedly curious, since she can be involved in war 
without her consent, but need not fight if she does not wish 
to so so. It is, however, obvious that another way of 
avoiding the anomaly presents itself: Canada might 
acquire a voice in deciding questions of war. The lack 
• 
520 IMPERIAL UNITY AND THE DOMINIONS 
of obligation on Canada to fight for the Empire is certain, 
the treaty of alliance with Japan imposes an obligation 
by British constitutional law on the United Kingdom 
alone to succour Japan in the events contemplated, but the 
disadvantage is one which accrues to the United Kingdom, 
and hardly a reason for insisting on Canadian in·dependence 
in itself. But the assertion that Canada cannot rely on 
British support in any difficulty must be met as being both 
counter to theory and to fact. The theory is undoubted : 
apart from the earlier admissions of statesmen made to 
the British House of Commons in 1861, it was made clear 
in the negotiations regarding Canadian defence from 1864 
onwards that the obligation to afford Canada every pro-
tection was in the fullest degree recognized by the Imperial 
Government, and the same thing was repeatedly asserted 
at later times as at the Colonial Conferences of 1902 and 
1907, and in Parliament by the First Lord of the Admiralty 
in 1914. The constitutional doctrine still holds good down 
to the present time that the obligation of defence in the 
case of the Imperial Government is absolute. 
The real question therefore arises whether in point of 
view of history the defence has failed. It is needless to 
say that the errors of 1783 and of 1814 have nothing to do 
with Canadian self-government: the treaty. of 1842 may be 
considered as having been concluded after- that system 
had set in, and in that regard recent research has shown 
that the treaty was an excellent piece of diplomacy for the 
United Kingdom, making good in no small degree earlier 
errors. The Reciprocity Treaty · of 1854, negotiated by 
Lord Elgin, was a splendid bargain for Canada, and the 
United States were very glad in 1866 to be rid of it. Nor 
is there the slightest doubt that the Treaty of Washington 
of 1871 was an excellent one for the Dominion: the United 
States Government tern1inated it with much pleasure in 
1885, and when a new treaty embodying some of its pro-
visions was negotiated in 1888, the United States Govern-
ment could not obtain its ratification.1 
1 Sir C. Tupper, Recollections of Sixty Years, pp. 371, 391. 
• 
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The accusation 1 is, however, made that the case of Canada 
in the matter of the control of the bays on the coast of the 
Dominion against American fishermen was seriously injured 
by the British policy of concession. The first charge is 
that the Bay of Fundy was conceded in 1845, but the 
sufficient answer is that the Government of Nova Scotia 
was prepared to agree, and did so, and the objections of 
that Government to the opening of other bays were respected. 
Secondly, it is objected that in 1866 the British Government 
insisted on the reduction of the Canadian claim to exclude 
United States fishermen to the case of bays with mouths 
not exceeding ten miles in width, the three mile line being 
drawn from a line between the headlands at the point 
where the bay reached that width. The rule, however, then 
laid down and accepted by Canada was based on the fact 
that the United States Government denied and had a right 
to deny, if they thought fit, the British claim to bays 
· in toto, and therefore the British Government were in the 
position that they must either insist on making good their 
position at the risk of war or must adopt a compromise 
which they could be certain of carrying with an arbitral 
tribunal if asked to arbitrate. The third charge, the opening 
of all the bays from 1870 onwards by a system of licences 
or by treaty, was a policy in which Canada thoroughly 
concurred, and the reason for her concurrence can be seen 
from the proceedings of 1887, when she tried to enforce 
exclusion-of American fishermen by the policy of forbidding 
them to purchase bait in Canadian waters. The United 
States Congress passed a non-intercourse Act, and though 
Mr. Ewart considers that this Act was a mer~ 'bluff', it 
is sufficient to say that Sir C. Tupper, who was the joint 
negotiator with Mr. Chamberlain of the treaty. of 1888, 
regarded the measure as a very serious menace to the 
position of Canada, and doubtless his view, based on his 
knowledge, as minister, of the whole position, must be held 
to have been correct. It is fair indeed to record in favour 
of Canada that, during the whole period of the fishery 
· E·wilrt1 K inr;dorn Papers, ii. 113-46. 
• 
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negotiations, she realized that the position was complicated, 
and that the differences of opinion between her and the 
Imperial Government as to the degree in which the rights of 
the British Crown should be enforced turned in the main 
on details. Moreover, it is undeniable that the British 
case at The Hague in 1910 was fought with an excellent 
persistence, and that the British Government gave valuable 
assistance through the Attorney-General. Mr. Ewart com-
plains that it had been expected that Canada and New-
, 
foundland would be allowed the complete control of their 
own case, but the assistance of the British Government 
was appreciated and valued by the Dominion and the 
Newfoundland Governments, and took place with their full 
concurrence, apart from the fact that in the case of a treaty 
the intervention of the Imperial Government was both 
constitutional and necessary. 
Another charge 1 against the United Kingdom is that the 
interests of Canada in the Behring Sea case were neglected 
by the Imperial Government, and in special by Lord Salis-
bury, who spent his time in giving away concessions to 
the United States. The accusation is, however, hardly 
borne out by the facts: the United States Government 
did desist from seizures in Behring Sea after asserting its 
full right to make them,2 and it is idle to presume that it 
did so out of any other consideration than that it felt that 
it could not go to war with the United Kingdom on the 
question at issue: it is not to be supposed that the United 
States feared Canada. The fact that the ultimate result 
of the negotiations was an arrangement which restricted 
the rights of Canadians to take seals on the open sea was 
due to the obvious consideration which every scientific 
man admitted, that the process of killing seals on the open 
seas was not merely barbarous but very wasteful, and in 
1911 Canada herself fully agreed to a treaty, which included 
Japan and Russia, and set up the principle that all pelagic 
sealing was a nuisance, and should be put down, com-
pensation, on the other hand, being made to the pelagic 
1 Kingdom Papers, ii. 59-112. 2 Above, p; 17 • 
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sealers for being shut off from their occupation. The 
Canadian Government accepted the seal fishery arrange-
ments, for it recognized that the claim of the sealers to 
exercise their occupation was one which was undeniable, 
but which, unless carefully regulated, would have resulted 
in the rapid destruction of the seal herds, and the end of 
the sealers' occupation, and their reward was the wise 
treaty by whicl1 the seals are protected for the most part, 
and the Dominion compensated for giving up the right 
of its subjects to engage in an undesirable trade.1 
Far more serious is the complaint made by Mr. Ewart 2 
of the conduct of the Alaska boundary arbitration with the 
United States of America. It is difficult, if not impossible, 
to condone the folly which caused the British Government 
to insist that there should be a British arbitrator on a tribunal 
which was to deal with a question purely Canadian, and to 
keep him there when it was learned that the impartial 
jurists of repute stipulated for by the treaty had been chosen · 
from gentlemen who had declared themselves irrevocably 
opposed to the British claims, though their mistake in this 
regard was shared by Canada, who adhered to the original 
choice of arbitrators. The choice of Lord Alverstone was 
singularly unfortunate, as he belonged to a type of man, 
good and clever enough, no doubt, but completely at the 
mercy in point of tactics of his American colleagues, and 
he was, moreover, determined to have the question solved. 
In the result he produced a settlement in flat defiance of 
his Canadian colleagues which could only be called ludicrous, 
as it contravened every principle of common sense and 
geography in its location of the initial part of the boundary 
line, spoiling the frontier, and making it indefensible from 
a strategic point of view. The worst of the matter was 
that it was quite clear that he had yielded on this poir1t 
merely to secure a settlement. His concession of the other 
points was perfectly legitimate as a judicial finding, even 
if it may seem to some that he misconceived the weight of 
• 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 5971 ; 6091, pp. 12, 13. 
2 Kingdom Papers, ii. 108 . 
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the argument, but his yielding of the question of the boundary 
among the islands could not be defended. His conduct 
was bitterly resented for years in the Dominion, and, had 
it not been that the importance of Alaska has diminished 
considerably of late, the injury done by his errors and 
complaisance to the relations of the Dominions and the 
United Kingdom might have been incalculable. For-
tunately, the Alaska episode is isolated, and probably on 
it ~lone has been based the prevalent idea of the. British 
Government as sacrificing the Colonies cheerfully for the 
sake of popularity . 
. A further objection to connexion with the United King-
dom is based by Mr. Ewa.rt on the ground that in the Hague 
arbitration the British case had to meet the fact that the 
headland doctrine had not been insisted upon by the British 
Government elsewhere, but that that Government had 
endeavoured in Europe to restrict it as closely as possible. 
This accusation, however, seems wholly groundless: the 
British case rested throughout on the definite fact that the 
treaty of 1818 dealt with the bays of North America as being 
closed waters, the three mile limit of exclusion being drawn 
from the coasts and the bays, not from the coasts of the bays. 
To this contention the United States Government proved to 
have no adequate reply of any kind, and the terms of the 
treaty made the British practice elsewhere irrelevant. Nor 
does it seem to have weighed with any of the arbitrators, 
who paid most stress to the terms of the Treaty of Wash-
ington of 1888, which never came into force, but which made 
practicable suggestions for the decision of the bay question, 
suggestions depending on the opinion of the Canadian 
negotiator, Sir Charles Tupper, who defended his views on 
these points with great vigour and success in the Dominion 
House of Commons, in moving the approval of the treaty. 
In truth, the complaints made by Mr. Ewart seem to point 
to failure to realize the essential features of foreign negotia-
tions, nam~ly that the British view of what is right is not 
necessarily the only view, and that inter se great powers 
cannot simply issue orders. The concessions and half 
• 
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measures of the British Government he constantly repre-
sents as grievous failures, and contrasts them with the strong 
words of Canada, but Canada had between it and the United 
States the British buffer, and the real question to be put 
is rather what attitude would Canada have been able to 
adopt vis-a-vis the United States, had the Imperial Govern-
ment not been at hand to bear the brunt. Unless per 
impossibile it can be said that Canada would have done better 
for herself by herself, it is idle to hold that Canada has 
suffered from British protection. Nor in quite recer1t years 
would Canada deny the value of the aid given by Mr. Bryce 
as ambassador, · in negotiating for her one treaty after 
another of the highest value and importance. 
In the third place, it is argued that by becoming an 
independent State Canada would be able to take part in 
international Conferences, such as that of The Hague and the 
London Conference, and be able to give her opinion contrary 
to the British view, in favour of the immunity of merchant 
ships from capture at sea.1 If the delegates of Canada 
would have done anything so excessively foolish after having 
-the opportunity to hear the views of British Admiralty 
,experts, it may well be doubted. But, if they had, they 
would certainly, as theory before and practice in the present 
war shows, have been entirely wrong. But the demand 
that Canada should be allowed to take part in these Con-
ferences is in itself entirely right, and such participation 
would be of the greatest aid to educate Canada in the nature 
of foreign politics, a fact on \vhich Mr. Ewart justly lays 
great stress. But it is premature to suggest that Canada 
cannot be represented without becoming independent : it 
is true that the Imperial Conference 2 of 1911 merely went so 
far as to assure Canada and the other Dominions the right 
to take part in the preparation of instructions to the dele-
gates to the Conferences in future and the circulation 
among the Dominions of treaties affecting them before 
1 Ewart, Kingdom Papers, ii. 243-53. This paper was dated June 1914; 
August sufficed to show its complete erroneousness. " 
2 Parl. Pap., Cd. 5745, pp. 15, 130-2. 
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signature. But the restricted nature of, the proposals was 
merely due to the fact that the Dominions did not ask for 
any more, and it is an established maxim of governments to 
concede so much as is asked for and no more. There appears 
to be no reason whatever why the right to take part in these 
Conferences by plenipotentiaries should not be aCcorded to 
Canada, and yet Canada might remain part of the Empire, 
her plenipotentiaries receiving their full powers under the 
great seal of the United Kingdom on the responsibility of 
Imperial ministers. The plan ·has been adopted for a con-
ference of quasi-political character, that on wireless tele-
graphy, and the precedent might well be followed in a 
future case. 
In the fourth place, it is contended by Mr. Ewart that the 
change would make for clear thinking, and that confusion 
results from the fact that Canada to-day is held to be part 
of the Empire, while in fact it is not part at all. The ques-
tion here seems to be begged: there is no conceivable reason 
why there should not be clear thinking as to the present 
relations of the Empire, and the objection to the use of 
' empire ' of the British Empire, though it has the authority 
of Lord Milner, is a singular example of logical fallacy. 
Empire, it is argued, on no conceivable ground, means that 
part of the Empire is subject to the United Kingdom. But 
in truth, empire merely means a sovereignty, and says 
nothing about the relation of the parts: an empire com-
posed of self-governing communities is not in the slightest 
degree anomalous: obvious instances are the Empire of 
Austria and the Empire of Germany, or the former Empires 
of Brazil or Mexico. The Empire of India is not given that 
title because 1 it is subje~t to the United Kingdom, but 
because it is a sovereignty in itself. Nor in truth is there 
any other term by which the congeries of communities which 
make up the dominions of the King can well be called, and 
the collective name 'empire' means merely that the whole, 
for purposes of international law, consists of one single 
sovereignty. 
1 Plainly this is Lord Milner's view, Standard of Empire, May 23, 1908. 
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A more serious consideration is the fifth, that the change 
of relationship would relieve the Imperial Government of 
difficulties arising from the anomaly that, though part of 
the Empire, Canada does not submit to allow to enter her 
territories any British subjects save such as she chooses. 
It is pointed out that it is difficult to understand, if Canada 
is part of the Empire, that she should refuse entrance not 
merely to Hindus but also to Englishmen, if they seem to 
fall short of her exacting standards of late years. It is 
difficult for India to understand that a self-governing 
Dominion cannot be coerced, when they know that their 
Government at home is manifestly subject to very close 
control by the Imperial Government. Nor is there any 
doubt that there is force in this argument : if Canada were 
an independent power, then on the one hand the position of 
the Imperial Government vis-a-vis India would be as simple 
as it is in the case of the United States, and on the other 
hand, the Imperial Government could deal with Canada 
more frankly and freely when it had over it no legal au-
thority, but merely the considerations of courtesy and 
international law. 
The position of India with regard to the self-governing 
Dominions is indeed one of the greatest difficulty and com-
plication, nor can any solution immediately be expected. 
It is difficult for India to appreciate the position of the self-
• 
governing Dominions : it is true that in practice the self-
governing Dominion of the Union of South Africa treats 
British-Indians worse than any foreign possession, and that 
they were before the European War less harassed in German 
possessions in Africa than in Natal, to the prosperity of 
which they hav~ contributed so greatly. Nor is it unnatural 
that, when an Indian cannot set foot in Australia without 
being exposed to insolence from petty officials, it should be 
asked why Australians should be entitled to compete in the 
India Civil Service examination, and be appointed to posts 
in India. But to recognize the difficulty of the position and 
to despair of a solution are very different . things, nor is it 
worth while to untie the bonds of empire because Canada 
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prefers Galicians to British-Indians, and ejects British sub-
jects who fail to establish themselves within three years, 
acting sometimes with great unfairness and injustice. The 
assistance rendered to the Empire by the Indian 1 forces in the 
European vVar must have its effect in breaking down the 
worst of the prejudices prevailing among the colonial forces : 
it cannot be without a lesson to the more in.telligent of our 
fellow subjects in the Empire, that, while India was able to 
send men to the front in France at the time of greatest need, 
the Dominion in which Indians have been treated worst not 
merely was powerless to send aid, but was in the throes of 
a dangerous rebellion. 
Finally, Mr. Ewart contends, the status of colony is 
one which is unworthy of the self-respect of the Dominion. 
' The colonial status ', says Professor Leacock, ' is a worn-
out, bygone thing. The sense and feeling of it has become 
harmful to us. It limits the ideas and circumscribes the 
patriotism of our people. It impairs the mental vigour and 
narrows the outlook of those who are reared and educated 
in our midst.' Or, as Dr. Parkin says, ' If the greater British 
colonies are permanently content with their present political 
status, they are unworthy of the source from which they 
sprang.' All this must at once be admitted: 2 if the 
Dominions were to be content to entrust their foreign policy 
to the Mother Country, and to lean on that country for 
defence perpetually, they would show a failure · of vigour 
which would be deplorable, but the supposition that inde-
pendence is the only way to solve the problem is not correct 
nor reasonable. The process of development of the Do-
minions has been slow but sure: they have grown from 
strength to strength and have attained more and more the 
stature of nationality: they are not now colonies, save from 
the point of view of formal law, and the use of the word 
' colonial ' is due only to the fact that the substitute ' Do-
minion ' is difficult to adapt for all adjectival purposes. 
,J 
_ 
1 So also as regards Japan; cf. Round Table, 1915, p. 493, as to New 
Zealand feeling. 
2 Cf. Round Table, 1915, p. 624. 
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But that their emergence into national life should be by way 
of independence, perhaps followed by a closer union, is rather 
an unreasonable theory, and those who have expressed the 
view, that the development of national status is a necessary 
preliminary to closer union, did not as a rule mean that the 
Dominions should first become independent : they meant 
only that the fullest development of autonomy consistent 
with the unity of the Empire is a necessary phase of the 
development of the Dominions. This would be fully ad-
mitted by Sir Robert Borden, but he has enunciated the 
principle that it now lies to extend the nationality of the 
Dominions, not by excluding them from British nationality,! 
but by giving the Dominion a just share in the control of 
foreign policy in return for their assumption of a just share 
in the burden of defence. 
There can indeed be no doubt that the two things are 
inseparable. The acute mind of Sir Wilfrid Laurier 2 has 
always seen that the two go together : if advice is given and 
acted on by the Imperial Government, the Dominions, he 
pointed out at the Imperial Conference of 1911, are morally 
bound to follow up that advice by assistance in war. In 
this Sir Wilfrid sees more clearly than Mr. Ewart, who con-
siders that Canada might properly have pressed the United 
Kingdom to adopt the suicidal policy of exempting merchant 
vessels from capture at sea in time of war, without accepting 
any responsibility for this advice. That position is impos-
sible if advice is meant to be considered seriously, and 
a great Dominion should not offer platonic remarks on vital 
issues of the conduct of war. 
1 The idea.l of M. Bourassa (Que devons-nous a l' Angleterre? Montreal, 
1915). 
2 Parl. Pap., Cd. 5745, p. 117; Round Table. 1915, p 431. 
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CHAPTER III 
IMPERIAL PARTNERSHIP 
'rnE chief claim which the solution of the independence of 
the Dominions as ending the complications of the present 
relations of the Empire can make is that it would be simple. 
It would be effected by nothing more than a treaty and an 
Imperial Act ratifying the treaty. With this there would 
fall to the ground the marks which formally show the position 
of a Dominion as a dependency, the selection of the Governor 
on the advice of Imperial Ministers, the power to withhold 
assent to Acts of Parliament or to disallow such Acts if 
assented to by the Governor, the power to pass Imperial 
legislation applicable to the Dominion, and the subjection of 
the Dominion Courts to the control of the Judicial Committee 
of the Privy Council. The new State would have to decide 
in what manner it would constitute its Executive Govern-
ment and its Legislature, and much would require to be done 
t.:> arrange for its recognition by the powers and to set up the 
regime in full form, but the difficulties would be compara-
tively small. It is a much more difficult thing to devise 
some plan by which the Dominions may retain their auto-
nomy, but yet may be associated in Imperial policy and 
play their part in Imperial defence. 
It is important to note that the difficulty as it now presents 
itself is not one of material means of furthering the growth 
of the Empire. The Dominions have grown without such 
means to greatness, and they feel that they must have in 
some way a national status, a feeling which of course has 
been greatly strengthened by the facts of the European War. 
No country which has played -its part in that struggle could 
ever again be expected to content itself with the position of 
a mere dependency. The change of emphasis is undoubtedly 
for the better : the old str~ggle over Imperial Preference 
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was one in which there · could be difficulty due to n1ere 
pecuniary considerations, and such differences are less 
amenable to treatment than differences regarding more 
intangible things. The stress laid on Imperial Preference 
may, perhaps, be traced as a matter of history to the strong 
efforts made by Sir Charles Tupper 1 to impress this doctrine 
upon his contemporaries as the one mode of effecting Imperial 
unity. The proposal in his mouth was an extremely natural 
one indeed, for he was anxious to build up the Dominion of 
Canada at a time when, in 1891, there was no sign of the 
realization of the great prospects of the Dominion, and it 
was .only right that he should advocate ·a policy that 
seemed to him to promise Canada the population which she 
so urgently needed, and which persisted in flowing to the 
United States. Moreover, he had assured himself from a 
study of the effect of a rise in wheat prices on the cost of 
bread that a rise in the price such as would be caused by the · 
imposition of a tariff on non-colonial wheat imports would 
not affect the price of bread to the consumer. To his view, 
therefore, the project of Imperial Preference for Canada, and 
in modified shape, e. g. in reduced duties on Colonial wool, 
for other parts of the Empire, seemed feasible and inevitable. 
This view was expressed by Canada, the Cape, and nearly 
all the Australasian Colonies at the Ottawa Conference of 
1894; but the Imperial Government of the day deliberately 
rejected it as contrary to the principles of Free Trade and 
unlikely to benefit the United Kingdom or the Colonies them-
selves, while leading in all probability to difficulties with 
foreign pow·ers, though it was explained that there would 
have been no objection whatever to a proposal of Free 
Trade within the ·Empire, which the fiscal exigencies of tl1e 
Dominions rendered out of the question. Revived effectively 
in 1902, the project became a living issue in the United 
Kingdom by the determination of Mr. Chamberlain, after his 
visit to South Africa in 1903, to present it as the best policy 
1 See an article in The Nineteenth Century, October, 1891, and a further 
e~planation in the same journal of April, 1892 ; reprinted in Recollections 
of Sixty Years, pp. 256-98. 
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for the ultimate federation of the Empire. It is perfectly 
clear from his speech on Imperial Federation, delivered to 
the Unionists of West Birmingham on May 15, 1903, that 
the genesis of his support of Preference was the belief that 
only thus could the growing nations oversea, which by that 
time had already a quarter of the population of the United 
Kingdom, be induced to unite in due course in a federal 
union. He laid stress on the fact that in the South African· 
War some 50,000 Colonial troops had at one time or other 
taken part in the conflict, but that the pecuniary burdens 
of the war had been borne in far too high a measure by the 
Imperial Government. It was in the extreme desirable that 
any offer by the Colonies to show their readiness to benefit 
the Mother Country should be reciprocated : the principle 
of Preference had been agreed to by Australia, New Zea-
land, and South Africa, and Canada had carried it into 
effect, for which Germany was now penalizing Canadian 
imports. It was surely not a true interpretation of the 
doctrine of Free Trade, which he himself held, believing that 
the aim should be to increase trade and make its movement 
more and more free, to lay down that nothing could be done 
to assist Canada, either directly or indirectly, by inducing 
Germany to abandon her hostile attitude. 
The proposal for a revision of the conception of Free Trade 
in the interest of Imperial unity was gradually accepted by 
the Unionist Party, and by other members of that party was 
developed into a full-grown theory of Protection as being 
desirable in itself for the benefit of the United Kingdom, 
a conception which, of course, is not completely to be made 
con~istent with the doctrine of Imperial Preference. Th.e 
chief attack of the Liberal Party in the period from 1903 to 
1905 was directed against the principle of Protection; and · 
the principle of Colonial Preference was assailed in the main 
either because in theory it was contrary to the rules of Free 
Trade, or more often because, without a violation of the fiscal 
system of the country by the imposition of new taxes simply 
for the purpose of remission in favour of the Dominions, no 
effective preference could be given. The position of Mr. 
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Chamberlain in his proposals had been rendered much more 
difficult by the fact that without his knowledge or concur-
rence the registration duty on wheat, imposed for revenue 
purposes during the South African War, with which he had 
proposed to operate in favour of the Dominions, was repealed 
by Mr. Ritchie as Chancellor of the Exchequer. The subject 
of course led itself to indefinite numbers of difficulties and 
doubts, but the main argument which was effective in the 
country was undoubtedly the view that, unless the price of 
food was increased, there would be no return of an increased 
price to farmers in Canada, and therefore no obvious benefit 
to the Dominion, while, if the price were to be increased, it 
would press most heavily on the very poor classes of the 
population, who were very much worse off in every way than 
the farmers froni whom an increased price was. asked. On 
the other side it was argued that, without any actual increase 
of price, the imposition of a differential duty on wheat against 
the foreign imports would result in an increased supply being 
obtained from the Dominions, which would enable the 
maintenance of a large population, and it was poin.ted out 
that the increase of population in the Dominions was a 
matter of great Imperial importance. At the same time it 
was suggested that there could be no expectation of the re-
tention of the Colonial preferences accorded by the Colonies 
if there was to be no reciprocity. To these arguments it 
was replied that the mere aggregation of population in a 
Dominion was not desirable, that quality was i1nportant,l and 
that Canada, in her indiscriminating readiness to take in any 
kind of men, was adopting a less wise policy than Australia, 
even if the latter might go rather far in her exclusiveness, 
when it was applied to keep out men whose only fault was 
that they had taken the ordinary precaution to secure an 
engagement before they proceeded to the Commonwealth, 
as in the famous case of the Six Hatters, which cast just 
ridicule on the Commonwealth Government. As regards 
the withdrawal of the Colonial preferences, it was pointed out 
1 Of. Mitchell, Western Canada before the War, pp. 133 seq., and the reports 
there cited. 
I 534 IMPERIAL UNITY AND THE DOMINIONS 
that the preferences were really advantageous in their own 
· way to the people of the Dominions, as they formed a con-
venient method of obviating the very high prices which the 
duties caused consumers to pay.1 Moreover, the preference 
was some recognition of the great services rendered to the 
Dominions by the Imperial Government in regard to pro-
tection of trade, the foreign services, diplomatic and con-
sular, and naval defence generally. 
It is probably now possible to look at these matters in 
a more dispassionate light than was conceivable at the time 
when the matters had been turned into questions of party 
politics. It would be idle to deny now that the question of 
securing the union of the Empire by commercial means is 
not of the highest importance : it was made a party issue 
in connexion with the Colonial Conference of 1907, mainly 
through the fiery eloquence of Mr. Deakin, who in 190.8 
secured a satisfactory grant of British preference, on the 
line of the established Commonwealth and Colonial doctrine 
that no such preference can ever be given ~swill hamper the 
development of any Dominion industry. It is important to 
realize that this principle lies at .the bottom of all the pre-
ferences accorded : the Dominions are not prepared for 
a moment to accept the doctrine suggested by Mr. Chamber-
lain that, while protecting already existing industries, the 
Dominions should refrain from protecting industries not yet 
established, in return for a protection for their agricultural 
and pastoral products in the United Kingdom. Most 
Dominion statesmen are not so unwise as to adopt the lan-
guage of Sir W. Lyne, Mr. Deakin's colleague, that the 
importer is a nuisance,2 who ought to be abolished, but each 
Dominion feels that it is a legitimate part of its national life 
to make itself as self-supporting in every way as possible. 
The work of the Commonwealth Parliament has largely con-
sisted in considering applications for increases of tariffs, and 
modifications of tariffs in order to protect new industries, or 
further to protect old industries, and the policy of the Com-
1 A view widely held by the farmers of Canada. 
2 Cf. Canadian Annual Review, 1913, pp. 296 seq. 
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monwealth, of New Zealand, and of Canada has been always 
·the same, that, on a case being made out for protection by 
reason of inability to compete with imported goods, duties 
will be imposed or bounties given on local production, or 
both methods will be resorted to. It would be idle to 
criticize the policy of the Dominions in this regard. What-
ever may be thought of the policy which originally set the 
Dominions on the path of protective tariffs, it would pro-
bably be absurd to try to leave that path in any abrupt 
way, and it must be left for the future to show whether the 
Dominions will follow the example of the United States, and 
finally themselves of their own free will lower their tariffs. 
New South Wales has never been satisfied that the tariff 
policy is as satisfactory as Victoria believes it to be. In 
Canada the movement for lower tariffs is a very important 
one ,I and the value of the British preference there as breaking 
down excessive tariff bars is shown by the solidarity of the 
whole of the west and of much of the east itself in the demand 
that it shall not be touched if it cannot be increased. In 
this case at least there can be no question of the voluntary 
character of the preference or pressure for its reciprocation. 
In the Union of South Africa, on the other hand, while the 
tariff preference has not been withdrawn, the proposal was 
mooted as suitable for discussion 2 at the Imperial Conference 
of 1911, that the tariff preference might be replaced by 
a payment made by the Union for purposes of defence, but 
the Government withdrew this proposal before it was finally 
placed on the agenda of the Conference. The value of the 
preference in the case of South Africa has beyond all doubt 
been considerable, and its withdrawal would be a matter for 
regret, but reciprocity in any effective way is practically im-
possible in the special case of the nature of Union products. 
From the point of view of the United Kingdom the policy 
of Colonial Preference and Protection generally must now be 
considered in the main simply in relation to the advantages 
to be derived in the United Kingdom. The o"Qvious fact 
that the Dominions do not need eleemosynary aid renders it 
1 Cf. Ibid. 2 Parl. Pap., Cd. 5513, pp. 15, 16. 
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unnecessary to consider the question as one of support for 
feeble dependencies, like the West Indies, and due im.por-
tance must be attached to the fact that the Dominions in 
their policy simply consider, and no doubt rightly consider, 
their own interest as the determining point in the matter. 
The situation is not rendered any easier by the European 
War : it is certain that on the conclusion of that war it will 
be necessary for every consideration to be given to the wishes 
of Russia, of Japan, of France and Italy and of other 
countries for closer commercial intercourse in order to 
strengthen the economic bonds among the Allies of the War, 
and this fact will doubtless not render Imperial Preference 
less difficult. But the important fact, in the meantime, 
' . 
is that the question of fiscal relations is no longer the point 
of most concern in the connexion between the United King-
dom and the Dominions, the centre of gravity of these 
relations having shifted from trade to foreign affairs. It is 
now practically certain from the drift of political feeling that, 
if the United l{ingdom alters its fiscal system, it will be in 
the direction not of mere Imperial Preference intended to 
·consolidate the Empire, but of preferential trade primarily 
aimed at the strengt~ening of the trade of the United King-
dom, and Imperial Preference will play a subordinate part. 
The matter therefore becomes one of economic theory rather 
than of constitutional politics.1 
One obvious means of communication between the Do-
minions and the Imperial Government, available at all times 
without difficulty, presents itself, and it is not surprising 
that the question should have been frequently raised why it 
is not more regularly used. The Colonies have represen-
tat~ves in London, High Commissioners for the four great 
Dominions, Agents-General for the Australian States: why 
should not their services be availed of as a means of keeping 
each Government in the Empire in touch with the Imperial 
Government? The fact is, however, beyond dispute that 
this mode of procedure has never been adopted in any con-
1 My colleague, Prof. J. Shield Nicholson's work, A Project of Empire, 
is the best presentation of the case of Imperial trade relations. 
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sistent way. The best case of a High Commissioner who 
was in close touch with his own Government and with the 
Imperial Government is perhaps that of Sir Charles Tupper 
during his tenure of the 'High Commissionership for Canada : 
he was so closely united in sentiment with his Government, 
and wasin such harmony with it, that he actually for a period 
left his High Commissionership in order to lend his colleagues 
aid in an electoral campaign, and to act as their represen-
tative in connexion with tl1e negotiations with the United 
States over the abortive Treaty of Washington of 1888.1 
Further, he was asked to stand for the leadership of the 
party on more than one occasion, and finally was induced 
to take up that post in the last days of the Conservative 
Ministry, a position in which he made a gallant fight for his 
party._ Moreover, when High Commissioner, he was engaged 
in various negotiations under the aegis of the British Govern-
ment, and, as plenipotentiary, arranged and signed, with the 
British Ambassador, the first Convention in 1893 regarding 
the trade between Canada and France. He was also en-
trusted by his Governme11t with urging on the Imperial 
Government their plans for the development of a swift 
steamship service between Canada and England, and the 
establishment of the Pacific Cable, and he was a protagonist 
in the movement for the repeal of the restrictions on the 
grant of preference by the Dominions to the Mother Country 
through the denunciation of the treaties of 1862 and 1865 
with Belgium and the German Confederation. Yet it would 
be idle to say that he was at any time in close touch with the 
Imperial Government save for the specific purposes on which 
he was authorized to deal with that Government. Still less 
by fa~ could this be said of the ordinary Agents-General of 
the Colonies. There is an interesting record of the failure 
of any scheme to make the Agents-General a council of 
advice in a memorandum dated February 24, 1885, by Sir 
J. Vogel,2 then Colonial Treasurer of New Zealand. 'During 
the last eighteen months,' he wrote, 'the Mother Country 
1 See Recollections of Sixty Years, pp. 204 seq. 
2 Parl. Pap., C. 4521. 
.. 
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has been considerably interested in those questions relating 
to the Pacific Islands which the Colonies of Australasia have 
regarded as possessing supreme importance. These Colonies 
h'a ve been represented in the Mother Country by exception-
ally able Agents-General, well fitted for any confidence Her 
Majesty's Government might deem it fitting to repose in 
them. But yet they have in _no sense been called into 
council. That it has not been deemed expedient to associate 
th~m in the negotiations that have been proceeding is proof 
sufficient that a Board of Council or Board of Confidential 
Advice is not found desirable or workable. Had it been 
otherwise there probably never was a time during which the 
Secretary of State would have been more inclined to such 
a plan.' The truth of his opinion is undeniable, although the 
alternative proposed by the writer, the election by the 
Colonies of members to sit in the Imperial Parliament, not 
exceeding twenty in number, if desired without the right 
to vote, was hardly a conceivable improvement on the plan, 
which he regarded as out of the question and proved to be 
a failure. Even the advent of the Com1nonwealth, by 
reducing the number of Agents-General to be taken into 
discussion, since for most purposes of Imperial importance 
the High Commissioner alone has power to represent the 
Commonwealth, has produced no alteration in the position 
as regards Australia. At the Imperial Conference in 1911 1 
a proposal was made indeed by New Zealand, which seemed • 
intended to suggest that the High Commissioners should be 
altered in position and become a real part of the Imperial 
machinery of communication.- It was proposed that the 
High Commissioners should become the sole channel of 
communication between the Imperial and the Dominion 
Governments, the Governors-General and Governors, how-
ever," being given identical and simultaneous information, 
that they should be invited to attend the meetings of the 
• 
Committee of Imperial Defence when questions of naval 
or military oversea defence were under discussion, and that 
they should be invited to consult with the Foreign Minister 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 5513, p. 4; 5745, pp. 77- 88, 92, 93. 
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on matters of foreign industrial, commercial, and social 
affairs in which the oversea Dominions were interested, and 
should keep their Governments informed. This proposal 
would clearly have turned the High Commissioners into 
importar1t links of Empire, and have provided a way of 
keeping the Governments in touch with such parts of foreign 
affairs as were not directly political; but, whatever its merits, 
the scheme was not seriously advocated by its proposer, and 
the representatives of the o~her Dominions were quite clear 
that they had no intention of altering the status of their 
representative, 011e of the South African representatives at 
the Conference going out of his way to make it clear that the 
then High Commissioner had been selected because of his 
special commercial abilities, and not for political purposes. 
The curious fact in that case was that the High Commissioner, 
more nearly than any other representative of a Dominion 
Government since Sir C. Tupper, had fulfilled the ideal of 
keeping his Ministry in touch with Imperial affairs, and had 
been in the closest personal confidence of the Prime Minister 
of the Union. 
The fact, of course, is that the proposal to make the High 
Commissioner a means of keeping in close touch with the 
Imperial Government offends against a fundamental con-
stitutional principle. The Agents-General and the High 
Commissioners are Government officials who hold their office 
under Acts of Parliament for definite periods, and who 
cannot be easily removed from office by any Government. 
Further, this tenure is in no small measure due to the fact 
that it is the custom for the office to be held by a person who 
. has held high political office in the Colony or Dominion, 
often in the case of the Australian Colonies by the late Prime 
Minister. But practically in every case the appointment is 
made from the ranks of the political supporters of the 
Ministry of the day, and, in default of a Prime Minister, then 
a minister who has social ambitions or who is too big to play 
a second part at home is dispatched to England. In the 
Dominions political parties, other than the Labour Party, 
have not the fixed character of the parties in the United 
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Kingdom, and a minister who has belonged to a party may 
find after his appointment that the party changes consider-
ably in tone and character, and that in effect it is no longer 
in complete harmony with him: still more frequently the 
Ministry is succeeded by another Ministry of completely 
different political tendency. The test is very clear in the 
case of the Dominions proper : Canada was represented from 
1896 to 1914 by Lord Strathcona,! who was a nominee of the 
Conservative Government, of which he had been a supporter 
in Parliament : his eminent fina11cial abilities rendered his 
appointment one to which exception could not possibly be 
taken by Sir W. Laurier's Government when it came into 
office shortly after his appointment, btlt on the other hand, 
it could not be expected that in any intimate matters the 
Government should give him the confidence which existed 
between his predecessor, Sir Charles Tupper, and the Con-
servative Ministries. Sir George Reid was an able politician, 
if a man of no profound knowledge, great ability, or grasp of 
principles; but it was absurd to expect that the Labour Party 
in the Commonwealth, with which he had been at variance 
all his political life, on finding him in office as a legacy from 
their predecessors, should trust him with political informa-
tion. Sir T. Mackenzie, as High Commissioner for New Zea-
land, stood precisely in the same position : it was desired to 
secure his departure from New Zealand in order to permit the 
due formation of the new Government of Mr. Massey, but 
between a Liberal and a Conservative Government no real 
harmony could be expected to exist.2 
It is an agreeable peculiarity of High Commissioners to 
deem themselves in some sense not general agents, as the 
popular mind is liable to deem them, but persons charged 
with ambassadorial privileges, and this belief is rightly 
encouraged by the British Government in the sense that they 
are shown marks of courtesy and distinction appropriate to 
the functions which they think they hold. But the essential 
distinction between an Ambassador and a High Commis-
1 Sir C. Tupper, Recollections of Sixty Years, p. 309. 
2 Parl. Pap., Cd. 6863, p. 116. 
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sioner lies in the fact that the former is a servant who is in 
the confidence of his Government, while the latter is not .. 
It is open to the Imperial Government at any moment to 
remove an Ambassador from his office in toto or to put him 
elsewhere, and this is occasionally done on change of Ministry, 
but it is seldom necessary, for an Ambassador belongs to 
a class which is, in fact, strictly non-political in its views and 
action. The Imperial Government can therefore have the 
utmost assistance from its ambassadors, and can trust them 
in the fullest degree, but that cannot be the case with a man 
who is normally a politician, and is at least appointed by 
a political party on party grounds, and holds office indepen-
dently of the new Government. Men of ambassadorial 
character would not be very easy to find in the Civil Service 
of the Dominions, which is, save in the cases of technical 
appointment, recruited from men of too inferior social and 
educational standing to develope the necessary qualities for 
ambassadorial functions. 
But even if this difficulty were not so serious as it appears, 
and if in due course the Dominions could send men of · the 
right class to represent them in this respect, there would 
still be difficulty in arriving at the fullest degree of inter-
communication between the Governments. It must be 
remembered that the position is not merely that the 
Dominions wish information on questions of foreign affairs, 
- but the Imperial Government desires to get into direct 
touch with the views of the Dominions. This could be 
done no doubt in some degree if the representatives of the 
Dominions in London were strict non-party men with 
permanent careers to look forward to and devoid of political 
ambitions of any kind; it might then be possible to induce 
their Governments to accord them full confidence in every 
regard. But the . i:nost effective manner is undoubtedly 
that laid down in the offer made by the Imperial Govern-
ment to the Dominion Governments in the dispatch from Mr. 
Harcourt of December 10, 1912,1 in which the definite sugges· 
tion was made that a Dominion minister might be sent to 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 6560; above, pp. 323, 324. 
542 IMPERIAL UNITY AND THE DOMINIONS 
London, where he would be available to represent the 
Dominion on the Committee of Imperial Defence, in which 
questions of foreign politics are considered in immediate 
relation to the essential question of the defence of the 
Empire as motived by these questions, where also he would 
have free and full access to the Prime Minister, the Foreign 
Secretary, and the Colonial Secretary on all questions of 
Imperial policy. 
It is important to note that the concession here offered, 
and ascertained to be satisfactory for the time being to 
Sir R. Borden,! is a very great one, unprecedented in the 
history of the Dominions. It is true that the assertion is 
expressly made that the Committee of Imperial Defence is 
a purely advisory committee, which could not become 
under any circumstances a body deciding on policy, which 
must remain the sole prerogative of the Cabinet, subject 
to the control of the House of Commons. But this assertion 
is obviously a mere statement of what is notorious : the 
policy of the United Kingdom 2 must be guided by the 
Cabinet, which is responsible to Parliament. It would be 
impossible for any body which Parliament could not directly 
control to be responsible for or decide on policy, without the 
disappearance of responsible government altogether, and 
the position is understood in all the Dominions. But the 
idea that a minister should reside in London and actually 
be in constant intercourse with the Prime Minister or 
Foreign Secretary is a novelty of the most pronounced 
kind. It is perfectly true that the High Commissioners 
and even Agents-General have occasionally had direct dis-
cussions with the Foreign Secretary or had interviews 
with him in conjunction with the Colonial Secretary, and 
that from quite early times, and the Prime Minister has 
naturally often seen and talked with Dominion ministers, 
but these are quite different things from a right to full and 
1 Canada House of Commons Debates, December 5, 1912. 
2 See Lord Kimberley's dispatch of June 12, 1882, and Mr. Chamberlain's 
dispatch of May 27, 1903, in reply to Home Rule addresses from the 
Dominion of Canada; Parl. Pap., C. 3294, p. 4; Cd. 1697, p. 4 
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.free access to both, that is a · right, not to ask the Colonial 
Secretary to arrange an interview, but to ask for an inter· 
·view direct and to discuss as an equal the affairs he wishes 
to discuss. Moreover, it is to be remembered that the 
discussion is not limited to foreign affairs: Mr. Borden's 
desire was that Canadian and other Dominion ministers 
who might be in London as members of the ~Committee of 
Imperial Defence should receive in confidence knowledge 
of the policy of the Imperial Government in foreign and 
other affairs. Further, foreign affairs include par excellence 
foreign political affairs, a point in which the scheme differs 
vitally from the abortive proposal of the Dominion of New 
Zealand at-the Imperial Conference of 1911. 
The Imperial Government offered to- make the scheme 
different in any way any other Dominion liked to have it 
varied. It is a striking confirmation of the view that these 
Governments do not trust their High Commissioners, that 
not one of the Dominions suggested that they would like 
him to be placed in the position indicated. Canada had 
already shown that she was only prepared to use a minister 
in the post. . Australia replied by asking for a full Imperial 
Conference; New Zealand and the Union of South Africa, 
not to mention Newfoundland, were not prepared to appoint 
resident ministers, holding that the existing means of 
co-operation were for the time adequate. The replies of 
the Dominions are most significant of the different stature 
of the Dominion of Canada as compared with the other 
Domi11ions, who may fairly be said to be in: some degree still 
in the dependency stage of development, and even in Canada 
there was delay before the plan was made effective. The 
opportunity for this was given in 1914 by the death of 
Lord Strathcona, whereupon the Dominion Government 
sent in his place as their representative an honorary minister, 
Mr., now Sir, George Perley. This minister was not, how-
ever, to be High Commissioner,! but he was to perform the 
functions of the High Commissioner while fulfilling the 
1 He could not legally have been Minister and paid High Commissioner 
simultaneously; Revised Statutes, 1906, c. 10, s. 10. 
544 IMPERIAL UNITY AND THE DOMINIONS 
duties of resident minister. Chance made his position in 
that respect of special importan.ce, inasmuch as th~ out-
break of the war made his services as an intermediary 
between the Dominion and the Imperial Government 
specially valuable. 
The appointment of a resident minister may be thought 
to be a diminution of the position of the Governor-General · 
or Governor. But it would not be possible to malre the 
Governor a channel of confidential communication in the 
sense in which a resident minister can serve. In the first 
place, the Governor is lilre a High Commissioner : he is 
appointed for a time, which is fixed at five or six years, 
according as he pleases, and Governors are not changed on 
changes of the Imperial Government. He is therefore very 
often not at all in harmony with the views of the Imperial 
Government. In the second place, the Governor is very 
seldom well informed before the event of the intentions of his 
ministers, as, on the whole, Ministries appear to be reluctant 
to give him their confidence. But a really more serious 
objection is the fact that the Governor has different functions 
to perform than an intelligence agency : his duty is to 
represent the King as the head of the local Government, 
and to serve as the channel of formal communications 
between the local and the central Governments, and in the 
performance of these functions his duty is fulfilled. Or in 
fact, just as in foreign politics, as experience in the European 
War has shown, direct discussion between ministers of the 
Crown is far more efficacious than any amount of com-
munications through ambassadors, so in Imperial relations 
the direct intercourse of minister and minister is far prefer-
able to any other form of comn1unication. 
It is, of course, obvious that the mode of communication 
adopted for the present by Canada is not a permanent settle-
ment of the question of the relations of the Imperial Govern-
ment and the Dominions as regards foreign affairs or 
anything else. But, while it leaves the responsibility of the 
United Kingdom untouched, it does secure an effective 
method by which the responsibility shall not be exercised 
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until it has been considered in what respect the decisions 
of the Imperial Government will affect the Dominions of 
the Crown. The Committee of Imperial Defence is essen-
tially ·a body whose advice is of very great importance, 
even if its power is merely advisory : the Dominions cannot 
claim at present any share of responsibility, but the means 
of advising are surely of the greatest value. 
But it is important to note that the principle has been 
carried a good deal further than this, for on his last visit 
in 1915 1 to the United Kingdom the Imperial Government 
. took the further step of inviting Sir R. Borden to attend 
a meeting of the cabinet. As a Privy Councillor, the Prime 
Minister of Canada has, of course, attended council meet-
ings, as have many of his predecessors in colonial office 
and authority, but the attendance of a cabinet by a Dominion 
minister is totally without precedent in the history of the 
Empire, and its significance was duly noted at the time. 
It is a privilege not even accorded to LorQ. Onslow when 
acting in lieu of the Secretary of State during the visit of 
Mr. Chamberlain to the South African colonies: when his 
opinion was desired on colonial matters it could not be 
given and discussed by him in cabinet, but only to some 
members of the Government, who could repeat it in cabinet. 
As in the case of the attendance of Dominion ministers ·at 
the Committee of Imperial Defence, it connotes no responsi-
bility on the Dominion minister, but it does most emphatic-
ally permit him to set out in the most effective manner his 
opinion on questions of importance to the Dominion. 
Now it would be idle to suppose that any such practice 
as that followed by Sir Robert Borden can at once be 
accepted by the other Dominions. There is one good 
reason for this at least, in the reluctance of a11y Dominio~ 
to imitate another. But there is a 1nore valid reason in 
the difficulty of providing as easily, as in the case of Canada, 
for a resident minister even for a period of the year. The 
1 See Times, July 15, 1915. Mr. Hughes was sworn of the Canadian 
Privy Council, and sat at an Imperial Cabinet meeting on March 9, 
1916. 
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Governments of the Commonwealth have seldom been 
strong enough to provide a minister who could be allowed 
to leave the country for long periods while still remaining 
a minister, and the state of New Zealand since the fall of 
Sir J. Ward from power in 1912 to the autumn of 1915 
was such that a single vote could never have been spared. 
In the case of South Africa, and doubtless too in the other 
cases, considerations of effective touch with the absent 
minister would have weight, and also, but mainly in the 
case of the Union, fear lest in some way the Dominion 
should be dragged willy nilly into the vortex of Imperial 
policies. This fear of the power of the United Kingdom, 
and nervous desire not to approach too closely the brilliance 
of its Government, a.re characteristic of the childhood of states, 
and it 'vill, it may be believed, disappear with growing 
consciousness of strength as it has disappeared in Canada, 
but the difficulties of sparing ministers, the lack of stability 
of governments, and the distance will make progress, it may 
well be, slower in the case of the other Dominions, while 
Newfoundland naturally realizes that in such case for her to 
send a resident minister would be unwise and unnecessary. 
But even if the full programme of a resident minister 
cannot be carried out, there may be possibilities in the 
way of giving increased power to a resident High Com-
missioner,1 especially in the case of the Labour Party in 
the Commonwealth, where the Government counts for 
little in the political world in comparison with the Labour 
Party caucus and the labour organizations behind the 
caucus. The appointment of a labour minister to succeed 
Sir G. Reid as the High Commissioner will for a time keep 
the Government and High Commissioner in unity of thought, 
but apart from changes of Government, it is doubtful if 
• 
1 The Colonial Secretary in 1907 endeavoured to encourage the use of 
the High Commissioner in connexion with the secretariat of the Conference 
(Parl. Pap., Cd. 3795, p. 4), but the Commonwealth and the other Govern-
ments remained indifferent. Indeed the whole history of the recent years 
of efforts to use High Commissioners has been one of rei uctance on the 
part of the ministries who are sensitive of their personal position. 
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this unity can long prevail. The representative in London 
of a Dominion is always a potential rival for power at 
home, a fact which adds to the difficulties inherent in 
securing close harmony of action. 
It is creditable to the intelligence of Sir C. Tupper that 
as far back as 1891 he saw quite clearly that the only 
possibility of establishing a Council of advice would rest 
on the sending of ministers, not officials, to represent the 
Government of the Dominions. More attention might per-
haps have been given to his advice at that time, had it not 
been adverse to the established idea then prevailing that 
some form of federation might be worked out, and had it 
not been bound up with the idea of preferential trade in 
some form or other. Nor doubtless was the idea anything 
but premature, since it has clearly been seen at the present 
day that the Dominions generally have not been able to 
accustom themselves to the conception. 
It is fairly clear from the replies 1 of Australia, New 
Zealand, and the Union of South Africa to the offer of the 
Imperial Government, that these Dominions think that the 
machinery of the Imperial Conference, plus arrangements 
for individual ministerial visits, cover adequately the whole 
ground of the needs of the day. It is important in this 
connexion, however, to remember that Mr. Fisher, when 
Prime Minister of the Commonwealth, was a declared believer 
in biennial or even annual conferences, and that his belief 
was founded on the need of keeping in close touch with the 
Imperial Government regarding foreign affairs. This was 
shown very clearly at the Imperial Conference of -1911 
when he made the suggestion that the affairs of the self-
governing Dominions might be transferred from the minis-
terial control of the Colonial Secretary to that of the Foreign 
Secretary. It was abundantly evident that his desire was 
to be au fait with the progress of the foreign relations of 
the Empire, and for that purpose he valued the holding of 
conferences. In this attitude he recognized the funda-
mental truth' that by far the most important subject of the 
1 See above, Part I, chap. ~v, § 3. 
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Conference of 1911 was the one not recorded in the official 
proceedings, the attendance of ministers at the Committee 
of Imperial Defence to hear an exposition of the foreign 
policy of the Empire and the situation of affairs from the 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.1 But it is perfectly 
clear that annual conferences for this purpose are a clumsy 
means of procedure, and that the attendance of an individual 
minister for a short time would be more simple and more 
effective. But this policy would have parliamentary dis-
- advantages which cannot be ignored. The departure of 
one minister would be often inconvenient as Parliament 
could not reasonably be asked to suspend operations for that 
cause, while an Imperial Conference gives a good excuse 
for three ministers or even more taking a journey to the 
centre of the Empire, where they can mix agreeably the 
utile with the dulce. Nor has the demand for more frequent 
conferences any real chance of obtaining general assent 
at present, considerations of ministerial convenience being 
conclusive.2 
The Imperial Conference must, therefore, be regarded 
not so much as a mearis of solving the fundamental problem 
of the grant to the Dominions of a share in the management 
of the external affairs of the Empire in return for their 
efforts to take part in its defence, but as a means of pro-
viding for the discussion of matters of common interest, 
on the basis of absolute autonomy and equality, or of 
strivings in that direction. It is undoubtedly true that as 
regards a good deal of the work which has come before 
·Imperial Conferences the subj.ect matter might quite as 
well have been treated by international conferences, since 
it has nothing specifically imperial connected with it. 
There are obvious examples of such cases in subjects like 
copyright, trade marks, patents, workmen's compensation, 
international exhibitions, mutual provisions for deserted 
wives and children, cheaper cable rates, universal penny 
postage, and so forth. Other matters are more truly Imperial, 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 5745, p. 440; Gen. Botha, Times, June 22, 1911. 
2 Round Table, 1915, pp. 670, 671, 700. 
IMPERIAL PARTNERSHIP 549 
but they all fall under the head rather of questions requiring 
legislation in the Empire than of matters of policy for 
executive decision. Nor is it unnatural that this should 
be the case: it is very seldom that any executive matter 
can conveniently be decided by discussion at a conference 
composed of persons, who have not been in contact with the 
questions from which the matter requiring decision arose. 
There is a very obvious instance in the case of the Conference 
of 1911. The Conference, after hearing the arguments of 
the Foreign Secretary in favour of the ratification of the 
Declaration of London, agreed to recommend its ratification, 
Australia abstaining on a technical point, but not denying 
the wisdom of the course. Fortunately, the attempt to 
pass off this discussion as the considered opinion of the 
Dominions was not taken seriously by the House of Lords, 
which threw out the Bill on which ratification depended, 
and they did thus incidentally a great service to the inter-
national position of the Empire in the European war. 
But the important point to note is that the Dominion 
ministers from lack of familiarity with the practical aspects 
of the matter at issue were hopelessly incompetent to deal 
with the position in the form of a set conference.1 Their 
ammunition of arguments had been picked up from repre-
sentations made at the time by miscellaneous private bodies, 
and they were wholly unable to see, before they were pointed 
out, the fallacies in the arguments which they adduced, or 
what was far more important to realize that the arguments 
of the Foreign Secretary, while valid against their own 
errors, were not conclusive of the main issues at all. It 
may safely be predicted that, if the Dominion representatives 
are to have only such control of or intelligence of foreign 
politics in their relation to the Empire as they can pick 
up once in four years at a very much overcrowded con-
ference, they are not likely to benefit the Empire very 
seriously by their advice. Nothing but the close following 
of the trend of politics abroad can be useful to a Govern-
ment, and since 1911 only the Government of Canada has 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 5745, pp. 97-134. 
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. 
been effectively in touch for · any considerable period with 
the Imperial Government, though in 1912 both Colonel 
Allen of New Zealand and General Smuts of the Union 
were at home, and in touch 'vith the Con1mittee of Imperial 
Defence. 
Everything at present indeed tends to show that the 
Committee of Imperial Defence will develop as a mode 
for the time being of assisting the appreciation of foreign 
affairs by the Dominions ; a part from the question of the 
presence of a resident minister, the Dominions all heartily 
agree in the desirability of the use of the Committee, though 
Australia's position is less clear than that of the other 
Dominions. rhe Committee has, of course, no legal con-
stitution or powers : it is a creation of Mr. Balfour's, 
devised to study defence problems in close relation to foreign 
politics, and the Prime Minister remains the only absolutely 
essential member of it, though the Ministers of War, the 
Admiralty and Foreign Affairs, with the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer are immediately concerned in all its delibera-
tions. The elasticity of its composition is best seen in the 
extraordinary varying ways in which its meetings are 
· composed from time to time as there may be need. Excep-
tion has of -late frequently been taken to its apparent 
usurpation of the po·wers of the Imperial Conference, but 
this attack is due to an error and misunderstanding of the 
position. The position of the Imperial Conference is that 
it is a gathering of ministers fully empowered to represent 
the Dominions for which they speak, though subject of 
course to the control of the Dominion Parliaments, who, 
in what they say and undertake, express the views of these 
Dominions on subjects which fall under their control, 
'vhether it be a mere question of alteration of law for the 
sake of uniformity, or a request to the Imperial Govern-
ment to alter taxation, such as double income tax, affect-
ing the Dominions. In the case of the discussions conducted 
at the Committee of Imperial Defence, ministers are not 
in a position to advise : they are present to receive informa-
tion, and to make, if . need be, suggestions for the considera-
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tion of the Imperial Government in the interest of the 
Dominions which they represent. The decision ~nd the 
action taken rest on the responsibility of the Imperial 
Government: the essential condition of secrecy renders it· 
impossible for ministers of the Dominions to take responsi-
bility to the Dominions even for their advice, and of course, 
as they do not control, they cannot ever take responsibility 
for the action determined upon. In those cases in regard 
to foreign affairs, where the Dominions can give advice 
and take responsibility for that advice, the proceedings 
take place at the Imperial Conference, as in 1907 in the 
case of the question of the New Hebrides and Newfound-
land, and in 1911 in the case of the Declaration of London. 
In effect the distinction of treatment corresponds to a vital 
distinction of fact, and it is to be noted that, while the 
details of the naval and admiralty questions raised at the 
Conference of 1911 were thrashed out in conferences with 
the War Office and the Admiralty, the results of these 
conferences were formally submitted to the Imperial Con-
ference, and adopted by it as its own/ thus placing them 
on the responsibility of the ministers of Canada and Australia 
in respect to the arrangements regarding these Dominions 
as to naval defence, and on these and the other Dominions 
as regards military defence. The distinction between the 
Conference and the Committee further appears in the fact 
that at the Committee, which is merely advisory, officers 
of the Army and Navy may be present, including officers 
of the Dominions, while the Imperial Conference is a con-
ference strictly confined to persons of ministerial rank and 
responsibility, the structure of the Conference reflecting its 
special importance. 
The nature of the Imperial Conference is now determined 
by the resolution passed in the Conference of 1907 2 to the 
effect that, ' it will be to the advantage of the Empire if 
a conference, to be called the Imperial Conference, is held 
every four years, at which questions of common interest 
may be discussed and considered as betwee~ His Majesty's 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 5745, p. 432. 2 Parl. Pap., Cd. 3523, p. 5. 
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Government and the governments of the self-governing 
Dominions beyond the seas. The Prime Minister of the 
United Kingdom will be ex officio president, and the Prime 
Ministers of the self-governing Dominions ex officio ministers 
of the Conference. The Secretary of State for the Colonies 
will be an ex officio member of the Conference, and will 
take the chair in the absence of the President. He will 
arrange for such Imperial Conferences after communication 
with the Prime Ministers of the respective Dominions.' 
The Conference of 1897 was confined to Prime Ministers 
only, advantage being taken of the Jubilee celebrations of 
Queen Victoria's reign to consult with them, but other 
ministers appeared informally at the Conference of 1902, 
held together with the coronation, and the demand for the 
recognition of these ministers as full members raised by 
Canada in 1905 1 was conceded in 1907, it being agreed that, 
' such other ministers as the respective governments may 
appoint will also be members of the conference, it being 
understood that, except by special permission of the con-
ference, each discussion will be conducted by not more 
than two representatives from each government, and that 
each government will have only one vote.' In point of 
fact in 1911 each Dominion sent three representatives, 
except Newfoundland and New Zealand, which had two. 
The delegates and their families and staffs were the guests 
of the Imperial Government, and the ministers brought 
with them some specially important officers from their 
civil service. 
The most obvious omission in the construction of the 
conference is that of India, and it is clear that the omission 
is undesirable. The fact that India can be represented 
occasionally by the Secretary of State for India, in the 
case of 1911, rendered the absence of an Indian repre-
sentative unobjectionable, since Lord Crewe had but recently 
left the Colonial for the India Office, but the accidental fact 
that he was then the best representative India could have 
had does not alter the fact that India has established by 
• 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 3340, pp. 3, 4, 10, 12 . 
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her service in the war a claim to be included in any Imperial 
conference, and that her omission was never justified. 
The demand of the Legislative Council of India 1 that this 
claim should be conceded has been promised the earnest 
consideration of the Imperial Government, and, though it 
doubtless lies on the Conference to alter its own constitution, 
it is clear that the Dominion Governments should be pressed 
if necessary to agree to this step before the next formal and 
full conference is summoned. It is quite impossible to 
accept the validity of the argument of Lord Elgin in 1906 2 
that the constitution of the conference cannot be changed 
save by a resolution of the conference. It can, it is clear, 
be changed by agreement between the Imperial and the 
Dominion Governments, and such agreement should be 
secured forthwith. 
The functions attributed to the conference have hitherto 
been rather inadequately considered. It is clear that it 
is desirable that the subjects dealt with should be limited 
to those which can effectively be considered and disposed 
of by a conference of ministers. The tendency to bring 
before the conference trifling and ludicrous points, is one 
which can hardly be regarded as conducing to the dignity 
of the conference or the swift and satisfactory conduct of 
business. Nor is there any useful purpose served by bring-
ing before the conference matters which depend on detail 
for their importance, for these questions are far better 
suited to form the subject of separate discussions, as is 
recognized in the resolution of 1907, which expressly says 
that 'upon matters of importance requiring consultation 
between two or more governments which cannot con-
veniently be postponed until the next conference or involv .. 
ing subjects of a minor character or such as call for detailed 
consideration subsidiary conferences should be held between 
representatives of the governments concerned, especially 
chosen for the purpose.' Of conferences of this type there 
have been three, the naval and n1ilitary of 1909, which was 
1 Times, Sept. 24, 1915; Round Table, 1915-16, pp. 88-119. 
2 Parl. Pap., Cd. 3340, p. 13, a singularly unconvincing dispatch. 
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a matter of urgency, and required technical investigation,! 
the Copyright of 1910,2 and the Surveyors' of 1911,3 both 
purely technical conferences. 
Another salutary rule in regard to the conferences 
should be that nothing should be referred to a conference 
which can better be effected by writing, and that every 
effort should be made . to present for discussion only such 
questions as admit of a clear decision being arrived at by 
ministers, or in the alternative questions of such impor-
tance that discussion at a public conference is likely to aid 
in some result, nor on the whole does it seem worth while 
to summon a conference of Prime Ministers and others for 
the mere sake of passing resolutions which are purely 
platitudinous. 
Judged by these not very exacting standards, the resolu-
tions and discussions of 1911 must be held to have con-
tained a good deal of waste matter. The Imperial Govern-
ment cannot be considered exempt from blame : they 
proposed to discuss in this formal manner the subject of 
a uniform design of stamps for the Empire, a proposal 
which was so outrageously absurd that it fortunately does 
not appear to have been pressed, the arrangements for the 
expulsion of undesirable aliens, and labour exchanges in 
their relation to the Dominions. The question of expulsion 
of undesirable aliens was briefly treated ; it is obvious that 
it was merely one for departmental correspondence. The 
question of labour exchanges and the Dominions was dis-
cussed, but the discussion, though interesting from the 
point of view of statistics of emigration work, was rendered 
futile by the obvious fact that the emigration to the Australian 
States is conducted by the Governments of the States which 
have been denied, despite their protests, a place in the 
Imperial Conference. This exclusion, which was probably 
accidental rather than intentional in 1902, was deliberately 
carried out in 1907 4 against the protests of the States 
but with the desire of the Commonwealth Government. 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 4948. 
3 Parl. Pap., Cd. 5776. 
2 Parl. Pap., Cd. 5272. 
. 
4 Parl. Pap., Cd. 3340; 3523, pp. 92-4. 
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The discussion is of importance in its bearing on the relative 
positions of the Commonwealth and the States, the Com-
monwealth being described by one of the States as merely 
an agent of the States for certain defined purposes, while 
the Commonwealth insisted that apart from her specific 
powers she alone should properly represent Australia. 
The decision had, of course, to be in favour of the Common-
wealth, but the exclusion of the States is an additional 
reason for deprecating the insertion of resolutions or attempts 
at resolutions which the Co~monwealth had no power to 
effect, and the same line of reasoning applied in several 
cases to Canada. 
Other resolutions offended against other canons. One in 
favour of Imperial postal orders being introduced in Australia 
and fully adopted in Canada, was in the first place improper 
as referring to two Dominions only ; in the second place 
it was clearly a matter for departmental treatment; and 
in the third place the attempt to bring pressure to bear 
by having a conference resolution passed was resented, 
and the provisional assents of the representatives of Australia 
and Canada resulted in no action. Not in themselves open to 
criticism, but idle as merely general, were the recommendations 
of cheaper cable rates, a state-owned Atlantic cable, if rates 
were not soon lowered, and an Imperial wireless telegraphy 
chain, which was fated to lead the Imperial Government 
into serious troubles and to be unfinished when war broke 
out, and universal penny.postage. On the latter resolution 
no action could be or was taken ; the Imperial Government 
declined to agree to a state-owned Atlantic cable, which 
New Zealand and Australia still wanted, . and Canada 
adopted a radio-telegraphic system of its own, and so 
becoming indifferent to the old proposal. On the other 
hand, cheaper rates were conceded, but the Imperial post 
office hardly needed the aid of the conference to obtain 
them, as the companies interested had found their hands 
forced by other considerations. 
Of the same useless character were the resolutions in 
favour of a steamship service between Canada or Newfound-
556 IMPERIAL UNITY AND THE DOMINIONS 
land and the United Kingdom, and between Australia and 
New Zealand and Canada, and the pious declaration that 
concerted action should be taken to improve trade and 
postal communications within the Empire _ and to dis-
courage combines for the control of freight rates, in so far 
as these combines injured trade. The first of the two 
merely readopted the old theory of an ' All Red Route ' 
mooted in 1907 and found impracticable at any reasonable 
rate; the second obviously meant nothing, and left South 
Africa, which raised the matter, to remove her own troubles 
by passing an Act 1 which threatened such severe dis-
crimination of all sorts against lines which gave rebates, 
that Messrs. Donald Currie & Co. retired from the manage-
ment of the Union Castle Line of Steamships, and left it to 
Sir Owen Philipps, who managed to make a contract with 
the Union on more or less satisfactory terms, though he 
has been accused of contravention of the Act also. Wisely, 
the eternal question of trade relations was referred to 
a Dominion Royal Commission to report upon the natural 
resources of the different parts of the Empire represented 
at the conference, the development attained and attainable, 
and the facilities for production, manufacture, and dis-
tribution, the trade of each part with the others and with 
the outside world, the food and raw material requirements 
of each, and the sources thereof available, to what extent 
if any the trade between each of the different parts had 
been affected by existing legislation in each, either bene-
ficially or otherwise, and by what methods, consistent with 
the existing fiscal policy of each part, the trade of each part 
with the others might be improved and extended. The 
question of uniformity in the law of alien immigration was 
referred by the conference to this Commission, but the 
Commissioners have not dealt with it at all; and,. as it is 
obviously a matter of high politics and not really a com-
mercial question, it is perfectly clear that it should not have 
been referred to the Commission, and that its reference 
was simply due to the fact that the conference desired to 
1 No. 10 of 1911; Parl. Pap., Cd. 6091, pp. 61, 62. 
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avoid touching on any point on which differences of opinion 
could arise. It would be idle to censure the conference 
for this decision : it is much more useful to discuss matters 
upon which something can be agreed than to deal with 
problems that are insoluble, and, what is more important, 
so different in each case that a general discussion would 
not be of any value. In point of fact all that could usefully 
be said on the subject would have been the obvious remark 
that every consideration must be shown for the feelings of 
Japan. 
The Commission appointed by the desires of the confer-
ence has taken its duties seriously, has visited Australia 
. and New Zealand, South Africa, Newfoundland, and a 
small part of Canada, but through the war the Australian 
Government has recalled its member, and the completion 
of its work seems likely to be delayed until its report is 
very much out of date as regards the evidence on which 
it is based. On the other hand it has recorded much interest-
ing matter about the Dominions it has visited.1 The serious 
doubt must arise whether any useful service has been 
rendered by these visits and records beyond the undoubted 
convenience of saving the governments concerned a repeti-
tion of the long wrangle of 1907, when Mr. Deakin tried to 
prove to a government, which had won an enormous majority 
on its free trade principles, that it ought to be protectionist, 
and while that Government explained to lVIr. Dealdn that 
his economic views were unsound. 
The other resolutions on industrial subjects were all of 
no real value. Fortunately, the Dominions represented 
realized the fact and wasted no time on their discussion. 
Accordingly it was agreed at once that uniformity in the 
law of trade-marks, copyright, patents, and companies was 
desirable, and also that uniformity of the law of accident 
compensation should be aimed at. On two of these topics, 
company law and accident compensation law, the Dominion 
of Canada and the Commonwealth had but little legislative 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 6515-17, 7170-2, 7173, 7210, 7706, 7707, 7710, 7711, 
7898, 7971, 8123. 
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authority, and therefore their agreement was negligible. 
The Commonwealth; however, improved in 1912 its trade-
mark law and adopted the Imperial Copyright Act of 1911, 
as it had arranged to do at the Conference on Copyright of 
1910. New Zealand also in 1911 improved its law of patents 
and trade-marks, and in 1913 fell into line as to copyright. 
Newfoundland, in 1912, accepted the Copyright Act. The 
Commonwealth also legislated as to compensation to seamen 
in 1911, and in reference to workmen employed by the 
Commonwealth in 1912. But the needlessness of a con-
ference for such an end was seen by the fact that the pro-
vinces of Manitoba and Nova Scotia in 1913 consented to 
follow the British model in certain respects, and if New 
Zealand legislated in 1911 by Act No. 34 on the matter 
as a result of the conference, South Australia, Western 
Australia, and Victoria 've1"e induced to act by mere corre-
spondence, though in the latter case a different system 
from the Imperial was preferred by the Upper House. 
Ontario, on the other hand, decided to adopt the German 
model as better suited to the case of the province where 
it was difficult on the English basis to secure that a work-
man would have an effective means of securing payment 
of compensation from his employer owing to the shifting 
character of the population. 
Another resolution which clearly depended on circutn-
stances beyond the control of the Domi~ion or the Common-
wealth was a resolution in favour of the mutual recognition 
of judgements and arbitral awards issued by the courts 
of the Empire. Necessarily the matter is one for corre-
spondence, with no great prospect of early legislation, 
especially as it involves legislation everywhere in the 
Empire. It may be doubted if facile endorsements of 
general principles without understanding what is involved 
serves any useful purpose, and legal questions are singularly 
unsuitable for discussion when they deal with mere points 
• 
of detail. 
The serious resolutions which alone would properly have 
been brought before the conference reduce themselves to 
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a few only, dealing in the main with constitutional matters. 
The Dominions of Canada and New Zealand asked for 
wider powers in merchant shipping legislation, but were 
refused what they asked: the Union, the Commonwealth, 
and Newfoundland held that the powers already existed, 
which ·\vas absurd, as the Common'\vealth had to admit 
in 1912, and the Imperial Government held that the powers 
should not be conceded as they were desired to exclude 
lascars from the shippi11g trade. A general resolution as 
to encouraging British shipping possessed some importance 
' 
as suggesting that steps be take11 to deal with unfair com-
petition by foreign subsidized vessels, thus giving the Com-
monwealth approval for her determination to close he:c 
coasting trade to such vessels. A resolution in favour of 
reduction of the Suez Canal dues was really a request to 
the Imperial Government to use its powers with the Suez 
Canal Company to reduce its dividends in the interest of 
the Dominion shipping, and was accepted by the Imperial 
Government in that sense. More important still were the 
resolutions regarding the future consultation of the Dominions 
as to international treaties such as the Hague Conventions, 
and the agreement that the Declaration of London should 
be ratified, while it was agreed to continue the efforts of 
the Imperial Government begun in 1907 to secure liberty 
for the Dominions to cease to be affected by the older 
treaties applied to them before the practice of consulting 
the Dominions in treaty matters . came into force. An 
agreement to consider the question of the attitude to be 
adopted in regard to international exhibitions led to a dis-
cussion with the Agents-General and High Commissioners 
of the Dominions and States as to the attitude to be adopted 
in the matter, the outcome of which was that the Dominions 
were not represented in any way at the Conference of 
Berlin in 1912, though of course the convention contained 
the usual provision for their adherence in due course if 
they desired. 
One important subject was that of the Court of Appeal, 
whose alteration in some minor respects was concurred in, 
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after an elaborate and inconclusive discussion.1 Naturaliza-
tion was also discussed and progress made with its decision.2 
Emigration was touched upon in its general aspects, and 
in close connexion with it a resolution arrived at in favour 
of provision being made to secure that wife and child 
desertion by emigrants and others should be discouraged, 
but the discussion of these topics was necessarily per-
functory, as the matters were in the main questions of 
State concern in Australia. An imperial aspect, however, 
was given by the stress laid by the President of the Local 
Government Board on the fact that the process of emigra-
tion was lessening the population of Scotland, and would 
use up all the natural EJ?.glish increase unless the death-
rate had improved, a serious fact which at once renders 
all schemes for emigration based on the theory of over-
crowding in the United Kingdom open to serious objection. 
These resolutions with the unimportant additions of one 
urging quite needlessly the celebration of the King's 
birthday on June 3, the interchange of civil servants, 
visits by ministers, and the holding of a conference or 
subsidiary conference in an oversea Dominion exhaust 
the list of serious business done, apart from the naval and 
military questions discussed only pro forma at the con-
ference, and the secret proceedings at the Committee of 
Imperial Defence. It is clear that they could have been 
dealt with in a good deal less than the twelve days which 
the conference lasted, and this is a matter of importance, for 
it is not desirable that the length of the conferences should 
be so great as to make the attendance of ministers from 
distant Dominions burdensome. It is of course true that 
ten days is a brief period to give to consideration of the 
topics of a conference, but the ministers are naturally 
anxious to see as much as they can of the United Kingdom, 
which many of them have few chances of visiting, and none 
can study under more favourable auspices. The conference 
straggled on from June 2-20, and it is clear that it would 
have been much better had it been confined within the 
1 Part I, chap. ;x:vi. 2 Part I, chap. xii. 
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limits of some ten days, as could easily have been done 
by dealing with the important topics alone. 
There is a further unsatisfactory feature regarding the 
Conferences, the error of the commingling of Conference and 
festivities. It is perfectly natural that the ministers who 
come with their wives and families should eagerly take 
part in the lavish hospitality provided by all sorts of people, 
official and otherwise. Nor is it other than desirable that 
they should have this opportunity of seeing the life of 
the Empire at first hand. But the rule should clearly be 
that during the period of the Conference the ministers 
shall restrict themselves strictly to Conference work. It 
is neither profitable nor desirable that ministers should 
be unable ~o attend to the obvious -business of correcting 
the accounts of their speeches which are to be published, 
because they are entertaining meetings of female suffrage 
supporters or having tea with duchesses. Nor should they 
be unable to attend meetings of the Conference at the 
proper time, or leave early because they have luncheon 
engagements. The custom of making the business of the 
Conference subservient to the pleasure of the ministers 
leads to the serious doubt whether the ministers regard the 
Conference as anything but an excellent opportunity for 
a visit to the United Kingdom, approved by the Opposition, 
and at the expense, when in the United Kingdom, of the 
Imperial Government, so that there can be none of those 
unpleasant questions which Opposition members love to 
put about the expense of the Prime Minister's 'trip to the 
old country '. Mr. Deakin in 1907 called attention to this 
anomaly by which entertainment is substituted for work, 
and it is to be regretted that neither the Dominion ministers 
nor their Parliaments have taken the hint. It is clear that 
it is not for the Imperial Government or for private hosts 
to refrain from offering their hospitality, and all that is 
required is that the Prime Ministers and their companions 
should lay it down definitely that for the time of the Con-
ference, which should be reduced to the consideration of 
real business, they can accept no social engager.aents. The 
1874 ~ Il 
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work of the Conference would then be accomplished more 
quickly and with greater effect. 
Consideration of the true functions of an Imperial Con-
ference lead inevitably to the condemnation of the various 
plans for a permanent commission or secretariat, which 
have been mooted from time to time, and which seem to 
have a rather seductive effect for some minds. To some 
extent the responsibility for the serious consideration of 
this idea seems to rest with Sir F. Pollock,1 who, with Mr. G. 
Drage, toured Canada in 1905 with a propaganda in favour 
of the establishment of an Imperial Council with a permanent 
secretariat as a general intelligence department, finding·, 
as might be expected, scant affection for any Council of 
any kind in the most sensitive of Dominions. The plan 
appeared in an official form in a proposal made by Mr. 
Lyttelton on April 20, 1905, to the Governments of the self-
governing Dominions.2 He then suggested that the Colonial 
Conference should be styled the Imperial Council, and be 
regarded as having a permanent constitution, the Secretary 
of State for the Colonies and the Prime Ministers of the 
Colonies being ex officio members, and that, during its periods 
of rest from its labours, its decisions should be entrusted 
to a body which could examine and report upon questions 
referred for such exan1ination and report by the Council. 
Moreover, there would also be the advantage that such 
a body would be available to carry out investigations and 
to report on such questions as the Imperial Government 
with one or more Colonial Governments might refer to it 
for consideration and report, much as Royal, Commissions 
and departmental committees considered matters for legisla-
tion by Parliament. The body would be appointed by the 
several Governments, who would pay the members, and 
would be able to add outside members for special purposes; 
it would be provided by the Imperial Government with 
a secretarial staff, and it could often do the work of an 
ad hoc conference, which was difficult and slow to convene. 
1 See J. S. Ewart, Kingdom Papers, ii. 214. 
2 Par:l. Pap., Cd. 2785. 
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The proposal was welcomed by the Governments of the 
Cape and of Natal, and also by the Commonwealth of 
Australia, but Canada, as usual, prognosticated evil, 
suggested that the term 'Council' might hint at the growth 
of an institution which would interfere with the autonomous 
legislative and administrative powers of the self-governing 
Colonies, and believed that the Commission might interfere 
with responsible government. The matter stood over for 
the Conference of 1907 ; Lord Elgin in the interim having 
intimated 1 that he did not share his predecessor's views, 
and the discussion at that Conference showed much diver-
gence of opinion. Australia moved that 'it is desirable 
to establish an Imperial Council to consist of representatives 
of Great Britain and the self-governing Colonies chosen 
ex officio from their existing Administrations . . That the 
objects of such Council shall be to discuss at regular con-
ferences matters of common Imperial interest, and to 
establish a system by which members of the Council shall 
be kept informed during the periods between the conferences 
in regard to matters which have been or may be subjects 
for discussion. That there shall be a permanent secretarial 
staff charged with the duty of obtaining information for 
the use of the Council, of attending to the execution of its 
resolutions, and of conducting correspondence on matters 
relating to its affairs. That the expenses of such a staff 
shall be borne by the countries represented on the Council 
in proportion to their populations.' The discussion showed 
clearly that Mr. Deakin did not care as to the title, and the 
term 'Imperial Conference' was therefore agreed to. Nor 
did he wish, it turned out, to have a Commission of the 
type proposed by Mr. Lyttelton, which would apparently 
have been analogous to the Committee of Imperial Defence. 
But he did wish the secretariat to be created as a separate 
body, under the Prime Minist_er, composed of officials from 
the different Dominions, and paid for by the Dominions 
and the United Kingdom. But in his views Mr. Deakin 
found no sympathy from Sir W. Laurier and General 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 297 5. 
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Botha, and the Prime Minister, while agreeing to the 
proposal of Sir J. Ward that he should become the President 
of the Conference, was unable to agree to control the staff, 
which therefore, as Sir W. Laurier insisted on ministerial 
control, had to be left to the control of the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies. 
The actual steps taken by the Secretary of State were 
to divide the office over which he presided into two divisions, 
the Crown Colony and the Dominions, and to name first 
four and later three officers of his staff in that division the 
Secretariat of the Imperial Conference. For all practical 
purposes the action taken ended at that point, except 
that the Secretary of State was moved to make a speech 
in the House of Lords explaining his action and eulogizing 
the abilities of the Colonial Office.1 Mr. Deakin was of 
course wholly displeased at the result, but the other 
Dominions apparently thought that all they had wished 
had been done. At the Conference of 1911,2 however, there 
was definitely put forward an idea which had been strongly 
pressed in England in 1910, and to which Lord Crewe 
seemed to have definitely pledged his concurrence, that 
the Dominions department, including the secretariat, should 
be placed under the Prime Minister, this being proposed 
by the Union Government, while Sir J. Ward proposed 
that there should be two permanent Under-Secretaries of 
State for the Colonies, and that the Dominions department 
and the secretariat be amalgamated, and the Secretary of 
State change his title to Secretary of State for Imperial 
Affairs. 
The discussion of these proposals at the Conference 3 was 
perfunctory. There was indeed no principle involved in 
the suggestions of Sir J. Ward, and his views were not 
pressed at all : the far more serious proposal that the 
Prime Minister should be the head of the Dominions depart-
ment was dismissed by the assurance of the Prime Minister 
that there would be in a year at least 1,000 papers which 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 3795. 2 Ibid. 5513. a Ibid., 5745. 
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he had to see, and that he could not undertake the work. 
The change of title was rejected without hesitation, and the 
Colonial Office was left unchanged in any respect. 
It may be doubted whether the argument used by the 
Prime Minister was very seriously intended : it was of course 
absurd to say that anything like 1,000 papers a year would 
have been seen by him, had he cared to undertake the work 
of controlling the secretariat, unless indeed he intended 
to take up the position of the permanent head of the depart-
ment, which was hardly contemplated. In all probability 
the actual number of papers to be considered might 
have reached a tenth of the number mentioned. But 
there was a better reason than that adduced for the 
decision not to place the Dominions department under the 
Prime 1\tlinister, namely, that Mr. Harcourt had been the 
author of an extensive system of hospitality to the oversea 
representatives, which the Prime Minister could neither 
find time nor means to imitate. This difficult~y, indeed, 
might have been surmounted by the device of allowing 
the Prime Minister the assistance in his work of the 
Chancellor of the Duchy or the Lord President of the 
Council, who are normally not overworked ministers and 
might be glad to have some occupation, while their high 
social rank renders them suitable for the office. For all 
practical purposes the result would, no doubt, be the same 
as at present, but the status of the Dominions is doubtless 
lowered in the eyes of thoughtful people by their being 
linked in the same office with the Crown Colonies, and the 
system of assuming that the knowledge of Crown Colony 
work is sufficient ground for employment on other work 
is an obvious absurdity, which explains all the serious 
errors made of recent years in dealing with the self-govern-
ing Dominions. Nor, of course, if it were really desired by 
the Domi11ions, would there be the slightest difficulty about 
the division of the Colonial Office, nor much extra cost, 
but the Imperial Government are clearly entitled to retain 
the status quo as long as the Dominions do not really mt1ch 
desire a change. 
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What · is more important is to consider whether the 
adoption of some plan for a secretariat would have any 
better result than the existing system. It is important to 
note that it has not been alleged by any Dominion Govern-
ment that the Dominions department of the Colonial Office 
has failed to carry out any action required by the Imperial 
Conference of 1911 or the Colonial Conference of 1907.1 
The action required of a secretariat is clearly that of corre-
spondence, and while after the Conferences of 1897 and 
1902, before the creation of the Dominions department, the 
duty of correspondence was not very effectively carried 
out, there has never been alleged by a Dominion Govern-
ment any failure since the undertaking of the Colonial 
Secretary in 1907. Indeed, under the aegis of Sir Charles 
Lucas the Dominions department went further, and for 
the years 1909-"--10 to 1913-14 2 produced a report on 
the affairs of the Dominions, summarizing the results of the 
correspondence of the secretariat, the chief events in the 
Dominions, and the legislat~on of the Dominions, provinces, 
and States. It may be doubtful whether much interest 
was taken in the Dominions in this venture, though some 
use of the material printed was made in the United Kingdom 
and occasionally in Australia. The later reports suffered 
from the lack of system on which they were edited, due 
to injudicious and inconsistent handling of the material. 
It is not, therefore, possible to see what more could have 
been done by a composite secretariat on the type apparently 
desired by Mr. Deakin. It would have presumably worked 
less well than one under an effective control. But there 
is more to be said if the scheme of Mr. Lyttelton is taken 
as the real aim of such a secretariat. Mr. Lyttelton clearly 
distinguished between the secretariat and the Commission, 
and the former would have been supplied by the Imperial 
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 5273. 
2 Ibid., 5135, 5582, 6091, 6863, and 7507. Practically all the material 
in the last three and the most of that in the first two, excepting the 
accounts of South African affairs and lists of Blue books, was contri-
buted by the author of this work. 
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Government, and, since the head of it was also to be secretary 
to the proposed Imperial Council, the secretariat of Mr. 
Lyttelton's scheme would have corresponded with the 
present secretariat of the Colonial Office in its functions. 
The r~al difference is therefore not in the secretariat, but 
in the omission of the Commission, and much confusion 
seems to have arisen from this fact. 
Viewed in the light of its real character, that of a Permanent 
Commission, it remains to ask what purpose the scheme 
would have served. No easy or obvious answer presents 
itself to this question. Apparently it has been contemplated 
by some of its supporters 1 as a somewhat large body, 
which would afford the means of setting up commissions 
to inquire into particular points : it has been suggested 
that · ex-Governors, ex-Ministers, and ex-Agents-General 
might sit on it and lend their skill and knowledge. The 
proposal is attractive until it becomes necessary to apply 
it to any special case. If the topics which were enumerated 
above are considered, it 'viii be seen that in most of them 
the Commission would have no scope at all for action: the 
question of treaties, for instance, is a question of the sur-
render of the authority of the Imperial Government by the 
admission of the Dominions to a share, and this is not 
a question which a commission is in the slightest degree 
competent to deal with. Still less was the question of the 
Imperial Court of Appeal one thus to treat of: the Imperial 
Government must advise itself what it will surrender to 
the Dominions, and it could not be helped by the advice 
of a miscellaneous band. 
But, it will be objected, there are other topics which were 
eminently suitable for reference to a commission, the ques-
tions of uniformity of legislation in particular. It is really 
the crucial example of what a con1mission might be used 
for,_ and it is precisely in this regard that the uselessness of 
a commission becomes most apparent. The question of 
uniformity of copyright law arose in an acute form after 
1908: is it to be conceived that the Dominions would have 
1 Ron. W. Pember Reeves, Times, May 24, 1909. 
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entrusted the consideration of a subject, which in its con-
stitutional aspect formed one of the most s~rious difficulty 
for years, and in its domestic aspect depended entirely on 
local conditions, to the judgement of a collection or selec-
tion of miscellaneous people established in London? The 
obvious answer is that they "\Vould do no such thing. 
Instead Canada sent to the United Kingdom special repre-
sentatives for the purpose of expounding her views, and, 
this being a suitable case because of the personality of the 
choice, the Commonwealth chose Lord Tennyson to speak 
for it, showing that the existence of a commission is not 
essential for · an ex-Governor-General to be employed if 
he has special qualifications for the work. Or again, the 
question of uniformity in the condition of admission and 
practice regarding ·surveyors :was dealt with in 1911 by an 
ad hoc conference, which proved abortive, but the subject 
was clearly one which no collection of experts of the ordinary 
type could deal with. The lack of assimilation of patents 
and trade marks laws is not due to any lack of advice or 
understanding of the issues in those cases where the same 
rules as in the United Kingdom have not been applied: 
it is due to local conditions, which are precisely what such 
a body would not fully appreciate: if they were to be 
discussed, a conference ad hoc again would be the only 
way to reach any real possibility of a result. Or is it seriously 
supposed that any conference sitting in London could, 
without expert help from the provinces of Canada, decide 
what they should do to their workmen's compensation 
law? The differences between the British and the pro-
vincial law can be, and have been, set out in detail by the 
Imperial departments concerned; but the question is not 
of the differences or the arguments in favour of the British 
law, but of the feeling of the province with regard to the 
question 1 • The same thing applies to company la,v. The 
Dominions have recorded for them in a beautifully clear 
form by the Board of Trade 2 the points in which their 
laws differ from the laws of the United Kingdom, but they 
1 e.g. Ontario Act, 1914, c. 25; Cd. 7507, pp. 53-5. 2 Parl. Pap., Cd. 5864. 
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are not all to be persuaded of the benefits, for local reasons 
of which they and no London Commission can judge. 
Reciprocal relief for deserted wives and children a11d mutual 
enforcement of judgements and awards of arbitration courts 
throughout the Empire are other subjects which might 
in theory be referred to such a commission, but which in 
fact could only be dealt with by a conference of legal experts 
from the provinces and States as well as the Dominions, 
and which are therefore best left to be dealt with by corre-
spondence, which, however slow, is a good deal more rapid 
than the progress made by experts in reporting, while 
after their report their recommendations as a rule remain 
recommendations alone, or if carried out, are only so trans-
formed after further correspondence.1 
In some cases the correspondence method is the best : 
in others the use of conferences ad hoc, especially if the 
Dominions will allow their High Commissioners to sit upon 
them and so save time and delay. But all efforts to induce 
the Dominions thus to deal with the question of naturaliza-
tion were a failure, so that the reception of a proposal to 
refer the matter to a permanent commission can be imagined. 
The question of wireless telegraphy was referred to the .con-
sideration of a committee, on which the High Commissioners 
for New Zealand and the Commonwealth sat, but as their 
two Governments would not do anything, their presence 
was not fruitful of much result. The questions of reduced 
· cable rates were kept in his own hands successfully by the 
Postmaster-General: nor is it easy to see how confidential 
negotiations, such as his, could have been managed had 
they been put into the hands of a commission. On the 
other hand, the general question of the resources of the 
Empire were entrusted to a special Royal Commission, and 
it is inconceivable that the Dominions or the United King-
dom would have sacrificed to any permanent commission 
any control of the business. 
The absurdity of the whole matter becomes still more 
1 Nothing has been done on the report of the Surveyors' Conference 
of 1911. 
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plain if jt is considered· how the commissioners are to be 
paid. No Dominion will consent to pay a salary to a man 
who does no work and whom it does not control: no 
Dominion will entrust any matter to the consideration of 
an ex -Governor or minister or official, except for some 
special cause in each case. Nor is the Imperial Government 
diffel"ent in essence. The Commission would therefore be 
reduced to a panel of names of persons who wished to 
be asked to serve on conferences ad hoc, i.e. it would have 
no real existence at all. This is clearly the result of Mr. 
Lyttelton's express declaration that the functions of the 
body would be purely advisory, and would not supersede, 
but supplement, those of the Colonial Office. 
An alternative plan would seem to have been before 
l\ir. Deakin's mind, in which the secretariat and the Imperial 
Conference would have set themselves up in the United 
Kingdom as something superior to the Imperial Govern-
ment, so that the secretariat would, in carrying out the 
resolutions of the Conference, have corresponded with all 
the Governments, including His Majesty's Government, as 
an external body. The possibility of such a body was 
denied by Sir W. Laurier, who insisted that it must be 
subject to ministerial responsibility, and there the matter 
ended, and it must end. Apart from every other objection, 
the possibility . of harmony in a body representing six 
different authorities is impossible, unless they all serve 
one head and are organized in a hierarchy. If it could 
work at all, such a body would of course have some work 
to do, but it is clear that it would simply have the same 
work to do as the Dominions department of the Colonial 
Office, but with no real standing to enable it to carry it 
out. The mere question of how such a body was to com-
municate with the provinces and States would show its 
impossibility. 
It is more than probable that the conception of the. Per-
manent Commission was due to the analogy of tariff com-
missions, such as at times in different countries are given 
a quasi-permanent life in order to report on tariff anomalies 
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and· so forth. It may in 1905 have been thought that the 
next Conference would deal "\\rith tariff questions and that 
it would be desirable to have prepared for it a considered 
statement of the tariff position of .. the Empire, and after 
its deliberations were over to have a body to elaborate 
tariff proposals. For this purpose such a body might have 
been of some use, as tariff questions are habitually in the 
Dominions relegated to persons with no expert knowledge, 
and, the art of tariff-making for any but revenue purposes 
being lost in England, the congregation of a miscellaneous 
body of ex-Governors, ministers, officials, &c., might have 
been comparatively innocuous. But, seriously speaking, it is 
difficult to believe that any of those who have supported the 
proposition of a permanent commission have had any under-
standing of what ·the real meaning of such a proposal is. 
. The extraordinary confusion of thought prevalent on 
these topics was illustrated in a most interesting way in 
a memorandum put in before the Dominions Royal Com-
mission on Natural Resources, Trade, and Industry, by the 
Empire Trade and Industries Committee of the Royal 
Colonial Institute. In that document the Committee sug-
gested the establishment of a joint fund for the general 
purpose of Empire development, thus reviving the proposal 
of Mr. Deakin at the Conference of 1907, when he pointed 
out that it was difficult to carry out the schemes for the 
improven1ent of steamship and telegraph communications, 
which in principle had been approved. The main difficulty, 
he judged, lay in the absence of a representative body com-
petent after the Conference to reduce such schemes to 
practical propositions by working out the technical details, 
ascertaining the cost and apportioning it among the Govern-
ments concerned. Mr. Deakin then suggested the voting of 
an annual contribution to a joint fund, to be administered 
by a joint board of representatives, whose duty it would be 
to prepare detailed schemes and estimates of projects sub-
mitted to its consideration by the Governments, who could 
then submit the proposals to their Parliaments. At the 
Conference of 1907 the objection was taken that it was 
\ 
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unconstitutional to vote in advance for an unspecified 
scheme, but that objection had disappeared in view of the 
action of the Government in the United Kingdom respecting 
the development grant. It was also objected that the pro-
posed basis of contribution, one per cent. on the value of 
foreign imports, was inequitable, making. the contribution of 
the United Kingdon1 on the figures of 1910 over £5,000,000, 
and that of Australia £155,000, while the population basis 
would make Australia's share over half a million. To avoid 
this difficulty the Committee suggested that each State 
could vote as much or little as it pleased, but if it voted 
nothing, the Board would be precluded from taking up any 
scheme which could not be adequately carried out without 
a contribution from that Parliament. 
Suitable subjects for reference to such a board were, 
they suggested, the 'All-Red Route', the reduction of the 
Suez Canal dues, or the State-owned Atlantic Cable, or the 
question of the New Zealand Bill, aimed at excluding lascars 
from the shipping trade in New Zealand, or the Australian 
Bill of 1906, which proposed to confine the British preference 
to goods imported in ships manned by white labour, or the 
Merchant Shipping Bill of Australia, or the rebate question 
in South Africa. Further, cable rates, cable landing rights, 
and wireless telegraphy might be placed under the control of 
the Board, which should act under the direction of the 
Governments, work out schemes, carry schemes into effect, 
suggest new schemes, and arrange and finance all mail and 
telegraph services involving subsidies fro~ two or more 
Governments of the Empire, watch over com1nercia.l interests 
as affected by maritime communications, and report on any 
other subjects referred to it. A further memorandum 
insisted that posts and telegraphs were suitable subjects 
for control by a board, as there was no vital interest of 
Dominion autonomy involved, and Crown Colonies and the 
Government of India, which were being left out of account 
in the Imperial movement, could thus obtain equal footing 
with the Governments of the self-governing Dominions. 
In reply to the Commission, it was explained that the 
• 
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Board should send its schemes out to the various Govern-
ments, and should amend its schemes to meet any criticism 
made by the Governn1ents. It would elect its o:wn chairman, 
and it would be responsible to the Governments represented, 
each controlling its own representative. It "\vould indeed be 
in a position somewhat analogous to the permanent bureaus 
created under the Brussels Sugar Conve11tion, the Inter-
national Telegraph Convention, and the Radio-telegraphy 
Convention, and would send its reports to the Secretary of 
the Imperial Conference for distribution to the members of 
that Conference. 
Mr. Foster, the Canadian member of the Commission, 
inquired whether all that was proposed could not be effec-
tively carried out by the secretariat of the Imperial Con-
ference. It was argued in reply that the existing secretariat 
had failed to carry out the resolutions of the Conference, and 
that, though it might be altered, it would be a very difficult 
thing to do. It was admitted, however, on further cross-
examination, that it would probably be better if the pro-
posals were more restricted and the Board reduced to a 
standing _committee, whose vital force would be the Imperial 
Conference, and which would content itself with placing in 
a concrete form proposals approved by the Conference. 
On behalf of New Zealand, Mr. Sinclair laid great stress 
upon the difficulty of asking Governments to divest them-
selves of powers and functions which they at present had, 
and to hand them over to a completely new and irresponsible 
body. In reply, objection was taken to the description of 
the body as irresponsible on the ground that· it had no power 
to spend money without the approval of Parliament in each 
case, and it was admitted that this involved t4e fact that 
there could be no practical result from any recommendation 
without the agreement by Governments and Parliaments. 
It was, however, argued that it threw the responsibility for 
failure directly on the representatives of the people of each 
Dominion and so was advantageous. Mr. Sinclair, however, 
pressed the view that, if the consent of Parliament were 
necessary, it was a waste of time to have recommendations 
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made until the Parliaments had first considered the question, 
and pointed out that it was not necessarily, as was asserted, 
from any defect of organization that schemes had failed to be 
carried out, but for reasons which the Government concerned 
considered sufficient to preclude it from proceeding with the 
schemes, and that the Governments already possessed suffi-
cient means of their own for ascertaining the facts which the 
Board would have to gather. He could not accept the view 
that such a body could give Governments greater guidance 
on important questions than what they could derive from 
their own resources; fundamental questions, such as whether 
telegraphic or maritime communications should be regarded 
as merely commercial schemes, to be rejected if they could 
not show profit, or accepted on political, social, and stra-
tegic grounds, were matters best fitted to be decided by 
Governments, nor would their discussion by an outside body 
further matters. In the concrete instances adduced by the 
Committee the failure to act was clearly due to fundamental 
discrepancies of outlook, such as the position of the British 
and the South African Governments on rebates, and the 
treatment of British Indians in shipping matters. It was 
out of the question that an outside body should pass 
judgement on the action either of New Zealand or of the 
lJnited Kingdom as regards the difficulty of the lascar 
competition. 
Other objections to the scheme were raised by the Com~ 
missioners, and it was suggested that no evidence had been 
adduced that the existing communications were not adequate, 
and still less evidence that the proposed method of dealing 
/ 
with them would be an improvement on the existing instru-
mentalities. Stress was also laid on the difficulty of any 
proposal which assumed that a sum of money, estimated at 
six million pounds a year, would be contributed by Govern-
ments for schemes which were later to be developed in detail 
and then resubmitted for the approval of the Parliaments. 
The only reply which the Committee could offer was that it 
would be much easier to have money spent if the money had 
been voted, and was therefore in a sense ready -for ~ use, and 
- - IMPERIAL PARTNERSHIP 575 
that experience showed that certainly it was very difficult 
with the existing modes of procedure to attain any effect. 
The whole argument is important, as it reveals the hope-
less divergence of view between practical men of affairs and 
theorists. The fact that Mr. Deakin had all his life never 
mastered practical detail is precisely why his brilliance and 
his energy have resulted in nothing but words: men with 
far less ability have accomplished what he could never do. 
It is, no doubt, easy to see that the' All-Red Route' is still in 
the air, nor is it difficult to proceed to the conclusion that 
some one is to blame, and that the person in question must 
be the secretariat. . It cannot be too clearly recognized that 
the duty of a secretariat is not to carry out the building of 
steamships or any other operations of the kind : the secre-
tariat is the instrument by which the necessary communica-
tions are made to the proper authorities as a result of reso-
lutions arrived at by the Conference. It is the duty of the 
secretariat to know what the proper authorities are, and to 
see that they are supplied with all the material necessary for 
the:q1 to have before them in dealing with the questions sent 
to them for consideration. It is further the duty of the 
secretariat to see that the responsible authorities are induced, 
if possible, to mal{e up their minds, primarily to carry out the 
resolution, -but if not, to explain why they will not do so, and 
the secretariat is also under obligation to keep the various 
members of the Conference fully acquainted with what has 
transpired. More · than these things it cannot do, and, if 
it could do, it would be usurping the Government of the 
Empire . . In view of the inevitable determination of every 
known Government, and perhaps most of all of Dominion 
Governments, to put off any decision, the task of getting any 
notice taken of resolutions is not an easy one, ar1d it says 
something for the efforts of the secretariat that the action 
to be taken by the Imperial Government is the action which 
is first and most -effectively taken, as, for instance, after the 
last Conference, in the making of new treaties- with the 
foreign powers willing to do so, the amendment of the con-
stitution of the Judicial Committee, and the change in the 
• 
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law of naturalization, the delay ip. considering which in the 
past fourteen years has practically entirely been due to the 
total inability of any Dominion Government 1 to reply to 
a dispatch without prolonged months either of anxious 
thought, or more probably of searching for the mislaid 
previous papers. So in the case of the' All-Red Route' the 
fact that it has never come to anything lies in the simple 
reason that no proposals for the provisions of such a service 
as was desired in 1907 have ever been brought forward 
which were from a financial point of view reasonable. It 
must be understood that these commercial suggestions of 
Imperial Conferences are essentially matters on which 
commercial considerations only can prevail : the ideal 
advantages of an increased speed in the arrival of letters .in 
Australia or New Zealand can easily be over-estimated, and 
at any rate, if they are held to be of the highest importance 
by the Dominions, they wil~ no doubt be prepared to pay 
for them the necessary subsidies, without requiring the 
Imperial Government to indulge in expenditure which from 
an Imperial view cannot be justified. Similarly, not only 
have the Suez Canal dues been steadily reduced 2 almost every 
year, as a result of the pressure of the British Government, 
but it is clear that the British Government has done every-
thing it can to secure this policy, at the expense of the 
Imperial Exchequer, and the In1perial Government can 
hardly be expected to be willing to pay further sums for the 
sake of giving rebates of dues, or whatever else may be 
contemplated, to British shipping, on the suggestion of any 
Board whatever. And why, may it be asked, should the 
Postmaster-General be prepared to forgo his control over 
postage · and cable rates for the sake of the advantage of 
being hampered by the advice of a Board which ex hypothesi 
would not consist of postal experts, unless those are to be 
ranked as experts whose activity consists in agitating for 
lower rates, while holding positions of no responsibility 
whatever? 
' 1 This can be seen by a glance at Parl. Pap., Cd. 5273, giving the corre .. 
spondence for 1907-10. 2 Part. Pap., Cd. 6863, p. 7. 
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From quite a different standpoint a suggestion of some 
interest has been recently made, with a view to promote 
legislation on· similar terms in matters of common interest 
in the Dominions and in the mother country. The occasion 
of the coronation of King George V was marked by the visit 
to the United Kingdom of a number of members of the 
Parliaments of the oversea Dominions, as guests of a Parlia-
mentary Committee in the United Kingdom. The members 
were, of course, brought to England wholly in the capacity 
of guests, and they were not in any way engaged in official 
functions during their stay, which was arranged so as to 
give men, who might never else have had the opportunity, 
the chance of having experience of the life of the United 
K~ngdom. It might not, it has been suggested, be impossible 
that on the occasion of the next Imperial Conference this 
precede11t should be followed, but the members , be encour-
aged to enter into discussions inter se of the questions 
debated at the Conference by ministers, or of similar ques-
tions, with a view to their better appreciation of the issues, 
when the Governments should, in due course, bring forward 
measures to give legal effect to resolutions of the Conference. 
The arrangement would only apply to such topics as were 
not party in character, such as measures requiring uniformity 
of legislation throughout the Empire. To this proposal the 
obvious objection, of course, is that mentioned above to 
many of the resolutions dealt with by the Imperial Confer-
ence. They are matters which are not the subjects of the 
legislation of either Canada or the Commonwealth, but per-
tain to the States or the provinces. On other questions 
such discussion might be possible, but tech11ical matters such 
as copyright are very hard for private n1embers of Parlia-
ment to follow, and are in practice left as a rule to the few 
who have, mainly from official experience, enough know-
ledge to discuss the questions. Moreover, it may safely be 
assumed that the jealousy with which those, who had been 
fortunate enough to be chosen to go to England, would 
be regarded by those not so fortunate would tend to 
make ' their views suspect and unacceptable. Various 
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modifications of the idea, to meet such objections, cot1ld 
. no doubt be devised, but on the whole the proposal seems 
hardly to be consistent with the principles of responsible 
Government. 
The events of the European War, however, have made it 
increasingly clear that the immediate need is not so much 
arrangements for leisurely consultations on matters of great 
magnitude as for some mode of rapid communication in 
cases of the highest importance, and some means of keeping 
the Imperial Government more closely in touch with the 
Governments of the oversea Dominions in the Pacific. The 
extraordinary difference between the attitude of the Govern-
ment of Canada towards the war and that of Australia must 
be observed by every one, and the consequence was a degree 
of private if not of official friction which seems regrettable. 
The difficulty in the case of the Commonwealth in 1915 
lay in the fact that Mr. Fisher would not consent to depute 
a minister to the United Kingdom to discuss matters, but 
insisted on the holding of a full Imperial Conference, or, 
in the alternative, of the visit of an Imperial minister to the 
Dominions.1 There was a certain lack of common sense about 
this attitude which betokens the unripeness of the public 
opinion of Australia for an intelligent discussion of affairs. 
It should be obvious on the slightest consideration that the 
sending of an Imperial minister on a tour of visiting the 
Australasian Dominions would be utterly impossible in the 
case of a minister of any consequence, and the value of 
a minister of no rank would be nil, while he would be hope-
lessly out of date in his personal knowledge of the views of 
the Governmerit of the United Kingdom. On the other 
hand, an Australian minister in London would have the best 
possible first-hand information on the subject, and could 
freely communicate it to his fellow ministers from day to day 
or week to week. The complaint that there has been no 
real close co-operation in military matters between the 
United Kingdom and the Commonwealth, and that the 
Commonwealth and New Zealand have not been told what 
I 
1 Times, May 22, 1915; contrast Mr. Hughes' wise action (p. 583). 
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they are expected to do in the way of providing troops, is 
a compliment to the correctness of the attitude 1 of the Im-
perial Government, and the difficulty arises precisely from the 
present stage of the relations of the self-governing Dominions 
and the Empire. 
It cannot be too clearly understood that, as these relations 
now stand as a strong party in Canada under the guidance 
of Sir W. Laurier thinks that they should stand the Do-
minions are in the position that, while through their forming 
part of the Empire they are liable to be involved in wars 
without their consent as in the case of the present European 
War, though they made it clear that they hoped that the 
United Kingdom would fight, and though it is recorded that 
-Australia, with her usual failure to understand the United 
Kingdom, feared that the United Kingdom would stand 
aloof from the conflict yet in such a case they are under no 
obligation, other than what their own will imposes on them, 
to send any assistance to the United Kingdom. As an 
immedia.te consequence of this position, they have not the 
right to dictate the Imperial policy of the United Kingdom, 
for the simple reason that, if the result of the pursuit of such 
policy was war with a foreign power, the United Kingdom 
would be without any right other than a moral right to ask 
for the whole force of the Empire to be exerted in the war.2 
The position of Sir W. Laurier has been always abundantly 
-clear in its exposition : he declined, in the Conference of 
1911,3 to press for the right of the Dominions to give advice 
on treaty matters, because advice meant that the Dominions 
should be willing to back up their advice with deeds, and 
Canada was not prepared to do so. If the Commonwealth 
desires to have the power to give authoritative advice on 
1 The intimation that the United Kingdom would take all the men sent 
by Australia was not a request, but an answer to a request for information: 
it therefore does not violate the rule as suggested in the Round Table, 1915, 
p. 865; for Canada see Sir W. Laurier's speech of Jan. 17; 1916. 
2 Round Table, 1915, p. 431. This involves, of course, the lack of reliance 
by the Imperial Government on the Dominions and lack of co-operation for 
joint action. 
3 Parl. Pap., Cd. 5745, p. 117. 
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matters affecting the Empire, it would be necessary for the 
Commonwealth to enter into such a relation with the United 
Kingdom that the amount of aid which would be forth-
coming from the Commonwealth could be definitely decided 
upon and rendered available without question or doubt, 
when the United Kingdom desired it. Sucl1 an arrangement, 
which assured the Commonwealth the power of giving 
.authoritative advice, would essentially involve some sort of 
federation for purposes of defence and foreign policy at 
.least: and, while, in such an arrangement, the Common-
.wealth could give its advice as a matter of right, it could not, 
· of course, expect its advice to be taken if the majority of 
voices in the federal authority were against it. It is obvious 
that with its small population, therefore, any such arrange .. 
ment w9uld. give no security to .the Commonwealth that it 
would obtain its ends, and therefore it is not at all wonderful 
that the idea of federation for defence as proposed by Sir 
J. Ward at the last Conference should have received scant 
consideration from Mr. Fisher. 
The position, therefore, is that in offering advice the 
Commonwealth acts as one who is not necessarily prepared 
to baclr up his advice if need be, and, if prepared to do so, 
is only prepared to send an indefinite amount of help, which 
may be changed from day to day ·at his own pleasure. The 
position . is one which need not in the slightest degree be 
considered as being discreditable to the Commonwealth: 
the alternative would be to merge a portion of her autonomy 
with the certainty of having a very faint voice in the decisions 
of the federal authority which might be set up. But, on the 
other hand, it is equally absurd to expect that the wishes of 
a Dominion which stands in this relation to the United 
Kingdom can necessarily always be given full effect to. 
There is this error running through all the long protests in 
violent language of the Commonwealth and Dominion 
Governments regarding the attitude of the British Govern-
ment in the case of the New Hebrides and of Samoa. The 
position adopted by the Dominions was only justifiable if the 
United Kingdom were in the position of an agent of the 
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Dominions, whose failure to carry out their wishes was 
matter for censure of the most severe kind. It is, of course, 
true that the allegiance of the Dominions to the Crown 
produces a very definite obligation on the part of the United 
Kingdom, namely, to preserve the Dominions from external 
aggression with the whole force of the Empire, so long, of 
course, as the Dominions do not themselves provoke a war, 
in which case the duty of the Imperial Government would 
disappear, and its action would fall to be decided by con-
siderations of sentiment or honour or profit, alone or in 
combination. But this obligation, which the United Kingdom 
has never attempted to limit or repudiate in any way, is 
confined to the existing boundaries of the Dominions and to 
any changes in these boundaries made with the assent of the 
Imperial Government. It is not obligatory on the Imperial 
Government to quarrel with France over the New Hebrides, 
or, in the alternative, to sacrifice the population of the west 
of Africa for the sake of acquiring lands for Australia; nor is 
it the duty of the United Kingdom to annex territory merely 
because a Dominion would like it to be British. It is not 
out of place to add that the calm demand that territories 
should be annexed, while the Dominions alone interested 
will not even consent to pay for the cost, is one of those 
proposals which can only be understood on the system that 
it is never a mistake to ask for anything, since it is always 
possible it will be given, and asking does no harm. This 
should not be the position of a nation or would-be nation, 
and the folly of the Cape Government in refusing to pay for 
the administration of the territory which later became 
German was unquestionably the cause of the losses of the 
Union in its conquest of that country and of the rebellion 
which the presence of German troops on the border fomented. 
Nor was it until 1887 that the colonies of Australia realized 
that the annexation of British New Guinea meant that they 
must pay part at least of the cost of administration. 
Further, the relation of the United Kingdom to the Do-
minions renders the Imperial Government unable to press 
the Dominions in any way for men or other assistance. It 
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can only wait · for offers of service, and any pressure· to the 
Dominions to raise definite amounts of men would be uncon _ 
stitutional and would be open to the most severe censure 
from the Dominions. Here is a clear case in which a Do-
minion minister in London could send to his Government the 
information required in a proper form: he could say, after 
consulting the Imperial Government, that the needs of the 
· situation were for every man available, and that, put in 
a practical form, the Imperial Government thought that 
Australia or New Zealand might best contribute such and 
such forces. The information would then be available in 
the hands of the Dominion Government in the best and most 
effective form, conveyed by a minister and colleague of their 
o'vn as the result of information of the most authentic 
character, and at the same time put as no demand or even 
invitation, but an indication of the most effective service 
which could be rendered to the Empire. It is surely idle 
to argue that a formal Conference must be convened for this 
sort of thing, especially when it is known that, when the 
proposal for convening such a Conference was pressed,! New-
foundland was the only other Dominion which could have 
been represented, so that if the demand were taken literally 
it meant that the Commonwealth wished an excuse to say 
that its wishes had been ignored, when it made deliberately 
a demand for what ·could not, through no fault of the United 
Kingdom, be conceded, because the other Dominions could 
not be represented. 
· The great response of the Commonwealth to the necessities 
of the situation, ·and its determination to give such aid as it 
can in the war, render it obvious that the question of the 
final settlement is one in which it will be deeply interested, 
especially, of course, in the hope that it will obtain, in case of 
victory, the German territories which it has occupied, and 
some arrangement by which the New Hebrides can be secured 
1 By the Round Table in March 1915 (pp. 325-44) and by Australia 
(Times, May 22, 1915). But cf. Round Table, 1915, pp. 670, 700, 867, 
where it is pointed out that some of Mr. Fisher's colleagues deprecated 
a Conference. 
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to the British Crown. These are legitimate desires, and 
even if, as a matter of fact, the need of using the Australia 
to protect the expeditions from New Zealand to Samoa,1 
and from Australia to the German possessions in the north-
east, may have interfered with her activities in more impor-
tant directions, still it was worth while securing the early 
success of these expeditions, which gratified naturally in 
the fullest degree the national wishes of the two Dominions 
and allowed them to see the fruits of war withollt its hard-
ships, such as their men were shortly to face with such 
conspicuous courage in the Dardanelles. But the suggestion 
that there is the slightest chance of any final terms of peace 
being arranged without the consliltation of the Dominions is 
one of the most idle imaginings ever invented in order to 
cause ill-feeling between the Dominions and the Imperial 
Government.2 It seems, however, to be a belief implanted 
in the mind of the Australian that the root of all evils is the 
fact that communications with the Imperial Government 
pass through the Colonial Office, and, unless that sentiment 
is removed by the fact that in the Coalition Government 
a statesman born in the Dominion par excellence has held 
the seals of the Colonial Department, it may be a good reason 
for changing the channel of control of such communications 
to the hands of the Prime Minister. In the long run it is 
merely a question of rearrangement of duties which would 
be involved : a Prime Minister must definitely concentrate 
his work in certain channels, and must therefore always be 
put to the necessity of deciding what sides of business he is 
to deal with. 
There is, it is fortunate, no sign in Canada or in South 
Africa of any uneasiness as to the Imperial action in the 
event of peace, nor has there been much indication of dis-
1 Parl. Pap., Cd. 7972, 7975. 
2 Mr. Hughes, the new Prime Minister of the Commonwealth, announced 
on November 4, 1915, that the Imperial Government had promised con-
sultation, if possible, before peace terms are arranged, and visited London 
in March, 1916. Sir J. Ward and Mr. Massey and Sir R. Borden will also 
come in the course of 1916. 
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satisfaction with the Imperial Government in any regard. 
The presence of a minister in London and the visits of its 
Prime Minister have enabled Canada to keep in touch with 
the progress of the war in a way which no other Dominion 
has been able to do, and· in the case of the Union the confi-
dence reposed by the Union Government in their represen-
tative in London, added to the close touch in which the 
Union Government have been able to keep with the Imperial 
Government through Viscount Buxton, whose . place as 
an ex-minister of the · Crown renders his help specially 
valuable, have prevented t~e divergence of sentin1ent which 
seems to exist in the case of Australasia. 
But the exigencies of the war must raise for the most 
serious consideration of all the Dominions the problem 
what they are to do to keep in touch with the progress of 
foreign politics. It is no doubt true that in an emergency 
there is scant time for consultation with the Dominions, but 
there would be time for consultation with a Dominion 
minister who was resident in London, and, if the minister 
were, as he should be, in touch with his Government and 
with popular feeling in the Dominion, the views of the 
Dominion would have a chance of being expressed effec-
tively : whether they prevailed or not would depend on all 
the circumstances of the case, nor does any Goverl!ment of 
a Dominion seriously suppose that its views can always 
prevail. Nor short of a federation of some kind, even if only 
for defence and foreign policy, is there any other way \vhat-
ever to keep in touch with foreign affairs. 
It is, of course, a question whether the time has yet come 
when the Dominion Governments, all or some, desire thus 
to keep in touch with foreign affairs. In Canada, from its 
proximity to Europe, there is clear proof that the desire does 
exist: it is expressed in the one form by Sir Robert Borden 
in his desire to have the Dominion in the closest touch with 
the heart of the Empire, and it is also expressed by another 
and less imperialistic quarter, Mr. Ewart, who avows that he 
desires the declaration of the status of Canada as an inde-
pendent kingdom, because it would enable Canada to take 
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a part in international politics as a sovereign State. That 
is clearly not the wish of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, whose view has 
always been to press to its furthest conclusion the doctrine 
of the autonomy of the Dominion within the Empire, and 
who has never sought, so far as can be seen, to attain for 
Canada a position as a unit in international politics, except 
for fiscal matters; these are, of course, only indirectly poli-
tical, for autonomy, real or qualified, in fiscal matters has 
been from time to time assigned to semi-sovereign . States. 
It may be that the ideal of Sir W. Laurier has been indepen-
dence of the Dominion in the fullest sense, but of that he has 
said nothing, and perhaps has thought nothing, content with 
establishing and extending in every sphere of action the 
doctrine that Canada is autonomous. But the position of 
Canada in its close proximity to London, is undoubtedly 
a fact of the greatest importance in its bearing on her relation 
to the United Kingdom, and, on the other hand, the intense 
suspfcion of one another which seems to be a characteristic 
of ministers of Australasia may prevent the ready accept-
ance of the view that a resident minister would be a good 
idea. It is clear that the usual objection that such a minister 
would rapidly cease to be in touch with the Government at 
home has more weight in the case of Australasia than in 
that of Canada, but it could easily be arranged that the 
minister should vary from time to time.1 The practice of 
appointing ministers without portfolios, which is even now 
not unknown in the United Kingdom, is a common practice 
in the Dominions, and there would, it seems, be no insuper-
able difficulty in allowing the post in London to rotate 
among the members of the Ministry. The question of salary 
would no doubt be a difficulty for a short time, since Do-
minion ministers receive, save in the Union·, salaries of very 
small amount, but the position could be dealt with by 
frankly pointing out to Parliament that a minister must be 
provided with a reasonable sum and a London residence. 
1 It is most significant that, despite the appointment of an ex-Prime 
Minister as High Commissioner for Australia, to obtain close touch with 
foreign affairs, Mr, Hughes himself came home in 1916. 
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It might, it may be added, be possible to let the minister 
supervise the work of the High Commissioner's office, and to 
perform the ornamental duties of that post, leaving the 
Government free to fill the post with a really first-class 
business man, whether in or out of politics. It is obviously 
not reasonable to expect a business man to have other 
qualifications for the work, and experience has shown that 
the good man of business in the position of Agent-General 
or High Commissioner is rarely good at other things. But 
these are minor matters, and, though trifles count for much 
more in these questions than is often realized, still, if a Do-
minion is really anxious to have first-hand information of 
foreign affairs, and thus to be in touch with the progress of 
events in Europe and abroad, it will not find it difficult to 
adopt this device, as a stage perhaps to some more satis-
factory condition. Constitutionally the offer of the Imperial 
Government is undoubtedly correct: it will willingly give 
information and weigh advice, but it retains responsibility, 
just as the Dominions retain their right to withhold or give 
aid in war, and to regulate as they think fit the amount of 
aid they will give, if it is accorded at all. On the other hand, 
while the Dominions are exposed to being involved by the 
United Kingdom in war, they are assured of the full pro-
tection of the United Kingdom in such a war, and they enjoy 
in peace the advantages which come from membership of 
a great Empire, without incurring any obligation to contri-
bute to the cost of maintaining that Empire. 
There is also a further question which must be solved in_ 
any final treatment of the constitutional arrangements of the 
Empire. It must always be ren1embered that the position 
of the Empire par excellence, India, can no longer be ignored 
in any decisions which are to be taken to()n such a matter. 
It is obvious enough that the long years of British rule are 
bearing in India their due fruit, and the folly of revolution-
aries should not conceal the fact that English education is 
producing an appreciation of western political ideals which 
alters inevitably the relations of the Imperial Government 
to the Empire. The Dominions cannot expect to share in. 
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the position forn1erly ·enjoyed without question by the 
United Kingdom, as the autocratic, if benevolent, con-
troller of the destinies of the country. The self-conscious-
ness of the people of India, as voiced by the inheritors of 
English political aspirations, would decline to accept the 
theory that Indian policy could be controlled in any way 
by the !epresentatives of the Dominions, and this refusal 
would be completely justified, in view of the fact that the 
Dominions shut their doors on the admission of Indians, and 
accordingly treat Indians as such as inferiors, on ground 
of race alone. · It is no answer to this fact that Indians, in 
their turn, regard Europeans as inferior on racial grounds : 
two wrongs do not make a right, and the United Kingdom 
fortunately is not impelled by economic considerations and 
by fear of a large Indian immigration to defend itself by an 
exclusion policy.· On the other hand, it is absurd to demand 
that the Dominions shall alter their exclusion policy in any 
wholesale sense : to put forward this claim would be to ask 
the Dominions to comn1it social suicide, and therefore it is 
idle to urge the ad.option of such a course of action. But, 
on the other hand, the modification of the present system 
so as to ensure free and undisputed entry, without humiliat-
ing formalities administered by underbred officials of low 
status and worse education, is a duty which is imperative 
on the Dominions in the interest of good neighbourship. 
Nor is it possible for a moment to defend the differential 
treatment on grounds of race of domiciled Indians. The 
fact that the influx of Indians must be stopped has nothing 
whatever in common with the question of the treatment of 
those already settled, and the policy of South . Africa in this 
respect has been an extraordinary record of meanness. But 
on the other hand it is impossible to acquit the British 
Government of having missed opportunity after opportunity 
of solving the questions raised, though the greatest share of 
the blame must rest with Lord Milner, who thought it con-
sistent with British honour to denounce the Transvaal 
Government for the wrongs of British Indians, and to pro-
pose t9 increase these wrongs by the legislation of a Crown 
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Colony, a policy which, in justice to Mr. Lyttelton, it should 
be noted that he firmly declined to sanction. Even later, 
however, the opportunity presented by the remission of the 
debt of £30,000,000, owed by the Transvaal to the Imperial 
Government, the guaranteeing of the £5,000,000 loan, and 
the passing of the Union Act offered chances of intervention 
of which the Imperial Government availed themselves with 
a regrettable feebleness. 
It follows inevitably that the Dominions cannot expect to 
be allowed to determine the destinies of the Empire of India, 
and from the point of view of the Imperial Government it is 
clear that in their general foreign policy they must expect 
to have in future to consider the views of India with as much 
care as they consider those of the self-governi11g Dominions. 
Their duty in either case is identical, and must be carried out 
without favour to either. It is inevitable, therefore, that 
India should be allowed a voice in the Imperial Conference 
just as any self-governing Dominion is allowed: it is indeed 
ludicrous to think that New Zealand, South Africa, and New-
foundland are to be ranked as superior to the Empire of 
India : it is right, further, that that voice should be uttered 
by a representative of India other than the Secretary of 
State for India, and preferably by a member of the Indian 
race. If the Dominio11 Governments recognize frankly and 
willingly this position, a great step in the effective consolida-
tion of the Empire in sympathy will have been gained, and 
there is no matter in which more easy and obvious progress 
towards Imperial unity could be made, and that, too, with-
out any formality or difficulty. The services rendered by 
India in the war afford an unparalleled opportunity for such 
recognition. Similarly, the definite abandonment of the 
foolish attitude of suspicion towards, and dislike of, Japan, 
manifested in Canada and Australasia, wo11:ld be a most 
valuable outcome of the great advantage derived by the 
Allies from the support of Japan. 
• 
CONCLUSION 
AT the conclusion of this review of the chief facts affecting 
the relations of the Imperial Government and the Govern-
ments of the Dominions, it may be desirable to set out 
briefly the proposals which might in my opinion advan-
tageously be carried into effect in the near future. I yield 
to no one in admiration of the splendid and legitimate ideal 
of bringing about ~ true union of the Empire, but I have 
as little faith in the possibility of its consummation at an 
early date as I have in the fruition of schemes of the perma-
nent pacification of Europe or the effective control of foreign 
policy by democracy. To such a result there seems to me to 
be an insuperable obstacle in the spirit of the self-governing 
Dominions, whether it be called the proud self-conscious-
ness of national destiny or a narrow and short-sighted 
parochialism, or, as is more just, it be deemed a blend of both. 
In 1911 the offer of Mr. Harcourt on behalf of the Imperial 
Government to arrange methods of fuller consultation with 
the Dominions was answered decisively in the negative by the 
representatives of the Dominions other than New Zealand: his 
still more decided offer in 1912 to Australia, New Zealand, and 
the Union of South Africa to admit them, as Canada was to 
be admitted, to a more real share in the direction of the 
foreign policy of the Empire received a totally negative 
response: Australia preferred the cumbrous and ineffective 
machinery of the Imperial Conference, and the Union of 
South Africa hinted suspicion of any attempt at closer 
relationship. While the party of Sir Robert Borden has 
risen to . the conception that the highest hope of Canadian 
greatness lies in the closest union on terms of equality with 
the United Kingdom, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, while lending to 
the cause of the United Kingdom in the great war the sup-
port of his unrivalled eloquence, remains as fully devoted 
as ever to the doctrine of the isolation of Canada and her 
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independence under the Imperial Crown. The great war 
will, we may assume, be a potent influence towards the 
unification of the Empire, but this influence, it is certain, 
will not be catastrophic, but will manifest itself gradually 
and through a long space of time. 
For the immediate future I suggest for the consideration 
of the Governments concerned in the Imperial Conference 
the following principles : 
1. That the Governors-General and Governors of the 
Dominions and the Governors of the Australian States 
should be placed as regards legal liability for their official 
actions in the same position as that now occupied by the 
Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. 
2. That the Governors-General and Governors be required 
in the conduct of the Executive Government of the Dominions 
and States to observe the same principles in all respects, 
including the grant of a dissolution of Parliament, as are 
observed by the Crown in the United Kingdom. 
3. That all personal responsibility on the part of Governors-
General and Governors in respect of the exercise of the 
prerogative of mercy should be removed. 
4. That, while the supremacy of Imperial over Dominion 
legislation should be retained, the power of the Imperial 
Government by means of reservation and disallowance to 
control Dominion legislation should be formally abandoned. 
5. That all legal restrictions on the powers of Dominion 
Parliaments to regulate merchant shipping should be 
removed ; that the extent to which Dominion legislative 
authority should be exercised in respect of British-ships not 
registered therein should be settled by constitutional agree-
ments ; and that legislation should be passed to secure the 
enforcement in the several parts of the Empire of laws of 
other parts, affecting ships registered in those parts, in the 
same manner as that in which the provisions of the Imperial 
Merchant Shipping Acts are enforced in respect of ships 
registered in the United Kingdom by all the courts through-
out the British Empire. 
6. That means should be provided by which the constitu-
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tions of the Dominions can, in so far as existing provisions 
in this regard are not already adequate, be altered by the 
authority of the people of the Dominions without reference 
to the Imperial Parliament. 
7. That, in order to preserve the Judicial Committee of 
the Privy Council as a supreme court of final appeal for 
the Empire, it is essential that it should be given a real 
Imperial character by the inclusion among its membership 
of effective and continuous representation of the Dominions, 
and by the entrusting to it of the judicial appeals in the 
United Kingdom which at present are dealt with by the 
House of Lords. 
8. That it is an essential condition for the attainment of 
Imperial unity that the Governments of the Dominions 
should take into their earnest consideration the means by 
which, while preserving essential homogeneity of race, free 
and unrestricted entry into their territories shall be secured 
to all educated British Indian subjects, and that all restric-
tions which are at present, on grounds of race or colour only, 
imposed on British Indians who are legitimately resident in 
the self-governing Dominions should be rescinded. 
9. That, whenever desired by Dominion Governments, 
arrangements should be made . for their representation at 
International Conferences, whether the objects of these 
conferences are political or not, by plenipotentiaries, nomin-
ated by the Government concerned and appointed by the 
King on the advice of the Imperial Government, constitu-
tional agreements- being made as to the mode in which the 
votes of such representatives shall be cast in cases where 
it is imperative that the action of the Empire shall be 
uniform, and the ratification of agreements concluded by 
such representatives resting with His Majesty on the advice 
of the Imperial Government acting in consultation with the 
Dominion Governments. 
10. That the Dominion Governments should take advan-
tage of the offers of the Imperial Government to afford 
them the fullest information with regard to, and as far as 
possible a share in the control of, foreign policy, and that 
• 
• 
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for this purpose it is desirable that there should be frequent 
visits to the United Kingdom of ministers of the Dominions, 
and that if possible each Dominion should be represented 
continuously in London by a minister enjoying the full 
confidence of his colleagues and of cabinet rank, whose duty 
it should be to keep his Government constantly and closely 
informed of all matters affecting the foreign relations of the 
Empire and to secure that the foreign interests of the Dominion 
shall be fully and completely represented to the Imperial 
Government. 
11.· That it is essential, in view of the experience of the 
present war, that all defence should be conceived on an 
Imperial and not on a local basis, and that the control of 
defence which is properly desired by the Dominions should 
be attained in the form of a share in the control of the "rhole 
defence forces of the Empire, and not as at present through 
the establishment of isolated local units. · 
These are only simple proposals, but they can claim to 
be practicable, as they are merely extensions of principles 
already in operation, and they are not therefore exposed to 
the grave political and commercial difficulties which will 
attend any scheme of federation or commercial union . 
• 
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on power ofCommon,vealth Govern-
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Act of Indemnity in Dominion, 
effect of in England, 38, 39, 44-, 45. 
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unity of control put forward in 
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part by Territorial rVaters Jurisdiction 
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Court in Canada, validity of, 459, 
460. 
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Lord Elgin resignation of Natal 
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Agents - General for Australian 
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part in discussion of attitude of 
Dominions to international exhi-
bition conference, 559. 
Agriculture, powers of Canadia.n 
legislatures as to, 443. 
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less diversity of Canadian legisla-
tion, 457. 
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in connexion with, 523. 
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312. 
Alberta : initiative and referendum 
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by Act, 1913, c. 2), 125, 126 ; re-
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437, 458; see Alberta and Great 
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Alberta and Great Waterways Rail-
way case, 164-, 483, 434. 
Alexander of Teck, H.S.H., Prince, 
Governor- General designate of 
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Alien enemy, status of in Dominions, 
359 ; power of Dominion legisla-
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of constitution of Imperial Con-
ference, erroneous doctrine of Lord 
Elgin regarding, 553. 
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(Pa'rl. Pap., 1901, No. 54), 69. 
Anglo-Dutch treaty of 1856, alleged 
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423. 
Anglo-French treaty of 1882, ignores 
colonies, 263. 
Annexation of territory, inability of 
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581. 
• 
600 INDEX 
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Africa, 556. 
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441. 
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scheme of Sir J. Ward, 504, 505; 
jnaccurate views on position of 
Dominions, 516; declines to accept 
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up of independent Auditor in 
Rhodesia, 497. 
Au.stralia, flagship of Commonwealth 
fleet, use of in European War, 336. 
Australia, question of honours in, 
59, 60 ; precedence in, 63, 64 ; see 
c~lso Comn1onwealth of Australia. 
Australian nationality, 253, 254. 
Australian Natives Association, 254:. 
Australian States, Governors of, 26 . 
excluded from participation i~ 
Imperial Conference, 554, 555 · 
relation to Common wealth as re~ 
gards external affairs, &c., 421-31 ; 
see also Commonwealth of Aus-
trnlia. 
Austria-Hungary, treaty of 1868 with 
(dissolved by war), 267, 268; emi-
gration dispute with in 1914, 296. 
Balfour, Rt. Ron. A. J., view on 
position of Dominions, 7, 516 · 
creates Committee of Imperiai 
Defence, 550; inaccurate view of 
control of negotiations of treaties 
with France, 274 n. 1; unusual 
action in resigning in 1905, 87. 
Ballance, Ron. J., Prime Minister of 
New Zealand (1891-3); dispute 
with Lord Glasgow in 1892, 81. 
Banishtnent for political crimes, 69. 
Bannerman: see Campbell-Banner-
roan. 
Baronetcies, conferred for Dominion 
services, 61. 
Barton, Rt. Hon. Sir Edmund, 
G.C.M.G., Justice of Common-
wealth High Court (1903- ), judi-
cial opinions on the interpretation 
of the Common\vealth constitution, 
219, 357, 380, 460, 467, 4 70 ; Mem-
ber of the Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council under the Act of 
1908, 380, 381. 
Basutoland, scheme for government 
of on merger in Union of South 
Africa, 187-9. 
Bay of Fundy, opened to United 
States fisher1nen in 1845, 521. 
Bayard, Mr., Secretary of State of 
the United States, treaty negotia-
tions with Canada, 128, 281. 
Bays, territorial character of certain 
in North America, 128, 129, 520-2. 
Bechuanaland Protectorate, scheme 
for government of on merger in 
Union of South Africa, 187-9. 
Behring Sea seizures, 17, 522. 
Belgium, treaty of 1862 with, 264, 
266, 537; trade relations \vith 
Canada,271. 
Bent, Hon. Sir Thomas, K.C.M.G., 
Premier of Victoria (1904-9), ob-
tains dissolution of Parliarnent on 
misrepresentations, 42, 92. 
Berlin Copyright Convention of 1908, 
240. 
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Bermuda, garrison for, supplied by 
Canada in 1914, 34 7. 
Berne Copyright Convention, acces-
sion of Dominions to, 237. 
Berry, Hon. Sir Graham, K.C.M.G., 
view on independence of the Colo-
nies, 23. 
Beyers, Commandant- General of 
Union forces, turns traitor and is 
killed in flight, 348. 
Bigamy, when punishable by Im-
perial and Don1inion laws, 136. 
Bilingualism, in Union of South 
Africa, 490. 
Birth, precedence based on, in Domi-
nions, 62, 63. 
Birth-rate, decline of in Australasia, 
192. 
Blake, Hon. E., K.C., views on 
Canadian independence, 22, 275 ; 
alterations made in royal instruc-
tions to Canada at his instance, 
119 n. 1. 
Blake, Sir Henry, G.C.M.G., pro-
posed appointment as Governor of 
Queensland, 28, 29. 
Boer reserve, proposed in German 
reconstruction of South Africa, 
350. 
Boer War, 1899-1902, 16; assistance 
rendered by Dominions in, 20, 21 ; · 
attitude of Dominions in respect 
of, 341 ; alleged ill-treatment of 
British Indians as one of causes 
of, 202, 203, 587. 
Bonar Law, Rt. Hon. A., use of 'vord 
'colonial ', 9; appointment in 1915 
as Secretary of State for the Colo-
nies, 583. 
Bond, Rt. Hon. Sir Robert, G.C.M.G., 
Prime Minister of Newfoundland 
(1900-9), negotiates convention 
with Mr. Hay in 1902, 17 ; erro-
neous policy in deadlock of 1909, 
95, 116. 
Borden, Rt. Hon. Sir Robert, 
G.C.M.G., Prime Minister of 
Canada (1911- ),views on parti-
cipation of Dominions in imperial 
policy, 339 n. 1, 344, 584 ; on 
representation of Don1inion in 
London by a resident minister, 
321, 322, 542, 543, 545; on sub-
mission of treaties to Parliamen-
tary ratification, 282 ; objection to 
reliance of Canada on Canning 
doctrine, 365 n. 3. 
Botha, Gen. Rt. Hon. Louis, Prime 
Minister of the Transvaal (1907-
10), Prime Minister of the Union 
of South Africa (1910- ), close 
relations 'vith Lord Gladstone as 
Governor-General, 92; attitude to 
representations regarding his na-
tive land policy, 187 ; vie,vs on 
imperial control of foreign policy, 
343 n. 2; crushes rebellion in 
South Afriea, 348; wins election 
of 1915, _351 n.1; defeats Germans 
in South-west Africa, 361 ; brings 
about union in 1909, 481; negative 
attitude towards proposal of a 
secretariat in l 907, 564 ; to pro-
posals of Sir J. Ward in 1911, 505. 
Boundary disputes referred to Privy 
Council, 379. 
Boundary Waters treaty with United 
States of 1909, 282 ; Commission 
provided for in its terms, 518. 
Bryce, Viscount, O.M., an1 bassador 
at Washington, 272-4, 277. 
Brisbane, great strike of 1912 at, 
439. 
British Columbia : anti-Asiatic legis-
lation, 193-7, 434, 435 ; Indian 
land clain1s, 169-72; dismissal of 
ministries and of Lieutenant-
Governor, 114, 432; divorce juris-
diction, 456 ; increase of represen-
tation (duration of legislature ex-
tended to five years by Act, 1913i 
c. 11 ), 393, 395 ; rights over lands 
granted to Dominion in respect of 
construction of transcontinental 
railway, 458; dispute with Canada 
over railway construction, 437, 
499. 
British Consular service, use of, by 
Dominions, 297. 
British Indians, im1nigration into 
and treatment in Cauada, 194-8; 
into Common·wealth, 198-201 ; 
New Zealand, 201, 202 ; South 
Africa, 202-13. 
British nationality, advantages of, to 
Dominions, 255-7, 586. 
British Nationality and Status of Aliens 
Act, 1914, 248-50. 
British N e'v Guinea., pecuniary re-
sponsibility for administtation of, 
accepted by Australian Colonies, 
581. 
British preference, proposed restric-
tion by Australia to ships manned 
by 'vhite labour, 267 ; in Canada, 
535; suggestion of Union govern-
ment to substitute for it payments 
on defence, 535. 
British South Africa Company, its 
governn1ent of Rhodesia, 494-8. 
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British subjects, personal rights of, 
11nder treaties, 255-7, 268, 269. 
Brodeur, Hun. L. P., Minister of 
Marine in Sir W. Laurier's govern-
ment, representation as to itlter-
ference with Dominion legislation 
on 1nercha.nt shipping, 229. 
Brussels Sugar Con·v·ention, perma-
nent bureau of, 573. 
Bulgaria, treaty of 1905 (dissolved 
by war) with, 268. 
Bulletin, influence in Australia di-
rected to danger from Japan, 337. 
Burnham, J. H., 1notion to abolisl1 
titles of honour in Canada, 56. 
Btirns, Rt. Hon. John, President of 
the Local Government Board, 
vie\vs on O\Tersea emigration in 
connexion 'vith population of tl1e 
United Kingdom, 560. 
Cabinet, Imperial, ultimate respon~ 
sibility for policy as opposed to 
. Committee of Imperial Defence, 
323 ; presence of Sir R. Borden 
and Mr. Hughes at meetings of, 545 . . 
Cable landing rights, proposal to 
place under a joint itnperial board, 
572. 
Cald·\vell, James, M.P., vie,vs on 
po"'"er of Crown to dissolve Parlia-
ment, 88. 
Campbell-Bannerman, Rt. Hon. Sir 
H., G.C.B., Prime Minister of the 
United Kingdom (1905-8), on sta-
tus of Dominions, 516; accepts 
Presidency of Imperial Conference, 
but not control of secretariat, 564. 
Canada: prerogative of mercy, 66, 
70 ; deputy of Governor-General, 
72 ; royal instructions, 118, 119; 
· no reservation of bills required, 
144 ; North American Indians, 
168-72; anti-Asiatic measures in, 
193-8; merchant shipping legisla-
tion, 215, 229, 559 ; commercial 
treaties, 262; extradition, 299, 300; 
-copyrigl1t, 237-42; military de-
. fence, 303, 304, 307; naval defence, 
315, 320; aid in war, 348; war 
nteasures, 352-4 ; judicial appeals, 
370, 371 ; two Hquses, 390-6 ; 
schelne offederal government,427-
60; treatyposition,517~518; High 
Commissioner, 537; resident minis-
ter, 543, 547, 583, 584. 
Canadian citizenship and nationality, 
253, 254, 354. 
Canadian Pacific Railway, value for 
consolidation of Canada, 302. 
Canberra, federal At1stralian capital 
428. ' 
Canning doctrine, foundation of 
Monroe policy, 365. 
Cape of Good Hope: native question 
181-7 ; immigration legislation' 
198 ; anti-Asiatic measures, 210' 
213; naval contribution, 316; join~ 
Union, 481 ; language question 
489; views as to Perrnane11t Com~ 
Inission of Imperial Co11ference 
563. ' 
Cape Town, attitude of City Council 
to Indian traders, 213. 
Capital, loans of British to Domi-
nions, 19. 
Capital cases, responsibilities of 
Governor-Ge11eral of Union of 
South Africn ar1d Go, .. ernor of 
N e\vfoundland as to, 66. 
Carmichael, Sir T. Gibson, Bart., 
K.C.M.G.(now Lord, G.C.I.E., &c.), 
Governor of Victoria, 42, 92, 98, 
429. 
Carnarvon, Earl of, Seeretary of 
State for the Colonies (1874-8), 
settlement of transcontinental 
railway question in Canada, 437; 
over-anxiety to bring about union 
in South Africa, 14. 
Cartier, Hon. Sir George, conferring 
of baronetcy upon, 56. 
Cartwright, Rt. Hon. Sir R., G. C.M.G., 
views on Canadia11 Senate, 392. 
Celebration of His Majesty's birthday, 
560. 
Censure or criticism of Governor by 
- Parliament of Dominion, 100, 113. 
Censure of Ministry by Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, unconstitu-
tional, 103. 
Central legislature, in Interpretation 
Act, 1889, position of Common-
wealtll Parliament as, 461. 
Chamberlain, Rt. Ho11. Josepl1, 
Secretary of State for the Colonies 
(1895-1903), negotiator of treaty of 
1888 regarding fisheries of North 
An1erica, 281 ; insists on adoption 
of policy of Natal Act No. 1 of 1897 
in exclusive legislation regarding 
Asiatics, 192, 193; views on posi-
tion of Dominions, 516 : urges 
imperial co-operation in 1897 and 
1902, 501; views on preferential 
trade as link of empire and pre-
liminary to federation, 531, 532, 
534 ; reply to Home Rule address 
from Ca11ada, 542 n. 2. 
Channel of communication bet\veei1 
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- Imperial and Dominion govern-
ments, 535, 544. 
Chapman, Hon. F. R., Judge of 
Supreme Court of New Zealand, 
. views on native land question, 
178. 
Charter, supplemental, of March 13, 
1915, granted to British South 
Africa Company, providing as to 
possible introduction of responsible 
government in Rhodesia, 497. 
Chartered accountants, Ontario Act 
regarding, 436 n. 3. 
Cheaper cable rates, 555. 
Chelmsford, Lord, G.C.M.G., Gover-
nor of Queensland (1905-9), now 
. Governor-General ofindia, quarrels 
"'~ith his Premier, Mr. Kidston, 
41, 42 ; lack of confidence shown 
by Premier in, 92, 93; grants Mr. 
Philp a dissolution in defiance of 
the Assembly, 97; narrow·ly escapes 
motion for recall, 113. 
Chief Justice, special precedence of, 
in Victori~ and Tasmania, 64. 
Childer.c;, war vessel of Victorian 
government, 312. 
China, extra-territorial jurisdiction 
in, over British subjects, 127. 
Chinese, immigration into, and treat-
ment in, Canada, 195; into the 
Commonwealth, 198-200. 
Chinese labour, party bitterness over 
question of, 78. 
Churchill, Rt. Hon. Winston S., 
Under-Secretary of State for the 
Colonies (1905-8), First Lord of 
the Admiralty (1911-15), views on 
Natal question, 77, 80, 150; on 
naval policy, 320, 334. 
Claim against Imperial Government, 
procedure in, 158, 159. 
Closure, first adopted in Canada in 
1913 in order to carry Naval Aid 
Bill in Commons, · 322. 
Coasting trade, regulation of, by 
Colonial legislature (in Union by 
, Act No.9 of 1913), 214, 219, 223-5, 
267 ; of Commonwealth, 559. 
Cobalt Lake case in Canada, 164, 
433. 
·Colombia, treaf;ies of commerce 'vith, 
267, 268. 
Colonial, use of adjective, 24, 25 ; 
sanctioned by Mr. Bonar Law, 9. 
Colonial Conference of 1887 : dis-
cussion of power of dissolution at, 
93, 119 ; assemblage of notables 
on Jy, 500 ; no discussion of federal 
proposals, 501. 
Colonial Conference of1897: question 
of petition of right against Colonial 
governments, 158; abandonment 
of control of aborigines depart-
ment in Western Australia, 179; 
denunciation of treaties of 1862 
with Belgium and 1865 with 
Germany regarding commerce, 
266 ; confined to Prime Ministers, 
500, 552; no discussion of federal 
proposals, 501. 
Colonial Conference of 1902 : dis-
cussion of navigation laws, 267 ; 
naval agreement with Australasia, 
311 ; composition of, 500, 552 ; 
omission of States of Australia., 554 . 
Colonial Conference of 1907 : ques-
tion of naturalization, 24 7 ; navi-
gation laws, 267 ; naval agreement, 
317; court of appeal, 381 ; no dis-
cussion of federal proposals, 501 ; 
preferential trade, 534, 537; com-
position of, 551, 552, 554 ; proposed 
imperial fund, 571 ; permanent 
Commission and Secretariat, 563, 
564. 
Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, 137, 
140. 
Colonial Office, influence of perma-
nent officials on development of 
responsible government, 14; divi-
sion into Dominions and Crown 
Colonies divisions as result of 
Colonial Conference of 1907, 564; 
proposed further division negatived 
in 1911, 564, 565. 
Colonial preference, 531-5. 
Colonial Sugar Refining Company, 
successful defiance of Common-
wealth government, 466. 
Colonies, uRe of term, 24. 
Coloured immigration, into Domi-
nions, 190-213. 
Coloured skilled workers, position of, 
in Transvaal and Cape of Good 
Hope (cf. Act No. 25 of 1914), 181. 
Co1nbines for control of freight rates 
(see Union Act No. 10 of 1911), 556. 
Commission, of Governors, 27. 
Commit tee of Imperial Defence, pro-
posed representation of Dominions 
upon, 323-6, 542, 548, 550 ; secret 
discussion of imperial foreign 
policy and defence at Conference 
of 1911, 545, 548. 
Commonwealth Constitution Act, 
216, 217. 
Common la\v, of Dominions, 45. 
Common law, English, largely re-
pealed in Dominions, 379. 
• 
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• 
Commonwealth of Australia: prero- Const1ls, quasi-diplomatic position of 
gative of mercy, 70; depttty of in Canada, 64, 294; position of i~ 
Governor-General, 72 ; royal in- Australia with regard to Comm'on-
structions, 118; reservation of bills, 'vealth and States, 426, 427 ; privi-
144 ; anti-Asiatic measures, 191, leges of, as secltred by treaty 256 . 
. ' ' 192, 198-201: Inerchant shipping cannot be appo1nted by Dominion 
legislation, 215, 217-22, 228, 229, governn1ents, 297. 
232, 559; customs, 261, 262; copy- Consuls-General, negotiations of 
right, 242 ; military defence, 303, Canadian government witl1, objec-
304, 306, 307 ; 11aval defence, 315- tions to practice of, 294. 
20; attitude towards Committee Convention regarding safety of life 
of Imperial Defence, 325, 326, 328, at sea in 1913-14, 231 . 
329, 334; attitude towards 'var, Cook, Rt. lion. J·., Prime Minister of 
347; war legislation, 354-8; ,·iews Australia (1913-14), receives grant 
on settlement, 362 ; appellate .iuris- of double dissolution of Parliament 
diction, 371, 379, 382; alteration from Governor-General in 1914, 
of constitution, 396, 397; relation 106, 112; requests a naval con-
to states, 421-81 ; interpretation of ference, 328 ; friendly relations 
constitution, 461-80; High Com- witl1 governments of States, 477. 
missioner, 538; attitude to pro- Cooper, Hon. T., Judge of Supreme 
posal of resident minister, 543, Court of New Zea.land, view on 
547. native land rights, 177. 
Commonwealth Parliament, exclu- Copyright., 237-43 ; dispute with 
sive powers of, 444, 445. Canada over, does not lead to resig-
Commonwealth Savings Bank (Act . nation of Canadian go,~ernment, 
No. 14 of 1911), dispute as to acti- 82. 
vities of, 478. Corn, repeal of duty 011 imported, by 
Com pan~" la~,., uniformity of, 557, Mr. (afterwards Lord) Ritchie, 
558, 569. 533. 
Company legislation, Dominio11 and Coronation of George V, visit of 
Provincial po,vers of, 452-4 ; Com- members of Dominion Parliaments 
monwealth and State po,vers of, on occasion of, in 1911, 577. 
464, 465. Correspondence, advantages of, for 
Comparison of federal systems of conduct of public affairs, 569. 
Canada and Attstralia, 421, 422. Correspondence between Imperial 
Co1npensation for accidents to work- Go,Ternment a11d Australian States, 
ers, ttniformity of law 1·egarding - 428, 429. 
(Union Act No. 25 of 1914), 558. Costa Rica, treaty of 1913 with, 268. 
Compulsory training of defence Courtney, Lord, bill for proportional 
forces in Dominions other than ·voting, 412. 
Canada and Ne\vfoundland, 304-7. Cre\ve, Marquess of, l{.G., Secretary 
Conception Bay, territorial status of, of State for the ColonieR (1908-
129. 10) : efforts to induce Dominions 
Conditions of grant of dissolution, to evince more interest in imperial 
may be imposed by Governor, 96, politics, 324 11. 1; as Secretary of 
97; conditions as to actions of new State for India (1910-15) repre-
ministry Inust not be so imposed sentslndiasuccessfullyatlmperial 
on an unwilling Premier, 98-104. Conference of 1911,552; expression 
Confederate States, partial British of opinion in favour of division of 
sympathy for, in War of Secession, Colonial Office, 564; withholds 
16. royal assent from Orange River 
Conference · regarding submarine Colony Act of 1908, 185. 
cables, Sir C. Tupper votes agai11st Crick, Mr., misfeasance as Minister 
other British delegates at, 292. of Lands in New South Wales, 
Conferences of State Premiers in 155. 
Australia, 4 73, 4 77, 478. Crin1inals, duty of responsible 
Con naught, Duke of, K.G., K. T., gover11n1ents to decide questions 
K. P., &c., precedence in Union of. COilCerning, 68. 
South Africain 1910,63; Governor- Crin1i11al assaults of white on black, 
General of Canada (1911- ), 33. and vice versa, in South Africa, 183. 
• 
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Criminal cases, Judicial Committee 
does not normally allo'v appeals 
in, 369, 370. 
Criminallaw,controlled by Dominion 
in Canada but not by Conlmon-
\Vealth in Australia, 70; 71. 
Crowe, Sir Joseph, assis~s Sir C. 
Tupper in treaty negotiations at 
Paris in 1893, 263. 
Crown, interest in foreign affairs, 
90, 91. 
Crown, service under as qualification 
for naturalization, 24 7. 
Crown Colonies, definition of, 9 ; 
position of, 8, 506 n. 1, 572 .. 
Cullen, Hon. Sir W. P., K.C.M.G., 
Lieutenant-Governor and Chief 
Justice of New South Wales, de~ 
clines advice of n1inisters as to 
prorogation of Parliament, 94. 
Currency, reservation of bills afrect-
ing in Australian States and New-
foundland, 144. 
Currie, Messrs. Donald & Co., retire 
from management of Union Castle 
Steamship Co. in view of policy of 
Union government, 556. 
Curzon, Lord, erroneous view on 
status of Dominions, 516. 
Cussen, Hon. L. F. B., Judge of 
Supreme Court of Victoria, 358. · · 
Customs and excise, exclusive control 
of by Commonwealth Parliament, 
445. 
Customs Union, in South Africa, 481. 
Dardanelles, Australasian force at, 
347. 
Deadlock provision in the Common-
wealth, 106. 
Deakin, Rt. Hon. Alfred, Prime 
Minister of Comn1on wealth of 
Australia (1903-4; 1905-8; 1909-
10) : remains in office despite re-
servation of assent to Bill of 1906 
regarding preference to goods itn-
ported in certain ships, 82 ; pro-
posal of independent Australian 
navy, 317, 318, 338; brings forward 
imperial preference at conference 
of 1907, 534, 557; deprecates ex-
cessive festivities at Colonial Con-
ference, 561 ; proposal for Con-
ference Secretariat, 563, 564, 566, 
570; proposal for development of 
empire fund, 571 ; lack of practical 
ability, 575. 
Dealers' licences, grievances affecting 
issue of in South Africa, 204, 205, 
213. 
Deceased wife's sister, n1arriage 'vith 
159. ' 
Declaration of London, 283, 288, 289, 
549, 551, 559. 
Defence, obligation of colonies re-
garding, 15, 16 ; absolute obliga-
tion to defend the whole Empire 
accepted by Imperial Governn1ent, 
330, 520, 586 . 
Delagoa Bay, con1mercial in1portance 
of for South Africa, 481. 
de la Rey, J. H., Assistant Com-
mandant-General of the forces of 
the South African Republic in the 
Boer War, meditated treason of 
in 1914, 349. 
Delegate, Colonial Parliament is not 
a delegate of Imperial Parliament, 
124, 449. 
Delegation of authority by Colonial 
Governor, validity of, 71-3. 
Delegatus non potest delegare, 124, 449. 
Denham, Hon. D., Premier of Queens-
land (1911-15), 401. 
Dependency, limitations of legislative 
power of, 121-4; summary of re-
strictions upon Dominions as 
dependencies, 530. 
Deportation of certain persons from 
South Africa, 160-7. 
Deputy of Governor, position of, 
71-3. 
Deserted wife, do1nicile not affected 
by husband's action in certain 
cases. 159. 
I 
Development grant, in United King-
dom, 572. 
De Villiers, Lord, P.C., K.C.M.G., 
Chief Justice of the Union of South 
Africa and member of the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council 
(1910-14), 385, 387. 
de Wet, C. R., treachery and amnesty 
of, 348, 361 ; indignation at being 
fined for assault on native, 183. 
Dicey, Prof. A. V., K.C., D.C.L., 
view as to imperial federation, 7. 
Differential duties, repeal of restric-
tion on, 261, 263 ; bills imposing 
still subject to reservation in New-
foundland under royal instruc-
tions, 144. 
Differential treatm~nt of black and 
white in the Union of South 
Africa, 183, 485. 
Dilatoriness of Dominion and Im-
perial governments, 575. 
Dilke, Rt. Hon. Sir Charles W., Bart., 
M.P., view a.s to discretionary 
po,ver of crown, 87 n. 1. 
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:Pinizulu, chief of Zululand, 81, 82. 
Diplomatic position claimed for Con-
suls in Canada, 64, 294. 
Diplomatic service, value of to 
Dominions, 19, 20. 
Direct taxation, restriction of Pro-
vincial powers as to, 132, 376, 456, 
457. 
Disallowance, power of exercised by 
Imperial Government, 143, 145 ; 
by Dominion Government in re-
spect of provincial_ acts of Canada, 
432-6. 
Discrimination between residents of 
S.tates, forbidden in Common-
wealth, 445, 4 70. 
Discretion of Governor in matter of 
action other than a dissolution of 
Parliament, 95, 96. 
Disloyalty and dishonesty of a section 
of Dutch population in South 
Africa, 350, 351. 
Dismissal of Ministry by the Crown 
in United Kingdom, 86-91 ; by 
Governor in Dominions, 112-19. 
.Disputes between Dominion govern-
ments and Imperial Government, 
mode of solution for cases of legal 
c_haracter suggested, 165, 166, 388. 
Disraeli, Right Hon. B., views on 
colonies as Inillstones, 15. 
Dissenting views of members of 
Judicial Committee, not recorded, 
382. 
Dissolution of Parliament, position 
of Governor with regard to, 29, 
85-112 ; proclamation of cann·ot be 
recalled, 112 n. 1. 
Divorce legislation, 159 ; in Canada, 
456; bills for divorce subject to 
reservation in Australian States 
and N e'vfoundland, 144. 
Doherty, Hon. C. J ., Minister of 
Justice of Canada, removal of H. 
Thaw_ from Canada, 300 ; views on 
in1 perial relations, 344. 
l)omicile, general basis of divorce 
jurisdiction, 159 ; basis of distinc-
tion of kinds of British subjects, 
25 7 ; in Canada, 254, 354 ; in A us-
tralia, 462. 
Dominions, definition of (including 
Papua and Norfolk Island with 
Common 'vealth, 4 and 5 Geo. V, 
c. 17, sched. I ; 4 and 5 Geo. V, 
c. 50; 5 and 6 Geo. V, c. 21), 9. 
Dominions Department of the Colo-
. nial Office, 564 ; reports on affairs 
in and legislation of Dominions 
for period 1909-14 (an unpopular 
innovation apparently discon-
tinued; for use made see Journ. 
Soc. Comp. Leg., Review of Leg.1913, 
pp. 22 sq., 78 sq., 112 sq., &c.), 126 
n. 1, 566. 
Dominion Royal Commission, 556, 
557, 571-6. 
Double dissolution in Commonwealth 
in 1914, 106-9. 
Double taxation in Canadian pro-
vinces, 457. 
Drage, G., visits Canada with Sir F. 
Pollock, 562. 
Dufferin, Marquess of, Governor-
General of Canada ( 1872-8), pro-
posed dismissal of Sir John Mac-
donald in 1873, 113, 114:. 
Duffy, Hon. Sir C. Gavan, views on 
independence of colonies, 23, 510. 
Duffy, Hon. E. Gavan, Justice of 
Commonwealth High Court, 221, 
357. 
Dukhobors, objectionable character 
of as immigrants, 191, 192. 
Duration of Parliament (Responsible 
Government, i. 502, 503 ; no'v five 
years in British Columbia, Act 
1913, c. 11), 93. 
Durham, Lord, advice as to respon-
sible government, 13. 
Dutch language, use of in South 
Africa, 489, 490. 
Dutch Reformed Church, union of, 
racial discrimination observed, 182. 
Earle, Ron. John, leader of Labour 
party in Tasmania, and Premier 
(1914- ), brief ministry (Oct. 20-
27, 1907), 94 ; dispute with Sir W. 
Ellison-Macartney in 1914, 99-103. 
Ecclesiastic precedence, 64. 
Education of British Indians in 
South Africa, 205; question of use 
of language in South Africa, 489, 
490. 
Edwards, Hon. W. B., Judge of 
Supreme Court of New Zealand, 
view on native land rights, 177. 
Egypt, treaty of 1907 with, 268. 
Elgin and Kincardine, Earl of, Secre-
tary of State for the Colonies 
(1905-8), hasty action in giving 
instructions to governor. in Natal 
case, due to inexperience, 75-81; 
abortive proposal to use Secretariat 
and High Commissioners as 
channel of communication, 546 
n. 1 ; ert·oneous doctrine of condi-
tion of alteration of the constitu-
tion of the In1 perial Conference, 
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553 ; repudiates Mr. Lyttelton's 
· proposal of a Permanent Commis-
. sion of Imperial Conference, 563 ; 
subdivides Colonial Office proforma, 
564. 
Ellison-Macartney, Rt. Hon. Sir W., 
K.C.M.G., Governor of Tasmania, 
(1913_- ), error in attaching condi-
tion to appointn1ent of ministry, 
99-104 ; protest against appoint-
ment, 27, 
Elmslie, Hon. G. A., first Labour 
Premier of Victoria, 94. 
Emigration from United Kingdom to 
Dominions, 19, 560. 
Emigration, indentured to Natal 
forbidden in 1911, 206. 
Eminent domain, doctrine applicable 
to native land in New Zealand, 
176. 
Emmott, Lord, on British Naturali-
zation, 245 n. 1. 
Empire, signification of: 526. 
Empire Parlia1nentary Com1nittee, 
· invites representatives of Domi-
nion Parliaments to Coronation 
of George V, 577. 
Empire Trade and Industries Com-
mittee of the Royal Colonial In-
stitute, proposal of joint develop-
ment fund, 571-5. 
England, effect of oversea congestion 
on population of, 560. 
Escheats, ownership of Provinces, 
458. 
Esquimalt, imperial garrison of, 302. 
Ethiopianisn1. in South Africa, 182. 
European land tenure in South 
Africa, 185, 186. 
European War of 1914, assistance 
rendered by Dominions in, 20, 21, 
346-66. 
Ewart, J. S., examination of his 
theory of Canadian independence, 
50~-29. 
E\ving, Hon. N. K., intrigues in 
Tasmania, 94. 
Exclusive powers of Dominion Par-
liament and Provincial Legisla-
tures in Canada, 442, 443 ; of 
Commonwealth and State Parlia-
ments, 444-6. 
Execution of natives in Natal in 
1906, 77-9. 
Execution of treaties, Dominion 
responsibility for, 281, 282. 
Executive Committees in Provinces 
of South Africa, 484, 485, 488. 
Exemption of religious objectors only 
from comp-q.lsory service in New 
Zealand, not in Australia, 305, 
306. 
Exequatur, issued at once to a consul 
de carriere, 427. 
Exile, restriction as to in case of 
pardon, 69, 70. 
Experts, delays of in arriving at 
conclusions, 569. 
Expulsion of undesirable aliens, 
arrangements regarding, 554. 
External affairs, relations of Com-
monwealth and States concerning, 
423-7. 
External Affairs Departments in 
Canada and Commonwealth, 422, 
423. 
Extradition treaties, consultation of 
Dominions as to, 297, 298 ; treaty 
with United States of 1889, 299 
n. 1. 
Extradition without treaty, 299, 300. 
Extra-territorial effect of Common-
wealth legislation, 444 ; as to 
merchant shipping, 216, 217; as 
to navy, 317. 
Extra-territorial privileges of British 
subjects, 19; not stricto iure enjoyed 
by persons naturalized merely in 
colonies, 246. 
Factory Acts, differentiation against 
Chinese in Australia, 200. 
Fear of Japan, prominent feature of 
Australian sentiment, 191, 337, 
588. 
Federal Constitutions, essential fea-
tures of, 418, 419. 
Federation, power to create vested 
in Imperial Parliament alone, 123. 
Festivities,inten1.pestive in connexion 
with Imperial Conference, 561. 
Fielding, Hon. W., Minister of 
Finance of Canada (1896-1911), 
trade negotiations in Paris and 
Canada, 270-2, 27 4, 295. 
Fiji, alleged influx of Indians from, 
into New Zealand, 201. 
Financial relations of Commonwealth 
and States of Australia, regulated 
by Act No.8 of 1910, 477. 
Finger prints, question of taking in 
South Africa, 207. 
Fiscal autonomy of Dominions, con-
ceded by 1859, 261. 
Fisher, Right Hon. Andrew, Prime 
Minister of Commonwealth (1910-
13; 1914-15) ; High Commissioner 
for the Commonwealth (1916- ) ; 
proposes referenda in 1911 and 
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1913, 104: ; refused dissolution of 
Parlian1ent in 1909, 108 n. 1 ; 
naval policy, 318; desire to obtain 
information by conferences regard-
ing imperial policy, 346, 547, 578, 
582; indiscreet attitude to,vards 
strikers at Brisbane, 440 ; criticism 
of federal proposals of Sir J. Ward, 
503, 580 ; appointment as High 
Commissioner, 578 ; suggests that 
Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs should deal with the afl:·airs 
of self-governing dominions, 54 7, 
548. 
Fisheries, in Canada, Dominion con-
trol of, 455. -
Fishery protection vessels in Domi-
nion, legal position of, 315. 
Fishery questions under treaty in 
Canada, 16, 520-2 ; in Newfound-
land, 16, 69, 168, 284, 285. 
Fitzpatrick, Rt. Hon. Sir C.,G.C.M.G., 
Chief Justice of Canada, 380. 
Forces supplied by Dozninions for 
the war (in Canada up to Feb. 14, 
1916, Ontario had given 12 per 
cent. of her availahle men, Quebec 
under 5, the Western Provinces 
about 19 per cent. No Dominion 
up to that date had enacted com-
pulsory service for the war ; Canada 
had decided never to do so, and 
similarly Australia), 347. 
Foreign affairs, exposition of to 
Governments of Dominions in 
1911, 545, 548 ; offer of Mr. Har-
court to afford full information as 
to, 322-4 ; inexperience of Domi-
nions regarding, 549. 
Foreign governments, position to-
\Vards Imperial Government in 
regard to action of Don1inion 
Governments, 78, 163, 423. 
· Foreign Office, suggestion to transfer 
control of affairs of Dominions to, 
made by Mr. Fisher in 1~11, 54 7, 
548. 
Foreign subsidized vessels, competi-
tion of with British, 559. 
Foster, Hon. Sir George Eulas, 
K.C.M.G., views on titles of 
honour, 56, 57 ; Canadian repre-
sentative on Dominions Roval 
• 
Comn1ission, 573. 
Fox, Rt. Hon. Charles, and Lord 
North, disn1issal of in 1784, by 
George III, 89. 
France : probability of closer com-
mercial relations with as result 
of war, 536; negotiations with 
regarding Canadian trade in 1893 
263; in 1907, 269; in 1907, 270: 
274; protocol of July 6, 1912 
regarding position of Dominion~ 
under treaty of 1826 (Parl. Pap., 
Cd. 6269), 268; different treatment 
in of persons of imperial and colo-
nial naturalization, 245 n. 2. 
Franchise, restriction upon in case of 
South African natives, 181, 182, 
183, 184; British Indians in Natal 
deprived of, 204. 
Freedom of Dominions from obliga-
tion to take part in wars of im-
perial policy, 341-4, 578-88. 
Free Trade v. Protection, 531-3. 
French Canadians' attitude to Em-
pire (unsatisfactory response in 
1915-16 to recruiting appeal), 491, 
492. 
French language, use of in Canada, 
490-2. 
Frere, Rt. Hon. Sir Bartle, Governor 
of the Cape of Good Hope, dispute 
with Mr. Molteno, 50. 
Fund for empire development, sug-
gestion of Mr. Deakin in 1907 to 
create, 571, 572. 
Fundy, Bay of, opened to United 
States fishermen in 1845, 521. 
Fur seal convention of July, 1911, 
277. 
Galician in1migrants into Canada, 
191; in many respects less desir-
able than the British immigrants 
to whom they were-on grounds 
of cheapness and docility-pre-
ferred, 258, 492, 528. 
Galt, Hon. Sir A., High Commis-
sioner for Canada, negotiates with 
Spanish Govern1nent for commer-
cial treaty, 263, 264. 
Gandhi, Mr., leader of British In-
dians in South Africa, 207, 208, 
210. 
Gardiner, case of the convict, in New 
South Wales, objection to release 
on condition of banishment, 70. 
Gavan Duffy, Hon. E., 357. 
Gayundah, placed at disposal of 
Admiralty in 1885, 312. 
General Court Martial, warrant to 
convene, incorrect use of by Gover-
nor-General of the Union, 167. 
Geneva, Convention of 1906, regard-
ing treatment of wounded, 293. 
George I and Hanover, 513. 
German communities in Canada, 
disloyalty of certain, 259. 
• 
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German empire, lack of responsible 
government in, 86; hostile attitude 
in Boer War, 362. . 
German language, use of, in schools 
in Ontario, 491. 
Gerrnan New Guinea, capture by 
Australian forces, 54, 34:7 ; desire 
of Australia to retain, 362, 582. 
German South·west Africa, capture 
of, by Union forces, and desire of 
Union to retain, 348, 34:9, 581. 
Gern1an trade relations with Canada, 
270, 271' 518, 532. 
Gladstone, Viscount, P.C., G.C.M.G., 
Governor-General of Union of 
South Africa (1910-14), action in 
case of Johannesburg riots, 4 7, 48, 
92, 167. 
Gladstone, Rt. Hon. W. E., M.P., 
Secretary of State for the Colonies 
and War (1845-6), views on im-
perial an.d local interests, 152. 
Glasgow, Earl of, G.C.M.G., Governor 
of New Zealand (1892-7), dispute 
with Mr. Ballance's government, 
81. 
Gokhale, Hon. Mr., visit to Union of 
South Africa to adjust questions 
with Union government, 207. 
Gold law of Transvaal, 213 n. 1. 
Goldwin Smith, Prof., belief in 
annexation to United States as 
destiny of Canada, 511. 
Government House, Sydney, restora-
tion to Governor, 429-31. 
Governor, 1neaning of term, 27 ; 
appointment of, 26-8 ; subject to 
concurrence of Dominion govern-
ment, 28-32; member of royal 
family as, 32-4 ; po,vers of, 35 ; 
legal liability of, 36-8 ; as to ex-
penditure of public funds, 38-4:3 ; 
as to 1nartial law, 43-51; limited 
delegation of prerogatives (a) as to 
war and peace, 52-4; (b) of honour, 
54:-65; (c) of mercy, 65-71; doubt 
as to validity of prerogative po,ver 
to appoint Deputies, 71-3; con-
trolled in executive acts by Im-
perial government, 74-84; power 
to dissolve Parliament, 85-112; 
to dismiss ministers, 112-19 ; bills 
for grants to, must be reserved in 
Australian States and Newfound-
land, 144; essential character of 
functions, 540. 
Governor-in-Council, formerly Court 
of Appeal, 368. 
Governors-General, mode of appoint-
ment, 26; omission of power to 
pardon in certain cases through 
oversight in case of Canada and 
Union of South Africa, 70, 71 ; 
power to issue licences to trade 
with enemy conferred by Pro-
clamation of Oct. 8, 1914, 352 n. 1. 
Grain-growers of Ccul.ada, objection 
to titles of honour, 56 n. 2 ; devo-
tion to imperial preference, 534: 
n.l. 
Great War of 1914, 16, 339-66. 
Greece, type of responsible govern-
Inent in, 86; treaties with, of Nov. 
10, 190!, and May 4, 1905, 267. 
Grey, Rt. Hon. Sir Edward, Secretary 
of State for Foreign Affairs (1905-
), views on Dominion treaty 
negotiations, 269, 270 ; defends 
Declaration of London at Imperial 
Conference of 1911, 549. 
Grey, Earl, Secretary of State for the 
Colonies and War (184:6-52), 14. 
Grey, Earl, G.C.M.G., Governor-
General of Canada (1904:-11 ), 33, 
92. 
Griffith, Rt. Hon. Sir Samuel W., 
G.C.M.G., Chief Justice of the 
Commonwealth (1903- ), judicial 
opinions on Commonwealth con-
stitution, 356, 357, 436, 460, 467, 
470; member of Judicial Com-
mittee of Privy Council, 380. 
Hague arbitral tribunal, 282. 
Hague Conference, position of Do-
minions with reference to, 289-94, 
325. 
Haldane, Lord, inconsistent action 
as to strengthening of Judicial 
Committee, 384; proposals for 
new constitution of Privy Council, 
384-6. 
Halifax, imperial garrison of, 302. 
Hanover and United Kingdom, rela-
tion of, 53, 512, 513. 
Harcourt, Rt. Ron. Lewis, Secretary 
of State for the Colonies (1910-15), 
on Imperial naturalization, 245 
n. 1 ; proposals for participation of 
Do1ninions in the executive control 
of foreign affairs, &c., 322-6, 541, 
542, 589 ; hospitality to Dominion 
representatives, 565. 
Harcourt, Rt. Hon. Sir William, 
M.P., views on Canadian shipping 
legislation, 141. 
Harter Act ( cf. Canada, Act 1910, c. 
61) as to carriage of goods at sea, 
in United States, 234:. 
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H .awaii, exodus of Ja.panese from, 
into Ct=tnada, 193. . 
Hay, Hon. J., Secretary of State 
of the United States, negotiates 
treaty witl1 Sir R. Bond (on basis 
of Bond-Blaine convention of 1890), 
17, 284. 
Headlands doctrine, 128, 521. 
Henderson, Admiral Sir R., advice 
to ConlmOI1wealth regarding naval 
construction, 320, 358. 
Hereros, partial extermination by 
Germans, 363. 
Hertzog, Hon. J. B. 1\I., Minister of 
Justice in Union of South Africa 
( 1910-12), proposals for bilingual 
teaching in South Africa, 490 ; 
disloyal attitude of, 348 ; reaction 
in Rhodesia caused by his anti-
British propaganda, 496. 
Higgins, Hon. H. B., Justice of Coln-
monwealth Higl1 Court (1906- ), 
judicial opinions on interpretation 
of constitutional powers of the 
Commonwealth and State parlia-
In.ents, 221, 460, 465, 467, 470. 
High Co1nmissioners, status and 
position of, 534-40 ; erroneous 
claim of ambassadorial rank, 540, 
541 ; refusal of Domi11ion govern-
nlents to use as a channel of com-
munication, 546 n. 1 ; discuss 
question of international exhibi-
tions, 559 ; but not that of naturali-
zation, 569. 
High Commissioner for South Africa, 
anomalous position, 50. 
Higl1 Court of Con1monwealth, diffi-
cult positio11 of, 460, 461. 
Hobart, Labour Conference a,t, I"€SO-
lution as to employment of troops 
in labour disputes, 440.1 
Holman, Hon. W. A., Attorney-
General (1910-13) and Premier of 
New Soutl1 Wales (1913- ), pro-
posals for federal constitutional 
change, 472, 473 ; disputes with 
Upper House, 398-400 ; asks Lieu-
tenant-Governor for prorogation 
in 1911, 96. 
Home Rule addresses from Dominion 
of Canada, 1·eplies of imperial 
government to, 542 n. 2 . 
Honduras, treaty of 1900 with, 267; 
treaty of 1910 with, 268 n. 2. 
Honours, royal prerogative as to, 54-
62, 74, 75. 
Hopkinson, Mr., murder of, b~y Indian 
revol1Itio11aries in Canada in 1914, 
196. 
Hospitality, interference witl1 serious 
businessoflmperial Conference 561. 
Hot pursuit, doctrine of, appli~d to 
Canadia11 Government vessel, 138. 
Howe, Hon. Joseph, opposes union of 
Canada, 420. 
Hughes, Hon. Sir Sam, K.C.M.G. 
Minister of Militia in Canad~ 
(1911- ), reorganization of Cana-
dian forces, 307 ; quarrel in Boer 
War 'vitl1 Lord Roherts and Cana-
clian Minister of Militia, 343. 
Hughes, Rt. Hon. W. M), Attorney-
General (1910-13, 1914-15), and 
Prime Minister of Commonwealth 
(1915- ), view on grant of double 
dissolution by Sir R.l\Iunro-Fergu-
son in 1914, 108; protagonist of 
movement for cotnpulsory service 
in Australia, 346 ; proposes tl1at 
Con1monwealth Parliament of 1914 
should be kept alive, 44 7 n. 1 ; 
decides, despiteappointme11t of Mr. 
Fisher as High Commissioner, to 
visit London in 1916 to obtain full 
information as to foreign affairs, 
583 n. 2; attends cabi11et meetings 
in Canada and London, 545. 
Hudson Bay, mare clausum as part of 
territorial waters of Canada, 129. 
Hudson Bay Company, charter of 
1673, 172; territory secured for 
Canada, 420. 
Identification certificates, issue to 
British Indians on leaving South 
Africa, 205, 210. 
In1maturity of responsible govern-
ment in the Dominions, 104. 
Immigration, meaning of, in Austra-
lian Constitutio11, 254. 
Immunity of instrumentalities, legal 
doctrine of, in Canada and Austra-
lia, 44 7, 448, 451. 
Imperial as opposed to local interests, 
impossible to attempt to define, 
152, 153. 
Imperial Acts, powers of Governor 
under, to be exercised 11ormally on 
n1inisterial advice, 83, 84. 
Imperinl Cabinet, ultimate responsi-
bility for policy, 323 ; Sir I~. Bor-
den's presence at meeting of, 545. 
Imperial Conference of 1911: ques-
tioil of commercial treaties binding 
Dominions, 268 ; consllltation of 
Dominions regarding political 
treaties, 288 ; naval policy discus-
sion, 309; Court of Imperial Ap-
peal, 381, 382 ; discussion of In1-
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perial federation, 501-6 ; proposed 
discussion of preferential trade, 
535 ; suggestion to use High Com-
missioners as channels of com-
munication, 538, 543; Mr. Fisher's 
suggestion regarding placing of 
affairs of Dominions under Foreign 
Secretary, 54 7, 548 ; sumtnary and 
criticism of subjects discussed and 
procedure adopted, 554-64. 
Imperial Conference, movement to 
call a meeting in 1915, 360-4. 
Imperial Copyright Conference of 
1910, 240-3. 
Imperial Council, Mr. Lyttelton's 
proposed creation of an, 562, 563. 
Imperial Council of State, Sir J. 
Ward's abortive proposal for, 
altered at conference of 1911, 
501. 
Imperial Court of Appeal, proposed 
for creation of a real, 384-8. 
Imperial expenditure on Canadian 
defence, 321. 
Imperial Federation, proposals for 
and possibilities of, 498-509. 
Imperial forces, use of, in 1906 in 
Natal, 75, 76; in New Zealand 
(1861-70), 301 ; bills affecting 
discipline of, to be reserved in 
Newfoundland, 144. 
Imperial garrisons in colonies, 301-3. 
Imperial Government, alleged obliga-
tion to yield always to Dominion 
wishes, 80-3, 14 7, 301 ; responsi-
bility for defence of Empire, 301, 
302, 578-88 ; unfair criticism of, 
for party purposes in Dominions, 
10, 328, 329; in case of Samoa, 362; 
of New Hebrides, 286, 287, 580. 
Imperial interests, with reference to 
cases of pardon, 68, 69. 
Imperial Intervention in Executive 
Acts of Governors, instances of 
and principles regulating, 74-84. 
Imperial Naturalization under British 
Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 
1914 (Canada, 1914, c. 44and sess. 2, 
c. 7), 248-50. 
Imperial Navigation Conference of 
1907, 215, 216. 
Itnperial Parliament, characteristics 
of sovereign powers of, 120, 121. 
Imperial Parliament of Defence, pro-
posal for, by Sir J. Ward at Impe-
rial Conference of 1911, 501-9. 
Imperial Postal Order scheme, futile 
effort to secure extension to Aus-
tralia and Canada at Imperial 
Conference of 1911, 555. 
Imperial Preference, 530, 531; pro-
posal of Union Government to 
substitute in its place payments 
for purposes of defence, 535. 
Imperial responsibility for naval 
defence, 301, 302, 315-17, 330. 
Imperial squadron of British navy, 
based on Gibraltar, proposed 
creation of, 330-4, 338. 
Imperial troops, inconsistency of 
presence in self-governing Dotni-
nion, 46-8; gradual withdrawal 
from, 301-3. 
Imperial Wireless Telegraphy 
scheme, 555. 
Importation, duties on, claim of 
State governments in Australia 
for exemption from, in respect of 
goods in1ported by them, 469. 
Incompetence of Dominion ministers 
to ad vise on foreign affairs, 549. 
Indemnity Act, of 1867, not allo,ved 
in New Zealand, 162. 
Indemnity Acts, responsibility of 
Imperial government regarding, 
76; disadvantages of this position, 
149, 150. 
Indemnity Bill of Union in 1914, 
amended at request of Imperial 
Government, 163, 517. 
Independence of the Dominions, 
progress of, 15; possibility of, 21 ; 
exatnination of Mr. J. S. Ewart's 
proposal for, 510-29. 
India and the Imperial Conference, 
191, 192, 260, 552, 563, 587, 588; 
relation of, to self-governing Domi-
nions, 527, 528. 
India, government of, forbids in 1911 
emigration of indentured labour 
to Natal, 206. 
Indians, North American, legal posi-
tion of, 457, 458 ; in territory 
added to Provinces in 1912 ( cf. 
Quebec Acts, 1912, cc. 7 and 13), 
492. 
Industrial questions, uselessness of 
discussion of, at Imperial Con-
ferences of 1907 and 1911, 557. 
Initiative and Referendum in 
Canada (Round Table, 1915-16, pp. 
148-50), ] 24-6. 
Inspection of Dominion Militia by 
imperial officers, 309, 310. 
Instruction of Dominion officers in 
the United Kingdom, 309. 
Instructions, should not be given to 
Dominion Government by Secre-
tary of State, 79, 80. 
Instructions to Governors on matters 
Q q 2 
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of imperial interest, prop1·iety of, · 
146; CL 76-80. . 
Interchange of Civil Servants, reso-
lution regarding at Imperial Con-
ference of 1911, a dead letter, 560. 
Interchange of officers bet''"een Im-
perial and Dominion military 
forces, 309, 310. 
Intercolonial railway in Canada, 
437. 
Intercolonial Conference of 1881 in 
Australia, resolution as to naval 
defence, 315. 
International Conference on safety 
of life at sea, of London in 1913-14, 
279. 
International Convention respecting 
industrial property, held at Wash-
ington in 1911, 278. 
International Convention and Radio-
telegraphic Conference in London 
· of 1912, 278. 
International Exhibitions, question 
of participation of Do1ninions in 
conference on, 559. 
International Joint Con1mission, be-
tweeil Canada a.nd United States, 
real character of, 518, 519. 
l11terilatioi1al Opiurn Conference of 
1911, 277. 
International position of Dominions, 
276-80. 
International Postal Union, position 
of Dominions in, 278, 279. 
Interstate Comrnission .Act, 1912, of 
Commonwealtl1, decla.red in part 
in valid b:r High Court of the 
Commonwealth, 355-7, 471. 
I11terstate Comn1ission in Australia 
not a judicial body, 4 71, 478. 
Ionian Islands, international status 
of, 512. 
Irish Catholics, in Canada, 492. 
Isaacs, Hon. I. A., Justice of Com-
monwealth High Court (1906- ), 
judicial opinions on the interpreta-
tion of the Commonwealth consti-
tution, 219, 460, 467, 470. 
Islington, Rt. Hon. Lord, P.C., 
G.C.M.G., D.S.O., Governor of 
New Zealand (1910-12), refrains 
from any pressure. on ministers to 
resign in deadlock of 1912, 117. 
Italy: type of responsible gover11-
1nent in, 86; treaty of 1883 with, 
267, 268 ; Queensland Act altered 
to correspond witl1, 425 ; commer-
cial relations of Canada with, 271, 
518 ; probable future relations of 
empire with, 536 ; Dominions con-
suited before re11ewal of arbitration 
treaty with, 288. 
Japan, agreements of 1911 and 1913 
with, respecti11g Canadian trade 
(adopted by Canadian Acts 1911, 
c. 7, and 1913, c. 27), 270 ; adheres 
to agreement of United Kingdom, 
France, Russia (and later Italy) 
not to conclude peace separately, 
386 n. 1 ; agrees to accept language 
test for immigration, 193. 
Japanese Alliance (Parl. Pap., Cd. 
5735), importance of both to the 
United Kingdom and Japan, 331, 
335, 336, 347, 588; attitude of 
Ne"T Zealand towa.rds, 528 n. 1. 
Japanese immigration i11to Canada, 
193, 194 ; into Co111monwealth, 
201. 
Johannesburg~ riots in 1913 a11d 1914 
at, 4 7, 48, 160-5. 
Johnstone,. Mr., Premier of Nova 
Scotia, dismissal of by Lie11tenant-
. Governor, 102. 
Joint High Commission, with United 
States, of 1898-9, 286. 
Judgements, proposals for enforce-
ment of tl1roughout the en1pire, 
558. 
Judgeships, needless delegation to 
Governors ofpo,ver of appointment 
to, 52. 
Judicial Co1nmittee, interpretation 
of Canadian and Com1non\vealth 
Constitutions, 446 seq. . 
Jurisdiction in territorial waters of 
Dominions, 129, 130. 
Kallenbach, Mr., a leader of Indians, 
imprison1nent of, in South Africa, 
208. 
Kidston, Ron. W., Premier of 
Queensland (1906-7, 1908-11), 41, 
42, 400. 
l{imberley, Earl of, K.G., Secretary 
of State for the Colonies (1880-2), 
reply to Home Rule address from 
Dominion of Cat1ada, 542 n. 2. 
King, H.M. the, consultation of, as 
regards Colonial Governors, 27, 
28 ; po,ver to bestow honours on 
his own i11itiative, 56, 58 ; relation 
to mi11isters as regards dissolution 
of Parliament and dismissal, 85-
90 ; opinion of Sir C. Tupper on 
rigl1t of dismissal, 114; conduct 
of may not be called in question 
in debate, 98. 
King's ships of war, sense of phrase 
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in Commonwealth of Australia Con-
stitution Act, 1900, 313. 
Kingdom, ti tie not used in case of 
Canada in deference to American 
sentiment, 420. 
Kitchener, Field-Marshal the Earl, 
visits to Australia and New Zea-
land, 304 ; advice in favour of 
completion of intercolonial rail way 
in Australia, 440. 
Kmnagata Maru, voyage to Canada in 
1914, 196. 
Kulsan Bibi, case of, in South Africa, 
207, 208. 
Labouchere, Rt. Ron. H., Secretary 
of State for the Colonies (1855-8), 
pledge of Imperial Government to 
Newfoundland in 1857, 286. 
Labouchere, H., M.P., refusal of 
Queen Victoria to accept as Minis-
ter, 90. 
Labour exchanges, use of, by Domi- · 
nion governments, 554. 
Labour party in Transvaal, 48 ; 
atte1npts to control executive 
government of province, 488, 489. 
Lake Rotorua., legal ownership of 
bed of, 173-7. 
Land in Rhodesia, ownership of, 495. 
Land, power of Governor to deal 
"'With, 52, 175, 178. 
Land taxation of Con1monwealth 
Parliament, futile petition for dis-
allowance of, 156. 
Land tenure by natives in Union of 
South Africa, 185~7. 
Land titles in N e\v Zealand, validity 
of native, 173-7. 
Langevin, Ron. Sir H., enforced 
retirement from Don1inion politics 
on grounds of corruption, 32. 
IJanguage question in Cana<l::~, 490-2 ; 
Union of South Africa, 489, 490. 
Language test, use of, to exclude 
Asiatics in Australia, 199, 200; in 
Ne\v Zealand, 201, 202; in South 
Africa, 207. 
Lascars, efforts to exclude from Aus-
tralasian trade by New Zealand 
and Commonwealth legislation, 82, 
200-2, 572, 574. 
Laurier, Rt. Ron. Sir Wilfrid, 
G.C.M.G., Prime Minister of Canada 
(1896-1911): theory of independent 
position of Don1inion, 7, 323 n. 1, 
337, 343, 344, 529, 585; dissolves 
Parliament without passing supply, 
41 n. 1 ; view on titles of honour, 
57, 58 ; on nationality and natura-
lization, 245, 247 ; negotiates 
treaty with France, 269 ; view on 
quasi-diplon1atic position of Con-
suls-General, 294 ; unwilling to 
ad vise on issues affecting war and 
peace, 289, 343, 529, 585 ; naval 
policy, 317, 321, 322, 506; not pre-
pared to rely on United States for 
defence, 365 n. 3 ; opposed in 1911 
to change in position of Judicial 
Committee, 381; never appoints a 
Conservative as Senator, 391 ; rela-
tion with Lord Strathcona, 540 ; 
opposed to Permanent Con1mission 
of I1nperial Conference or Secre-
tariat, 563, 570; opposed to any 
schen1e of imperial federation, 505. 
Leacock, Prof. S., vie·w of colonial 
status as degrading to Canada, 528. 
Leasehold v. Freehold in land tenure 
of Dominions, &c., 410. 
Legal tender, reduction of State 
powers as to, in Common,vealth, 
445. 
Legislative Council of Rhodesia, 
reforn1 of, 495-7; of New South 
Wales, 398-400 ; of Queensland, 
400, 401 ; of Victoria, 401, 402; of 
South Australia, 402-8; of Tas-
nlania, 408, 409 ; of Western Aus-
tralia, 409-11 ; of New Zealand, 
411-15; ofNe,vfoundland,416,417; 
of Nova Scotia and Quebec, 417. 
Legislative Council of India, desire 
for representation at the Imperial 
Conference, 563, 588. 
Legislative subordination of Domi-
nion Parliaments, 120-53. 
Lemieux, Ron. Rodolphe, negotiates 
arrangement at Tokio regarding 
Japanese immigration, 193, 295. 
Letellier, Ron. Luc de St. ,T ust, 
Lieutenant-Governor of Quebec 
(1876-9), dismissal of, 114, 431. 
Lewis, Ron. Sir N. Elliott, K.C.M.G., 
Premier of Tasn1ania (1909-12), 
resigns in 1909 . as a manoouvre to 
consolidate his position, 94 ; re-
signs in 1912 in view of defective 
support of his party, 98; dissents 
from disagreement with action of 
the Governor in 1914, 100. 
Liberia, freedom of Dominions se-
cured by treaty of 1908 with, 267, 
268. 
Licence fee on British Indians in 
Natal, 204, 211. 
Lieutenant-Governor in Canadian 
Province, office not subject to pro-
vincial control, 416, 443 ; political 
Q q 3 
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and other dtities of, 32, 114, 115, 
431, 432. 
Limitation of prerogative delegated 
to Governor, 52-73: (a) prerogatives 
relating to \var and sovereig11ty, 
52-4 ; (b) honours, 54-65 ; (c) 
mercy, 65-71 ; (d) appointment of 
deputy, 71-3. 
Liquor licence acts of Canada., 451. 
Lithuanian migration into Canada, 
191. 
Loans to Dominions for \Var purposes 
fron1 Imperial Government, 354 
n. 1. 
Load lines, legislative powers of 
Domi11ion parliaments as to, i11 
Canada and Australia, 215, 228, 229. 
Lobengula, grants of land to British 
South Africa Compat1y, 495. 
Local government, importance of in 
South Africa, 483. 
London Naval Co11ference, 288. 
Long, Rt. Hon. Vt7alter, views on 
action of Imperial Government as 
to mart.iallaw in Natal. 78. 
I 
Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, no legal 
liability of, 36. 
Lord-President of the Co11ncil, sug-
gestion that he should act as 
deputy head of Imperial Co11fer-
ence Secretariat, 565. 
Lorne, Marquess of, K.G., G.C.M.G., 
Governor-General of Canada (1878-
83), 34. 
Lotbiniere, Hon. Sir Henri Gustave 
J oly de, Lieutenant-Governor of 
Britisl1 Columbia (1900-6), forces 
resignation of Col. Prior's govern-
ment, and starts regime by Sir 
Richard MeBride, K.C.M.G. (1903-
15), 114. 
Lucas, Sir C. P., K.C.B., K.C.M.G., 
head of the Dominions Department 
of the Colonial Office, 566. 
Lyne, Hon. Sir W., l(.C.M.G., views 
on importers as nuisances, 534. 
Lyttelton, Rt. Ron. Alfred, Secretary 
of State for the Colonies (1903-5), 
·562, 570, 588; refuses to accept 
Lord Milner's erroneous policy as 
to British Indians, 203, 588 ; in-
accurately expressed view of posi-
tion of Don1inions, 7, 516. 
Macartney, R.t. Ron. Sir W. Ellison, 
objection to appointment as Gover-
nor of Tasma11ia, 27; dispute with 
Ministers, 98-104. 
McCallum, Col. Sir H. E., G.C.M. G., 
Gover11or of Natal (1901-7), 80. 
Macdonald, Rt. Hon. Sir John, 
G.C.M.G., Pri1ne Minister of 
Canada(1867-73; 1878-91):honour 
conferred on, 56 ; seeks to control 
l1is colleagues' expenditure, 91 ; 
circumstances regarding fall of his 
government in 1873, 113, 114; 
tariff policy in 1878, 262 ; supports 
Britisl} connexion, 275 ; takes 
part in negotiatio11 of treaty of 
Washington 1871, 286, 292; atti-
tude towards Senate of Canada, 
391, 392; desires title of Kingdom 
for Canada, 420 ; restrictive inter-
pretation of powers of provinces, 
432. 
1\Iacdonald, Baroness, 61. 
Macdonald, Mr. Ramsay, M.P., motion 
regarding martial law in Natal in 
1906, 77. 
Macgregor, Sir W., M.D., G.C.M.G., 
C.B., LL.D., Governor of New-
foundland, criticized for exercise 
of prerogative of mercy by opposi-
tion, 67 ; management of crisis in 
deadlock of 1909, 116. 
Mcinnes, Hon. T. R., Lieutenant-
Governor of British Columbia 
(1897-1900), dismissed by Liberal 
government for irregular proce-
dure, 114, 432. 
Mackenzie, Hon. Sir Thomas, 
K.C.M.G., Prime Minister of New 
Zealand (1912),Higll Commissioner 
for New Zealand (1912- ), 117, 
326. 
Mackenzie, Hon. vV., Prime Minister 
of Canada (1873-8), 113, 392. 
McNeill, John Gordon Swift, K.C., 
M.P., views on power of Crown to 
dissolve Parliament, 88. 
Madden, Ron. Sir John, G.C.M.G., 
Lieutenant· Governor and Chief 
Justice of Victoria, declines Mr. 
Elmslie a dissolution of Parlia-
Inent in 1913, 94. 
Mail service, under contract with 
Commonwealth, exclusion of lascar 
labour from, 200. 
JYiandamus does not lie to a Governor 
of an Australian State, 462. 
Manitoba : distnissal of ministry in 
1915 by Lieutenant-Governor, 115; 
anti-Asiatic act, 198 ; redistribu-
tion, 393; lands question, 437, 
458 ; senators, 395 ; education 
question, 240, 438 ; boundary dis-
pute with Ontario, 379 ; increase 
of area, 492. 
Maoris i11 New Zealand (by Act No. 
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34 of 1912 a Maori may be declared 
a European for land-holding pur-
poses), 173-7 ; service in European 
War, 181. 
Maritime Provinces, loyalty of, to 
British connexion, 276. 
Maritz, rebellion of, in Union in 1914, 
348. 
Marriage, proposal in Western Aus-
tralia to forbid, with Asiatic, 199; 
Dominion legislative powers as to, 
in Canada, 456. 
Married women, national status of, 
251. 
Marshall Islands, transferred by 
Japan to Australia, 347 n. 1. 
Martial law, 43-51; misused in Natal, 
75-80. 
Massey, Rt. Hon. W. F., Prin1e 
Minister of New Zealand (1914- ), 
540, 583 n. 2. 
Mayo, Lord, reduction of salary of 
Governor-General results in his 
proposed. appointment to Canada 
falling through, 151. 
Melbourne, Lord, alleged dismissal 
of, by William IV, 89, 90. 
Merchant shipping, 213.-36. 
Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, 214, 
225-7. 
Merchant Shipping (Convention) Act, 
1914, 231. 
Merchant Shipping Legislation, re-
fusal of wider powers as to, in 
1911, 559. 
Mercy, prerogative of, 65-71. 
Merivale, Her1nann, C.B., Under 
Secretary of State for the Colonies 
(184 7-59), views on independence 
of the Colonies, 15 n. 1. 
Merriman, Rt. Hon. J. X., views on 
deportation of labour leaders from 
South Africa, 161. 
Metal industry, Commonwealth 
efforts to rescue from German 
control, 366. 
Military defence, 301-10. 
Mill, John Stuart, definition of direct 
taxation adopted by Privy Council 
in interpretation of Constitution 
of Canada, 376. 
Millen, Hon. E. D., Senator, Minister 
of Defence in Commonwealth 
(1913-14), reply to Mr. Churchill's 
criticisms of Australian naval 
policy, 334, 337. 
Milner, Lord, errors and failure of 
policy in regard to position of 
British Indians in Transvaal, 203, 
526, 587 ; erroneous objections 
.. 
(apparently now modified) to use 
of term Empire~ 526. 
Minister, instance of dismissal of 
one by Governor 'vithout change 
of ministry in Newfoundland, 
116, 117. 
Ministerial responsibility, distinction 
of practice between United King-
dom and Dominions, 85-91 ; does 
not exist in case of grant of honours 
in every case, 57, 58. 
Miscellaneous powers of Privy Coun-
cil as a judicial body, 384. 
Modus vivendi ·with France over New-
foundland fisheries, 283, 284 ; \Vith 
the United States, 285. 
Mohammedan prisoners, refusal of 
religious concessions to, in Trans-
vaal prisons, 203, 204. 
Molteno, Hon. Sir J., K.C.M.G., 
Prime Minister of Cape of Good 
Hope (1872-8), dispute with Sir 
Bartle Frere, 50. 
Money Bill, Canadian Senate may 
not amend, 392; arrangements in 
South Australia under act of 1913, 
· 405, 406 ; treatment of, by Legisla-
tive Council in Victoria, 401 ; in 
Tasmania, 409; in New Zealand, 
413, 415. 
Monogamous marriage, dispute as to 
Indian marriages in South Africa, 
208, 212. 
Monroe doctrine, based on views of 
Canning, 365. 
Montenegro, treaty with, of Jan. 21, 
1882, 263 ; treaty of 1910, 268. 
Montreal, fortification of, partly at 
expense of United Kingdom, 302. 
Morine, Ron. A. B., dismissal of, by 
Governor of Newfoundland, 117. 
Morocco, treatyofcommerce,vith,267. 
Morris, Rt. Hon. Sir Edward P., 
K.C.M.G., Prime :1\'Iinister of New· 
foundland ( 1909- ), action in 
deadlock of 1909, 95, 116; obtains 
increase of number of members of 
Legislative Council, 417. 
Mountstephen, . Lord, 61 ; view on 
imperial federation scheme of Sir J. 
Ward in 1911, 505. 
Mowat, Hon. Sir Oliver, G.C.:M:.G., 
Lieutenant-Governor of Ontario 
(1897-1903), 432. 
Mozambique, treaty of 1909 with, 
54 ; close relations with Transvaal, 
481. 
Mulgrave, Lord, Lieutenant-Governo1· 
of Nova Scotia, 102-4. 
Municipal franchise, proposal to 
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withdraw, from British Indians in 
Natal, 204:. 
Municipal taxation, power of, in 
Canada, 459. 
Munro-Ferguson, Rt. Hon. Sir Ronald, 
G.C.M.G., Governor-General of the 
Commonwealth (1914- ), 106-12. 
Murray, Rt. Hon. Sir George, G.C.B., 
report on Canadian methods of 
conducting public business, 91. 
~Iurray, Sir Herbert, K.C.B., as 
Governor of Newfoundland ( 1896-
8) dismisses Mr. A. B. Morine in 
1898, 117. 
Murray River, confere11ce rflgarding 
waters of, in March, 1914,478. 
Musgrave, Sir A., G.C.M.G., Governor 
· of Queensland (1886-8), views 011 
prerogative of mercy, 28, 65. 
· Natal : martial law, 44-6; dispute 
with Imperial Governn1ent, 76-8, 
130-2 ; anti-Asiatic legislation, 
208,211; joins Union, 481 ; special 
subsidy, 486 ; special payment, 
488 ; language question, 489; naval 
contribution, 316; views on Per-
n1anent Commission of Imperial 
Conference, 563. 
Natal Act (No. 1 of 1897), model of 
immigration restriction legislation, 
193. 
Natal Native Affairs Commission, 
46. 
Nathan, Col. Sir M., R.E., G.C.M.G., 
action as Go,rernor of Natal in 
1907' 44, 45. 
Nationalist party in Union of Soutl1 
Africa (successfully prevent pay-
ment of equal amounts to Soutl1 
African expeditionary force in 
Europe and to force in East Africa, 
on racial grout1ds, Ti1nes, Feb. 17, 
1916), defeat at election of 1915, 
18; dangerous attitude of, 351 11. 1; 
512 n. 1. 
Nationality, 244-60. 
Native Affairs Con1mission of South 
Africa, 1903-5, 184, 483. 
Native affairs, mistnanagement of, in 
Natal, 46. 
Native Land Act, 1909 (amended by 
No. 34 of 1912; Cd. 6863, p. 94), 
of New Zealand, 178-7. 
Native Lar1d Court, in New Zealand, 
powers of, 173-7. 
Native land titles in Unitecl States, 
175. 
Native question in South Africa, 
180-9. 
Native rac€s, treatment of, 168-89. 
Naturalization, 244-60. 
Naval Agreement of 1887 with Aus-
tralasian Colonies, 316 ; rene\ved 
in 1897, 316; modified in 1902, 
316, 317. 
Naval Defence, 310-39. 
Na·val Defence> conference proposed 
to be held in 1913 or 1914, 325, 
326. 
Naval Disc-ipline (Dominiol~ Naval F~orces) 
Act, 1911, 314. 
Naval strategy, pri11ciples of, 330-6. 
Navigation Bill of the Commonwealtl1 
(now Act No.4 of 1913), 215, 228, 
229. 
Navigation Conference of 1907, 215, 
216. 
Negotiation of treaties for Do·minions, 
262-70. 
Ne temere decree, effect in Canada, 
455. 
Nether lands, trade with Canada, 
concess~ons as to, 271 ; consulta-
tion of Dominions before rene"\\,.al 
of arbitration treaty "\vith, 288; 
representation in case of Vondel in 
Soutl1 Australia, 423. 
N eutralit:y· of Dominions, proposed 
by Royal Commission in Victoria 
in 1870, 23, 294, 340 ; no power to 
declare, in Doil1it1i011 Parliament, 
122. 
New Brunswick, redistribution 
(Legislature now of 48 members; 
Act 1912, c. 5), 393 ; divorce juris-
diction, 456. 
N e\vfoundland : financial irregulari-
ties, 43 ; prerogative of mercy, 
66, 69 ; royal instructions, 118 ; 
reservation of bills, 144 ; dis-
appearance ofBoethucs, 168; copy-
right, 242 ; naval contribution, 
317 ; aid in war, 34 7 ; relations to 
Canada, 394, 396, 492, 493 ; altera-
tion of constitution, 416, 417; 
disputes with Imperial Govern-
ment on fishery questions 'vitl1 
France and United States, 81, 128, 
14 7, 150, 283, 284 ; deadlock in 
1908- 9, 116; commercial conces-
sions obtained for, in Portuguese 
treaty, 296 n. 1. 
Ne\v Guinea, proposal of Queensland 
to annex, 54. 
New Hebrides, British policy regard-
ing, 286, 287, 580, 581. 
New Soutl1 Wales : prerogative of 
mercy, 67, 68; deputy governor, 
73; royal instructions, 118; reser-
• 
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vation of bills, 144 ; aborigines, 
179 ; naval force, 312, 318 ; im-
migration restriction, 193 ; two 
Houses, 398-400; free trade lean-
ings, 535. 
New Zealand, retention of, in British 
waters, 326. 
New Zealand: disturbances in 1913, 
51 n. 1; prerogative of mercy, 35, 
66; Deputy Governor, 71-3; royal 
instructions, 118 ; reservation of 
bills, 144 ; indemnity act of 1867 
disallo\ved, 162; ilnmigration bill 
not allo\ved, 193 ; anti-Asiatic 
measures, 201, 202; merchant 
shipping legislation, 82, 215, 222-8, 
232, 559; copyright, 242; custon1s, 
261, 262; military defence, 304, 
305; naval defence, 315, 319 ; 
attitude to Committee of Imperial 
Defence, 326; services in war, 337, 
34 7 ; wishes in settlement, 362 ; 
judicial appeals, 375, 382 ; relation 
of two Houses, 411-15 ; High Com-
missioners, 538 ; question of Resi-
dent Minister, 543, 54 7; uniformity 
of patents, trademarks, and copy-
right law, 558. 
Nolle prosequi available to prevent 
criminal proceedings against a 
. Governor, 37. 
North American fisheries, dispute 
'vith United States over, 17. 
North American Indians, treatment 
of, 169-72. 
North-West, rebellion of 1885, 302. 
Northern territory, aborigines in, 
179, 180. 
Norway, treaty of 1913 with, 268. 
Nova Scotia, redistribution, 393 ; 
two Houses, 417 ; joins Union, 
420 ; divorce jurisdiction, 456 ; 
\vorkmen's compensation legisla-
tion, 558. 
Nicaragua, treaty of 1905 with, 268. 
Nicholson, Prof. J. Shield, A Project 
of Empire, 536. 
Niobe, purchased by Canadian Govern-
ment, 320, 338. 
Norfolk !Bland (administered by 
Commonwealth under Act No. 15 
of 1913), included in Comnlon-
""ealth for purposes of certain 
Acts (4 & 5 Geo. V, cc. 17, 50; 
5 & 6 Geo. V, c. 21), 235 n. 2. 
O'Connor, Ron. R., Justice of Com-
mon,vealth High Court (1903-12), 
357, 460. 
Occupation- not annexation -of 
German territory by Dominion 
forces, 54, 361, 362. 
Ojibeway Indians, surrender of lands 
in Canada, 457. 
Old Age Pension Acts, exclusion of 
certain Asiatics from benefit of, 
199. 
Onslow, Earl of, G.C.M.G., Governor 
of New Zealand, Under Secretary 
of State for the Colonies (1901-3), 
suggests in 1891 change in royal 
instructions regarding duties of 
Governors as to pardons, 65 ; 
relation to Cabinet when in charge 
of Colonial Office, 545. 
Ontario, boundary dispute with 
Quebec and Manitoba, 379; redis-
tribution of seats, 393 ; language 
question, 491 ; increase of area in 
1912, 492; work1nen's compensa-
tion, 558; re-enact1nent ofmeasure 
affecting chartered accountants 
after disallo,vance, 436 n. 3. 
Orange Free State : native question, 
181-7; British Indians excluded 
from, 205, 209, 213; joins Union, 
481; language question, 489 ; edu-
cation controversy, 490 ; special 
subsidy, 486. 
Order of Saint Michael and Saint 
George, 55, 60. 
Order in Council of 1907, overriding 
la\v of Newfoundland, 69, 148, 284, 
285. 
Orders in Council, procedure by, in 
Dominions, 91, 92. 
Orders in Council under Colonial Naval 
Defence Act 1865 no'\v obsolete, 312, 
313. 
Ottawa Conference of 1894, 264, 531. 
Otter, Maj. Gen. Sir William Dillon, 
K.C.B., C. V.O., report on defence 
forces of Canada, 307 n. 1. 
Ottoman Dominions, extra-territorial 
jurisdiction in, over British sub-
Jects (abrogated pro tempore by war), 
127. 
0\vnership of land by British Indians, 
restriction on, in South Africa, 205. 
Paardeberg, Canadian valour at, 343. 
Pacific, relation of C()mmonwealth 
'vith, 444. 
Pacific cable, 537. 
Papineau, revolt in Lower Canada 
under, 13. 
Papua, included with Norfolk Island 
in Commonwealth for certain pur-
• 
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poses ( 4 & 5 Geo. V, cc. 17, 50; 5 & 
6 Geo. V, c. 21), 235 n. 2. 
Paraguay, Dominions freed from 
obligations if desired under exist-
ing treaty by treaty of 1908 with, 
268. 
Pardon, action of Sir A. Musgrave in 
1888 as to, 28 ; delegation of pre-
rogative to Governor, 65-71. 
Parker, Sir Gilbert, · Bart., views on 
question of interference of Imperial 
Government as to 1nartial law in 
Natal, 78. 
Parkin, Dr. G. R., views on Colonial 
status, 528. 
Pass la,vs, affecting natives in South 
Africa, 183. 
Pa!:;sport, form of, issued to natura-
lized British subjects, 245. 
Patents, uniformity of legislation as 
to ( cf. Queensland Act No. 25 of 
1912; Cd. 6863, p. 71 ), 557, 558. 
Paterson, Hon. W., joint negotiator 
of arrangement as to trade with 
United States in 1911, 272. 
Payn1ent of n1embers of Parliament 
in Dominions (Responsible Govern-
ment, i. 503, 504 : now in N e'v 
South Wales £500 with £250 extra 
for Leader of Opposition, by Act 
No. 19 of 1912; in Tasmania £200 
with £100 extra for Leader of 
Opposition, by Act No. 49 of 1913 ; 
$1,600 in British Columbia by Act 
1913, c. 13), effect on duration of 
Parliament. 93. 
I 
Peace Commission Treaty of 1914 
'vith United States, position of 
Dominions under, 287. 
Peace Conference, position of Domi-
. nions at any, 365~ 366. 
Peake, Hon. A. H., defeat of his 
ministry (1912-15) in South Aus-
tralia, 4 79. 
Pearce, Senator Hon. G. F., Minister of 
Defence in Commonwealth (1910-
13; 1914- ), efforts to secure satis-
factory scheme of defence for the 
Commonwealth, 346. 
Pearl fishery of Australia, proposed 
exclusion of Japanese from, 201. 
Pecuniary Claims Convention with 
United States of 1910 (Parl. Pap., 
Cd. 6201 ), 287. 
Peel, Rt. Hon. Sir Robert, accepts 
responsibility for dismissal of Lord 
Melbourne's Goveriunent, 89. 
Peerages conferred for Colonial ser-
vices (that of Sir T. Shaughnessy 
'vas rendered possible by the pro-
vision of 4 and 5 Geo. V, c. 17, 
(adopted by Canada, Acts 1914 
sess. 1, c. 44 and sess. 2, c. 7) provid-
ing for imperial naturalization, 61. 
Pelagic sealing discussion and treaty 
of 1911, 522, 523. 
Perley, Hon. Sir G., K.C.M.G., Hono-
rary Minister in Dominion Cabinet, 
represents Canadian Government 
in United Kingdom, 246 n. 1, 345, 
543. 
Permanent Commission of Imperial 
Conference suggested by Mr. Lyttel-
ton, 562-71. 
Permanent officials of Colonial Office, 
influence on policy of, 14. 
Persia, extra-territorial jurisdiction 
over British subjects in, 127. 
Personal responsibility of Governor 
in certain criminal cases, objec-
tions to, 68, 69. 
Personal union of Scotland and 
England, 512, 513. 
Petitions of Right, against Colonial 
Governments, 157-9. 
Petitions to the Cro,vn from subjects 
in Do1ninions, 156-8. 
Philip, Hon. R., Pre1nier of Queens-
land (1907-8), 42. 
Philipps, Sir Owen, K.C.l\LG., M.F., 
undertakes management of Union 
Castle Steamship Co. on retirement 
of Messrs. Donald Currie & Co. in 
view of anti-rebate policy of Union 
Governn1ent, 556. 
Philomel, taken over in 1914 J;y Ne\V 
Zealand Government and placed 
at disposal of Admiralty under Act 
No. 45 of 1913, 327. 
Piddington, A. B., K.C. (now Chair-
man of Interstate Commission), 
\vithdra'-'TS from appointment as 
Justice of the Commonwealth High 
Court, 357, 461. 
Plenipotentiaries, representation of 
Dominions by, at certain con-
ferences, 278-80 ; suggested repre-
sentation thus at Hague Con-
ferences, 289-94. 
Political treaties, position of Domi-
nions under, 281-300. 
Pollak, Mr., one of leaders of Indians 
in South Africa, imprisonment of, 
208. 
Pollock, Rt. Hon. Sir F., Bart., on 
status of the Dominions, 506 ; 
views on ~rnperial Council, 562. 
Pope, Sir Joseph, K.C.l\LG., I.S.O., 
mission to Japan regarding Japa-
nese immigration in to Canada, 193. 
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Portuguese territory, expulsion of 
Indians from Transvaal into, 204; 
employment of natives from, in 
Transvaal, 54. 
Portuguese treaty of commerce, ad:-
vantages secured for N e'vfound-
land, 296; necessary legislation to 
enable its execution carried before 
ratification, 283. 
Postal voting in the Common,vealth 
(abolished by Act No. 17 of 1911), 
abortive proposal to restore in 1914, 
106, 107. 
Powers, Hon. C., appointed in 1912 
a Justice of Common,vealth High 
Court, 357. 
Powers of Canadian Parliaments and 
Provincial Legislatures inter se, 
442, 443. 
Powers of Provincial Councils in 
South Africa, 484, 486, 487, 488. 
Precedence, in self-governing Domi-
nions and States, 52-6. 
Precious Minerals, ownership by 
Canadian Provinces of, 458. 
Preference to unionists, dispute as to 
in Co1nmonwealth, 107. 
Prerogative, Ne·wfoundland's consti-
tution given under, 141. 
Preston, W. R. T., for1nerly Trade 
Commissioner of Canada in Hol-
land, 297 n. 1. 
Price, Hon. T., Premier of South 
Australia (1905-9), views on local 
appoinbnent of Governors, 30, 31. 
Prime Minister, position in regard 
to honours, 58, 59 ; access of Domi-
nion ministers to, 322, 323, 542 ; 
consultation of, as to appointments 
of Governors of Dominions, 27 ; 
ex-officio President of Imperial 
Conference, 552. 
Prhne Ministers of Dominions, ex-
officio members of the Imperial 
Conference, 552. 
Prince Edward Island: land ques-
tion, 154; divorce jurisdiction not 
exercised, 458 ; redistribution, 393, 
395; fails to enter Union in 1867, 
420. 
Privy Council, possible use in decid-
ing disputes between Imperial 
and Dominion Governments, 165, 
166 ; reference of question of land 
ownership in Rhodesia to, 4 98. 
Privy Councillorship, may be be-
sto,ved on Dominion statesmen, 
59 ; Dominion Privy Councillor 
admitted to meeting of Imperial 
Cabinet, 545 ; Dominion judges as 
Privy Councillors and mem hers of 
the Judicial Com1nittee, 380, 381. 
Proportional voting in Tas1nania, 
bad results of, 408. 
Proposed union of Newfoundland 
with Canada, 492, 493 ; of Austra-
lia and New Zealand, 493, 494; of 
Rhodesia and the Union, 494, 495. 
Protector, placed by government of 
South Australia at disposal of 
Adn1iralty in 1900 for service in 
China, 312. 
Province of Canada, legislative 
powers of, 442, 443. 
Provincial Acts in Canada, no power 
of Governor-General or Lieutenant-
Governor to pardon offences against, 
except in second case by statute, 
71 ; Don1inion power to disallow, 
432-6 ; disuse of power of reserva-
tion, 153. 
Provincial Councils, position of, in 
South Africa, 483-9. 
Provincial Ordinances, no power of 
Governor-General to pa:rdon in 
respect of offences against, in South 
Africa, 71. -
Prussia, no responsible government 
in, 86. 
Public money, position of Governor 
with regard to, 39. 
Public works, control by Upper 
Houses of proposals for, in New 
South Wales, 399, 400 ; in Com-
mon,vealth, 399 n. 1 ; in South 
Australia, 403, 407 n. 1. 
Quebec, city of, imperial expenditure 
on defence of, 302. 
Quebec, dispute 'vith Privy Council, 
375-8 ; two Houses (lower House 
of 82 members by Act 1912, c. 9, 
franchise, c. 10), 417 ; language 
question, 490-2 ; redistribution, 
393 ; dismissal of Lieutenant-
Governor, 114, 432 ; addition of 
territory (Ungava), 492; boundary 
question with Ontario, 379. 
Queensland: prerogative of mercy, 
65 : royal instructions, 118 ; reser-
vation of bills, 144 ; aborigines, 
179, 180; naval force, 312 ; two 
Houses, 41, 400, 401 ; proposal to 
annex New Guinea, 54. 
Racial questions in Do1ninions, 191, 
192. 
Railway belt lands in British Cohun-
bia, legal position of, 455, 458. 
Railway contract in N e'vfoundland, 
• 
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request for Imperial interference 
in, 155. 
Raihvay gauge of Con1monwealth, 
necessity of uniformity for mili-
tary purposes, 44. 
Railways, government ownership of, 
in Dominions, 482. 
Rainbow, purchased by Canadian 
government, and placed at disposal 
of Admiralty in 1914, 320. 
Ratification of treaties, necessity of 
retaining control of, in hands of 
the Imperial ministry, 290, 293; 
asserted in 1895 by Lord Ripon, 
255. 
Rebellion in South Africa in 1914, 
348-51, 512 ; in Canada in 1870 
and 1885, 302; of Papineau, 13. 
Reciprocity, proposed conclusion of 
arrangement with United States by 
Canada in 1911, 272-6. 
Reciprocity treaty of 1854 with 
United States, 16, 281, 315, 520. 
Recruiting for Imperial forces in 
oversea Dominions, 309. 
Red River, rebellion of 1870, suppres-
sion of, by Imperial forces, 302. 
Redistribution of seats in House of 
Commons of Canada, 393 ; four 
seats retained by Prince Edward 
Island, 395. 
Referenda in Commonwealth in 1910 
and 1913, 104-6 ; proposed in 1915 
(despite failure of State Parlia-
ments to carry compro1nise of 1915 
into effect Mr. Hughes declines to 
proceed with, during war), 471, 
4 72; Governor-General declines to 
submit to people in 1914, 110-12. 
Ref'erendum as mode of legislation 
adopted in Canadian provinces, 
124-6. 
Reform of Privy Council as a judicial 
body, suggestions for, 379-88. 
Registered vessels, powers of Colonial 
legislature to legislate for, 214, 
233. 
Reid, Rt. Ron. Sir George H., M.P., 
High Commissioner for the Com-
nlonwealth of Australia (1909-15), 
estimate of political capacity, 540. 
Reid, Sir R. G., raihvay contract in 
Newfoundland, 155. 
Religion, no power in Common-
wealth to legislate as to, 446 ; 
question of in Canada, 456, 492. 
Republicanism in South Africa, 348, 
512 • 
Repugnancy of Dominion legislation, 
138-42. 
Reservation of Dominion Bills, 143-
5 ; of Provincial legislation in 
Canada, 153. 
Reserved powers of the States, Aus-
. tralian doctrine of, 449, 463 seq. 
Resident Minister, of Dominion to 
United Kingdom, 322, 323, 542-4, 
578, 579. 
Residual power, limits of exercise of 
in Canada, 452. 
Resignation of cro,vn office depen-
dent on permission, 146, 147. 
Responsible goYernment, origin of, 
13; prematurely granted to Natal, 
46; essential conditions of exis-
tence of, 83. 
Retaliation policy of Canada, 266. 
Revolutionary movement among 
British Indians in North America, 
196. 
Rhodesia, constitution and future of, 
493-8. 
Rich, Ron. G. E., Justice of Conl-
monwealth High Court (1912- ), 
357 ; views on interpretation of 
Commonwealth constitution, 221. 
Rioting in Natal in October, 1913, 
208; in Vancouver in 1907, 193; 
in Johannesburg in 1913 and 1914, 
47-9; in Ne'v Zealand in 1913, 
51 n. 1. 
Ripon, Marquess of, K.G., sets out 
policy of Imperial Government 
regarding treaty relations of 
Don1inions, 264-6. 
Roblin, Ron. Sir R., K.C.M.G., 
Premier of Manitoba, forced to 
resign in 1915 by Lieutenant-
Governor, 114, 115. 
Rogers, Ron. R., Minister of Interior 
of Canada, 197. 
Rogers, Sir Frederick, Bart., 
G.C.M.G. (afterwards Lord Blach-
ford), Under Secretary of State for 
the Colonies ( 1859-71 ), views on 
independence of the Colonies, 15 
n.l. 
Roman Catholic education question 
in Manitoba, 438, 439; marriage 
question concerning, 455 ; differ-
ence between Irish and French 
Canadian, 492. 
Roman Catholics in Canada, 492. 
Roman Dutch la,v, lack of familiarity 
of Privy Council with, 37 4. 
Ross, Ron. Sir George, K.C.M.G., 
leader of Liberal party in Canadian 
Senate, erroneous policy in ques-
tion of Naval Aid Bill, 322. 
Round Voyage, power of Common-
1 
INDEX 621 
'vealth Parliatnent to legislate for, 
218. 
Royal Commissions Act, 1914, of Com-
mon\vealth declared invalid by 
tT udicial Cornmittee ( criticistn by 
S. Jethro Brown, Law Quarterly 
Review, xxx. 301-11), 468, 469. 
Royal fan1ily, members of, as Gover-
nors, 33 ; precedence of, in Domi-
nions, 63. 
Royal Instructions to Governors, 26, 
27; amendment proposed, 118, 119. 
Royal Naval Reserve, branches of, in 
Dominions, 316, 317. 
Royal Proclamation of1763 regarding 
lands in Canada, 170, 457. 
Rumania, treaty of 1905 with, 268. 
Rupert's Land, incorporation in 
Canada, 18, 420. 
Russia, treaty of 1859 'vith, 267, 
268 ; alteration of State acts to 
secure compliance with terms of, 
425 ; commercial relations 'vith, 
536. 
Russo-Japanese war, effect on opinion 
in Australasia, 337. 
Safety of life at sea, Convention of 
1914 regarding, 231. 
Salisbury, Marquess of, K.G., action 
in Behring sea dispute in 1890, 
17, 522 ; on imperial federation 
requests (July 19, 1891) a definite 
scheme (United Empire, 1915, p. 269), 
501. 
Salus reipublicae suprema lex, 160. 
Salvador, freedom of Dominions ob-
tained by treaty of con1merce with, 
267, 268. 
Samoa, capture and occupation by 
N e\v Zealand forces, 54, 34 7 ; Bri-
tish policy regarding, 362, 580. 
Saskatchewan : initiative and re-
ferendum (legislature raised to 56 
members by Acts 1912, cc. 2-4), 
124, 125 ; lands question, 458 ; re-
distribution, 393; senators, 395 ; 
claim for grant of control of lands, 
437. 
Scad don, Ron. John, Premier of 
Western Australia (1911- ), sug-
gests selection of an Australian 
citizen as State Governor, 30; sup-
ports Mr. Holman's proposals for 
reform of federal constitution, 4 73 
n.l. 
Schreiner, Hon.W. P., Prime Minister 
of the Cape of Good Hope ( 1898-
1900), proposed neutrality of Cape 
in Boer War, 342. 
Scotland, serious decline in popula-
tion of, by emigration, 560. 
Secession of Dominions, possibility 
of. 148. 
' Second Ballot, repealed in 1913 in 
N e\V Zealand, 412 n. 2. 
Secretariat of Imperial Conference, 
question of d:uties and personnel, 
563-71 ; reluctance of Dominions 
to encourage communications 
through, 546 n. 1. 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
ex-officio member of Imperial Con-
ference, 552 ; provision for his 
acting as arbiter in disagreement 
between British Columbia and 
Canadian Government over land of 
Indians, 171. 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 
offer by Mr. Harcourt in 1912 of 
full and free access of Dominion 
Ministers to, 322, 323, 542, 584 ; 
proposal to put Dominions under 
charge of, 54 7, 548. 
Seely, Col. Rt. Hon. J. E. B., D.S.O., 
Under-Secretary of State for the 
Colonies (1908-11), views on 
martial law in Natal, 78. 
Seisin of ]and in N e\V Zealand 
vested in Crown by prerogative, 
173, 174. 
Selborne, Earl of, P.C., K. G., 
G.C.M.G., n1emorandum on South 
Africa written as Governor of the 
Transvaal (1905-10), 482; as First 
Lord of the Admiralty (1900-5), 
memorandum on naval policy, 
316. 
Self-governingDo1ninions, definition 
of, 9. 
Senate of Canada, alteration of con-
stitution of, by Imperial act, 394, 
395 ; constitutional relation to 
the House of Commons, 391-4. 
Senate of Com1nonwealth, constitu-
tional relation to lower House, 
106-9, 110-12. 
Senate of United States, constitu-
tional position in treaty matters, 
287, 288. 
Senators, election of, in Common-
'vealth, 4 75, 4 76 . . 
Senators, in Union of South Africa, 
qualifications of certain, 186, 187. 
Serbia, co1nmercial treaty of 1907 
with, 268. 
Shipping and Seamen Act, 1908 (New 
Zealand), 225-7. 
Siam, extra-territorial jurisdiction 
over British subjects in, 127. 
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Sikhs, grievances of, in British 
Columbia, 197. 
Sinclair, Ron. J. R., New Zealand 
member of Do1ninions Royal Com-
mission, views on proposal of an 
empire development fund, 573. 
Situs of assets of deceased testators, 
132, 133. 
Six Hatters, refusal of Common-
wealth emigration authorities to 
allow landing of, 533. 
Smartt, Hon. Sir Thomas W., 
K.C.M.G., Commissioner of Public 
Works in Cape of Good Hope 
(1900-2 ; 1904-8), proposals as to 
naval defence at Colonial Confer· 
ence of 1907, 317. 
Smuggling of Chinese immigrants 
into Australia, 199. 
Stnuts, General (appointed to com-
mand British forces-including 
large body of volunteers from 
South Africa-in East A.frica, Feb. 
1916), action in Jol1annesburg 
riots, 4 7, 48. 
Solomon, Ron. A. E., Premier of 
Ta.smania (1912-14), 98, 99. 
Solomon, . Ron. Sir Richard, High 
Commissioner for the Union of 
South Africa, commercial position 
of, insisted on by Mr. Malan at 
Imperial Conference of 1911, 537. 
Solotnon Islands, cession of German 
portion of, to United Ki11gdon1, 
362. 
Songhees Indian reserve (Canada 
Act, 1911, c. 24), case of, 169. 
South Australia : Deputy Governor, 
72, 73 ; royal instructions, 118 ; 
reservation of bills, 144 ; abori-
gines, 179 ; naval force, 312 ; two 
Houses, 39, 41, 402-8 ; '\Vork1nen~s 
. compensation, 558 ; boundary dis-
pute with Victoria, 379. 
South-West Africa, occ11pation of, by 
South African Union forces, 54, 
348, 349. 
Sovereign, powers in United Ki11g-
dom contrasted with those of a 
Governor, 86-91. 
Sovereign legislation, cl1aracteristics 
of, 120, 121. 
Spain, Sir A. Galt's co1nmercial 
negotiations for treaty with, 263 ; 
consultation of Dominions before 
rene,val of arbitration treaty with, · 
288. 
Squatting on lands by natives in 
Orange Free State, 185, 186 . . 
Staff Colleges at Camberley and 
Quetta, attendance of Dominion 
officers at, 310. 
State Parliaments in Australia, 
powers of, 444-6. 
State-owned Atlantic cable, abortive 
proposal for, 555. 
Steamship services, proposed im-
. provement of, 555, 556. 
Stephen, Rt. Hon. Sir James, K.C.B., 
Under Secretary of State for tl1e 
Colonies (1836-4-7), view in favour 
of independence of colonies, 15 
n. 1. 
Steyn, ex-President, inaction in con-
nexion with rebellion of 1914, 
348. 
Stout, Rt. Ron. Sir Robert, Chief 
Justice of Ne"T Zealand, views on 
native land rigl1ts, 175-7; objec-
tion to Judicial Committee of 
Privy Council, 375 ; represents 
Dominion on, 383 ; dislike of Im-
perial Government, 512. 
Strathcona and Mour1t Royal, Lord, 
G.C.M.G., High Commissioner of 
Canada (1896-1914), 61, 540. 
Strickland, Sir Gerald, Count della 
Catena, G.C.M.G., Governor of 
Tasmania (1904-9), Western Aus-
tralja (1909-13), a11d New South . 
Wales (1913- ), views on prero-
gative of mercy in capital cases, 
67 ; successful administration of, 
92 ; Government House, Sydney, 
restored to, as token of appreciation 
of services, 431. 
Sudan expedition of 1884-5, assis-
tance rendered by Ca11ada and 
Ne'v South Wales, 500. 
Suez Canal dues, reduction of, 559, 
576. 
Suga.r industry in Commonwealtlt, 
exclusion of coloured labotlr from, 
on payment of co1npensation to 
those with vested rights, 201. 
Sunday observance, Provincial power 
as to, 458. 
Supply, ·should be obtained before 
dissolution, 96, 97 ; exceptional 
cases, 41 n. 1. 
Supreme Chief, Governor of Natal's 
position as, l 82. 
Surrender by Imperial Government 
of power of requiring reservation 
of Dominion bills and of disallow-
at1ce of acts, suggested, 149-51. 
Surveyors' Conference of 1911, abor-
tive, 548, 554. 
Suspending clauses required by cer-
tain Acts (57-58 Viet. c. 60, ss. 785, 
' 
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736 ; 53 and 54 Viet. c. 27, s. 4 ), 
145. 
Swaziland, scheme of government of, 
on merger in Union of South 
Africa, 187- 9. 
Sweated labour, danger of, in Canada, 
258, 259. 
S\veden, freedom of 'vithdrawal of 
Do1ninions from old treaties of 
commerce secured by treaty of 1911 
with, 268. 
Switzerland, commercial treaty with, 
regarding position of Dominions, 
257 ; consultation of Dominions 
before renewal of arbitration 
treaty with, 288. 
Taft, ex-President W., indiscretion 
of, as regards commercial arrange-
ment between Canada and United 
States, 275. 
Tariff Commissions, 570, 571; pro-
posals of Sir R. Borden's govern-
ment for setting up a Tariff Com-
mission in Canada, 392. 
Tariff questions, mode of considering, 
571. 
. Tarte, Ron. I., forces resignation of 
Sir Hector Langevin from Domi-
nion Govern1nent, 32. 
Taschereau, Rt. Hon. Sir H. E., Chief 
Justice of Canada, formerly mem-
ber of Judicial Committee, 380. 
Tasmania: prerogative of mercy, 66, 
67 ; deputy governor, 73 ; royal 
instructions, 118 ; reservation of 
bills, 144; aborigines, 179; immi-
gration bill, 199, 201 ; two Houses, 
408, 409 ; constitutional dispute 
between Governor and ministry 
in 1914, 98-104. 
Taxation of land values, proposed 
adoption of, as sole basis of taxation 
in Transvaal, 489. 
Taxation of salaries of federal officers, 
legality of, 44 7, 448. 
Tennyson, Lord, G.C.M.G., Governor-
General of the Common wealth 
(1902-4), represents Common-
"\Vealth at Copyright Conference of 
1910, 568. 
Territorial lin1i tation of Dotn inion 
legislation, 127-38. 
1.'haw, Harry, criminal lunatic, ex-
pulsion of, from Canada, 300. 
Tho1npson, Rt. Ron. Sir John, 
G: C.M.G., Prime Minister of Canada 
(1891-4), dispute with Imperial 
government as to copyright, 142, 
239, 240. 
Tin plate manufacturers, protest 
against proposed arrangement be-
tween United States and Canada, 
275. 
Titanic disaster, summoning of inter-
. national convention on safety of 
life at sea as outcome of, 231. 
Tonga, acquisition by United King-
dom of all Gertnan claims in re-
spect of, in 1899, 362. 
Torts, position of Governor as regards 
liability for, 36, 37. 
To,vnship Amendment Act, of Trans-
vaal, 213. 
Trade agents, of Canada and Aus-
tralia, in foreign countries, 296,297. 
Trade and con1merce power of Domi-
nion in Canada, 436. 
Trade and commercial treaties, 261-
80. 
Trade Commissioner of New South 
Wales in Far East, views on Aus-
tralian trade with Japan, 1!>4. 
Trade Marks, uniformity of legisla-
tion as to, 557, 558. 
Trade Marks Act, 1905, of Common-
wealth, invalidity of part vii of, 
464. 
Trading Licences, grant to British 
·Indians in South Africa, 204, 213. 
Trading "\Vith the enemy, Dominion 
Government authorized to license, 
352. 
Transcontinental railway in Canada, 
437; in Australia (Commonwealth 
Act No. 7 of 1911), 440. 
Transvaal, evasion of law by govern-
ment of, in 1910, 42, 43 ; use of 
imperial forces against rioters in, 
4 7, 48 ; native question, 181-7 ; 
British Indians, 202-13; joins 
Union, 481; languagequestion,489. 
Transvaal Republic, treatn1ent of 
British Indians by, 203, 587, 588. 
Treaties, application to Canada, 421, 
422 ; to Australia, 425, 426 ; obli-
gation of, as affecting legislation, 
120, 121, 425 ; certain treaties 
must be observed by colonial legis-
latures 'vith regard to coasting 
trade legislation, 214; bills con-
trary to, must be reserved in Aus-
tralian States and Newfoundland, 
144. 
Treaty of 1783 with United States, 
520. 
Treaty of 1814 "\Vith United States, 
520. 
Treaty of 1818 with United States, 
148. 
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Treaty of 1842 with United States, 
520. 
Treaty of 1854 with United States, 
16, 281, 315, 520. 
Treaty of 1871 with U11ited States, 
16, 128, 281, 315, 520. 
Treaty of 1888 with United States, 
128, 281, 286, 520, 537. 
Treaty of 1862 with Belgium, 264, 
266, 537. 
Treaty of 1865 with Germany, 264-, 
266, 537. 
Treaty of 1893 with France, 263, 
537. 
Treaty of 1911 V\~itll .Japan, 255, 256. 
Treaty of 1913 with Japan, 270, 274. 
Treaty of W ai tangi i11 1840, 173, 17 4, 
177. 
Treaty po,ver, suggested concession 
of, to Do1ninions, 270-6. 
Trusts ar1d Monopolies, CommOil-
wealth referendum as to, 105, 106. 
Tryon, Rear-Admiral, 11egotiates 
naval agreement with Australasian 
colonies, 316. 
Tupper, Right Hon. Sir Charles, 
Bart., G.C.M.G., Privy Coltncillor-
ship co11ferred on, 59 ; negotiates 
treaty of 1888 with United States, 
281, 521, 537 ; tries to avert fall of 
Sir H. Langevi11, 32 ; protests 
against Lord Dufl'erin's proposal 
to dismiss Sir J. Macdona.Id, 113, 
114 ; quarrels \vith Lord Aberdeen, 
114, 115; secures withholding of · 
assent to Car1adian bill reducing 
salary of Governor-General, 151; 
Prime Minister of Canada i11 1896, 
240, 337 ; negotiates treaty 'vitlt 
France, 263, 537 ; votes against 
colleagues at a conference on sub-
marine cables in 1893, 292 ; vie'v 
on development of Canada, 304 ; 
supports sending of aid in Boer 
'var, 343; secures building of 
transcontinental rail\vay to British 
Columbia, 437; views on imperial 
federation by means of trade, 531 ; 
insists on representation by 
minister at London, 54 7 ; political 
assistance to his government, 537. 
Under Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, proposed creation of t~·o 
posts of, 564. 
Unfair criticism of Imperial Govern-
ment for party purposes in Domi-
nions, 10, 79, 328, 329; in tl1e 
matter of Samoa, 362. 
Uniform design of stamps for empire 
554. ' 
Unifortnity in law of workmen's 
compensation (cf. New Brunswick 
Act, 1914, c. 34; Manitoba, 1913 
cc. 4, 11 ; Nova Scotia, 1913, c. 4 7 ! 
Solt th Australia No. 1053 ; Wester~ 
Australia, No. 69 of1912; Victoria, 
No. 2496; New Zealand, No. 70 of 
1913; Common,vealth, No. 29 of 
1912 ; Union, No. 25 of 1914, 
Ontario, 1914, c. 25), 558. 
Unio11 of South Africa: prerogative 
of mercy, 69, 70 ; deputy of 
Gover11or-General, 72 ; royal in-
structions, 118 ; reservation of 
bills, 145 ; native races, 180-9 ; 
anti-Asiatic 1neasures, 202-213 ; 
military defence, 306, 307 ; aid in 
'var, 348-51 ; war measures, 358-
60 ; vie,vs on settlement, 362, 363 ; 
judicial appeals,· 373, 374, 382; 
alteration of constitution, 415, 416 ; 
form of union, 480-98 ; tariff pre-
ference, 535, 536; vie\v as to 
resident minister, 325, 543, 54 7 ; 
deportation of labour leaders, 131, 
132. 
Union Castle Steamship Co1npany, 
alteration of 1nanagement and of 
rebate system as result of policy 
of Union governme11t, 556. 
United States: designs against Cana-
dian independence, 13, 15, 16 ; 
claims dominion over Behring 
sea and seals, 17 ; trade relations 
witlt Canada, 271, 272 ; blackmail 
in copyright matters, 238; protest 
in case of crirninal Gardiner, 70; 
alteration of fiscal policy, 535 ; 
feeling in New Zealand against, 
owing to failure to protest aga.inst 
invasion of Belgium 322 n. 1 ; 
constitution of Canada and AllS-
tralia in relation to, 441. 
U 11ited States Harter Act, regulatio11 
of carriage of goods at sea, 234. 
Universal Pen11y Postage, 555. 
Unskilled labour, restrictions on 
immigration into Canada, 195. 
Upper Houses, relations to lower 
Houses in respect of fir1ance, 39-
41 ; relations in Canada, 391-5 ; 
in Commonwealth, 396; in New 
South Wales, 398-400; in Queens-
land, 400, 401 ; in Victoria, 401, 
402 ; South Australia, 402-8 ; 'Tas-
mania, 408, 409 ; Western Aus-
tralia, 4.09-11; Ne'v Zeala11d, 411-
15; tl1e Union of Soutl1 Africa, 
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415, 416; Newfoundland, 4-16, 417; 
Nova Scotia and Quebec, 417. 
Uruguay, treaty of commerce 'vith, 
267 ; wrongs of Canadian sailors in 
redressed by Imperial action, 19. 
Van Rensburg, effect of his vaticina-
tions on de la Rey, 349. 
Veto, i.e. negative voice of Governor, 
148. 
Venezuela boundary question, 16. 
Vice-Admirals, Governors of States in 
Australia are, 461, 462. 
Victm·ia, war vessel of Victorian 
government, 312. 
Victoria: Deputy-Governor, 73; royal 
instructions, 118 ; reservation of 
bills, 144 ; aborigines, 179 ; naval 
defence, 310, 311, 318; two Houses, 
401 ; workrnen's compensation, 
558; boundary dispute 'vi th South 
Australia, 379 ; policy in favour of 
tariff preference and protection, 
535; re-election of ministers (abo-
lished by Act No. 2578), 94. 
Victorian Royal Commission on 
federation, 23, 284, 340. 
Visits by Dominion Ministers, 560. 
Vogel, Hon. Sir Julius, l{.C.M.G., 
Colonial Treasurer of N e'v Zealand, 
views on Imperial federation, 537. 
Vondel, case of in South Australia 
raises constitutional issue of States 
'D. Con1n1onwealth, 423, 424. 
Wallach, case of in Australia ( cf. 
decision as to detention of natura-
lized British subject under regula-
tions made under the Defence of the 
Realm (Consolidation) Act, 1914, s. 1 
(1), the validity of detention being 
upheld by the Divisional Court in 
R. v. Halliday, ex parte Zadig, Times, 
Jan. 21, and by the Court of Appeal, 
ibid., Feb. 10, 1916), 357, 358. 
War and peace, limits of Governor's 
power to declare, 53; general prin-
ciples regarding, 339-66. 
War legislation in Canada, 352-4 ; 
in Queensland, 353 ; in New South 
Wales, 353-7; in the Common-
wealth, 357-8; in the Union, 358-
60. 
War of 1812 with United States, 16. 
\Var of Secession, in United States, 
British attitude in, 16. 
War Precautions Act, 1914, of Common-
'vealth, 357, 358. 
War, relation of Dominions to United 
• 
Kingdom as to, 53, 54, 339-66, 
501-6, 581-3. 
Ward, Rt . . Hon. Sir Joseph, Prime 
Minister of New Zealand (1906-12}, 
unpopularity of baronetcy con-
ferred on, in 1911, 56; resigns 
office in 1912, 117, 546; naval 
policy, 327, 338 n. 1, 502, 503 ; 
secures appointn1ent of a New 
Zealand judge to the Privy Coun-
cil, 381, 382, 385; views on rela-
tions of two Houses in the Domi-
nions, 412; proposal of ilnperial 
federation in 1911 at Imperial 
Conference, 501-4, 580; vie\vs on 
reconstitution of Colouial Office, 
564. 
Warlike operations carried out by 
Dominion governments, 53, 54, 
347, 348. 
Warrants for expenditure of money 
without legislative authority, sign-
ing by Governor of, 40. 
Watson, Hoa. J. C., Prime Minister 
of Commonwealth in 1904, no\V 
controller of Labour party in 
Commonwealth, 108 n. 1, 346, 476. 
Watt, Hon. \V. A., Premier of Vic-
toria (1912-14), clever manoouvre 
in 1913, 94. 
Way, Rt. Hon. Sir Samuel, Chief 
Justice of South Australia (1896-
1915), views on position of Deputy 
of Governor, 73 ; appointed to 
Privy Council in 1897, 380. 
Western Australia : proposals of 
government in favour of local ap-
pointment of Governors, 30, 31 ; 
relation of t'vo Houses, 39, 41, 
409-11 ; prerogative of mercy, 67 ; 
deputy Governor, 73 ; royal in-
structions, 118 ; initiative and 
referendum, 126, 410; reservation 
of bills, 144; aborigines, 179; im-
migration bill, 199; intercolonial 
rail way, 440, 441 ; \Vorkmen's com-
pensation, 558. 
Western Canada, set-back in, 195. 
White Australia, ideal of, 191, 587. 
White superior to black in South 
Africa, a formal precept of the 
Boer Republics and Church, 182. 
White,vay,Rt. Hon. SirW., K.C.M.G., 
Premier of Newfoundland (1878-
84 ; 1889-94 ; 1895-7), 154, 155. 
Wido'v, national status of, 251. 
Wife and child desertion by emi-
grants, 560. 
Williams, Rt. Hon. Sir Joshua, Jus-
tice of Supreme Court of New 
626 INDEX 
Zealand, views on native land 
question, 177 ; first representative 
(1914-15) of Dominion on Privy 
Council, 385. 
Williams, Sir Ralph, K.C.M.G., 
Governor of Newfoundland, de-
clines to dismiss his Minister of 
Justice, 116; expected to use dis-
cretion as to prerogative of mercy, 
67 n. 1. 
Wireless Telegraphy Act, 1904, 230. 
Wireless Telegraphy Conference, 569. 
Wireless telegraphy, regulation of 
use at sea, 230, 231. 
.Witwatersrand Disturbances (1913) 
Commission, 48. 
•• 
Workn1en's compensation law, uni-
formity in, 558. 
Yiddish, a European language in 
South African legislation, 202, 207 
n. 4. 
Yiddish-speaking immigrants, 258, 
283. 
Young, Mr., Premier of Nova Scotia, 
accepts office on conditions laid 
down by Lieutenant-Governor, 
102. 
Zululand, declaration in 1907 of 
martial law in, 44-6 ; surrender 
of government of, to Natal, 81. 
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